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ABSTRACT 
The objective of this thesis is to determine whether European firms exhibit firm- 
specific optimal capital structure solutions. If the capital structure of the firm is 
irrelevant then the finance manager should concentrate upon the maximisation of the 
returns from the firm's investment projects alone. Alternatively, if the capital structure 
is relevant then the finance manager should strive to attain the capital structure which 
minimises the cost of capital to the firm, and thus maximises the value of the firm. 
The firm is positioned within three environments: the macroeconomic environment, the 
taxation environment and the corporate environment, and it is with respect to these 
environments that optin-ýising behaviour may be measured. A variety of conventional 
and modem econometric techniques are employed to study the interaction of the 
capital structure with the environments within which it is placed to determine whether 
behaviour of an optimising nature may be ascertained. To allow for as comprehensive a 
perspective as possible, the processes which determine capital structure policies are 
tested and modelled across average, marginal, dynamic and long-run time-frames, to 
enable operational capital structure policies to be distinguished from strategic capital 
structure policies of the firm. 
The conclusions suggest that there exists a behavioural dichotomy between larger and 
smaller firms, based upon differences in the sophistication of information systems 
present within the finance function of the firm. Larger firms engage in full-optimisation 
behaviour at the strategic level by targeting the long-run path of the capital structure 
ratio in relation to key taxation, macroeconomic, and corporate environment variables, 
endo-exogenous interaction effects, and consideration of the effects of the two-way 
causal interrelationship between the capital structure ratio and the corporate 
environment. Smaller firms engage in a form of bounded-optimisation behaviour at the 
strategic level, targeting the capital structure ratio upon the norm for the industry to 
which the firm belongs, upon the capital structure ratio of larger firms, or on the basis 
of some other targeting criterion. For both larger and smaller firms, departures from 
the long-run path of the capital structure ratio, determined by the strategic capital 
structure policy, are caused by operational capital structure policy adjustments. The 
operational capital structure policy of both larger and smaller firms is determined 
mainly by those exogenous factors which determine the explicit costs of finance, 
although endo-exogenous interaction effects and the two-way causal interrelationship 
between the capital structure ratio and the corporate environment also exert an 
influence. 
Overall, the theoretical and empirical analyses of the European research provide very 
strong support for the existence of firm-specific optimal capital structure solutions. 
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CHAPTERI 
INTRODUCTION 
"Finance has changed from primarily a descriptive study to one that 
encompasses rigorous analysis and normative theory; from a field that 
was concerned primarily with the procurement of funds to one that 
includes the management of assets, the allocation of capital, and the 
valuation of the firm in the overall market; and from a field that 
emphasized external analysis of the firm to one that stresses decision 
making within the firm. " (Van Horne (1986), p. 5) 
Economists such as Van Home (1986) and Jensen and Smith (1984) argue that before 
the 1950's, the finance area was defined by the financial instruments, institutions and 
procedures which characterised it, whereas the theoretical underpinning of the area 
was almost entirely prescriptive and plagued by logical inconsistencies. Disillusionment 
with this state of affairs encouraged economists to search for a more objective and 
scientific means of assessment of the corporate financing decisions of the firm, spurred 
on by the rapid development of new methods and techniques in economics, and the 
desire of finance managers for analytical techniques to enable more sophisticated 
monitoring and control of their firms. Up until the 1950's, questions concerning 
important finance issues such as the optimal mix of debt and equity finance that the 
firm should employ remained unanswered, apart from the contribution of a number of 
extremely crude models. Some argued that the mix of the firm's finances was of no 
consequence to the firm and that finance managers should employ their energies to the 
maximisation of the returns on their investment projects rather than consideration of 
the financing mix. Others argued that the mix of the firm's finances were of great 
importance to the firm, as the finance manager could maximise the value of the firm by 
minin-ýising the average cost of its capital, thus producing an optimal capital structure 
solution. 
The watershed in finance theory came in the form of the theoretical models of 
Modigliani and Nfiller (1958,1961), which revolutionised thinking in the two most 
important fields of finance: capital structure theory and the theory of dividend policy. 
The central message of these models was that the debt and dividend policies of the firm 
2 
did not affect its valuation, given assumptions such as efficient capital markets and the 
absence of imperfections. However, although the models were to provide the 
framework for theoretical and empirical enquiry of the subsequent decades, the 
assumptions underpinning them were extremely restrictive and the relevance of either 
the capital structure or dividend policy of the firm appeared to be very sensitive to the 
assumptions made. Subsequent papers on the subject of capital structure theory sought 
to determine whether the relevance of the funding mix gave rise to a valuation effect 
when the assumptions were relaxed, particularly those assumptions related to taxation. 
The key capital structure models to follow were to correctly introduce corporate taxes 
(Modighani and Miller, 1963) and corporate taxes in conjunction with personal taxes 
(Miller, 1977), proposing that the firm's capital structure was relevant, and then 
irrelevant., respectively. More recent research has concentrated on studying the effects 
of various market imperfections and the impact of various external factors on the 
corporate capital structure, representing to some extent a movement away from all- 
encompassing general equilibrium models towards the study of the influence of 
separate capital structure determinants. New developments in econometrics within the 
last decade mean that finance research has now entered a new phase whereby the 
interactions and processes which characterise financial markets may be examined to a 
far greater level of complexity, thus facilitating entirely new perspectives on the 
determination of the corporate capital structure and enabling the question of capital 
structure optimality to be re-examined. 
The main objective of this research is thus to determine whether firm-level optimal 
capital structure solutions exist for European quoted firms, and if they do, what are the 
most important determinants, whether direct or indirect, of such optimal solutions. The 
question of optimality is best addressed by studying the relationship between the 
corporate capital structure decision of the firm and the determinants of that decision, 
because consideration of the question of optimality necessarily requires certain points 
of reference. Examination of the relationship between measures of the corporate 
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capital structure and capital structure determinants (which represent the points of 
reference) enable examination of the processes which generate the capital structure 
policies of the firm. Study of the capital structure policies thus reveals whether firms 
appear to engage in optimising behaviour, or whether the capital structure decision 
appears to be of only marginal importance to the individual firm. 
The theoretical work and empirics of this research are undertaken from the perspective 
of an economist, a perspective which has implications for the approach employed. The 
theoretical work is developed on a conceptual basis, by means of the creation of a 
series of theoretical constructs, which are drawn together to produce a model of 
European corporate capital structure determination which is hopefully both coherent 
and intuitive to the non-specialist reader. The theoretical discussion neither becomes 
too dominated by detailed accounting issues, nor is it framed by strict mathematical 
representations of the constructs developed. The empirical models which underlie the 
theoretical development of the research are generally intended to be illustrative, rather 
than to be employed as high-powered predictive and meticulously specified models. 
Furthermore, the econometric techniques used are described with respect to their 
employment as research tools, and thus such descriptions are not intended to represent 
elaborate expositions of the underlying econometrics. However, each method is fairly 
comprehensively described and discussed with respect to its use in applied econometric 
research as the research progresses. 
The style of the research is positive rather than normative. It is a study of what the 
capital structure behaviour of the European firm is, rather than a suggestion of what 
such behaviour "should be". The approach is objective, as far as possible, although the 
choice and application of the empirical techniques necessarily involves an amount of 
subjectivity. European firm capital structure behaviour is examined to determine 
whether the corporate finance theories which exhibit a strong Anglo-American bias 
hold for a wider and more diverse group of financial economies. 
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The focus of the research is the long-run external financing decision of European 
quoted firms. Only quoted firms are studied as the data limitations do not enable the 
study of smaller, non-quoted firms. Long-term debt and equity are assumed to be 
homogenous instruments for the purposes of this research, since to differentiate 
between the different forrns of long-term debt and equity would render the enquiry 
intractable. Thus long-term debt covers both the long-term bank debt and long-term 
debt issued to individual and institutional investors. Equity covers the entire range of 
forms of equity issued by the firm. As external finance is the focus of the study, 
retentions as a form of finance are not expressly modelled and discussed in this 
research, except where they impact significantly on the choice between debt and equity 
finance. The use of short-term debt as a substitute for long-term debt is considered 
only briefly, as such consideration unnecessarily widens the scope of the research. The 
study of the capital structure environment is conducted from the corporate rather than 
the investor perspective, as the finance market objective functions which underlie the 
two perspectives are necessarily very different. However, the investor-side of the 
market is still examined, but from the perspective of the firm-side of the market. 
The structure of the research is designed to represent a steady progression from the 
timelessly static through to the long-run time-frame within which the finance manager 
operates. Chapter 2 examines the influence of taxation upon the corporate capital 
structure decision of the firm. It discusses the development of the theory and related 
evidence from the origins of conventional theories, through the pivotal contributions of 
Modigliani and Nfiller, to the modern theories of finance which move away from the 
development of general equilibrium frameworks. The chapter attempts to evaluate the 
theoretical and empirical support for a distinct tax advantage to debt, considering also 
those factors which might alter the magnitude of any advantage, such as the incidence 
of tax exhaustion and changes in tax rates and tax systems. 
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Chapter 3 examines the influence of macro economic and corporate factors upon the 
capital structure decision of the firm. The theory and evidence describing the influence 
of macro economic factors concentrate mainly on the important effects of inflation and 
various institutional factors upon the capital structure choice of the firm. The 
corporate-influence theory and evidence described is far more extensive, and includes: 
the examination of the influence of corporate measure factors such as the firm's 
accounting structure, bankruptcy risk and scale factors; behavioural. factors such as the 
influence of investment and production decisions and the influence of industry- 
targeting norms; and investor-related factors such as the influence of issue-related 
costs, the information signalling nature of finance decisions and agency problems. The 
chapter also summarises the overall influence of the macro economic, corporate and 
taxation environments, and suggests how the finance manager may prioritise these 
influences when making a capital structure decision. 
Chapter 4 formulates the hypotheses arising from the existing literature that are to be 
tested throughout the research. The structure and relationship between the hypotheses 
are explained, such that the central hypothesis is addressed by testing the macro 
economic, taxation and corporate hypotheses, which in turn are addressed by testing 
numerous subsidiary hypotheses. The methodology is discussed, explaining how 
explicit hypothesis testing, in conjunction with econometric modelling, enables the 
existing literature hypotheses and the new research hypotheses to be addressed over 
average, marginal, dynamic and long-run time-frames. The chapter engages in 
preliminary analyses of patterns evident within the main data sets, with particular 
reference to the influence of the tax system and country within which the firm is 
positioned. Finally, the chapter also presents an indirect test of the Nliller (1977) 
financial leverage clientele hypothesis. 
Chapter 5 examines determinants of the corporate capital structure using direct and 
indirect methods. The indirect studies comprise testing for the significance of industry 
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effects upon the corporate capital structures of UK firms, and testing for the incidence 
of tax exhaustion across European firms. The more direct studies comprise modelling 
the average and marginal capital structure decision time-frames. A bivariate regression 
analysis enables the average time-frame to be studied, to determine the factors 
influencing the capital structure decision at a point in time. A multivariate logistic 
regression analysis enables the marginal time-frame to be studied, to determine the 
most important influences of the incremental capital structure decision. 
Chapter 6 introduces a time series extension to the European research. The nature of 
the time series data set to be analysed and its associated limitations are examined, and 
the merits of introducing a macroeconomic perspective to the research are discussed. 
The rationale for the weighting method employed to facilitate the distinction between 
the capital structure policy behaviour of larger and smaller firms is discussed in some 
detail. The main purpose of the chapter, however, is to examine, by means of a detailed 
graphical analysis, inter-temporal movements in European corporate capital structure 
ratios. Additionally, prima facie bivariate capital structure relationships with respect to 
taxation and macroeconomic environment factors are identified, and the impact of key 
European taxation and macroeconomic events on the movement of corporate capital 
structure ratios is examined. Such graphical analyses are conducted as a precursor to 
more formal econometric analyses. 
Chapter 7 describes the methodology and hypotheses necessary to test the central 
hypothesis from a bivariate time series perspective. A detailed examination of the 
methods employed towards the development of bivariate time series models is 
presented. The methods described are: unit root testing to determine the order of 
integration of the time series variables; cointegration testing to identify those time 
series variables which are cointegrated with the DDE ratio; Granger causality analysis 
to determine the direction of causation within a bivariate corporate capital structure 
relationship; the construction and estimation of autoregressive 
distributed lag (ADL) 
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models to determine the factors which influence the DDE ratio in the short-term; and 
the construction and estimation of bivariate error correction (EC) models to determine 
the short-run and long-run processes present within key capital structure relationships. 
Hypotheses arising from the existing literature and the development of the European 
research are then presented, Such hypotheses form the basis for the expected 
specification of the bivariate corporate capital structure models to be estimated, 
although more general finance theory, econometric theory, and potential data 
limitations also contribute to the development of expected model specifications. 
Chapter 8 presents the results arising from the bivariate corporate capital structure 
time series analyses which derive from the application of the methodology discussed in 
chapter 7. The results address the bivariate time series hypotheses and provide a 
greater understanding of the processes underlying capital structure determination by 
examining the influence of the taxation, macroeconomic and corporate environment 
factors upon corporate gearing. The bivariate error correction modelling exercise is 
then extended to the multivariate perspective, by means of the Johansen (1988,1989) 
procedure, to enable a greater understanding of the interaction of the capital structure 
ratio with the environments within which it is determined. To further investigate the 
nature of a potential behavioural dichotomy based upon the scale of the firm, a 
cointegration analysis is undertaken to determine whether smaller firms engage in a 
different form of capital structure behaviour from larger firms, referred to as intra-ratio 
targeting. The final section summarises the salient results of all of the time series 
analyses to address the central hypothesis and to present an overall model of European 
capital structure determination to explain the operational and strategic behaviour of 
both larger and smaller firms. 
Finally, chapter 9 draws together'the salient results from the European research to 
produce an overall model of European corporate capital structure determination, thus 
enabling the central hypothesis to be addressed. It discusses briefly conclusions arising 
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from the review of the existing theoretical and empirical corporate finance research and 
discusses the development of hypotheses which are underpinned by those existing 
research conclusions. It describes the results of naive cross-sectional and inter- 
temporal descriptive analyses, which serve as a precursor to the econometric modelling 
undertaken, providing a perspective within which to position the salient results of the 
European research. The structure of the econometric modelling undertaken is then 
discussed, reiterating the significant insights provided by each modelling stage towards 
the precise nature of capital structure optin-ýisation across Europe. The European 
corporate capital structure model is briefly summarised by examining the operational 
and strategic capital structure policies employed by larger and smaller firms. The 
chapter also identifies the pivotal detern-ýinants of the corporate capital structure as 
well as describing those circumstances in which corporate gearing may itself impact 
upon the corporate environment of the firm. The central hypothesis is then addressed 
by examining four strict criteria essential to the existence of firm-level optimal capital 
structure solutions. Linýtations of the European research are then identified, and the 
potential impact of such limitations upon the body of results is determined. Finally, the 
main contributions of the European research to the corporate capital structure area are 
summarised, and recommendations for further research are made. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE INFLUENCE OF THE TAXATION ENVIRONMENT UPON THE 
CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF THE FIRM 
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2.1 Introduction 
"In this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes. " 
(Benjamin Franklin, 1789) 
Corporate finance is still a relatively new development within economics, though much 
of the seminal theory which once proved contentious is now enshrined within finance 
texts, enabling a positivist analysis of a once purely pragmatist area. Though corporate 
finance theory encompasses the study of both the investment and financing decisions of 
the firm, it is the latter which initially spurred the rapid development of the area. 
However, both decisions are intrinsically linked as the cost of capital is employed by 
finance managers as the discount rate for investment decisions. If the cost of capital 
changes with the type of funding instrument issued to raise the investment funds, then 
the capital structure choice (the mix of debt and equity) of the firm impacts directly 
upon the investment decision. King (1977) noted that there are three main types of 
corporate funding: retained profits, the issue of new shares, and corporate borrowing. 
If the firm's capital structure choice is relevant, then, the firm should strive to minimise 
its cost of capital, implying that there may exist some optimal level of debt-to-equity. 
Conversely, if the firm's capital structure choice is irrelevant, then the firm may ignore 
the mix as the cost of capital is constant and thus does not impact on the investment 
decision. 
Development of finance theory stemmed from growing disillusionment towards the 
pragmatic guide-lines and conventional wisdoms concerning the limitation of debt 
issuance. The central papers in the area were written by Modigliani and Nfiller 
(hereafter referred to as MM) in an attempt to produce a more coherent, rigorous and 
mathematically derivable framework, culminating eventually in a general equilibrium 
model of the corporate capital structure environment. MM initially made many 
simplifying assumptions to produce simple models of capital structure determination, 
particularly with respect to corporate and personal taxes. However, they soon realised 
that taxation was perhaps one of the most fundamental determinants of the corporate 
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capital structure, and that progress in the area might only be achieved by incorporating 
taxation into their models. Indeed, the examination of the influence of taxation allowed 
MM to produce both capital structure relevance and irrelevance propositions, 
depending on the extent to which corporate and personal taxes are accounted for. 
Corporate finance theory largely developed from the capital structure debate refuelled 
by the MM models, and therefore these models are described in some detail. The 
models propose taxation to be one of the most important determinant of the corporate 
capital structure, and therefore, consistent with this proposition, chapter 2 concentrates 
upon the influence that the taxation environment has upon the capital structure of the 
firm. Only that theory and empirical evidence relating directly to taxation factors is 
discussed in this second chapter, as chapter 3 considers the important effect of non-tax 
factors. Where available, evidence is reviewed which strengthens or weakens the 
theories examined, allowing greater weight to be attached to those theories which 
appear to have some real-world application. This chapter does not claim to cover all of 
the literature on the influence of taxation on corporate capital structures, as such a 
body of literature is immense, but seeks merely to provide a structured perspective on 
the incidences where tax impacts upon the firm's funding choice. 
The structure of chapter 2 serves to divide the literature into theory groupings which 
may be more easily discussed. Such a structure is not ideal, as many tax factors are 
interrelated, rendering the isolation of separate factors extremely difficult. However, 
the dividing of the literature in this way more readily enables empirical testing of the 
importance of such factors later in this report. Section 2.2 describes the conventional 
models of corporate capital structure, before the imperfection of taxation is introduced. 
Section 2.3 describes the contributions of Modigliani and Miller, both together and 
separately, a section which in6oduces the theoretical framework and empirical 
methodology employed by much of the subsequent literature. Section 2.4 examines the 
concept of the tax advantage to debt, considering the models and empirical work 
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related to the MM propositions. Section 2.5 introduces a further complication to the 
corporate finance/taxation environment, which may be important in the real-world, that 
is, the incidence of corporate tax exhaustion. Section 2.6 discusses the influence of tax 
reform and changes in tax rates upon the firm's capital structure. Section 2.7 attempts 
to briefly consider the effects of differing tax systems upon the firm's funding choice. 
Finally, section 2.8 draws together the theory and evidence reviewed to attempt to 
summarise the nature of the influence of taxation on the corporate capital structure, 
paying particular attention to those tax factors which are most instrumental in capital 
structure determination. 
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2.2 The conventional models of corporate capital structure 
2.2.1 The Net Income Approach 
Durand's (1952) Net Income Approach ignores any implicit costs that may be 
associated with debt) and assumes that the interest rate payable is the only cost of debt. 
As debt holders are essentially priority claim holders on the firm's earnings (and 
assets), the return they demand is less than that of equity holders, reflecting the lower 
risk of the former compared to the latter's claim, as illustrated in figure 2.1. 
Fip. ure 2.1 
The cost of capital under the Net Income Approach 
cost of 
capital 
return on equity 
weighted average 
cost of capital 
return on debt 
Therefore, the net operating income of the firm paid to debt holders is discounted at a 
lower rate than that paid out to equity holders. The weighted average cost of capital 
decreases and the value of the firm increases as the debt-equity ratio increases, as 
illustrated in figure 2.2. The Net Income Approach would appear to advocate the 
issuing of a limitless amount of debt to reduce the cost of capital and thus maximise 
firm value. 
The approach may be criticised in two important respects. Firstly, it is likely that equity 
holders will demand higher returns as the debt-equity ratio increases, to compensate 
them for the increased risk of their claim on the firm's income. The increased risk 
causes the returns to equity holders to become more variable, as the increased debt 
claims are mandatory and have precedence over equity claims. Secondly, the risk of 
bankruptcy is ignored, which is an unrealistic implicit assumption, because it may be an 
important limiting factor to the debt-equity ratio in the real world. Indeed, the limitless 
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employment of debt which the model advocates is simply not observed in the real 
world 
FiF-ure 2.2 
The relationship between the debt-eguity ratio and firm value under the Net 
Income Approach 
firm 
value 
2.2.2 The Net Operating Income Approach 
Durand's Net Operating Income Approach assumes that there are both explicit costs 
and implicit costs associated with debt finance. The explicit cost is the debt interest 
rate whereas the implicit cost reflects the increased returns demanded by equity holders 
as the proportion of debt in the capital structure increases. As the cheaper debt funds 
are increased, the returns demanded by equity holders increase in direct proportion, 
and thus the weighted average cost of capital remains constant as the debt-equity ratio 
increases, as illustrated in figure 2.3. 
The Net Operating Income Approach thus proposes that there is no advantage to the 
firm of issuing debt rather than equity to fund its investments and thus there is no 
optimal capital structure, as illustrated in figure 2.4. The market value of the firm 
remains constant whatever the level of debt, and thus the choice of capital structure is 
irrelevant. 
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Figure 2.3 
The cost of caDital under the Net Operatifig Income Approach 
cost of 
capital 
return on equity 
weighted average 
cost of capital 
return on debt 
The Net Operating Income approach may be criticised in a number of respects. Firstly, 
it is questionable that the weighted average cost of capital remains constant because 
debt holders would perceive an increased risk associated with their returns at high debt 
levels and would demand a higher return, causing the weighted average cost of capital 
curve to increase at high debt levels. Secondly, the exact offsetting of the benefits of 
the increased debt and the increasing equity return will pnly occur if there is perfect 
dissemination of information in investor markets. However, the Net Operating Income 
A Approach represents an improvement upon the Net Income Approach as it recognises 
that there are implicit costs associated with capital structure decisions. 
Fip. ure 2.4 
The relationshil2 between the debt-ecluity ratio and firm value under the Net 
Operating Income Approach 
firm 
value 
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2.2.3 The Traditional Approach 
The Traditional Approach assumes that firms may attain an optimal capital structure, 
through the use of some moderate levelof debt financing. Figure 2.5 illustrates this. 
Figure 2.5 
The cost of capital under the Traditional Approach 
cost of 
capital 
rn on equity 
ieighted average 
cost of capital 
\ 
return on debt 
As the level of debt rises, the return that equity holders demand increases gradually at 
first, and then steeply at some higher level of debt as the risk of bankruptcy becomes 
significant. The returns demanded by debt holders also increase in a similar manner, 
rising steeply when the risk of bankruptcy becomes significant. An optimal level of the 
debt-equity ratio thus exists where the weighted average cost of capital is minimised, 
that is, where the benefits of the cheaper debt are exactly offset by the increased 
returns demanded by equity holders and debt holders. The Traditional Approach 
therefore considers the explicit and implicit costs associated with increasing debt with 
respect to both equity holders and debt holders, and advocates the use of some positive 
moderate level of debt in the firm's capital structure, as illustrated in figure 2.6. 
The model is an improvement upon the other conventional models for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, it introduces the concept of bankruptcy costs (risk) and explains how 
such costs increase the return demanded by equity holders (to compensate them for the 
increased risk of those returns) and debt holders (in the form of monitoring costs). 
Secondly, the model proposes an optimal positive but moderate level of debt, which is 
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consistent with real world evidence. However, the model is still extremely naive, is a 
partial-equilibrium approach, and takes no account of the most important distortion to 
the corporate finance market, that is, taxation. 
Figure 2.6 
The relationship between the debt-eguity ratio and firm value under the 
Traditional Approach 
firm 
value 
2.2.4 Summa!: y of the conventional corporate capital structure models 
The conventional models are therefore naive models, developed within a perfect 
market framework, and ignore important real-world finance market distortions such as 
taxation. There is also very little empirical evidence which could be used to directly 
support or refute the propositions of such models. Indeed, the extreme debt positions 
proposed by the NI Approach are simply not observed in the real world and the capital 
structure irrelevance proposition of the NOI Approach is notoriously difficult to test 
directly. Even the Traditional Approach is questionable, as it is still relies upon many 
restrictive assumptions. However, examination of the models is essential to a greater 
understanding of the development and contribution of the seminal Modigliani and 
Miller models which followed. 
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2.3 The Modighani and Miller capital structure models 
2.3.1 Introduction 
The conventional models of corporate capital structure attempted to explain how firms 
determined the mix of funding instruments used to finance their investments. The 
models varied in complexity, depending mainly on the degree to which the 
costs associated with debt and equity were accounted for. The Traditional Approach 
produced a proposition of the existence of an optimal firm-level capital structure 
containing some moderate level of debt, a proposition which appeared to be reflected 
in real world observation of firm capital structures. As the conventional models lacked 
any formal mathematical derivation, the area remained dominated by arguments based 
in pragmatic conservatism and institutional guide-lines. However, the revolutionary 
paper of Modigliani and Nfiller in 1958 marked the beginning of a rapid development in 
the field of corporate finance, mainly because the model they produced was 
mathematically derivable and empirically testable. Section 2.3 discusses the 1958 and 
subsequent Modigliani and Nfiller papers, as they progress from the non-tax to the 
general equilibrium taxed environment. 
2.3.2 The Modighani and Miller (1958) model 
Modigliani and Miller in their ground-breaking paper of 1958 produced a mathematical 
model of the corporate capital structure, questioning the optimal capital structure 
proposition of the Traditional Approach, and setting in place a coherent framework for 
the theoretical development and empirical testing of subsequent models. Their main 
proposition was that the firm cannot increase its value merely by packaging its cash 
flows differently. The model they developed made many simplifying assumptions such 
as: the existence of efficient capital markets; the absence of bankruptcy costs and 
transactions costs; the ability of equity holders to borrow at the same rate as 
companies; and the existence of two firms of identical income and risk which differ 
only with respect to gearing. They argued that as the level of debt increases, the 
weighted average cost of capital remains constant. This is because as the relatively 
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cheaper debt (lower returns paid to debt holders than equity holders) is increased in the 
firm's capital structure, it is exactly offset by the increased returns demanded by equity 
holders (which reflects the increased risk of the firm's earnings being paid entirely to . 
debt holders in the form of mandatory interest payments). This invariance is illustrated 
in figure 2.7. 
Fizure 2.7 
The weip-hted average cost of capital within the MM (1958) model 
cost of 
capital 
equity retums 
weighted average 
cost of capital 
debt retums 
Indeed, MM proved, more formally, that the return demanded by equity holders is 
equal to the expected return from an ungeared firm plus a premium which is a linear 
function of the amount of debt in the firm's capital structure: 
I --': A+ (pk- r). 
Dj 
j' Si 
Equation 2.1 
where: 
I jý the expected rate of return on the stock of any ýcompany 
j belonging to the kth 
class 
Pk = the expected return from an identical ungeared firm 
r= the risk-free rate of interest 
Dj = the market value of debts to the company 
sj:: ý the market value of a firm's common shares 
Therefore, the increased risk associated with increased debt is immediately, exactly and 
proportionately accounted for in the increased returns demanded by equity 
holders. 
The invariance of market value to capital structure changes is underpinned by the 
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concept of arbitrage. If the total bonds and equity of a firm sell at a price greater than 
the total equity of another identical firm which employs no debt, the arbitrage process 
ensures that the prices converge in equilibrium, and thus there is no equilibrium 
advantage to the geared over the ungeared firm. 
The NM model thus proposes that the capital structure chosen by the firm is irrelevant 
and that the firm should only concentrate on maximising the returns from its 
investment projects and not on the financing of those projects. However, the 
assumptions employed by MN4 to develop the model are restrictive and some are 
unrealistic. Each assumption shall be briefly discussed. The assumption that there are 
no bankruptcy costs must be questioned, as the assets of the firm when sold at their 
"break-up" value may only reach, say, half of their going-concem value in the event of 
bankruptcy leading to liquidation. The legal and accounting costs of bankruptcy are 
also likely to be significant. Though bankruptcy costs are probably significant at high 
levels of debt, they may be insignificant to the average firm. Bankruptcy costs are 
examined in more detail in chapter 3. The assumption that capital markets are efficient 
is reasonable as there is strong evidence to support it. Brealey (1970) produced 
evidence in support of weak-form efficiency and Firth (1967) produced evidence to 
support semi-strong-form efficiency. The assumption of zero transactions costs is 
unrealistic as the brokerage costs, for example, borne by investors are likely to be 
significant, preventing frequent dealing in equity and bond markets. The assumption 
that there exists two firms of identical income and risk, differing only in respect to the 
presence or absence of gearing is questionable. However, Stiglitz (1969) shows that 
the MM theorem does not depend on the existence of risk classes in his general 
equilibrium state preference model, although the assumption that individuals can 
borrow at the same market rate of interest as firms and the assumption that there is no 
bankruptcy remain important to this proof 
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Authors such as Weston (1963) argued that the assumption that equity holders can 
borrow at the same rate as companies is unrealistic. Firms have the advantage of 
econon-ýies of large borrowing and generally also have significant collateral to support 
such borrowing, whereas investors have neither of these benefits. However, investors 
may effectively gain such corporate borrowing facilities by investing in investment 
trusts and other intermediaries. Overall, the interest gap remaIns a significant 
characteristic of the finance market, which questions NIM's concept of arbitrage and 
home-made gearing. 
Probably the main shortcoming of the MM (1958) model is that it failed to correctly 
account for corporate taxes, an error which spurred the 1963 model to follow. 
Empirical evidence to test the MM (1958) propositions is provided by MM themselves 
(1958), Weston (1963), Barges (1963), and Sametz (1964). 
MM(1958) cited studies by Allen (1954) and Smith (1955), who studied 43 large 
electric utilities and 42 oil companies, respectively, to examine the effect of gearing on 
the cost of capital and the effect of gearing on equity returns. They found that the 
slope coefficient in a regression of the cost of capital on the debt-equity ratio was 
insignificantly different from zero, confirming their irrelevance proposition and 
questioning the optimum proposed by the Traditional Approach. They found also that 
the slope coefficient in a regression of equity returns on the debt-equity ratio was 
significantly positive, confirming their proposition that equity returns increased with 
gearing to maintain the capital structure irrelevance proposition. This result also 
questions the Traditional Approach as the slope should be insignificant if the approach 
holds. Therefore, MM argued that the evidence from these two studies supports their 
capital structure irrelevance proposition. 
Barges (1963) strongly criticised the empirical work that Modigliani and Nfiller 
conducted to support their 1958 model. His first criticism was that, for the "utilities" 
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that they examined, ) MM did not have a sufficient number of observations on certain 
parts of the capital structure range to allow the bold inferences made. Barges noted 
particularly that most of the observations for debt-to-total-market-value ratios fell 
between 50% and 80%. The second criticism was that, for the oil companies, their 
nature is too diverse and thus cannot even approximate a homogeneous risk class, 
which MM (1958) require as a fundamental in their analysis. The differences in the oil 
the markets, products and so on, of the oil companies render them a very 
heterogeneous grouping. Thirdly, Barges questioned the use of current earnings as an 
approximation to expected future earnings. Particularly in the oil industry, stock values 
tend to reflect the value associated with oil properties and reserves which do not 
contribute to current earnings but will certainly contribute significantly to future 
eamings. 
Barges did not suggest that these three criticisms are capable of refuting the MM 
(1958) empirical work, but argued that they make the MM tests appear weaker and 
less convincing. However, a fourth and final criticism that he proposed: 
"is sufficiently great to cast serious doubt on the meaning and validity of the 
tests". (Barges (1963), p. 23) 
This criticism centred on biases within the MM empirical work. Barges listed five main 
heterogeneous factors, which cause variations in yields within a risk class: business 
risk; the degree of market imperfection; dividend policy; errors of measurement; and 
firm size. The bias that these factors produce is enough to undermine the empirical 
work of MM (1958) because the bias caused by the heterogeneous factors all pulls in 
the same direction. Therefore variations within the risk class cause variations which are 
not accounted for in the regression model testing of the MM research. 
Barges proceeded, then, to test three industry classes which were less prone to the 
deficiencies just described, and which were adjusted for the shortcomings of the MM 
(1958) empirical work. The industry classes were: Class I railroads, department store 
companies, and cement companies. He conducted two types of tests. Firstly, he 
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examined the relationship between the average cost of capital and the total market 
value of the firm, and secondly, he tested to determine whether equity returns 
increased as firms' employment of debt varied from zero up to some moderate debt 
level. For the railroad companies, a positive relationship was found between equity 
returns and the debt-equity ratio, which appears to support the MM (1958) hypothesis. 
However, when the relationship between average cost of capital and the debt-equity 
ratio was tested, it revealed a significant relationship, which strongly refutes the MM 
hypothesis that the choice of capital structure is irrelevant. For the department stores 
and cement companies, there was found to be no significant correlation between equity 
returns and the debt-equity ratio up to the moderate debt range. Thus, as equity returns 
did not increase with increasing debt, then MM (1958) appears to be questioned, as 
this was a fundamental part of their theory. 
Barges concluded that: 
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... on the 
basis of the evidence presented herein, the hypothesis of 
independence between average cost and capital structure appears untenable". 
(Barges (1963), p. 103) 
Thus, Barges questioned the methodology of the MM (1958) empirical testing, 
produced evidence in support of a relationship between the weighted average cost of 
capital and the debt-equity ratio, and questioned the increase of equity returns as the 
level of debt rises; all of which must weaken the MM (1958) irrelevance proposition. 
Weston (1963) criticised the MM (1958) empirical studies and conducted his own 
empirical testing with certain corrections. He expressed four main criticisms of the 
empirical tests of MM. Firstly, the arbitrage operations of MM were not possible 
because personal leverage is not a perfect substitute for corporate leverage. Secondly, 
he questioned the identification of risk class with an industry, as industries such as the 
oil industry are extremely heterogeneous. The oil industry, 
for example, consists of 
firms, at different stages of vertical integration, with markets ranging 
from regional to 
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international, and with varying degrees of diversification (horizontal integration). 
Thirdly, Weston argued that the time period studied was unrepresentative as equity 
prices in the late 1940's were low, and thus earnings-price ratios were high, a 
phenomenon more likely to produce favourable results for MM. Finally, the MM 
measure of the current earnings-price ratio understated the cost of capital of a firm 
experiencing earnings growth. Therefore, Weston strongly questioned the 
methodology and data of the MM empirical tests. 
Given the apparent shortcomings of the MM tests, Weston conducted his own tests 
upon the electrical industry, which he argued was more homogeneous than the oil 
industry. Flis main correction was to account for the influence of the growth of 
earnings per share on both the cost of equity and the overall cost of capital, as he 
found such growth to be highly correlated with these measures. Once growth was 
accounted for,, the level of gearing no longer exerted a significant influence on equity 
returns and the cost of capital became significantly related to the level of gearing. 
Weston therefore argued that his evidence, with the important correction for growth of 
earnings, supported the Traditional Approach and questioned the results of the 
MM(1958) study. Thus, he argued that not only were the MM tests methodologically 
unsound, but new evidence suggested that the XW proposition of capital structure 
irrelevancy did not hold. 
However, Sametz (1964) produced evidence which supported, to some extent, the 
MM(1958) capital structure irrelevance proposition. He studied the debt-equity ratio 
of US non-financial corporations over the period 1901 to 1962 and found that: 
"It seems clear that the major secular constant in corporate financial decision- 
-making is the aggregate debt-equity ratio ... " (Sametz (1964), p. 45 1) 
Sametz compared the periods 1901-1929 and 1930-58 and found that there had been 
no more than a2 per cent change in the debt-equity ratio over those periods, even 
though the structure of debt and equity changed significantly over these periods as 
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short-term debt and internal equity rose and long-term debt and external equity 
decreased. He argued that in the MM (1958) model, where the debt-equity and pay- 
out ratios are variables, the comparative the costs of equity finance and debt finance 
are irrelevant because the mix of the capital structure does not affect the average cost 
of capital as the sum of interest rate on debt and the risk differential must be equal to 
the earnings-price ratio. He concluded that any debt-equity ratio may be considered 
optimum and might as well be left unchanged, therefore providing some indirect 
support for the MM (1958) propositions. 
In addition to a pure critique of the restrictiveness of the assumptions of the MM 
(1958) model, some authors sought to determine which of the MM assumptions are 
essential to the proposition that the financing decisions of the firin are irrelevant, as a 
means of generalising and thus strengthening the proposition. 
Stiglitz (1969,1974) argued that in addition to the perfect market assumption made by 
MMI it is essential that bonds issued by firms and individuals must be free of default 
risk. He argued that the most restrictive assumption underlying the capital structure 
irrelevance proposition that individuals can exactly "undo" any financial policy 
undertaken by the firm is that of no bankruptcy. The reason for this, he argued, is that 
it is not reasonable to assume that the price of bonds for which there is a positive 
probability of default at maturation would be the same as the price of a riskless bond. 
Indeed, bankruptcy alters the opportunity set facing the individual so that the value of 
the firm is changed and the financial policy of the firm becomes relevant. 
However, Fama and Miller (1972) demonstrated that the capital structure irrelevance 
proposition still holds when debt is risky as long as stockholders and bondholders 
protect their claims on the firm vVith "me-first" rules, Under such rules, bondholders 
would ensure that their debt is senior to any new debt issued, such that the old 
bondholders are paid off before the newer bondholders in the event of bankruptcy. 
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Also, stockholders would ensure that the firm does not conduct its financing decisions 
so as to improve the positions of any bondholders. Therefore, given these me-first 
rules, the market value of a firm remains unaffected by its financing decisions even if 
debt is risky. 
The generalisation of the capital structure irrelevance proposition was developed even 
further by Fama (1978), who showed that even the "me-first" rules are unnecessary to 
the capital structure irrelevance proposition when allowing for risky debt. His 
argument is underpinned either by the assumption that investors and firms have equal 
access to the capital market or the assumption that no firm issues securities for which 
there are not perfect substitutes available from other firms, 
Fama assumed that the capital market is perfect, that firms and individuals have equal 
access to capital markets, that all market agents have access to all available information 
and agree about its implications for firms and securities, and that the investment 
strategies of firms are given. Given these assumptions, if unprotected securities are 
issued at time 0, then at time I firms may be able to use their financing decisions to 
affect the positions of their security holders. At time 0, neither the range of securities 
that can be traded nor the instruments chosen by investors are affected by the financing 
decisions of firms in an equal access market because if firms did not offer the positions 
that investors would like to hold, then investors could create their desired positions by 
trading among themselves. Therefore, the positions that investors take at time 0 do not 
change regardless of changes in the financing decisions of firms at time 0. At time 1, if 
some investors benefit or lose from their unprotected positions, such expropriation 
occurs to the same degree for any set of financing decisions by firms at time 0. When 
equal access to capital markets is assumed, the financing decisions of firms will not 
affect the positions that investors take in firms, the prices that they pay for such 
positions, or the market values of the firms. Therefore, even when bonds are risky, as 
long as equal access is assumed, the financing decisions of firms are still irrelevant to 
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investors. Intuitively, the creators or purchasers of bonds are never surprised by any 
event that occurs during the life of a debt contract, and thus the price of the debt 
contract always fully reflects the probability of expropriations that may occur. 
Alternatively, it may be assumed that there are always perfect substitutes for all 
securities issued by any firm, the capital market is perfect, complete agreement exists, 
the investment strategies of firms are given and the firm aims to maxinlise its total 
market value at whatever prices are observed in the market. If these assumptions are 
made then changes in the financing decision of the firm do not affect the firm's market 
value, investors, or the prices of different types of securities. If unprotected securities 
issued by different firms at time t-1 are perfect substitutes then any expropriations at 
time t will be the same for all firms, and therefore expropriations will be the same for 
all financing decisions made at time t. At time t, when the state of the world is known, 
firms make their financing decisions and a general equilibrium is established whereby 
equilibrium prices and firms values are determined. If a firm which has unprotected 
securities changes its capital structure then the change cannot bring about 
expropriations beyond those of the firm's original financing decisions at time t. 
Therefore, even where debt is risky and me-first rules do not hold, the market can 
regain a general equilibrium if other firms exactly offset the firm's capital structure 
change, resulting in the aggregate supplies and prices of different securities remaining 
unchanged. 
Therefore, by employing either of the two assumption sets, Fama demonstrated that 
the market value of the firm is not affected by its financing decisions, and additionally, 
that a firm's financing decisions have no effect on its security holders. This is because 
there are mechanisms that shield the opportunity set facing investors from the effects 
of firms' financing decisions. The Fama (1978) paper thus generalises the MM (195 8) 
capital structure irrelevance proposition by relaxing some of its restrictive assumptions, 
particularly the assumption that debt is free from default risk. The effect of this is to 
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strengthen the proposition, giving it greater support, as it does not rely on such a 
restrictive assumption set. 
The Modigliani and Miller (1958) model therefore developed a coherent framework 
for the analysis of the corporate capital structure decision. The invariance of the 
overall cost of capital as debt increases was an appealing proposition, as it suggested 
that managers should concentrate upon the investment decision and disregard the form 
of the investment funding. The arbitrage proof underpining the invariance proposition 
was demonstrated by authors such as Fama (1978) to hold under a far less restrictive 
set of assumptions, thus strengthening its appeal. The evidence in support of the model 
is weakened by the non-homogeneity of the industries studied and by the lack of 
consideration of growth. Correction for such failings produced evidence which 
strongly questioned the applicability of the MM (195 8) model to the real world finance 
market and appears to support the Traditional Approach with its capital structure 
relevance proposition. However, neither the MM model nor the related empirics 
correctly considered the effects of taxation, which were to become of central 
importance to the literature which was to follow. The correct consideration of taxation 
therefore represents an important development in capital structure theory, bringing the 
theoretical developments closer to the real world corporate capital structure 
environment. 
2.3.3 The Modigliani and Miller (1963) model 
The MM (1958) model failed to correctly take into account the important impact of 
corporate taxes. Their 1963 paper is known as the "MM Tax Correction Paper", as it 
corrected a fundamental error made in the earlier paper. The 1958 paper stated that: 
"It can be shown ... that the market values of 
firms in each class must be 
proportional in equilibrium to their expected returns net of taxes... " 
(MM (1958), p. 272) 
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MM recognised that this statement was erroneous. If two firms of equivalent risk have 
different degrees of gearing, even though one firm may have an post-tax 
return double that of the other firm, the actual post-tax return will not always be 
double that of the second firm. There is thus no arbitrage mechanism to ensure the 
proportionality of values to their expected post-tax returns because the distribution of 
post-tax returns of the two firms is not proportional. They argue that this "arbitrage" 
renders firm values within a risk class a function of expected post-tax returns as well as 
the tax rate and gearing level of the firm, in effect increasing the tax advantage to debt 
to a significant level. Therefore, a tax advantage to debt arises from the corporate tax 
deductibility of debt interest payments, whilst under a classical tax system dividend 
payments are not tax-deductible against the corporation tax bill. The value of the firm 
thus becomes the value of an identical ungeared firm plus the value of the tax shield. 
The tax shield is simply the effective corporate tax rate multiplied by the market value 
of debt issued. Therefore, the greater the debt-equity ratio, the greater is the tax shield 
and the greater is the value of the firm. 
Figure 2.8 shows that the weighted average cost of capital decreases constantly as the 
degree of gearing increases. Though the equity holders demand higher returns to 
compensate them for the higher risk associated with increased debt, the much cheaper 
post-tax debt outweighs this, and thus the overall cost of capital decreases as debt 
increases. 
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Figure 2.8 
The cost of capital under the MM(1963) model 
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The MM (1963) tax advantage to debt proposition appears to advocate a limitless use 
of debt financing, such that firms should ideally employ 99.9 per cent debt in their 
capital structures. This is a weak result as such extreme capital structures are not 
observed in the real world. However, MM argued that the distinct tax advantage to 
debt does not necessarily lead to extreme gearing positions due to such factors as the 
tax status of investors, limitations imposed by lenders and the need to maintain some 
spare corporate debt capacity. Franks and Broyles (1979) argued that financial 
conservatism was inadequate as a reason for the lack of evidence of extreme debt 
positions across firms, and further argued that the increasing financial risk, moral 
hazard, monitoring costs and legal problems related to extreme debt would force banks 
to limit the firm's borrowing to moderate levels. Many other factors, such as tax 
exhaustion, may limit the firm's use of debt, but these factors are considered in later 
sections. 
To summarise, the Modigliani and Miller (1963) model revealed that, when corporate 
taxes were added to their model, a distinct tax advantage to debt existed, resulting 
from the tax-deductibility of debt interest payments. 
MN4 (1966) sought to support 'their 1963 model with evidence from the electric 
utilities industry. They argued that their sample suffered less from the criticisms made 
concerning the 1958 empirics, and that the study sample was large, extremely 
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debt-equity ratio 
homogenous, utilised uniform accounting conventions and exhibited highly stable 
earnings. For the years 1954,1956 and 1957, they computed two-stage least squares 
models of the valuation of the firm. To ascertain the contribution of the different 
factors to market value, they multiplied the model coefficient estimates by the sample 
mean values for each of the years. The factors they modelled were: the capitalised 
earnings on assets currently held, the tax subsidy on debt, growth potential, and the 
difference between infinite size and the mean size of firms in the industry. The most 
important contributor to market value in this model was the capitalised earning power 
of assets currently held, which is an unsurprising result. The next most important 
contributor was the tax subsidy to debt, followed by the future growth potential and 
the size measure. As the tax subsidy was found to be significantly related to the value 
of the firm, this supported the MM (1963) model. 
However, as with the evidence related ýo the 1958 model, the MM empirics of 1966 
were subject to some fundamental criticisms with regard to the data, the methodology 
employed, and the strength of the results. Boness and Frankfurter (1977) argued that 
even the electricity industry was diverse in nature and may not be considered 
analogous to a risk class. Freear (1980) argued that NW's data sets were too narrow 
to distinguish between support for the 1958 or 1963 models. Freear thus argued that 
tests of the narrow middle capital structure range could not be used to represent the 
full range of capital structure ratios from the underlying population, particularly for 
extreme gearing positions. This is a particularly important criticism as it is at such 
extreme capital structure ratios that models may be more readily distinguished, and 
thus the MM (1966) empirics cannot support such a strong inference. Evidence from 
Sametz (1964) also strongly questioned the MM post-tax propositions. In his study of 
the capital structures of US non-financial corporations, as discussed earlier, he found 
that the aggregate debt-equity ratio remained very stable. He argued further that, as 
the corporate tax rate rose substantially over the study period, a rise in the debt-equity 
ratio would be expected, as the tax advantage to debt increases. However, the stability 
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of the debt-equity ratio questions the MM (1963) model, because any increase in the 
tax advantage to debt was not reflected in corporate capital structures over the period. 
Therefore, though MM's 1966 empirical evidence represented a significant 
methodological improvement upon their 1958 empirics, their study was still flawed 
with data problems, and evidence ftom Sametz strongly questioned the significance of 
any corporate tax advantage to debt. However, evidence from Hamada (1972), 
Masulis (1980,1983) does provide some support for the MM (1963) model. 
Hamada (1972) examined the effect of the firm's capital structure on the systematic 
risk of common stocks, as a means of testing the MM (1963) model. The MM theory 
predicts that all firms in the same risk class have the same capitalisation rate regardless 
of their degree of gearing, and thus ungeared betas should be equal, and geared betas 
should change with the level of gearing. The Traditional view would postulate that the 
ungeared beta should remain constant up to some critical level of gearing. Harnada 
argued that: 
"... by specifying reasonable a priori risk-classes, if the individual firms had 
closer or less scattered A-betas (unlevered betas) than B-betas (levered betas) 
then this would support the NM1 theory and contradict the traditional theory. " 
(Hamada (1972), p. 448) 
The data studied were US Compustat and CRSP data for 304 firms for the period 
1948 to 1967. Three statistical tests were employed to determine this degree of spread: 
calculation of the standard deviations of the beta distributions; a Chi-square test of the 
total sample beta distribution compared with specific industry beta distributions; and 
the computation of an analysis of variance of betas between industries. It was found 
that the ungeared betas were far less spread than the geared betas and that there was 
more clustering of ungeared than geared betas. The ratio of estimated variance 
between industries to the estimated variance within industries was far less for geared 
than for ungeared betas. The results thus supported the post-tax propositions of the 
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MM (1963) model, supporting the proposition that there exists an optimal level of 
gearing deriving from the corporate tax advantage to debt compared to equity. 
Masulis (1980) examined the change in the market value of the firm following capital 
structure changes, by studying the impact of pure capital structure changes, in the form 
of exchange offers, on security prices. He defined an exchange offer as follows: 
it 
... an exchange offer gives one or more security classes the right to exchange 
part or all of their present holdings for a different class of firm securities. " 
(Masulis (1980), p. 148) 
He utilised the "Comparison Period Returns" approach which allowed security- specific 
announcement effects to be separated from unrelated market pricing effects, to study 
163 US exchange offers from 1962 to 1976. The results of the study were that gearing 
increases produced a common stock portfolio two-day announcement period return of 
7.6 per cent, with 79 per cent of such stocks exhibiting positive returns for that period. 
Gearing decreases produced a return of -5.4 per cent, with 84 per cent of stocks 
showing negative returns. Therefore, Masulis' study provides strong support for the 
MM (1963) distinct tax advantage to debt proposition. Moreover, by examining 
different types of security class exchanges, and by isolating effects by means of 
separating his sample into exchange-type sub-groups, Masulis found evidence of a 
corporate tax shield effect and a wealth distribution effect across security classes, 
though no evidence of an expected cost of bankruptcy effect. Thus, not only did 
Masulis find evidence of a strong relationship between gearing and firm value, he also 
found evidence that this was partly caused by a tax subsidy to debt effect. 
Masulis (1983) again studied US exchange offers to ascertain the nature of the 
relationship between equity returns and gearing changes. For a sample of 133 US 
exchange offers between 1963 and 1978 he regressed equity returns upon an expected 
I 
"normal" return on equity, gearing increase and gearing decrease variables, and other 
regressors representing wealth transfers between holders of other firm financial 
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instruments. The estimated model was able to explain 54 per cent of the variability in 
returns following announcement of exchange offers. The gearing change variable 
coefficients were significant and positive, revealing a greater reaction to gearing 
increases than decreases. The model confirmed the results of his empirical study of 
1980, showing that changes in firm gearing are positively related to equity prices and 
firm value. He therefore concluded that: 
"This evidence was shown to be consistent with tax based models of optimal 
capital structure and leverage induced wealth transfers across security classes 
as well as with information effects concerning firm value which are positively 
related to changes in firm debt level. " (Masulis (1983), p. 125) 
Therefore his work supports the MM (1963) post-tax propositions of a distinct tax 
advantage to debt, as well as the information signalling models created by authors such 
as Ross (1977). 
The NM (1963) model, which proposed a distinct tax advantage to corporate debt, 
appears, on balance, to be supported by the evidence reviewed. Though the model 
logically proposes an optimum level of debt of almost 100 per cent of the firm's capital 
structure, it is clear that firms do not employ such gearing levels, and thus some 
optimal positive "moderate" level of debt would appear more reasonable, particularly if 
such factors as bankruptcy costs, agency costs, and so on, offset some of the 
advantages to debt finance. Such factors are discussed in detail in chapter 3, along with 
other non-tax factors influencing the corporate capital structure decision. 
2.3.4 The Miller (1977) general equilibrium model 
The NM (1963) model was criticised for the reason that, although it took corporate 
taxes into consideration, it did not consider the effect of personal taxes. The Miller 
(1977) general equilibrium model corrected for this shortcoming, and proposed that 
the presence of taxes on personal'income was capable of reducing or even eliminating 
any corporate tax advantage to debt. 
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The value of the tax shield to equity holders in the firm becomes: 
Tax shield value 
TC) 0- TPS) 
B 
(I -TL PB) 
Equation 2.2 
Where: 
TC = the corporate tax rate 
TpS the personal income tax rate on equity 
TpB the personal income tax rate on debt 
BL the market value of the geared firm's debt 
The value of the tax shield reduces to zero, intuitively, when all the tax rates are set to 
zero. In the event of the equity income tax rate equalling the debt income tax rate, the 
tax advantage to debt is merely TC. BL, that is, the tax advantage to debt proposed by 
the MM (1963) model. In the event of the equity income tax rate being less than the 
debt income tax rate, Miller argued, the tax advantage to debt is much less than the 
valueý TC. BL, and may even be reduced to zero or a disadvantage to debt. However, 
when (I- TpB) equals (I- TC)(1- TpS) in the equation, there is no advantage to 
the firm at all of issuing debt as opposed to equity, and the market is in equilibrium. 
Miller illustrated his general equilibrium proposition in a diagrammatic form. He made 
the simplifying assumptions that: personal tax rates on equity income are zero and that 
all bonds are riskless and there are no transactions costs or other issue costs. In figure 
2.9, rd (B) represents the demand for bonds by investors and ro is the equilibrium 
rate on fully tax-exempt bonds. Miller argued that the flat section of the demand curve, 
rd (B), shows the demand for fully taxable bonds by fully tax-exempt investors, as 
only such tax-exempt investors would be interested in purchasing bonds at the low 
interest rate, ro. However, the interest rate must be higher than this rate to persuade 
taxable investors to purchase bonds, as the higher interest rate must compensate them 
for the taxes they must pay on debt income. This produces a demand rate of interest of 
r To attract higher tax bracket investors the demand interest rate must 0 
T; B 
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rise further. At B*, the demand rate of interest equals the supply rate of interest (the 
tax-exempt rate grossed up by the corporate tax rate), ro / (I - Tc), and thus the 
quantity of bonds B* represents the market equilibrium level of debt. Therefore there 
is a market equilibrium debt-equity ratio, in aggregate, of B*,, but no optimum for the 
individual firm. 
Figure 2.9 
Equilibrium in the market for bonds within the Miller (1977) model 
rate of 
interest 
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The model represented a significant improvement upon the 1963 model as it included 
both corporate and personal taxes, which are probably the most important distortions 
in finance markets. For the first time, a coherent general equilibrium model of capital 
structure was created, bringing together both firms and investors in the same model to 
reach an equilibrium. It is interesting that the capital structure irrelevance conclusion 
emerged again, a conclusion similar to the pre-tax MM propositions but for the fact 
that the 1977 model proposed an aggregate optimal capital structure. 
Probably the main criticism of the Miller (1977) model concerned the initial simplifying 
assumption that the personal tax rate on equity is effectively zero, although some of 
the other assumptions that were retained from his earlier models with Modigliani were 
still questionable. Miller and Scholes (1978) argued that, in the US, individuals can 
postpone the realisation of capital gains until their death by utilising various tax 
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B* quantity of bonds 
outstanding 
shelters, thus escaping capital gains taxes. However, it is observed that individuals do 
indeed pay taxes on capital gains and also on dividend income in the real world, an 
observation which weakens Miller's 1977 model. 
Miller noted that the model is consistent with the fact that the US corporate debt ratio 
did not rise substantially despite the enormous increases in tax rates since the 1920's. 
mainly because, he argued, the tax rate changes moved in the same direction. 
The most comprehensive tests of the Miller general equilibrium model were conducted 
by Kim, Lewellen and McConnell (1979) (hereafter known as KLM). They extended 
Miller's analysis to show how financial leverage clienteles would emerge from his tax 
framework for the US, and then conducted tests upon three empirically testable 
implications of the leverage clientele hypothesis. The results of their extension of the 
Nfiller framework were that the investors with marginal tax rates greater than the 
corporate tax rate would demand the equity of ungeared or negative-geared firms, 
whereas investors with marginal tax rates less than the corporate tax rate would 
demand the equity of firms which are highly geared. Thus, firms would respond to such 
demand by specialising their capital structure mix in either zero or high gearing ratios. 
The empirically testable implications of their analysis are as follows. Firstly, it would be 
expected that firms of similar nature, such as the same industry group, would not have 
sinular capital structures, otherwise investors would not be able to achieve both 
adequate diversification and the amount of corporate gearing they desire. Secondly, 
they argued that there should be a negative cross-sectional relationship between firm 
capital structures and equity holder tax rates, if investors specialised their portfolios in 
relation to the gearing policies of firms. Moreover, the equity of firms with low gearing 
should be held by high bracket tix payers and highly geared firms' equity should be 
held by low bracket tax payers. Thirdly, the distribution of firm gearing ratios should 
be bimodal, with one mode centred at zero gearing and the other centred around some 
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high gearing level, following from Miller's 'bond holder surplus' concept. Equity 
holders associated with the lower mode should be high tax bracket investors, paying 
tax at a rate higher than the corporate tax rate, whereas equity holders associated with . 
the higher mode should be low tax bracket investors, paying tax at a lower rate than 
the corporate rate. Such testable implications of the Miller model are only indirect, 
KLM argued, as they are tests of implications rather than tests of hypotheses deriving 
directly from the model. The tests were conducted upon data from US firms and 
investors for the period 1964 to 1970. 
The first implication is not tested by KLM. However, there are a number of other 
authors who have tested this implication, that is, the similarity of capital structures 
within an industry. Such evidence is discussed in detail under the concept of target 
capital structure ratios in chapter 3, and thus the results are only briefly summarised 
here. Schwartz and Aronson (1967), Scott (1972), Scott and Martin (1975), amongst 
others, found evidence in support of the existence of significant differences in gearing 
ratios between, but not within, particular industries. There is less evidence of the 
converse, but authors such as Ferri and Jones (1979), did find a wide dispersion of 
gearing ratios within the same industry. Therefore, evidence on this first implication of 
Miller's model is mixed, though probably questions rather than supports the 
implication. Firms of similar nature do appear to have similar capital structures. 
The second implication to be tested was the relationship between corporate capital 
structures and investor tax rates. To do this, KLM ranked the sample by the debt- 
equity ratio of firms, divided the sample into deciles, and calculated the mean gearing 
ratios and mean tax rates of the associated equity holders. However, they found little 
evidence of the negative cross-sectional relationship between gearing ratios and 
investor tax rates, implied by the Miller model. Therefore, investors of specific tax 
brackets are not attracted to firms merely because of their gearing policies, a result 
which questions Miller's concept of financial leverage clienteles. 
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The third implication of the Nfiller model to be tested was the existence of a bimodal 
corporate capital structure distribution. For both total-debt-to-total-capital and long- 
term-debt-to-long-term-capital, KLM found evidence of a bimodal distribution. The 
lower modes were found to be close to zero, as expected, but the upper modes, in the 
30-35 per cent rangel fell short of what might be expected and were not pronounced. 
Thus, there is some weak evidence of bimodal corporate capital structures, giving 
some support to the Miller model. Related to the third implication, KLM tested to 
discover whether the equity of low (high) tax bracket firms was owned by investors 
with marginal tax rates greater (less) than the corporate tax rate. However, they found 
no evidence of this, a result which questioned the Miller model. They also regressed 
the corporate gearing ratios upon the marginal personal tax rates and other 
characteristics of equity holders in such firms and found that although the marginal tax 
rate variable was significant, the overall power of the model was very weak. 
The evidence deriving from tests of the three implications of the NEller model 
suggested that there is only weak evidence to support the existence of financial 
leverage clienteles, a result which questions the concept upon which the Miller model 
was created. KLM thus concluded that: 
"Financial managers should not be especially concerned about tailoring their 
firms' capital structure policies to specific shareholder tax groups nor, by 
extension, about disrupting such a clientele if they decide to change those 
policies. " (Kim, Lewellen and McConnell (1979), p. 108) 
Though the Miller model represented a more complete consideration of the effect of 
taxation on corporate capital structures as well as producing a general equilibrium 
framework, it is generally not supported by evidence from the real world. The model 
must therefore be considered an impressive framework, spurring further development 
in the area, but its lack of support by available empirical evidence might suggest that 
other important variables must be considered in addition to taxation for a more 
complete understanding of corporate capital structure determination. 
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2.3.5 SummaEy of the contributions of Modighani and Miller 
Modigliani and Miller were responsible for: the development of corporate capital 
structure theory in a more formal, mathematical framework; the creation of a coherent 
general equilibrium model; the theoretical development of the important influence of 
taxation; the production of the framework for subsequent critique and development of 
the area; and for the revitalisation of a debate perceived to be fairly stagnant at the 
time. 
The Modigliani and Miller models thus progressed from a firm-level capital structure 
irrelevance proposition, through a relevance proposition, reverting again to an 
irrelevance proposition. It is evident that the question of relevance relies upon the 
complexity of assumptions employed by the model author. The apparent lack of 
empirical support for the latter Miller (1977) model must therefore be due to the fact 
that, though relatively complex, it ornitted certain influences, tax or otherwise, which 
may be necessary to ensure the support of empirical evidence. Taxation influences that 
require further examination include: the tax advantage to debt in theory and practice; 
the occurrence of changes in the tax system and the structure of tax rates; and the 
overall influence of differing tax systems. Sections 2.4 to 2.7 examine these additional 
influences upon the corporate capital structure in turn. 
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2.4 The tax advantage tn debt in theory and practice 
The MM (1963) model proposed a distinct tax advantage to debt over equity which 
arose from the tax-deductibility of corporate debt interest payments. The model 
appeared to be supported, generally, by the available evidence, though its apparent 
advocacy of 99.9 per cent debt capital structures is rarely observed in finance markets. 
A number of factorsl therefore, must work against this effectively limitless tax 
advantage, to constrain the use of debt to "moderate" levels. The factors might 
include: the incidence of tax exhaustion (examined later in this chapter); bankruptcy 
costs and agency costs (examined in chapter 3); uncertainty; and factors related to a 
specific tax system, industry or firm. As noted in the previous section, the 1963 model 
only incorporated corporate taxes. With the addition of personal taxes by Miller 
(1977), the tax advantage to corporate debt is potentially eliminated at the firm level, 
and thus there is an optimal aggregate debt-equity ratio at the level of the whole 
market but not for the individual firm. This proposition derived from the interaction of 
firms and investor leverage clienteles in a model relying upon some very strict 
assumptions about the structure of tax ratios and implicit assumptions concerning the 
nature of the tax system itself Indeed, the Miller model assumed the effective tax rate 
on equity income to be zero and the model framework was that of a classical tax 
system, a system not commonly used outside the US. Various authors have found that 
the Miller (1977) general equilibrium model no longer holds when adapted for different 
tax systems or when certain assumptions are relaxed. Such criticisms are discussed 
later. Therefore, it is possible that a distinct tax advantage to debt remains and may 
vary from country to country, from firm to firm, as different factors influencing the tax 
advantage to debt are accounted for. 
In addition to a tax preference for either debt over equity or vice versa, the tax 
preference for debt in relation to'retained earnings is also studied by many authors. 
Although this study is concerned primarily with the external funding choice of the firm, 
where such a tax advantage exists between debt and retained earnings, this is briefly 
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discussed to more comprehensively examine the firm's tax preferences across all of its 
sources of potential finance. 
Firstly, this section discusses the circumstances where the tax advantage to debt may 
be considerably less than the magnitude suggested by MM (1963). Secondly, the 
empirical evidence of the authors who have found a positive relationship between the 
tax advantage to debt and corporate debt-equity ratios is examined. Thirdly, evidence 
questioning the strength of this relationship is presented. Finally, the overall 
significance of the tax advantage is discussed, explaining the effects which reduce the 
tax advantage to debt or even eliminate it completely. Thus, the importance of the tax- 
deductibility of interest payments on corporate debt is considered in an environment 
which may effectively offset this tax feature. 
The tax advantage may be considerably less than that implied by the MM (1963) 
model. The model proposed a tax advantage to debt equal to the amount of debt 
borrowed multiplied by the corporate rate of tax, at least for the US market. Indeed, 
Franks and Broyles (1979) noted that the tax advantage to corporate debt in the NM 
formula is different for the UK because of the double taxation of dividends in the US. 
The US employs a classical tax system whereby dividends are taxed at the corporate 
level and the personal level, and thus the tax advantage to debt denving from corporate 
taxes cannot be replicated by the equity holder by means of "home-made" borrowing. 
However, in the UK, which employs an imputation tax system, part of this tax 
advantage can be replicated by the equity holder through home-made borrowing, and 
therefore, the net tax advantage to debt represents only that part of the tax advantage 
which cannot be replicated by equity holders. Therefore, the nature of the UK tax 
system, whereby part of the corporate tax rate is imputed to the equity holder as their 
payment of personal taxes, reduces the tax advantage to debt to a 
fraction of the US 
tax advantage to debt, equal to the difference between the corporate tax rate and the 
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equity holders' marginal personal tax rate, all multiplied by the amount of debt in the 
firm's capital structure, and then grossed up at the basic rate. 
Substituting in the UK rates (correct at 1989) of 0.35 for the corporate tax rate and 
0.25 for the average marginal personal tax rate on debt interest and gross dividend 
income, Ashton (1989) demonstrated that the tax advantage to debt becomes: 
(T - ts) tax shield value 
(0.35 - 0.25) 
(1-0.25) 
13.33 per cent 
ts) 
Equation 2.3 
Where: 
the corporate tax rate 
ts the personal tax rate on investor income 
B the amount of debt 
Therefore, he argued that the tax advantage to debt in the UK was 13 per cent in 1989. 
However, he further argued that because the gross dividend can be offset against the 
firm's corporation tax liability under the imputation system, the tax advantage to debt is 
likely to be reduced from this value. Ashton then argued that in a world with personal 
taxes, this tax advantage to debt would disappear, particularly because the restrictions 
on personal tax arbitrage (Auerbach and King (1983), discussed in chapter 3) are an 
inherent characteristic of the LJK system. Ashton thus concluded that the tax advantage 
to corporate debt was no more than 13 per cent and was therefore much less than the 
35-50 per cent (of the face value of debt) often quoted in the US literature. 
Mayer and Morris (1982) studied the effect of firm differences in investment activity 
upon the marginal corporate tax rate of UK firms using the IFS Corporation Tax 
Model. They found that average present value associated with the tax benefits of 
different forms of finance was 18 per cent for debt, 7.5 per cent for retentions and -17 
per cent for new equity issues. 
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Cordes and Sheffiin (1983) estimated the marginal effective tax advantage to debt 
finance, using data from the Treasury 1978 Corporate Master Statistical File and 
simulations from the Treasury Corporate Tax Model. They found that the average , 
advantage to debt finance, defined as the reduction in corporate tax liabilities divided 
by the increase in interest deductions causing that reduction, was 0.31 for US 
corporations as a whole, and also for non-financial corporations. Therefore, Cordes 
and Sheffiin found the US tax advantage to debt to be far short of the 0.46 often 
assumed. 
In summary, a number of authors found the tax advantage to corporate debt to be very 
much less than the often assumed nominal tax benefits to debt in the UK and the US. 
The tax advantage to debt appeared to be reduced because of the nature of the tax 
system, the structure of tax rates, and the existence of tax exhaustion deriving from 
insufficient taxable earnings and high investment and other allowances. It remains 
unclear whether the tax advantage is eliminated by the effect of personal taxes, but it is 
clear that the tax advantage is less than that proposed by the NM (1963) model. 
Though the tax advantage may be significantly less than that proposed by the NM 
(1963) model, it would still be expected that an increase in a tax advantage present M 
should increase the debt-equity ratios that firms employ. King (1977), Norton (1991), 
and Rajan and Zingales (1994) found evidence to support this important relationship. 
King (1977) created a model similar to the MM (1963) model and tested the 
relationship between the tax incentives to different forms of finance and the observed 
pattern of funding in the UK economy. He argues that the optimal financial policy of a 
firm depends upon the marginal income tax rates of its equity holders. His empirical 
research thus examines the optimýlity of different forms of finance, assuming that the 
personal income tax rate is that applying either to the mean equity holder or the median 
equity holder. He found that 
in the period 1947-71 at no time would new equity issues 
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be the optimal source of finance in the UK for the average equity holder and that only 
in the year 1965 would the median equity holder have a preference for new equity. 
Furthermore, his tax incentive measures showed that debt would be preferred to new 
equity issues in every year of the study for the mean and median equity holder. The tax 
incentive measures that he computed suggested that: retained earnings would 
predominate in the UK after World War 11; new equity issues would be small; and that 
gearing would increase in importance through time. He found that evidence on the 
pattern of funding supported these predictions. 
King then computed three types of funding ratio: new- share-issues-to-retained- 
earnings, new- share-issues-to-borrowing, and new-debt-to-retained-eamings, and 
argued that a positive relationship would be expected between these ratios and the tax 
incentive measures. He thus regressed the financial ratios: upon the tax incentive 
measures; upon a multiplicative measure representing the trade-off at the margin 
between the different sources of finance; and upon the rate of growth of the corporate 
sector capital stock. The data used were aggregate time series data of LJK publicly 
quoted firms over the period 1950-71, and another independent sample of industrial 
and commercial firms over the period 1954-71. The tax incentive variable coefficients 
were found to be predominantly positive, with relationships for the new-share-issues- 
to-borrowing ratio and new-debt-to-retained-earnings ratio appearing more significant 
than the new-shares-to-retained-earnings ratio. The coefficients of the multiplicative 
variables were positive and the coefficients of the growth rate variable were positive 
and significant. Therefore, King found strong evidence of a positive relationship not 
only between the debt-equity ratio and the tax advantage to debt, but also between 
other financial ratios and their respective tax incentive measures. He argued that 
because this growth rate variable was significant in the financial ratios containing 
retained earnings, it might be considered as a proxy variable for the need to resort to 
external finance, as retained earnings are used in preference to debt, which is in turn 
used in preference to new equity. Thus, the tax incentive to any form of finance, and 
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debt in particular, was found by King to be strongly positively related to its respective 
financial ratio. 
King also created a portfolio adjustment model to explain the behaviour of the debt- 
equity ratio. He postulated that the target debt-equity ratio (d) would be expected to 
be negatively related to the tax incentive to issue new equity rather than debt (VB) and 
positively related to the tax incentive to issue debt rather than use retained earnings 
(VC). Thus: 
d, = a. + alVB + a2VC + a3d, -, 
Equation 2.4 
This model was then estimated for UK industrial and commercial firms over the period 
1955-71, using a mixed autoregressive and moving average error structure equation. 
He found that VB was significantly negatively related to the debt-equity ratio for both 
the mean and median marginal equity holder tax rates, but that VC had the incorrect 
sign and was insignificant for the median tax rate and just significant for the average 
tax rate. Thus, he included a takeover activity variable to adjust for this inconsistency, 
and found the tax incentive coefficient for VC to be positive, though still insignificant. 
The significance of the coefficient of VB (the tax incentive to issue equity rather than 
debt) and the insignificance of the VC coefficient (the tax incentive to issue debt rather 
than use retained earnings) suggests that the important choice for the UK firm is not 
between internal and external funding, it is between the forms of external funding. 
Retained earnings are likely to predominate over each form of external funding. 
Thus, evidence from King (1977) supported the MM (1963) tax advantage to debt 
proposition, implying a unique interior optimum debt-equity ratio for firms. In general, 
tax incentives to one form of finance over the others appears to influence the actual 
choice of funding mix. However, UK firms prefer in general to employ retained 
earnings, resorting only to external funding when these are exhausted. The tax 
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advantage to debt apparent in the UK appears to strongly influence the choice of debt 
to new equity issues. 
Norton (1991), in his 1984 factor analysis of US Fortune 500 firms, found that tax 
deductions and tax losses may affect capital structure choice. Thus) this evidence, 
based on the survey replies of firms, showed that firms perceived there to be a tax 
advantage to debt, and that tax exhaustion might reduce such a tax advantage. 
Rajan and Zingales (1994) studied the capital structures of firms in the G7 countries. 
They found a positive relationship between the tax advantage to debt and pre-tax 
earnings flowing to debt in Japan, Italy, Germany and the UK, in the period 1989-9 1, 
though no such relationshiP existed for the US. Therefore the G7 ýcountries' firms 
generally responded to an increase in the tax advantage to debt by increasing the 
amount of debt in their capital structures. 
Thus, there is evidence not only of a positive relationship between the tax advantage to 
debt and the proportion of debt in firm capital structures, but also evidence that firms 
perceive this advantage to be an important factor in their choice of capital structure. 
However, Rutterford (1988) and Mayer (1990) question this positive relationship in 
their empirical studies of corporate capital structures. Rutterford (1988) derived 
expressions for the tax advantage to debt in a number of countries, assuming that the 
tax rates on both dividend and debt to be 30 per cent. Shýe found the tax advantage to 
debt deriving from her formulae to be greatest for US firms and least for Japanese and 
German firms, which proved to be the exact opposite of the rankings of gearing ratios 
from sources such as the Wilson Report and the OECD. She concluded that: 
"A relatively high tax advantage to debt or likely demand for debt in a 
particular country is not related to a high aggregate leverage ratio. " 
(Rutterford (1988), p. 206) 
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Mayer (1990) compared the tax incentive to debt with actual average debt-equity 
ratios in eight countries over the period 1970 to 1985. He found that 
.7 
in theory, debt 
was generally preferred to equity in seven of the eight countries he studied, but that 
there was a universal preference for equity over debt observed in those countries' 
capital structures. However, Mayer noted that such a study did not take into 
consideration cross-border tax incentives, and other features of real finance markets 
and that the tax incentives refer only to 1983 whereas the actual debt-equity ratios 
related to a much larger time-span. Even though such shortcomings might weaken the 
result slightly, he argued that the result was still valid. Thus Mayer found evidence that 
the tax advantage to debt was not positively related to the actual capital structures of 
firms observed, and that a negative relationship may even exist. Therefore, the 
evidence of Rutterford and Mayer strongly questioned the positive relationship 
between the tax advantage to debt and the proportion of debt in the firm's capital 
structure. 
In summary, the tax advantage to debt proposed by Modigliani and Nfiller appeared to 
overstate the tax advantage to debt in real world finance markets, as such factors as 
the nature of the tax system, the structure of tax rates and tax exhaustion may 
significantly reduce this incentive. There is evidence that firms do indeed perceive the 
tax advantage to debt to be a significant determinant of their capital structures, and 
that increases in this tax advantage increase the proportion of debt employed by the 
firm. However, considerable evidence also exists to question such a relationship. 
Therefore, firms may indeed perceive there to be a distinct tax advantage to debt, 
though evidence on the strength of the relationship across countries between the tax 
advantage to debt and observed debt-equity ratios is mixed. The important time series 
evidence of King (1977), however, suggests that such a relationship is readily observed 
through time, at least for the UK. ' 
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2.5 The influence of tax exhaustion on the corporate capital structure 
Section 2.4 suggested that the advantage associated with the tax deductibility of 
corporate debt interest payments may influence the capital structure choice of the firm, 
though the exact nature of the relationship is uncertain. However, the occurrence of 
tax exhaustion may limit this tax benefit by "crowding-out" the ability of firms to claim 
the full, nominal tax advantage to debt. Tax exhaustion occurs where a firm has a 
surplus of capital (or other) allowances or losses carried forward over taxable profits. 
Thus firms with relatively high investment (and other allowable) expenditures, low 
taxable profits, or a combination of both, may find that any tax advantage to debt 
present is reduced or even eliminated. 
To examine the precise influence of tax exhaustion upon the capital structure of the 
firm, it is necessary to look at the theory and evidence. Firstly, the theory models are 
examined to more fully explain the concept of tax exhaustion, its relation to former 
capital structure theories, and its implications for corporate capital structure choice. 
Secondly, evidence on the extent of tax exhaustion is considered. Thirdly, and related 
to the second section, evidence of the effect of tax exhaustion upon the tax aýdvantage 
to debt is discussed. Finally, the overall impact of tax exhaustion on corporate capital 
structure choice is summarised. 
Firstly, the theory of models of DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Mayer and Morris 
(1982), Mayer (1984) and Dammon and Senbet (1988) are discussed to provide the 
theory framework necessary to fully examine the problem of corporate tax exhaustion. 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) developed a state-preference model of corporate 
gearing choice to examine the sensitivity of the Miller (1977) model to various tax 
extensions. They found that the' existence of non-debt corporate tax shields was 
sufficient to overturn the Miller proposition of capital structure irrelevancy. Their 
model demonstrated that such tax shields implied an optimal degree of gearing for each 
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individual firm, and that such an optimum did not require the incorporation of such 
offsetting factors as bankruptcy and agency costs. Furthermore, they argued that the 
net corporate-marginal personal tax benefit is of the same order of magnitude as 
expected marginal default costs, and that if such costs are incorporated the unique firm 
optimum still occurs. The model predicts that the level of gearing is negatively related 
to the level of non-debt tax shields. DeAngelo and Masulis therefore argued that the 
effect of tax exhaustion is extremely important to the determination of corporate 
capital structures, to the extent that it overturns Nfiller's firm-level capital structure 
I 
irrelevance proposition. 
Mayer and Morris (1982) studied the effects of different rates of allowances on the 
marginal rates of taxation of UK firms, using the IFS model of Corporation Tax. They 
found that such tax allowances depended upon the asset structure and activity of the 
firm and also the earnings of the firm, and are thus necessarily firm-specific. They 
concluded that: 
"There are considerable variations across companies in the value of the tax 
deductibility of interest payments and the mainstream offset of the imputation 
system. " (Mayer and Morris (1982), p. 159-60) 
Such a conclusion supports the proposition of DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), that the 
presence of non-debt tax shields is capable of overturning the Miller irrelevancy 
proposition and implies firm-level optimal capital structures. 
Mayer (1984) extended this study of tax exhaustion by introducing uncertainty about 
the level of taxable earnings into his stochastic model of company earnings. He found 
that once such uncertainty was incorporated into his model, the value of tax deductions 
and allowances becomes dependent on the financial and investment policy of the firm. 
Extreme gearing positions would no longer be optimal as a result of this, and financial 
or legal constraints on gearing would not be necessary to achieve an optimum. His 
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analysis suggests that firms would set their debt levels based upon their expectations of 
the level of future earnings compared to their taxable allowances. He concluded that: 
"Tax exhaustion can, and in very many cases does, occur well before 
bankruptcy so that tax considerations will come into play even at 
comparatively modest debt: equity ratios. " (Mayer (1984), p. 32) 
Therefore, not only does tax exhaustion appear to be an important determinant of the 
corporate capital structure (and vice versa), its effect is felt by the firm well before it 
may reach a position of financial distress. Thus tax acts upon the capital structure, 
through tax exhaustion, as an offsetting factor to the benefits of debt, even where firms 
are relatively buoyant and not experiencing significant bankruptcy or agency costs. 
Dammon and Senbet (1988) extended the DeAngelo and Masulis model in a state- 
preference model which allowed for uncertainty and incorporated investment. They 
found that increases in allowable investment-related tax shields were not necessarily 
associated with reductions in gearing, when investment was allowed to adjust 
optimally in their model. The argued that the effect of an increase in such investment 
tax shields depends on the extent to which substitution and income effects offset each 
other. The "substitution effect" (developed by DeAngelo and Masulis) derives from the 
fact that, ceteris paribus, an increase in investment tax shields reduces the value of the 
debt interest tax shield. The "income effect" derives from the fact that as firm output 
increases, debt interest tax shields increase in value. They also conducted a cross- 
sectional analysis and produced the interesting result that'. 
"Firms with higher investment-related tax shields (normalized by expected 
earnings) need not have lower debt-related tax shields (normalized by expected 
earnings) if firms employ different production technologies. " 
(Dammon and Senbet (1988), p. 359) 
Thus, in their model, increases in investment tax shields need not reduce debt interest 
tax shields if this condition holds, but if firms do have the same production 
technologies then there is a negative relationship between the types of tax shield. 
Dammon and Senbet (1988), then, modified the DeAngelo and Masulis result of a 
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negative relationship between investment tax shields and gearing, arguing that such a 
relationship would result only if firms maintained identical production technologies. 
The theory models of the effect of tax exhaustion appear to strongly support the 
proposition that there exists a firm-level optimal capital structure, as the extent of tax 
exhaustion is specific to the individual firm. The value of non-debt tax allowances 
appears to depend not only on the level of gearing, but also on the asset structure, 
expected earnings, and production technology of the firm. As earnings are uncertain 
from year to year, later models accounted for this uncertainty, but still generally 
produced the same proposition: that an increase in the amount of non-debt tax shields 
"crowds out" debt interest tax shields, reducing the effective tax advantage to 
corporate debt. 
There is a large body of evidence concerning the extent of corporate tax exhaustion, 
only some of which is examined here. Evidence from the IRS (DeAngelo and Masulis, 
1980), the UK Government Green Paper on Corporation Tax (1982), and Mayer and 
Morris (1982) is discussed. 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) reviewed evidence from the US IRS which found that 
investment tax shields ($49.5 bn. ) were of the same order as debt interest tax shields 
($64.3 bn. ) in 1975. They also studied Statistics of Income data for the period 1964- 
1973 and found that, for the US, 27 per cent of US firms paid no taxes at all in a given 
year period. Therefore, investment tax shields are as significant as debt tax shields, 
supporting the propositions of DeAngelo and Masulis, and tax exhaustion is a 
widespread occurrence for US firms. 
53 
The LJK Government Green Paper on Corporation Tax (1982) noted that, 
"... it is estimated that in any year only about 40 per cent of all companies are 
currently earning sufficient profits, after all tax reliefs and allowances, to pay 
mainstream corporation tax. " (HN4SO (1982), p. 9 para. 4.7) 
Therefore, this is indirect evidence that tax exhaustion is also significant in the UK. 
Mayer and Morris (1982) studied the effects of changes in investment allowances upon 
the marginal change in corporation tax in the UK. They noted a strong relationship 
between increases in investment allowances and decreases in the marginal change in 
corporation tax. They argued that the significant fluctuations in the average level of 
marginal investment incentives, even in periods when the allowance rates and 
corporate tax rates remained constant, arose because tax exhausted firms were often 
unable to claim available incentives in the year of investment. Therefore, using the IFS 
model, they found evidence that the extent of tax exhaustion varied from year to year 
in the UK, but was always a significant determinant of the effective corporate tax rate. 
To summarise, there is strong evidence that tax exhaustion is a significant problem in 
the US and the UK, as it reduces the effective corporate tax rate, reducing the tax 
advantage to debt, and limits the extent of gearing of the firm. 
There is another large body of evidence concerning the effect of tax exhaustion on the 
corporate tax advantage to debt and thus the corporate capital structure. Evidence 
from DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Cordes and Sheffrin (1983), Mayer and Morris 
(1982), Long and Malitz (1983), Kay and Sen (1983), Rutterford (1988), and Mackie- 
Mason (1990) is reviewed. 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) sought to test the hypothesis that differential investment 
tax shields should induce differential optimal leverage ratios for firms. They cited US 
studies by authors such as Vanik (1978) and Muskie (1976), showing significant 
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variations in investment tax shields across industries, and studies by authors such as 
Scott and Martin (1975) and Schwartz and Aronson (1967), who found significant 
differences in gearing ratios across industries but not within industries. They argued 
that this evidence supported their model, as significant investment tax shield variations 
across industries should produce significant gearing variations across industries with 
differing non-debt tax shields relative to earnings (before interest and taxes), whereas 
intra-industry gearing ratio differences should be less significant. DeAngelo and 
Masulis also hypothesized that, as many corporate deductions are based on historical 
costs, inflation increases should increase notninal revenues and decrease the real value 
of investment tax shields, thus encouraging firms to increase their gearing as they can 
better utilise debt tax shields. They cited studies by Corcoran (1977) and Zwick (1977) 
who found the gearing ratios of US firms to increase significantly over the period 
1965-74 when the US economy experienced significant increases in the rate of 
inflation. DeAngelo and Masulis, then, found evidence of a significant impact of tax 
exhaustion on the tax deductibility of corporate debt interest payments (the tax 
advantage to debt). 
Mayer and Morris (1982) found that in 1976,36 per cent of the sample studied, using 
the UK IFS model, received no relief on a unit increment in interest payments. 
Therefore, a significant number of UK firms are likely to be faced with a zero tax 
advantage to debt. They also noted that, because the tax system in the UK is complex, 
the tax advantage to debt for a firm is very sensitive to its specific underlying position, 
thus reinforcing the proposition that there exist firm-specific optimal capital structures. 
Cordes and Sheffrin (1983) found the tax advantage to debt of US firms to be 0.31 
(the reduction in corporate tax liabilities divided by the increase in interest deductions), 
which was considerably less than the corporate tax rate of 0.46 in 1978. They argued 
that this differential was due to the fact that the use of non-debt tax shields was 
impaired by debt interest deductions. They also found that the marginal incentives to 
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debt varied significantly by industry and asset size, the former result supporting the 
DeAngelo and Masulis hypotheses. 
Long and Malitz (1983), in their study of 545 US manufacturing firms, found a large 
positive correlation between a non-debt tax shield and gearing, which contrasts with 
the negative relationship found by other authors. They argued that DeAngelo and 
Masulis' study did not take account of advertising and R&D (which, they argued, are 
greater for US firms than capital spending because such expenditures are immediately 
allowable against tax rather than being amortised over time). They thus incorporated 
such expenditures into the tax shield measure, and they found a statistically significant 
negative relationship between non-debt tax shields and gearing which is consistent with 
intuition. 
Rutterford (1988) estimated the tax advantage to debt in a number of countries. She 
compared her tax advantage to debt values with estimates of effective average rates of 
corporation tax on undistributed profits estimated by Kay and Sen (1983), and found 
that the typical nominal corporate tax rate of 50 per cent was significantly greater than 
the average effective rates in each of the countries studied. The overstatement of the 
tax advantage to debt, she argued, was a result of the generosity of allowances in each 
country, to the extent that, by 1982, LJK firms had an estimated L30 billion of unused 
allowances. Thus, Rutterford found that the generosity of tax allowances significantly 
reduced the average effective corporate tax rate of firms in a number of countries, thus 
restricting the value of debt tax shields, thereby discouraging firms from using as 
much debt at the margin. 
Mackie-Mason (1990) employed a discrete choice analysis to model the debt/equity 
choice of the US firm, based on'SEC Registered Offering Statistics and Compustat 
data. He studied both tax loss carry forwards (TLCs) and investment tax credits 
(ITC's), as he argued that increases in non-debt tax shields do not necessarily always 
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lead to reductions in gearing. He found that increases in tax loss carry forwards 
significantly reduced the probability that the firm will issue debt, as carry forwards are 
very likely to "crowd out" debt interest deductions. However, he found that increases 
in investment tax credits significantly increased the probability that the firm will issue 
debt. Such an apparently counter intuitive result is explained by some authors by means 
of the "moral hazard hypothesis", Mackie-Mason argued, whereby: 
"High tangible asset values should encourage debt issues by lowering the 
associated moral hazard costs. " (Mackie-Mason (1990), p. 1482) 
However, when he modelled the investment tax credits of firms near tax exhaustion, he 
found the expected negative coefficient. 
Therefore, there is a considerable body of evidence to support DeAngelo and Masulis' 
(1980) proposition that the greater the level of non-debt tax shields that a firm has, the 
lower the gearing ratio it will have, as non-debt tax shields "crowd out" debt interest 
tax shields. There is evidence that the effective tax advantage to corporate debt is 
significantly reduced by non-debt tax shields, though different tax shields influence the 
corporate capital structure is different ways. For example, tax loss carry forwards will 
exert a very significant negative influence on corporate gearing because firms 
experiencing losses will be far closer to a state of complete tax exhaustion. Studies 
which incorporate the probability of complete tax exhaustion appear to be more 
convincing, and the resulting models more robust. Increases in inflation may increase 
gearing ratios as the value of investment tax shields is reduced. Some authors found 
marginal investment incentives to vary with firm size and industry, and other important 
firm-specific factors reinforce this firm-level optimal capital structure result. Thus, the 
effect of the existence of non-debt tax shields is to reduce the tax advantage to debt, 
producing an optimal firm-level capital structure which is rather less than the extreme 
all debt position. 
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To summarise, the existence of non-debt tax shields is sufficient to produce optimal 
firm-level capital structures, specific to the firm, as they are determined by the 
underlying tax position of that individual firm. This tax position is in turn determined , 
by the firm's past, current and future investment and financial decisions. Expansion of 
one type of tax shield may "crowd out" another, but need not do so if the firm is 
expanding output and sales, in which case, for example, investment tax credits may not 
crowd out debt interest tax shields. Thus, although the central proposition of '. 'tax 
exhaustion theories" is clear, the mechanics of the processes involved may be difficult 
to understand and model, due to the important effects of tax system complexities and 
uncertainty. 
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2.6 The influence of corporate tax reform and -changes 
in tax rates upon the 
corporate capital structure 
This section seeks to examine the effect of corporate tax changes, and more generally, 
tax code reforms, upon the gearing ratios of firms. Firstly, theory models and 
propositions concerning the relationship between the corporate tax rate and the 
corporate gearing ratio are examined. Secondly, evidence to test such a relationship is 
examined. Thirdly, evidence of the impact of corporate tax reform on the corporate 
capital structure is discussed. Finally, the overall impact of changes in the corporate tax 
rate and corporate tax reforms is summarised. 
Theory related to the relationship between the corporate tax rate and the gearing ratio 
of the firm is extensive, and at times complex. However, only the important work of 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) and Litzenberger and Talmor (1989) is discussed here, 
as more complex theories of the relationship have already been considered in earlier 
sections. 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) developed a model of corporate gearing choice which 
yielded a number of testable hypotheses, one of which was that firms will substitute 
debt for equity financing as the corporate tax rate is raised. Therefore, their model of 
optimal capital structure choice, which concentrated upon the effect of tax exhaustion, 
also predicted that the gearing ratio should increase with the corporate tax rate. It is 
notable that most theories of optimal capital structure choice would support the nature 
of this relationship, even if they include other tax and non-tax factors. 
However, Litzenberger and Talmor (1989) developed a corporate capital structure 
model which produced a very different result. Their model proposed that corporate 
taxes have a neutral effect on the firm's capital structure, the mix of which is therefore 
of no interest to the firm. This capital structure irrelevancy result, they argued, was 
analogous to NM (1958) irrelevancy in the respect that: 
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"Investors can hedge against changes in corporate decisions that redistribute 
wealth in the economy, in a manner similar to the ability of homemade 
leverage to unravel on a personal account any corporate financial leverage. " 
(Litzenberger and Talmor (1989), p. 313) 
it is clearly demonstrated that the influence of changes in the corporate tax rate 
depends on the author's theoretical propositions of either the relevancy or irrelevancy 
of the corporate capital structure, "relevancy" supporting the importance of the 
corporate tax rate and "irrelevancy" challenging its importance. 
It is essential, then, to discuss the evidence examining the relationship between the 
corporate tax rate and the gearing ratios of firms. Such evidence is provided by Taub 
(1975), Zwick (1977), and Holland and Myers (1977). Taub (1975) argued that both 
the traditional and MM models supported a strong relationship between the corporate 
tax rate and the firm debt-equity ratio. They studied US firm data over the period 
1951-70 and found a negative relationship between the two variables, suggesting that 
increases in the corporate tax rate were associated with decreases in the gearing ratios 
of US firms over the period. This counter intuitive result was explained by Peles and 
Sarnat (1977) who argued that the degree of variation in the tax rate over the period 
(4.8 per cent) was insufficient to support a strong conclusion, a shortcoming which 
was alluded to by Taub in his paper. Zwick (1977), in his study of the market for US 
corporate bonds, found evidence to suggest that: 
"The increase in debt ratios from 1960 through 1967 - after fifteen years of 
change - occurred because of a decrease in asset risk rather than an increase 
in 
taxes or inflation. " (Zwick (1977), p-34) 
Thus, he found little evidence linking the increase in corporate gearing ratios with 
increases in the corporate tax rate. Holland and Myers (1977) studied the debt-equity 
ratios of all non-financial US firms over the long period 1929-75. They found evidence 
that over the period 1940-42, when corporate taxes increased significantly, corporate 
gearing ratios also rose significantly. Therefore, only in the latter study was evidence 
found of a strong relationship between the corporate tax rate and the level of corporate 
gearing. However, such studies require relatively long data time spans to enable 
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observation of a relationship, which is further hindered by the often "sticky" nature of 
corporate tax rates from year to year. 
Further evidence on the effect of corporate tax changes is provided by Peles and 
Sarnat (1977) and Rajan and Zingales (1994), as both studies examine the effect of tax 
reforms upon the corporate capital structure. Peles and Sarnat (1977) sought to 
examine the effect of a significant tax reform, the Finance Act (1965), upon UK 
corporate capital structures. Amongst other measures, this reform replaced profit and 
income taxes with a single uniform corporate tax. They studied gearing ratios for the 
five year period before and after the reform was effected. As the tax reform in effect 
taxed distributed profits at a higher rate than before, the reform would be expected to 
increase corporate gearing. They found that the tax reform had a very significant effect 
on UK corporate capital structures, effectively doubling the average corporate debt- 
equity ratio. Thus, corporate capital structures are extremely sensitive to radical tax 
reforms. Rajan and Zingales (1994) argued that if tax mattered, changes in the 
incentives to employ different funding instruments should result in an increase in those 
instruments which become most tax advantaged following the reform. They studied tax 
reforms in G7 countries over the period 1982-90 and found that the instrument 
becoming most favoured after the reform increased in importance in 6 of the 7 
countries and the instrument becoming least favoured decreased in importance in all of 
the countries. Indeed., a Wilcoxon Rank Test confirmed this effect to be significant at 
the I per cent level. Tax reforms, then, appear to exert a significant impact upon the 
capital structures of firms, particularly when they radically alter the tax incentives of 
one form of funding over the others. 
To summarise, this section sought to examine the influence of corporate tax reform 
and changes in tax rates upon thecorporate capital structure. As found with respect to 
the tax advantage to debt, the effect of a change in the corporate tax rate has an 
uncertain effect on the capital structure. This result derives more from the evidence 
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than the theory. However, tax reforms do appear to have an important impact. The 
reason for these results is unclear. There are three possible explanations: tax is not an 
important influence on the corporate capital structure; the corporate capital structure 
and taxation models are too naive; or, other, non-tax factors are more important. 
The first explanation is unsatisfactory, as there is clear evidence of the impact of tax 
factors such as tax exhaustion and tax reform on the corporate capital structure, in 
addition to the vast body of literature examining the effect of taxation. Moreover, the 
corporate finance literature surely would not have been steered by taxation frameworks 
over the last 30 years unless there were both strong theoretical and empirical reasons 
for doing so. 
The argument that corporate capital structure/taxation models are too naive to 
adequately represent real world finance markets, and therefore produce useful testable 
hypotheses, is perhaps a valid one. The sheer complexity of tax systems which have 
developed over hundreds of years, being subject to numerous incremental adjustments 
each year, is such that models are necessarily abstract so as to represent only part of 
the taxation environment. It may be argued that models are only supposed to be simple 
representations of reality, but the complexity of a given tax system may mean that 
authors do not even fully appreciate the "reality" to be qualified to model it. Taxation 
factors may not be considered in isolation, as the taxation environment is a set of 
complex relationships, governed by: causation uncertainty; differing degrees of 
understanding of the system by participants; differing perceptions of the influence of 
taxation; a lack a detailed firm-specific taxation data; interactions of corporate and 
personal finance markets, the wider corporate environment and the macro economy; 
continual evolution based on the whims of resident governments; firm expectations of 
future earnings and the probability of tax exhaustion; and numerous other factors. 
Thus, the "taxation naivety" argument appears to be a possibility. 
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Other non-tax factors may indeed be more important than taxation factors, particularly 
as many firms in the economy are relatively unsophisticated and do not appreciate the 
full tax implications of their capital structure changes. Such factors are explored in 
detail in chapter 3. 
It therefore appears that taxation is not adequately modelled in the literature to date 
due to its complexity; or, that other non-tax factors are more important to the capital 
structure decision of the firm; or that both explanations are valid. Such a statement 
implies that further work must be undertaken to enable a more precise understanding 
of taxation and that the effect of the non-tax financial environment must be examined. 
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2.7 The influence of the tax system u1pon the corporate capital structure 
It has been demonstrated that there is significant evidence of the strong influence of 
changes in the tax system upon corporate capital structures. However, the tax system 
in place should also be examined with regard to its influence on the funding choice of 
firms. Much of the theory of corporate finance is based upon the US classical taxation 
system and therefore results from such models are not necessarily universal to firms in 
other countries. Indeed, Ashton (1989) argued that: 
"The UK tax system is sufficiently different from the US system that their (the 
writings of Modigliani and Miller) relevance to the practice of UK financial 
management is non-existent. " (Ashton (1989), p. 207) 
Therefore, different tax systems induce different firm behaviour in corporate funding 
decisions,, as the tax incentives to different funding instruments may vary significantly 
from one system to another. Many authors describe the conditions under which there is 
a tax advantage to corporate debt using the MM (1963) model, or the conditions 
necessary to achieve Miller (1977) capital structure irrelevancy. 
This section, first of all, describes the main types of tax system in use in modem 
industrialised economies, along with the overall direction such systems are moving in. 
Secondly, derivations of the MM models for different tax systems are discussed, 
paying particular attention to the implications of such adapted models for the 
economies concerned. Finally, the overall influence of the tax system is summarised, 
based upon the discussion of the results of the models. 
The main tax systems employed by modern industrialised economies may be described 
as classical, imputation, dual-rate (split-rate), and hybrid systems. Stapleton and Burke 
(1977), Nobes (1980), and Rutterford (1988) describe these systems, descriptions of 
which are briefly summarised below. 
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Nobes (1980) described classical systems in the following manner: 
"Under such systems, company profits are taxed without a deduction for 
dividends paid; then the dividends are fully taxed as investment income in the 
hands of the shareholders. " (Nobes (1980), p. 22 1) 
Stapleton and Burke (1977) described the imputation system, 
"Where the stockholder receives a credit against his personal tax equal to some 
proportion of the corporate tax paid by the firm. " 
(Stapleton and Burke (1977), p. 55) 
Rutterford (1988) stated that dual rate systems attempt to mitigate, at least partially, 
the effective double taxation of income inherent in the classical system: 
"By imposing a lower corporate tax rate on distributed profits. " 
(Rutterford (1988), p. 200) 
She further explained that hybrid systems are simply a combination of dual corporate 
tax rates and an imputation tax system. 
There has been a clear movement of tax systems away from the classical tax system 
towards imputation type systems in the post-war period, as a means of mitigating the 
effective double taxation of dividends under the former system. 
Nobes (1980) argued that the UK's movement away from the classical tax system, for 
example, was the result of three factors: the desire to bring EEC tax systems closer 
together; an equity argument, that is, mitigation of the double taxation of equity 
income, first at the corporate level and second at the personal level; and the desire to 
encourage effective investment. This latter reason, he argued, was due to the fact that 
an imputation system reduces the bias against the distribution of profits, in turn, 
improving the quality of investment. This is because larger dividend payments should 
result, withdrawing resources from firms of lower profitability and hopefully 
channelling it towards firms of higher profitability. Therefore, the reasons of tax 
I 
harmonisation, double taxation mitigation and improved investment should encourage 
governments to move towards an imputation system, should encourage firms to 
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distribute higher dividends and investors to maximise profits and increasing the quality 
of investment. Such a movement towards an imputation system should encourage a 
greater use of equity funding, impacting directly upon the capital structure of the firm 
Rutterford (1988) found that tax reforms in the UK, France, Germany and Japan 
sought to relieve the effects of double taxation on equity income. She argued that the 
major reason for such tax reform was the government's desire to influence firms' 
dividend decisions and that this was particularly evident in tax reforms in Japan and the 
US, examples which demonstrated an explicit desire to promote the use of debt over 
equity. Thus, the government exerts a direct influence on the capital structure of the 
firm through the definition of a particular tax system type, and may also exert a less 
direct influence upon the firm through various tax reforms. 
Stapleton and Burke (1977) studied the Van den Tempel (1969) report to the EEC 
Comn-dssion on tax systems within Europe. The report considered the issue of tax 
neutrality, which found that the imputation (and dual rate) systems are neutral with 
respect to dividend policy. Stapleton and Burke defined a neutral tax system as 
follows: 
"A neutral tax system is then precisely one under which financing and dividend 
policies have no effect on the market value (of the stock plus the bonds) of the 
firm. " (Stapleton and Burke (1977), p. 57) 
They basically reasoned that tax neutrality should be pursued for philosophical and 
allocative efficiency reasons. Philosophically, the tax environment should not be 
distortionary and should not restrain firms from their business. The tax system should 
be allocation efficient, in that it should not create a bias for one form of finance over 
another, or encourage one type of firm over another. 
I 
Thus, the movement towards imputation-type tax systems across the modem 
industrialised economies was based upon reasons of harmonisation, equity, 
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encouragement of investment, allocative efficiency, government control, and greater 
tax neutrality. The overall effect on corporate capital structures appear to have been a 
reduction in equity income taxation, thus encouraging the greater use of equity relative 
to debt. Therefore, the gradual development of the tax system is one method by which 
governments can directly impact upon the capital structures of firms, by altering their 
dividend decisions. 
Theoretical models which extend the MM models for different tax systems are 
developed by Franks and Broyles (1979), Pointon (1981), Mayer (1984), Rutterford 
(1988), and Ashton (1989). 
Franks and Broyles (1979) argued that under the US classical tax system, the tax 
advantage to debt was merely the corporate tax rate multiplied by the amount of debt, 
using the MM (1963) formulae. However, under the UK imputation system the 
company is deemed to act as an agent for the tax authorities in collecting the 
shareholder's tax and thus the corporate tax rate in effect "includes" the shareholder's 
tax at the standard rate. The tax advantage to debt thus becomes, for one period, the 
difference between the corporate rate and the shareholder standard rate. They argued 
that, in the UK, the tax advantage to debt related to the personal tax rate can be 
replicated in part by the shareholder by means of homemade borrowing and therefore 
only the difference between the rates is the net advantage to debt. Thus, Franks and 
Broyles found the tax advantage to be very much less in the UK due to the imputation 
system and the possibility of homemade borrowing. 
Pointon (198 1) developed a model to examine the effects of the imputation system on 
the optimal corporate capital structure. His perfect market tax-free model produced 
the same results as the NM (1958) model. Pointon extended MM's 1963 work by 
determining the effect of risky debt interest and incorporated a personal tax 
framework. While it would be of little use reproducing his model, the main conclusion 
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deriving from the model is of more interest to this section. Pointon concluded that the 
UK imputation system was characterised by complex tax effects which the MM models 
did not adequately represent. 
Mayer (1984) created a dynamic programming model of the corporate financial and 
investment decisions, which he extended for the UK imputation system. Under such a 
system, otherwise independent financial and investment activities become interrelated, 
as the value of interest tax deductions may decrease as non-debt allowances increase. 
He found that equality of costs of alternative forms of finance could be achieved 
without the need for the legal constraints necessary to other models' solutions. The 
imputation system, then, in conjunction with tax exhaustion effects, produces an 
internal optimum capital structure solution at firm level, and thus the extent of any tax 
advantage to debt (the extent to which firms should monitor their funding choice) may 
differ across tax systems. 
Rutterford (1988) produced formulae for the tax advantage to debt under classical, 
imputation, and hybrid tax systems. She assumed that investor taxes are constant 
across all firms, thus producing the following formulae. The expressions to follow 
merely represent the difference in the income streams accruing to stockholders and 
debt holders between a levered and an unlevered firm, capitalised at the after-tax cost 
of debt. The tax advantage to debt under the classical tax system is: 
Tax advantage to debt =BI- 
(I - Tc)(I - tps) 
L- 
(1 
- tpb 
) 
-i 
Where: 
B= the amount of debt in the geared firm 
T= the corporate tax rate C 
tPS the tax rate on investor from equity investment 
tpb = the investor income tax rate on debt income 
Equation 2.5 
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The tax advantage to debt under the imputation tax system if all profits are paid out as 
dividends is: 
Tax advantage to debt =BI- 
(1 TDO - tpd) 
Equation 2.6 
L- 
(1 tpb )(1 - ti 
) 
_j 
Where: 
tpd = the personal tax rate on dividend income 
tj = imputation rate on gross dividends 
Alternatively, if all profits are paid out as capital gains (for example, through share 
repurchase) under the imputation system the tax advantage to debt is: 
Tax advantage to debt =BI- 
(I - Tc)(I - 
tg) 
Equation 2.7 
L- 
(I 
- tpb 
) 
Where: 
tg the capital gains tax rate 
The tax advantage to debt under the hybrid system (which is a combination of an 
imputation system and the use of dual corporate taxes), if all profits are paid out as 
dividends, is: 
Tax advantage to debt =BI 
(I - Tcd)(I tpd) 
Equation 2.8 
L- 
(1- tpb)(1 ti) 
Where: 
T= the tax rate on distributed profits cd 
Alternatively, the tax advantage to debt under the hybrid system if all profits are paid 
out as capital gains (for example, through share repurchase) is: 
Tax advantage to debt 
BI- 
(I - Tcu)(I - 
tg) 
L- 
0- t 
pb 
) 
-j 
Where T == the tax rate on undistributed profits cu 
Equation 2.9 
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Given these formulae, Rutterford examined the tax advantage to debt under the 
different systems, and showed how this changed under different assumptions about 
equity distributions and tax rates. She found that if zero taxes were assumed on equity 
returns then the tax advantage to debt may disappear. Employing the Nfiller 
assumptions that the equity income tax rate is zero and that the personal tax rate on 
debt income varies across investors, she found that the classical tax system model 
produced an aggregate optimal debt-equity ratio at the market level, but no such 
optimum at firm level. Using the same Miller assumptions she found that debt 
irrelevance could hold in the US, UK and Japan, whereas debt don-finated in France 
and equity dominated in Germany. However, as noted in section 2.4, she discovered 
that such results bore little resemblance to observed capital structures in these 
countries. Therefore, Rutterford adapted the MM tax advantage to debt formula for 
differing tax systems and found that the Miller (1977) irrelevancy proposition could 
hold in countries using imputation or hybrid systems. The tax system employed by a 
country thus has an important impact upon the incentives to firms of utilising one form 
of finance over another. 
Ashton (1989) reworked the Modigliani and Nfiller formulae under the UK imputation 
system, as he argued the MM formulae in their standard form were irrelevant to the 
UK system. He found that, assuming 1989 tax rates (corporate tax rate = 0.35; basic 
rate of personal tax rate = 0.25), the tax advantage to debt was merely 13 per cent of 
the debt's market value, which may in turn be reduced by bankruptcy or agency costs. 
The reduced tax advantage to debt, compared to the often quoted 35-50 per cent of 
debt value for the US, was due to the fact that, under an imputation system, the gross 
dividend may be offset against the firm's corporation tax liability. However, when 
personal taxes were added to his analysis, Ashton argued that, because individuals 
cannot indulge in personal tax arbitrage, market segmentation occurs with some 
individuals preferring debt over equity (and vice versa) for tax reasons. This is because 
a lower bound is placed on debt because personal debt interest is not tax-deductible 
70 
and an upper bound is placed on debt because short positions on equity and long 
positions on debt are restricted by UK institutions. The marginal tax rates on debt and 
equity need not be equal under such investor specialisation, and thus in general 
equilibrium firms adjust their debt-equity ratios and investors adjust their portfolios 
until the tax advantage to debt disappears. Therefore, Ashton proposed that the 
inherent nature of the UK's imputation system is consistent with firm-level capital 
structure irrelevancyl begging the question as to what non-tax factors may determine 
the firm capital structure choice. 
The theory models of the tax advantage to debt under different tax systems generally 
reveal a tax advantage to debt under non-classical systems which is very much less 
than the often quoted 35-50 per cent of debt market value for the US. There are a 
number of reasons for this. Firstly, outside the US, possibilities for homemade gearing 
may be greater, reducing the tax advantage to debt from the full corporate rate. 
Secondly, different tax systems tax different forms of investor returns differently, 
altering the tax rate structures required for either a distinct tax advantage to debt or 
firm level irrelevancy. Thirdly, Nfiller's general equilibrium proposition of firm-level 
capital structure irrelevancy can hold under differing tax systems, subject both to 
institutional restrictions and certain strict tax assumptions. This reinforces the 
proposition that tax may be an important determinant of the corporate capital structure 
but conditional upon the combination of the tax system, the structure of tax rates, 
institutional structures, and other factors such as the extent of tax exhaustion. 
This section therefore demonstrated the important influence that the tax system exerts 
across firms in different countries. The tax system in conjunction with the tax rates set 
in a particular country determine any tax advantage to debt that may exist, though such 
a tax advantage may be reduced by other indirect influences on the capital structure, 
such as the generosity of investment allowances. It is intuitive, but necessary, to state 
that the tax system is capable of contributing to inter-country corporate capital 
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structure differentials, but only departures from tax neutrality should induce intra- 
country differentials, influencing different types of firms to finance themselves 
differently. Within a country, tax reforms also alter the incentives to firms in aggregate , 
of choosing one form of finance over another, the degree of tax neutrality again 
determining any biases between types of firms (for example, if a tax system produces 
incentives to finance from retained earnings, then this biases against new, fast-growing 
firms with little retentions and high gearing). 
In sum: it is proposed that the overall tax system, the structure of corporate and 
investor tax rates, institutional structures and constraints, factors such as tax 
exhaustion, and other factors, must ALL be considered in combination before it may be 
ascertained what the effect of a change in any one of these factors will have on the 
corporate capital structure. The lack of consensus in the literature over the precise 
effect of any tax factor is merely a result of authors holding constant other tax factors 
whose interrelationship with the variable concerned may not be ignored. 
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2.8 Summary 
Chapter 2 set out with the objective of both determining the relevance of the individual 
firm capital structure decision and of explaining the important determinants of this 
decision. If the capital structure decision is relevant then the firm should monitor these 
determinants and select that capital structure which minimises its weighted average 
cost of capital, thus maximising its value. Alternatively, if the capital structure decision 
is not relevant then the firm should ignore the mix of its capital structure, to 
concentrate solely upon the maximisation of returns from its portfolio of investment 
proj e s. 
The results from this chapter appear at times conflicting and therefore must be brought 
together to understand the apparent influence of taxation on the corporate capital 
structure. The MM (1963) tax advantage to debt model appeared to be more favoured 
than the Miller (1977) gearing irrelevance model, and the former was more supported 
by evidence than the other MM models. Many authors developed theory models which 
proposed a distinct tax advantage to debt and it appears that individual firms perceive 
such a tax benefit. Theory also suggests that increases in the corporate tax rate, ceteris 
paribus, should increase the tax advantage to debt, encouraging higher levels of 
gearing. However, evidence concerning the effect of the corporate tax rate and the tax 
advantage to debt on gearing levels is mixed, and thus no clear relationship appears to 
exist in the real world. 
Research into the effect of tax exhaustion, however, clearly reveals a reduction of any 
tax advantage as a result of such tax exhaustion. Other studies reveal a tax advantage 
to debt in different countries very much less than that proposed by the MM (1963) 
model. Thus, factors such as tax exhaustion do appear to significantly reduce the 
effective tax advantage to debt. Theory and evidence reveals that the tax system in 
place and tax code reforms significantly impact upon corporate gearing. 
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The existing literature suggests that some of the main factors influencing the 
magnitude of any tax advantage to debt are known, but computed tax advantage to 
debt measures are not consistent with observed gearing ratios, even though it is clear . 
that the tax system and changes in the tax system impact upon corporate gearing. The 
conclusion that must be drawn from these results is that tax certainly is an important 
influence, as radical changes in the tax system significantly influence corporate capital 
structures, but isolated individual tax measures are generally incapable of 
demonstrating a relationship with corporate gearing. This suggests that the tax 
environment is extremely difficult to model using isolated naive tax variables, and that 
it would be better to model the whole tax system rather than parts of it to fully 
understand the influence of taxation on corporate gearing. Additionally, it suggests that 
other factors, which are held constant in such models and often are not accounted for 
in empirical testing, may also exert an extremely important influence on corporate 
capital structures, reducing any tax advantage to debt so that its relationship with 
gearing levels is no longer easily measurable. Therefore, chapter 3 concentrates on the 
important non-tax influences upon the corporate capital structure, referring to the tax 
factors only when such factors must be considered in conjunction with the non-tax 
factors to fully understand their combined impact. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE INFLUENCE OF NON-TAXATION FACTORS UPON THE CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE OF THE FIRM 
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3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 examined the various and complex influences of taxation upon the corporate 
capital structure. Many taxation-based theories of the corporate capital structure hold 
constant other influences upon the corporate capital structure which are so important 
that they are, at times, capable of over-tuming the propositions of the taxation models. 
Such factors are examined in chapter 3. 
Chapter 2 started from a perfect market framework which enabled the more obvious 
costs and benefits associated with different financial instruments to be considered. 
Chapter 3 allows some of the more unrealistic perfect market assumptions to be 
relaxed to examine how the firm's capital structure choice is affected. 
The myriad of capital structure influences examined in this chapter, most of which 
exert their impact at the level of the firm, would appear to suggest that each firm has a 
unique optimal capital structure. New benefits and costs related to debt and equity 
which are identified in this chapter should be considered in conjunction with the costs 
and benefits, taxation or otherwise, examined in the preceding chapter. 
The structure of chapter 3 is as follows. The factors influencing the corporate capital 
structure may be roughly divided such that section 3.2 considers the macro economic 
factors and section 3.3 considers the corporate factors. Section 3.2 is much shorter 
than section 3.3, reflecting the fact that most of the capital structure literature 
concentrates on corporate rather than macro economic factors. Thus, section 3.2 
considers the influence of inflation, capital factors, cyclical effects, and international 
factors. Section 3.3 considers risk factors, agency influences, the information signalling 
nature of the capital structure, security costs and the influence of internal funds, firm 
size and growth, accounting structure factors, production and investment factors, and 
the influence of industry classification. Finally, section 3.4 summarises the influence of 
such non-tax factors on the corporate capital structure and, in addition, draws upon the 
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results of the taxation chapter to arrive at a perspective concerning the capital 
propositions of the literature to date. 
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3.2 The macro economic factors which influence the corporate capital structure 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Taxation factors have been demonstrated in chapter 2 to exert an important potential 
influence upon corporate capital structures. Such factors might be considered on the 
borderline between the corporation and the macro economic environment and thus 
could be considered within either perspective, depending on the degree of the firm- 
specific nature of each tax factor. However, the non-tax macro economic environment 
may also impact significantly on the corporate capital structure and thus the theory and 
empirical evidence examining the impact of the macro econon-fic environment must be 
explored. The macro economic factors to be considered are those pertaining to 
inflation, capital, the cycle, and the international environment; the overall impact of 
these is drawn together in a summary at the end of the section. 
3.2.2 Inflation 
Inflation is one of the most important macro economic indicators in western economies 
as it affects all real variables when valued in money terms (even when their real value is 
unchanged). The theory explaining its relationship with the corporate capital structure 
is first explained, before examining the evidence available to test such theory. 
Most authors agree that inflation and the corporate debt-equity ratio are positively 
related. Zwick (1977) argued that inflation encourages firms to prefer debt to equity if 
the real cost of borrowing declines. However, it is noted that the extent to which the 
real cost of borrowing declines depends on how nominal rates of interest react. 
Corcoran (1977) argued that an increase in inflation causes the real value of net 
(nominal) debt to decline, making equity holders better off and debt holders worse off. 
If inflation and interest rates rise equally, he explained, the cost of debt finance will fall 
by the amount of the increased tax deductions. Franks and Broyles (1979) argued that 
many firms perceived borrowing to be more worthwhile at times of higher inflation 
because the firm is essentially repaying "cheaper" pounds to investors. However, there 
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is not necessarily a gain to firms if interest rates fully reflect expectations about the 
inflation rate. Indeed, if inflation exceeds expectations then the borrower (the firm) 
gains and if inflation falls below expectations then the borrower loses. DeAngelo and 
Masulis (1980) predicted, as a testable hypothesis of their famous model: 
Teteris paribus, decreases in allowable investment tax shields (eg, depreciation 
deductions or investment tax credits) due to changes in the corporate tax code 
or due to changes in inflation which reduce the real value of tax shields will 
increase the amount of debt that firms employ. " 
(DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), p. 21) 
Modigliani (1982) included inflation in his demand-side capital structure model and 
found that inflation should increase the value of leverage, that is, the advantage to 
debt. 
While most authors agree that the relationship is positive, Schall (1984) argued that the 
relationship between inflation and the corporate capital structure is negative. Thus, in 
inflationary conditions investors sell debt in exchange for equity because the real after- 
tax return on equity becomes relatively higher than the return on debt, while the net 
return on both declines. 
Kim and Wu (1988) explained the conflicting arguments on the effect of inflation by 
explaining that inflation decreases the demand for debt if the debt yield becomes 
relatively lower than the equity yield, but the supply of debt will increase if the tax- 
deductibility effect related to debt exceeds the tax-deductibility effect related to 
depreciation. Thus, the net effect of supply and demand factors determines the net 
effect of inflation. 
Many authors have conducted studies of the relationship between inflation and the 
corporate capital structure. Zwick, (1977) found that the higher inflation between 1968 
and 1974 caused US firms to significantly increase their debt-equity ratios. Corcoran 
(1977) studied US non-financial firms and found that the debt-to-debt-plus-equity 
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ratios of such firms increased from 22 per cent to 42 per cent over the 1965-74 period, 
during which time inflation accelerated. Holland and Myers (1977) also discovered a 
similar relationship. Rudolph (1978) studied the effect of inflation on the entire balance , 
sheet of 311 US manufacturing firms over the period 1964 to 1974 and found that 
long-term-debt-to-total-assets increased with increases in the rate of inflation. Kim and 
Wu (1988) studied 1,092 US firms over the period 1953-80 and found that the 
coefficients of their regression model suggested that aI per cent change in inflation 
leads to a 0.7 per cent change in the corporate debt rate. 
Therefore, the effect of inflation on the corporate capital structure may be a result of 
complex demand and supply trade-offs. Although the theory is somewhat mixed 
regarding the effect of inflation upon corporate gearing, the evidence appears to 
support a positive relationship. Theoretically, whereas anticipated increases in the rate 
of inflation should be accounted for in the 'price' of debt, unanticipated increases in the 
rate of inflation may indeed cause increases in the corporate debt-equity ratio. 
3.2.3 CaDital factors 
Constraints on capital in the finance market, and the structure of interest rates, may 
affect the corporate capital structure in a number of ways. 
Auerbach and King (1983), in their "theory of incomplete markets", argued that unless 
there were constraints on investors or incomplete markets, then the general equilibrium 
result of the Miller (1977) model could not be obtained. Their model was based on a 
mean-variance analysis which maximised investor utility, given constraints such as 
wealth. When constraints on personal borrowing and short selling are introduced, a 
Lagrangian is formed expressing the investor's utility function, along with multipliers 
for the above constraints. Short sales need to be constrained in the model to obtain a 
Nfiller-type equilibrium, otherwise investors would engage in infinite tax arbitrage, with 
there being no bounds on the investment of debt. Such bounds are necessary to the 
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creation of investor clienteles and an aggregate equilibrium. Optimisation produces an 
expression for the market equilibrium interest rate, which is a function of the debt- 
equity ratio. By means of this interest rate, then, an equilibrium occurs where: 
"The aggregate corporate sector debt-equity ratio will equal the ratio of the 
wealth of those investors with a tax preference for debt and those with a tax 
preference for equity. " (Auerbach and King (1983), p. 594) 
Thus, individual investors will hold either debt or equity, depending on their tax 
preference, and not both within the same portfolio. In their model, then, if capital 
market constraints did not exist on investor borrowing or short sales of equity, then 
investors would engage in infinite tax arbitrage, holding both the debt and equity of 
firms to undo their leverage, resulting in an optimal capital structure for each firm. 
Therefore, Auerbach and King's model reveals the importance, in theory, of capital 
constraints at the aggregate level, as such constraints may have the power to render the 
capital structure decision of the firm irrelevant, suggesting instead that it should 
concentrate solely on maximising the value of its investments. 
Evidence on the importance of capital market constraints is provided by Stonehill et al 
(1975). Stonehill et al, in their survey of 87 manufacturing firms in five countries over 
the period 1972-73 found that firm finance managers were more concerned about 
(financial risk and) the availability of capital than its cost. Capital market conditions 
and opportunities were ranked highly by firms in Japan, France and Norway. 
Therefore, there is evidence that capital availability and opportunities influence firms 
when considering changes to their capital structures. intuitively, firms may only issue 
funds when investors are receptive to such funds. 
King (1977) regressed the debt-equity ratio upon dummy variables representing 
periods of capital controls in the, UK from the end of World War II until 1958. He 
found little evidence that the capital controls enforced by the government's Capital 
Issues Committee had any significant effect on corporate capital structures. Thus., 
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while demand-side capital restrictions do appear to influence the corporate capital 
structure, government-enforced restrictions do not. 
Dempsey (199 1) modelled the UK imputation system under a Modigliani and Nfiller 
Capital Assets Pricing Model framework, allowing for a spread between borrowing 
and lending interest rates. Thus in the UK, as in other countries, there is a gap between 
borrowing and lending rates which, Dempsey argued, is sufficient to eliminate any tax 
advantage to debt, to the extent that there is a net disadvantage to debt of up to 8 or 9 
per cent of the debt's market value. Therefore his model showed that as the structure 
of interest rates varies depending on the status of the borrower and lender, any tax 
advantage to debt, as proposed by MM (1963) and other models, may be eliminated. 
This macro economic factor, then, is not only an influence upon the level of the debt- 
equity ratio, but may also swing the preferences of investors towards equity. 
The supply of capital appears to dictate the environment within which both debt and 
equity are supplied and is thus capable of significantly influencing preferences for the 
issue of one instrument over another. 
3.2.4 Cyclical factors 
As the macro economy is seen to be cyclical in nature, it is likely that the corporate 
capital structure is affected by such factors as booms and recessions, and stock and 
bond market peaks and troughs. For example, one might expect to observe a 
relationship between economic recovery and an increased use of long-term debt, or 
stock market price rises and issues of equity. 
Rudolph (1978) constructed a theoretical model of the effect of the economic 
environment on balance sheet items. which predicted that as an economy moves from a 
recession into a recovery period., firms should raise their long-term-debt-to-total-assets 
ratio (a capital structure measure). However, he found in his empirical analysis of 311 
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US manufacturing firms, over the period 1964-74, that as the economy recovered, the 
amount of long-term debt decreased. He rationalised this behaviour by explaining that 
it may be that firms may be able to finance most of their expansion during recovery by 
using retained earnings and thus do not need to increase debt financing as rapidly as 
might be expected. Overall, Rudolph found evidence that firms changed the structure 
of their balance sheets in response to economic cycles, but did not increase their use of 
long-term debt in recovery periods. Therefore, the debt-equity ratio of firms is not 
necessarily heavily influenced by economic cycles. 
Martin and Scott (1974) argued that market conditions at the time of issuance 
influence the marginal debt or equity decision of the firm. Furthermore, they suggested 
that if management felt that the firm's equity price was currently depressed and that 
higher earnings were expected in the future then they may decide to issue debt rather 
than equity, and thus the price-eamings ratios of equity-issuing firms should be greater 
than those of debt-issuing firms. In their multiple discriminant analysis of 112 firms 
issuing securities during 197 1, they found the price-earnings ratio to be a very 
significant differentiating factor between debt and equity-issuing firms, and that lower 
price-earnings ratios were associated with debt-issuing firms. Thus, Martin and Scott 
found strong evidence of a link between the capital structure decision and capital 
market conditions. 
King (1977) sought to test the hypothesis that a positive relationship exists between 
new equity issues and the share price index because, he argued, firms prefer to issue 
equity when share prices are high, relative to recent performance. The relationship was 
inferred from evidence from the Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and 
Wealth (1975). However, when King tested this relationship on a sample of UK 
companies over the period 1950-71, he found that the relationship was insignificant. 
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Thus, though firms perceive a benefit of issuing equity when the stock market is 
buoyant, he found no evidence to support such a rýelationship. 
Marsh (1982) also argued that the level of equity and debt issues is related to the 
performance of the equity and bond markets. He suggested that managers would be 
more likely to issue equity after periods of strong stock market performance and would 
be more likely to issue debt when interest rates were low or were expected to rise. He 
conducted a logit analysis of the choice between equity and long-term debt for 748 
security issues by UK companies during the period 1959-70, and found that market 
conditions and the past history of security prices were very strong determinants of the 
debt-equity choice of the firm. 
Thus, the cyclical nature of the economy in aggregate appears to have little empirical 
support as a factor acting on the corporate capital structure decision, although stock 
and bond market conditions do appear to be significantly related to the firm's choice of 
capital structure. 
3.2.5 International factors 
It has been demonstrated that capital factors significantly influence corporate capital 
structures, and that certain cyclical factors may significantly influence corporate capital 
structures, within a Darticular count . 
However, there are also influences which 
should explain inter-country differences in capital structures, and these are referred to 
by authors as intemational or cultural factors. 
Stonehill et al (1975) studied, by means of a survey over the period 1972-73, the 
influence of international factors on the corporate capital structures of five western 
economies. They explained that such factors might include governmental incentives to 
raise funds abroad, hedging strategies, and capital repatriation. They found such 
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factors to rank highly in France, the US and the Netherlands as determinants of firm 
capital structures. 
Stonehill et al also noted that cultural factors may be important determinants, as firms 
may feel obliged to maintain the debt-equity ratios of their subsidiaries similar to the 
norms of the host country. Thus, the corporate culture of the host country might 
dictate the firm capital structure. Also, it is likely, they argued, that non-US firms will 
depart from the shareholder-oriented goals prevalent in the US, and may thus maintain 
different capital structures, based upon such cultural factors as societal values about 
income distribution, the state of development of equity markets, tax and accounting 
systems, and so on. Therefore, different countries may induce differing corporate 
capital structures due to the influence of different norms, institutions and goals. 
Sekely and Collins (1987) studied 677 firms in 9 industries in a total of 23 different 
countries, seeking to establish the influence of cultural factors on the debt structure. 
They grouped countries into "cultural realms", which Broek and Webb (1973) defined 
as groups that have: 
"Fundamental unity of composition, arrangement and integration of significant 
traits which distinguish them from other realms. " (Broek and Webb (1973)) 
Sekely and Collins employed the Kruskal-Wallis test to examine patterns within the 
data. They found some limited evidence of a positive relationship between the degree 
of development and a country's aggregate corporate capital structure. They also found 
evidence of significant differences between cultural realms but not within them. 
Therefore, cultural influences may, at least in part, explain some of the country effects 
on capital structures, Within groups of countries, cultural patterns may affect the 
development of financial institutions and affect attitudes towards debt and risk. 
I 
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Thus , international 
factors and cultural factors may be a cause of differences in 
corporate capital structures between countries, and countries of similar culture may 
have similar debt-equity ratios. 
3.2.6 Summarv 
Many authors suggest that the macro economic environment significantly impacts upon 
the choice of capital structure of the firm. There is significant evidence supporting a 
positive relationship between inflation and the corporate capital structure. Investor 
capital market restrictions do appear to affect firm gearing, although government 
capital restrictions do not. The interest rate gap between lenders and borrowers of debt 
may reduce the tax advantage to debt, and may even eliminate this tax benefit in the 
UK. There is little evidence of the significance of economy-wide cycles influencing 
corporate capital structures, although market conditions, particularly stock and bond 
prices, do appear to significantly influence the capital structure choice. However, 
international factors, particularly cultural factors, appear to impact significantly upon 
corporate capital structures and are capable, at least in part, of explaining inter-country 
aggregate gearing ratio differences. To summarise, though only a few macro economic 
influences on the corporate capital structure have been exan-fined in this section, it is 
clear that the macro economic environment significantly influences the firm's choice of 
capital structure. Thus, the macro economy sets the framework within which individual 
firms conduct their financial operations, and it is intuitive that alterations in this 
framework will impact upon such operations. However, corporate financial decisions 
are more immediately influenced by the corporate environment, and it is this corporate 
environment which enables firm-specific capital structure solutions. Therefore, the 
corporate factors influencing firm capital structures are examined next. 
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3.3 The corporate factors which influence the corporate capital structure 
3.3.1 Introduction 
in addition to the corporate environment which has been shown to exert a significant 
influence on the firm's choice of capital structure, there are many factors influencing 
the capital structure which occur at firm-level. As a complex and varied number of 
influences impact upon the capital structure choice, this may mean that the firm arrives 
at a capital structure which is optimal for its own environment, which is in turn 
governed by taxation, macro economic, and corporate factors. Aside from the taxation 
factors already examined, the firm-level or corporate factors may strongly impact upon 
the firm's capital structure choice, as the corporate environment is that which is more 
readily understood by the firm in making both short-term and long-term funding 
decisions. Each group of corporate factors is thus examined in turn. 
3.3.2 The influence of risk factors on the corporate capital structure 
3.3.2.1 Introduction 
Risk is defined in the Oxford Dictionary as, "exposure to mischance". In the corporate 
setting, such exposure may be the result of high debt levels, high earnings variability, 
or other factors. However, the main incidence of corporate risk is related to 
bankruptcy and earnings and thus the discussion concentrates on these factors. 
3.3.2.2 The influence of bankruptel costs on the corporate capital structure 
Following the MM (1958,1963) models, many authors sought to determine the effect 
of introducing the possibility of bankruptcy into the MM perfect market models. Some 
authorsargued that its inclusion radically changed the conclusions of the MM models, 
whereas others argued that either such costs were insignificant in magnitude or had no 
effect on the capital structure irrelevance debate. The literature in this area is very large 
and thus is only summarised here , 
drawing out some of the more important theoretical 
and empirical results. Firstly, the concept of bankruptcy is described. Secondly, models 
which suggest that the presence of bankruptcy costs is capable of producing an optimal 
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capital structure solution are discussed, followed by those models which suggest that 
the influence of bankruptcy is insignificant. Thirdly, evidence on the magnitude of 
bankruptcy costs is reviewed, as well as evidence on the empirical relationship between 
such costs and the debt-equity ratio. Finally, the theory and evidence are summarised, 
to arrive at a balanced perspective on the effect of bankruptcy costs on the corporate 
capital structure. 
The absence of bankruptcy costs from the MM models is perhaps their greatest 
shortcoming. The firm is forced into bankruptcy on the demands of debt holders when 
it can no longer meet the capital or interest payments due on debt. When bankruptcy 
occurs, the assets of the firm are sold and the funds are distributed to the debt holders, 
and if any funds are left over then these are distributed to the finn's equity holders. 
Within a perfect market, no financial loss results from bankruptcy as all assets are sold 
for their economic value. In the real world, however, the costs of bankruptcy may be 
significant, and the magnitude of such costs has become a key factor in many of the 
bankruptcy papers of the last few decades. 
Warner (1977) suggested that bankruptcy costs are either direct or indirect. Direct 
costs would include lawyers' and accountants' fees, the fees of other professionals, and 
the opportunity cost of managerial time spent in administering the bankruptcy, whereas 
indirect costs might include lost sales and profits and the increased difficulty (and 
costs) of raising new finance and credit. 
Thus, the expected value of bankruptcy costs may indeed be assumed to be 
insignificant in the perfect market, but may be considerable in the real world. 
Many authors have suggested that an optimal firm-level capital structure may be 
reached where the marginal benefit of the debt tax deduction equals the marginal costs 
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associated with the risk of bankruptcy. Earlier writers recognised this trade-off, which 
was later formalised in state preference models of corporate capital structure. 
Robichek and Myers (1966) argued that there was a trade-off between the present 
value of the tax rebate associated with increased debt and the present value of the 
marginal cost of the "disadvantages" of debt, Baxter (1967) argued that the risk of ruin 
(bankruptcy) became very real as leverage increases and cannot be eliminated by 
arbitrage as the geared firm will always be less desirable than the ungeared firm, Thus 
he suggested that up to some degree of gearing, the market value of the firm increases 
with debt, but at high levels of gearing, extra debt reduces firm value due to the rising 
expectation of the costs associated with bankruptcy. Hirshleifer (1970) studied mainly 
personal bankruptcies, but proposed that: 
"Even within complete capital markets, allowing for considerations such as 
taxes and bankruptcy penalties would presumably permit the determination of 
an optimal debt-equity mix for the firm. " (11irshleifer (1970), p. 264) 
Even writers such as Stiglitz (1970), who assumed no bankruptcy costs in his 
multiperiod model, noted that this restrictive assumption was a serious limitation of his 
model. He argued that the price of a bond with the risk of bankruptcy and a bond 
without this risk would not be equal, resulting in a change in the opportunity set facing 
the investor and thus affecting firm value. 
Though many authors proposed this intuitive trade-off between the tax advantage to 
debt and the costs associated with bankruptcy, only a few of the central papers are 
discussed here. Stiglitz (1972) demonstrated in his model that if the non-ýinal rate of 
debt interest rises as the firm borrows more, an internal optimal debt-equity ratio 
results from this bankruptcy cost, counterbalancing the tax benefits to debt. Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1973) produced a formal state preference model of corporate capital 
structure, including bankruptcy costs, and found that: 
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"The market value of a levered firm is shown to equal the unlevered market 
value, plus the corporate tax rate times the market value of the firm's debt, less 
the complement of the corporate tax rate times the present value of bankruptcy 
costs. " (Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), p-918) 
Thus, an optimal capital structure may exist. Scott (1976) developed a multiperiod 
model of firm valuation which proposed a unique optimal capital structure, whereby 
firm value was a function of the liquidating value of its assets in addition to expected 
future earnings. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) found that, in their model, the tax 
advantage to debt is of the same magnitude as expected marginal default costs, 
whether such default costs are large or small, and that such costs were capable of 
producing a unique optimum capital structure, regardless of the presence of other 
counterbalancing factors such as non-debt tax shields. Therefore, the consensus of 
academic opinion was that a trade-off was indeed possible between the tax advantage 
to debt and the costs associated with bankruptcy. 
Other authors have argued that capital structure irrelevance (market value invariance) 
still holds, even if bankruptcy costs are incorporated into their models. Stiglitz (1969) 
found the market value of the firm to be unrelated to its capital structure when there is 
a positive probability of bankruptcy, but only when the transactions costs associated 
with bankruptcy are zero, wl-&h is surely an unrealistic assumption. Miller (1977) 
addressed the issue of bankruptcy costs whilst constructing his famous capital structure 
irrelevancy model. I-Es main argument for assuming zero bankruptcy costs was that the 
expected value of such costs were very small relative to the tax advantages they were 
suppose to balance. Indeed, he argued that: 
"The supposed trade-off between the tax gains and bankruptcy costs looks 
suspiciously like the recipe for the fabled horse-and-rabbit stew - one horse 
and one rabbit. " (Miller (1977), p. 264) 
However, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) criticised NEller's "horse-and-rabbit stew" 
argument, as they hypothesized, that the expected net tax advantage to debt is 
endogenously determined by the interaction of supply and demand to be of the same 
order of magnitude as the marginal default costs. 
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Haugen and Senbet (1978), in their model, argued that bankruptcy costs are an 
insignificant (or even non-existent) determinant of corporate capital structure in a well 
functioning market. This proposition arose from the argument that the liquidation 
decision is distinct from the event of bankruptcy; the costs associated with the latter 
are limited to the costs of informal capital structure reorganisation prior to default; 
and, that actual liquidation would only occur if the present value of such liquidation 
was greater than the value of the firm if allowed to continue. They extended their 
model in 1984, this time arguing that, with rational behaviour and unhindered 
arbitrage, bankruptcy costs would not exceed the lower of financial markets 
transactions costs and court system costs. 
Therefore, models which question the impact of bankruptcy-associated costs on the 
corporate capital structure mainly question the ability of such costs to trade-off against 
the tax advantage to debt, as the magnitude of the former is argued to be much less 
than the latter. Thus, evidence on the magnitude of bankruptcy costs must be 
discussed. 
Evidence on the magnitude of bankruptcy costs is provided by authors such as: Van 
Home (1976), Sharpe (198 1), Baxter (1967), and Warner (1977). 
Van Home (1976) found the costs of bankruptcy to be significant, as assets sold 
realised only 30-70 per cent of their going-concern value and administrative expenses 
were found to add another 20 per cent to this value, suggesting a total bankruptcy cost 
of greater than 50 per cent of the firm's before-bankruptcy value. Baxter (1967) 
studied personal bankruptcies and found that in 1965,19.9 per cent of large US 
bankruptcy realisation values went to administrative expenses, and further proposed 
that for corporate cases this percentage would be smaller but far from insignificant. He 
also noted that the indirect costs probably have a far more important impact on firm 
value (and thus on the capital structure). Miller (1977) criticised Baxter's study arguing 
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that direct corporate bankruptcy costs have no relation to personal bankruptcy costs 
and that Baxter's study examined only those individuals undergoing liquidation and did 
not consider reorganisation. 
Perhaps more convincing evidence was provided by Warner (1977) who studied the 
direct bankruptcy costs of II US railroad firms over the period 1930-55. Warner 
found that bankruptcy costs represented on average only I per cent of the value of the 
firm 7 years prior to bankruptcy. He further argued that it was the expected costs of 
bankruptcy that influenced the corporate capital structure, and thus such costs were 
likely to be very much less than I per cent, rendering them negligible and thus 
irrelevant to the firm's choice of debt-equity ratios. Miller (1977) argued that this 
evidence supported a key assumption of his model, but that Warner considered only 
the direct costs of bankruptcy. The indirect costs, such as the reluctance of customers 
and suppliers to deal with the firm and the opportunity cost of management time, he 
argued, were likely to be large. However, Miller suggested that the lack of use of 
income bonds in the US, which have all the tax advantages of debt with none of the 
bankruptcy cost disadvantages, suggested that the combined costs of bankruptcy 
cannot be very large. 
Therefore, the authors who found evidence that direct bankruptcy costs were 
significant appeared to study personal bankruptcies, whereas the study of corporate 
bankruptcies revealed direct costs to be very small. It may not be conclusively argued, 
however, whether bankruptcy costs are large or small, as there is little evidence of the 
extent of indirect costs which are arguably much larger than direct costs. 
Stonehill et al (1975), Marsh (1982) and Mackie-Mason (1990) included measures of 
bankruptcy risk in their capital 'structure empirical studies. Stonehill et al (1975) 
studied the determinants of the corporate capital structure in their 1972-73 survey of 
87 firms in five countries. They found that financial risk ranked the most important 
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determinant to firms in three of the five countries. Marsh (1982), in his study of UK 
companies between 1959 and 1974, found that bankruptcy risk (a coverage ratio 
measure) was a significant capital structure determinant and that those firms with 
greater bankruptcy risk were more likely to issue equity than debt. Mackie-Mason 
(1990) studied 1,747 US issues since 1977 and found that financial distress variables 
were significantly negatively related to the probability of issuing debt. Thus, there is 
strong evidence that bankruptcy risk measures significantly influence the corporate 
capital structure. 
To summarise, many authors suggested that the tax advantage to debt may be 
counterbalanced by bankruptcy-related costs. Indeed, many authors extended such 
ideas and formalised them in state-preference models which produced internal optimal 
capital structure results. Models which found the inclusion of bankruptcy to be an 
insignificant factor often did so by using a combination of restrictive, unrealistic 
perfect-market assumptions. There is little evidence of the significance of direct 
corporate bankruptcy costs, and indirect bankruptcy costs have been found to be 
extremely difficult to estimate. However, bankruptcy cost variables were found to be 
significant determinants of the discrete choice between new debt and equity issues. 
Therefore, much of the theory proposed a counterbalancing effect between the tax 
advantage and bankruptcy risk disadvantage to debt, though very little evidence is 
available to either support or refute this proposition. Evidence clearly shows, however, 
that firms perceive bankruptcy costs to be a determinant of their capital structure 
choice and therefore a counterbalancing effect is entirely possible, as well as being 
intuitively appealing. 
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3.3.2.3 The influence of earnings risk on the corporate capital structure 
Bankruptcy risk was seen to be an important determinant of the corporate capital 
structure. However, there are other types of risk which must be considered by the firm, . 
prior to its capital structure decision. Various measures of earnings risk are thus briefly 
discussed. 
Toy et al (1974) conducted regression tests to discover the performance variables 
which determined the corporate debt ratios of 816 manufacturing firms in four 
industries in five countries. They hypothesized that firms with high earnings rate 
variability were likely to employ less debt due to institutional constraints and 
bankruptcy risk. The earnings risk measure was found to be highly significantly related 
to debt ratios in three of the five countries, but that the relationship was positive, and 
thus, counter intuitively at first glance, higher earnings risk appeared to be associated 
with higher debt ratios. Taub (1975) modelled the choice of new funding for 89 US 
firms between 1960 and 1969, including testing for the significance of an "uncertainty 
of future earnings" variable. He expected to find that the greater the uncertainty of 
such earnings was, the lower the desired debt-equity ratio would be. After depreciation 
was excluded from earnings, he found that the future earnings uncertainty variable was 
significantly negatively related to the debt ratio. Titman and Wessels (1988) employed 
a factor analytic approach to study 469 US firms over the period 1974-82. He included 
an indicator of volatility, the standard deviation of the percentage change in operating 
income, but found it not to be a significant determinant. Finally, Zwick (1977) 
conducted an empirical study of the influence of asset risk on the corporate capital 
structure. He defined asset risk as: 
" The amount of uncertainty or expected variability of their (corporations') 
earnings before interest and taxes. " (Zwick (1977), p. 3 2) 
He proposed that an increase in asset risk should cause firms to reduce their gearing to 
reduce the risk of bankruptcy. He observed increases in debt ratios in the US between 
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1960 and 1967, and argued that such increases were due to a decrease in asset risk. 
Therefore, evidence on the significance of earnings risk aa g-y suggest a positive 
relationship, although the evidence is mixed. 
3.3.2.4 Summary 
Following the MM (1963) tax advantage to debt proposition which appeared to 
advocate an extreme corporate gearing position, many authors explored the risk of 
bankruptcy as a limiting factor on gearing. Though little evidence is available on 
bankruptcy risk, most authors suggested that such risk counterbalanced the tax 
advantage to debt, thus implying a unique capital structure for each firm. Evidence 
suggests that firms take into account bankruptcy risk, however, before determining 
their gearing levels. Firms with high earnings variability should limit their gearing, as 
such high variability adds to the financial risk associated with debt. However, there is 
only weak evidence to support the significance of earnings risk as a capital structure 
determinant. 
3.3.3 Agency influences on the corporate capital structure 
3.3.3.1 Introduction 
The firm is described by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as a nexus for the set of 
contracting relationships among interested parties. As each of these interested party 
consists of rational economic agents, they are driven by self-interest to pursue their 
own goals, as much as they are able. The relationship between the owners (equity 
holders) and managers of the firm may be described as an agency relationship. Jensen 
and Meckling defined the agency relationship as: 
"A contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent. " 
(Jensen and Meckling (1976), p. 308) 
The firm manager who owns less than 100 per cent of residual claims on the firm will 
pursue to some extent his own goals such as maximising the level of perquisites or 
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minimising his effort searching for new profitable projects, rather than pursuing the 
equity holders' goal of profit maximisation with full vigour. The divergence between 
the owner-manager's goals and the equity holders' goals increase as the proportion of 
outside equity increases. Realising this, equity holders set up monitoring procedures 
and safeguards to minimise the divergence. If the equity holders anticipate the 
divergence and the costs of monitoring then they will reduce the price they are willing 
to pay for the equity. The wealth effects of the equity holders' actions are borne 
entirely by the owner-manager, representing an agency cost of equity. 
With respect to debt, agency costs may also arise between debt holders and the 
manager acting on the behalf of equity holders in the firm. Suppose the manager has 
the opportunity to take up either a low risk or high risk project. The manager may 
borrow from debt holders on the pretence that the funds are intended for the less risky 
project, but, after the funds are raised, the manager may choose the more risky project. 
In so doing, the manager has essentially transferred business risk from the equity 
holders to the debt holders because the latter invested funds at a lower rate than they 
should have for the riskier project. Equity holders thus gain and debt holders lose from 
such a phenomenon. Again, debt holders may incur monitoring costs to prevent 
business risk transformation, or any other action by the manager which reduces the 
value of their claim, costs which are ultimately borne by the firm in the form of reduced 
income from debt issues. 
There may, then, be agency costs associated with both equity and debt as the 
monitoring costs of claim holders are simply passed on to the firm. In addition, firm 
managers may even incur "bonding costs" as a result of their own decision to ensure 
that their actions are in the interests of claim holders. 
Firstly, the theories describing the agency relationship between equity holders and 
managers are described. Secondly, theories describing the agency relationship between 
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equity holders and debt holders are examined. Thirdly, evidence relating to the 
significance of agency costs to corporate capital structure determination is reviewed. 
Finally, the trading-off of the agency costs of debt and equity to produce an optimal 
capital structure is considered. 
3.3.3.2 The agenc3: relationship between eguity holders and managers 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) were probably the first authors to coherently analyse the 
agency relationships present within the firm. They argued that where the owner- 
manager has issued some outside equity, so that he/she no longer owns 100 per cent of 
the equity, the costs of any activities to promote profit-maximisation are borne by the 
manager whereas he/she does not capture the entire gains of the activities. Conversely, 
if the manager decides to increase his/her level of perquisites, then he/she receives the 
entire benefits of the increase but pays only partly for the costs. Thus, as the 
proportion of outside equity increases, the degree of efficiency of the firm may 
decrease. However, ceteris paribus, introducing or increasing debt in the capital 
structure essentially increases the proportion of equity owned by the manager, 
reducing the loss from monitoring costs imposed by outside equity holders. Therefore, 
in this sense, debt produces an agency benefit which helps to reduce the agency costs 
of equity. 
Jensen (1986) extended the agency advantage to debt concept into a "control 
hypothesis" for debt creation, He argued that managers of firms with substantial free 
cash flow might invest it at below the cost of capital or waste it on organisational 
inefficiencies rather than paying it out. However, debt creation allows managers to 
bond their promise to pay out future cash flows, by issuing debt in exchange for equity. 
In this respect, Jensen suggested that debt was an effective substitute for dividends, as 
the firm is forced to pay out future cash flows as interest by law (in the bankruptcy 
court if necessary). 
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"Thus, debt reduces the agency costs of the free cash flow by reducing the cash 
flow available for spending at the discretion of managers. " 
(Jensen (1986), p. 324) 
Therefore, both Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986) suggested that there 
are potential agency benefits associated with debt. 
Harris and Raviv (1990) argued that managers will always want to continue operating 
even if investors want to liquidate. Debt may resolve this problem, however, as debt 
holders may force liquidation if the firm defaults, and as debt increases, so does the 
probability of default. Thus, debt improves the liquidation decision and the benefits of 
this are traded off against the costs of investigation to make an efficient liquidation 
decision. Thus, greater use of debt reduces the agency problem between managers and 
investors which arises from the decision to liquidate or continue the firm. 
Stultz (1990) assumed, in a sin-filar manner to Jensen (1986), that even if it would be 
better to pay out free cash flow to investors, managers would always rather invest such 
cash flows. He argued that there is a counterbalancing effect between the benefits and 
costs of debt. The benefits arise from preventing the manager from investing in value 
decreasing projects as increased debt payments reduce the free cash flow, whereas the 
costs of debt arise from the debt payments preventing value increasing projects. Thus, 
the agency costs and benefits are traded off to produce an optimal level of debt for the 
firm. 
Therefore, where a conflict arises between managers and investors, concerning the 
level of perquisites, investment in value-decreasing projects, or the decision to 
liquidate, debt may be employed to reduce or even eliminate such conflict by 
encouraging managers towards more efficient actions. 
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3.3.3.3 The agenev relationship between equity holders and debt holders 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that debt encourages equity holders to invest 
suboptimally. This is because if an investment is successful and yields returns greater - 
than the value of debt., equity holders receive most of the gains whereas if the 
investment fails debt holders lose. Thus, equity holders will invest in risky projects 
even if they decrease firm value, as such a decrease is offset by the gain at the expense 
of debt holders. However, if debt holders anticipate this behaviour they will increase 
the returns they demand, passing the costs on to the equity holder. This is an "asset 
substitution effect" and represents an agency cost of debt. 
Myers (1977) argued that firms have both assets-in-place and future investment 
opportunities. Outstanding debt will cause under-investment in such future 
opportunities as the number of projects are reduced because the returns from projects 
must be able to cover not only the investment outlay but also the outstanding debt 
servicing costs (principal + interest). Therefore, future investment opportunities may 
be passed up, even though they make a positive contribution to firm value, and thus the 
present market value of the firm is reduced. Firms with few assets-in-place and many 
future investment opportunities should, Myers argued, employ less debt. 
IT. 
rurshleifer and Thakor (1989) argued that managers may pursue safe projects as they 
are concerned about their reputations. If the manager has the option of pursuing two 
projects, where one project is higher risk than the other, but has a higher return if 
successful, the manager may choose the lower-risk-lower-return project to avoid 
failure and thus a loss of reputation. However, equity holders would have preferred the 
higher expected return project. This effect reduces the agency costs of debt observed 
in earlier models. 
Diamond (1989) argued that firms choose investment projects which assure debt 
repayment. A firm can build a reputation for investing in safe projects by not defaulting 
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on debt, thus enabling it to benefit from cheaper debt. Thus, reputation of non-default 
on debt causes firms to refrain from indulging in asset- substitution, again reducing the 
agency cost of debt (an agency benefit of debt). 
Therefore, use of debt may cause firms to indulge in asset substitution, producing gains 
to equity holders at the expense of debt holders, and may also cause the firm to engage 
in sub-optimal investment policies. However, the firm's reputation for non-default and 
the manager's reputation for success both work against these agency costs, and may 
produce some optimal level of debt. 
3.3.3.4 Empirical evidence on the influence of agency effects on the corporate 
capital structure 
As the agency relationship is very often fairly intangible, empirical studies of the 
importance of agency costs to the corporate capital structure necessarily concentrate 
on testing the implications of such theories. 
Smith and Warner (1979) studied the bond covenants of firms to attempt to discover 
the significance of agency costs. 
"A bond covenant is a provision, such as a limitation on the payment of 
dividends, which restricts the firm from engaging in specified actions after the 
bonds are sold. " (Smith and Warner (1979), p. 117) 
They studied 87 US public issues of debt over the period 1974-75 and found that 90.8 
per cent of bond covenants contained restrictions on the issuance of additional debt; 
39.1 per cent restricted merger activities; 35.6 per cent constrained the firm's disposals 
of assets; and 23 per cent contained restrictions on dividend payments. These 
restrictions imply that agency conflicts between debt holders and firms must be 
significant. Smith and Warner suggested that variation in debt contracts across firms 
supports their "Costly Contracting, Hypothesis", which suggests that if agency costs are 
significant, then bond covenants should contain a large range of carefully chosen 
clauses. 
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Marsh (1982), in his empirical study of UK firms over the period 1959-70, argued that 
a firm with a higher proportion of assets-in-place should employ more long term debt. 
He conducted a logit analysis of funding issues over the period, modelling the choice 
between debt and equity, and found that the higher the ratio of fixed-to-total-assets, 
the higher the probability of debt issue. Thus, this supports Myers' (1977) assets-in- 
place agency theory. 
Rutterford (1988) found that taxes did not explain cross-sectional differences in 
gearing across countries, and thus studied the impact of agency costs as a possible 
determinant instead. She compared the relationships between firms and their creditors 
in the US, the UK, France, Germany and Japan. Close links between lenders and firms 
were in place in the last three of these countries, such as banks holding significant 
equity holdings in firms, banks holding positions on the Boards of firms, banks 
employing industrial specialists to monitor the firm, and so on. She argued that such 
close links should reduce the agency costs of debt in such countries, leading to higher 
gearing. Observation of debt-to-total-asset ratios from the OECD for 1982, listed by 
Rutterford, reveals that this was indeed the case. Fligher corporate debt countries were 
those with closer bank-to-firm links. 
Mackie-Mason (1990) studied the influence of moral hazard costs on the debt-equity 
choice of firms since 1977. He calculated three measures to test the significance of 
agency costs: the ratio of plant and equipment to total assets to proxy for Myers' 
(1977) assets-in-place; research and advertising expenditures to proxy for Myers' 
future investment opportunities; and a cash flow deficit variable to proxy for Jensen's 
(1986) free cash flow. He found all three measures to be related to a higher probability 
of debt issue. This generally supports the importance of agency costs to the capital 
structure decision of the firm, although the second measure should be related to a 
greater probability of issuing equity as debt should cause under investment in future 
opportunities. 
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Finally, Norton (1991), in his factor analysis of US Fortune 500 firms during 1986, 
found that agency cost factors were of little, if any, concern to the firms responding to 
his survey. 
Therefore, there is generally both observational and empirical evidence that agency 
costs significantly influence the firm's choice of capital structure. 
3.3.3.5 Summarv 
By abstracting the concept of the firm to a nexus of contracting relationships, the 
conflicts between various interested parties may be discussed. Such conflicts impose 
costs and benefits on the firm such as monitoring and bonding costs, losses in value 
through sub-optimal investment decisions, and so on. The effect of debt on the firm is 
complex, as it may both create such costs or reduce such costs, depending on the 
situation of the firm. The evidence supports the importance of agency costs to the firm, 
as implications of agency relationships are inherent in the accounts of firms and surveys 
show that firms do indeed perceive such agency conflicts, otherwise elaborate and 
complex bond contracts would not exist. Thus, as a result of the agency costs and 
agency benefits associated with both debt and equity, an optimal capital structure may 
result where these costs and benefits are traded off, regardless of other factors such as 
taxation or bankruptcy costs. 
3.3.4 The information signalling nature of the corl2orate capital structure 
3.3.4.1 Introduction 
Information asymmetry theories assume that firm managers have access to information 
about the firm which investors do not. This information asymmetry may cause the firm 
to maintain a preferred "pecking order" with respect to its capital structure. The firm's 
capital structure decision may also send signals of inside information to investors. 
Theories relating to these statements are discussed in turn, and evidence supporting 
their validity is examined in some detail. 
102 
3.3.4.2 Pecking order theories of corporate capital structure 
Probably the seminal papers on the "pecking order" capital structure preferences of 
firms are those written by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984). 
Myers (1984) extended the work of authors such as Donaldson (1961), who observed 
that: 
"Management strongly favoured internal generation as a source of new funds 
even to the exclusion of external funds, except for unavoidable 'bulges' in the 
need for funds. " (Donaldson (1961), p. 67) 
Myers proposed, then, that firms would prefer to fund new investment by internal 
rather than external funds, but if external funds were to be used then low-risk debt 
would be used first and equity would only be used as a last resort. 
In their model, Myers and Majluf (1984) proposed that a firm could be of two types: 
one firm type with high valued current assets and another firm type with lower valued 
current assets, and furthermore, that investors do not know which type the firm is 
initially. The firm manager has the opportunity to invest in a new project, and must 
finance by equity issue if he or she decides to go ahead. The firm with the higher 
valued current assets would decide to issue no equity and would not invest in the 
project whereas the firm with the lower valued current assets would accept and issue 
equity to fund the investment. This is because the manager of the firm with the higher 
valued current assets would anticipate that an issue of equity would be mispriced 
because of the information asymmetry, which might result in new investors benefiting 
from more than the NPV of the new project, and thus existing equity holders losing as 
a result. Thus, such information asymmetry causes under-investment by the firm with 
the higher valued current assets. The firm that issues equity signals to investors that it 
has lower valued current assets. Such firms would not imitate firms with higher valued 
current assets as current shareholders would have to pass up the positive net present 
value (hereafter referred to as NPV) project and would receive no gain in the valuation 
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of their assets. Firms with higher valued current assets would not in-ýitate firms with 
lower valued current assets, as the equity issued would be underpriced and current 
shareholders would lose their existing assets plus the value of the new project. Thus, 
Myers and MaJluf argued that firms would attempt to avoid the dilemma of passing up 
positive NPV investments or issuing underpriced stock; would set target dividend 
payout ratios to ensure that most investment could be financed internally; that firms 
may still issue debt as long as it is low risk; and that if internal funds and risk-free debt 
does become exhausted, risky debt and convertibles would be issued before common 
stock. Therefore, their model suggests a pecking order of finance, rather than an 
optimal capital structure, and that what is observed in finance markets is the 
cumulative requirement for external financing. 
Thus, Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) propose a distinct pecking order of 
finance such that rather than firms seeking to attain an optimal capital structure mix, 
they instead merely prefer retained earnings to debt to outside equity. 
However, Brennan and Kraus (1987) and Constantinides and Grundy (1989) argued 
that such a pecking order for finance does not exist as there is a far wider set of 
funding options available to firms, such as combinations of issues and repurchases, 
resolving the under-investment problem of the Myers and Majluf (1984) model. 
Brennan and Kraus (1987) created a model in which two types of firm exist: firm H 
with high valued current assets and firm L with lower valued current assets, and each 
firm has outstanding debt. An equilibrium will exist whereby L issues sufficient equity 
to just fund the new project, whereas H issues sufficient equity to finance the new 
project AND to retire its outstanding debt at face value. Investors correctly infer the 
firm type. As H's debt is riskless, the firm receives a commensurate price on the equity 
issued as well as the debt that is repurchased. H-type firms would never imitate L-type 
firms as this would lead to their equity being overpriced. As L-type firmsdebt is risky, 
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they will not imitate H-type firms because repurchase of L's debt at face value would 
be an overpayment, and this would outweigh the gains from their overpriced equity 
issue. Therefore, neither firms will issue debt, in equilibrium, but will issue equity and 
will take on positive NPV projects, and the under-investment suggested by Myers and 
MaJluf (1984) will not longer exist. With respect to signalling, a negative signal would 
be produced by issuing equity alone, but if this were accompanied by a simultaneous 
repurchasing of debt, the signal would be positive. Brennan and Kraus thus obtain a 
result which directly contrasts to Myers and MaJluf s result - that equity is preferred to 
debt to finance new investment. 
In Constantinides and Grundy's (1989) model, managers are assumed to hold some of 
the firm's equity and are allowed to issue any type of security as well as to repurchase 
existing equity. In equilibrium, all firms undertake positive NPV projects financed by 
the issue of securities (such as convertible debt) which are neither pure equity nor debt. 
The hybrid security is issued to fund both the new investment and the repurchase of 
some of the firm's equity. This repurchase means that firms find it costly to overstate 
their true value (by emulating the behaviour of a higher valued firm), and the new 
hybrid security, which is sensitive to the value of the firm, makes it costly to understate 
firm value. There is no longer a need for the firm to finance the investment internally, 
or use riskless debt and neither Myers and Majlufs under-investment nor their pecking 
order theories apply. 
Therefore, theory is divided over the existence of a "pecking order" for corporate 
funding. There is also a potential under-investment problem in the Myers and Ma luf 
(1984) and Myers (1984) models, which is resolved in the models of Brennan and 
Kraus (1987) and Constantinides and Grundy (1989) because, they argued, firms have 
access to a broader range of financial instruments than pure debt and equity. These 
pecking order theories, then, do not propose the existence of an optimal capital 
structure, but merely suggest the rationale for preferences of one form of finance over 
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another. The interaction of the finance and investment decisions, as discussed in the 
case of tax exhaustion, may mean that investment is a determinant of the capital 
structure decision, or indeed, vice versa. 
3.3.4.3 The signalling nature of the corporate capital structure 
If perfect markets are assumed, as in the MM models, there is perfect dissemination of 
information about firms to investors, enabling investors to efficiently price the 
securities of firms. However, a number of authors have argued that such perfect 
dissemination does not occur, and that the capital structure itself sends signals to 
investors concerning, in particular, the investment policy of the firm. 
Ross (1977) argued that, if the nature of the firm's investment policy is signalled to the 
market through its capital structure decision and if the compensation that a manager 
receives is related to the accuracy of the capital structure signal, then the capital 
structure may indeed be relevant, implying a unique optimal debt-equity ratio for the 
firm. Therefore, the degree of gearing may be used by management to signal to 
investors the value of the firm. To support this, he argued that low valued firms will 
not have high debt-equity ratios, due to the risk of insolvency, and thus firm value will 
be positively related to the gearing ratio. 
Leland and Pyle (1977) argued that managers of firms which wish to expand, will often 
invest a large part of the required equity themselves. This produces a signal of business 
confidence to investors, increasing the amount they are willing to lend, and thus the 
debt-equity ratio of the firm will increase as a result. Thus, the degree to which 
managers take up equity in their own firms sends a signal of the quality of investment 
projects to investors, and the greater the fraction of total equity taken up by managers, 
the greater the value of the firm. fn turn, as the value of the firm increases, so will its 
debt capacity, and, in general, the amount of debt issued to fund investment will 
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increase. This positive relationship between firm value and debt is a similar conclusion 
to the MM (1963) model, but in a tax-free environment. 
The theories describing the information signalling nature of the corporate capital 
structure suggest that firm value is positively related to gearing in a world of imperfect 
information dissemination. The degree of gearing thus conveys information about the 
degree of business confidence and the quality of the firm's investment projects. This 
suggests that managers will not only set the level of debt in the firm's capital structure 
for reasons of taxation, financial distress risk, and so on, but will also be influenced by 
the type of signal which a capital structure change may send to investors about the 
"health" of the firm. 
3.3.4.4 Evidence on the information signalling nature of the corporate capital 
structure 
Breaking down the assumption of perfect information in finance markets led to 
theories which suggest that the capital structure signals firm value to investors, but at 
the same time this may lead to distortions in corporate investment. Empirical research 
has concentrated mainly on testing the validity of the Myers and Majluf (1984) model, 
but such evidence may be employed more generally as a measure of the importance of 
the information signalling nature of the corporate capital structure. 
Evidence supporting the information signalling theories is provided by Myers (1984) 
and Remolona, ý(I 990). In addition Mackie-Mason (1990) produced mixed results in 
his 
empirical work. 
Myers (1984) computed figures from the evidence of Brealey and Myers (1984) for 
US firm data over the period 1973-82. He found that 62 per cent, on average, of 
capital expenditures were financed internally, with the majority of external funding 
coming from debt and only 6 per cent of external financing coming from new equity 
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issues. He suggested that such an observation may provide some prima facie evidence 
in support of a pecking order for corporate funds. 
Remolona (1990) studied Global Vantage data for a number of major countries over 
the period 1983-88 and found that: 
"Firms manage their long-term debt to achieve an optimal capital structure 
while they adjust short-term debt to accommodate cash-flow shocks. " 
(Remolona (1990), p. 36) 
Thus, there is a pecking order effect, particularly for short-term debt. He also argued 
that if the pecking order hypothesis holds, firms will exhaust their cash flow (internal 
funds) before issuing debt and thus strong cash flows relative to investment should lead 
to a decline in leverage. The evidence from his test reveals that relatively strong cash 
flows in aggregate do indeed appear to be related to decreases in leverage. 
Furthermore, he found evidence, on a disaggregated basis, that firms were acting as if 
external funds were far more costly than internal funds by regressing the change in 
total debt upon a measure or predicted external financing needs. Therefore, Remolona 
found strong evidence to support the pecking order hypothesis. 
Mackie-Mason (1990), in his study of US public offerings since 1977, examined the 
importance of various signalling costs variables on the firm's choice of debt or equity. 
He noted that authors such as John and Williams (1985) assumed that dividends are 
employed by firms as a costly signal of earnings, and that Bagnoli and Khanna (1987) 
assumed the prior year percentage change on the firm's share price would be an 
important signalling proxy. He found that 'investing in dividends' makes a debt issue 
more likely and that firms are more likely to issue equity when the share price has 
recently risen. Therefore, signalling variables do impact upon the choice of corporate 
capital structure but signals which should support equity issues are not necessarily 
followed by such issues. Mackie-Mason's evidence is thus mixed on the significance of 
the signalling nature of the corporate capital structure. 
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Evidence questioning the significance of information signalling effects is provided by 
Mayer (1990) and Norton (199 1). Mayer (1990) examined OECD data and company 
accounts data for eight major countries, to test various hypotheses concerning capital 
markets. His initial observations provided some support for information theories, as 
retentions were found to be the dominant source of finance in all countries, with 
external finance representing only a small proportion of funding in each country, 
However, he also noted that the pecking order proposed by Myers and Majluf (1984) 
may not exist as the sale of equity to external investors is not allowed in many 
countries. He argued that Myers' (1984) prediction that equity finance is employed at 
high levels of gearing when debt becomes risky finds little support in the evidence, as 
in countries such as Japan which have high gearing levels, there is little evidence of 
new equity finance. 
Mayer found that bond finance was more significant in countries which contained large 
numbers of bond-rated firms, which suggests that use of debt finance is promoted by 
the action of pure information-gathering institutions. Therefore information asymmetry 
must be a problem in these countries, otherwise such institutions would not exist. 
Finally, he observed that banks are the dominant source of external finance in the 
countries studied. However, information theory cannot explain this preference if it is 
possible to establish institutions that perform a pure information-gathering role (such 
as bond-rating agencies). Mayer concluded that: 
"Information deficiencies do not provide a convincing explanation for observed 
international patterns of corporate finance on their own. " 
(Mayer (1990), p. 323) 
Norton (1991), in his 1986 survey of US Fortune 500 firms, conducted a factor 
analysis upon the firm responses and found that firms did not perceive debt to send a 
I 
positive signal, nor equity a negative signal, questioning the pecking order theory of 
Myers and Majluf (1984). Another factor in his analysis indicated that signalling either 
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does not happen or is not considered important by firms when deciding on their capital 
structure mix. 
Therefore, evidence from Mayer (1990) and Norton (1991) questions the significance 
of any information signalling characteristic of the corporate capital structure. 
In summary, there is mixed evidence on the validity of information theories of capital 
structure. It is not clear whether a pecking order exists for the choice of financial 
instruments or whether this may lead to distortions in investment (such as under- 
investment). 
3.3.4.5 Summary 
Both the theory and evidence suggesting a distinct pecking order to corporate financial 
instruments is mixed. However, it is clear that firms do prefer to finance using internal 
ffinds rather than external fands, even if the pecking order within external funds is 
unclear. A pecking order for corporate funding may be consistent with capital structure 
irrelevancy, and implies little about the existence of a unique optimal capital structure. 
Therefore, the information signalling nature of the capital structure, if indeed capital 
structure changes do send signals to investors, is unclear both in theory and is not 
clearly supported or refuted by the available evidence. 
3.3.5 The influence of security costs and internal funds on the corporate capital 
structur 
3J. 5.1 Introduction 
The direct costs associated with issuing and servicing securities, as well as the level of 
internally generated funds, should impact upon the firm's choice of capital structure. 
Firstly, the influence of transactions costs is considered, a discussion which includes 
consideration of the influence of retentions. Secondly, the costs of servicing equity in 
the form of the payout ratio, are discussed to determine its influence on the corporate 
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capital structure. Finally, the theory and evidence are brought together to summarise 
the effect that the direct costs associated with firm securities have upon the corporate 
capital structure. 
3.3.5.2 The influence of transactions costs on the corporate capital structure 
It is often assumed in the theoretical models of the literature, particularly in the MM 
models, that the firm exists within a perfect market where transactions costs are zero. 
However, in the real world, such transactions costs may be considerable, and will thus 
affect the firm's capital structure decision. Consideration of the effect of such costs 
would be incomplete if the level of retentions was not also discussed. 
Titman and Wessels (1988), in their factor analysis of 469 US firms over the period 
1974-82, found that transactions costs were an important determinant of the capital 
structure choice. They observed that smaller firms relied far more on short-term debt 
than larger firms owing to economies of issue costs. They also found that there was a 
negative relationship between various profitability measures and current debt to the 
market value of equity ratios, which may imply that the increased transactions costs 
related to higher debt levels may reduce profitability. 
Mayer (1990) found little evidence of the significance of transactions costs to the 
corporate capital structure choice. He found that although the US and LTK had the 
most complex and efficient financial systems in the world, other countries raised 
considerably more external finance than firms in these countries. In addition, although 
US and UK firms' equity markets contained considerably more quoted companies than 
other countries, they appeared to raise roughly similar amounts of new finance to 
countries such as France and Japan. In bond markets, he observed that direct costs of 
issues over the period 1982-83 represented 1.7 per cent for Canada and only 1.1 per 
cent for the UK, whereas comparatively little was raised by European firms on the 
Eurobond market and a considerably greater amount was raised by North American 
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firms using domestic bonds (OECD, 1989). To confirm that such results did not merely 
reflect differences in investment demand across countries, he revealed that high growth 
electronics and pharmaceutical industries had the highest proportion of retentions of all 
industries. Therefore, Mayer found no evidence of transactions costs significantly 
impacting upon the capital structure of firms. 
In the same study, Mayer (1990) noted that if transactions costs are introduced to any 
examination of the capital structure decision of the firm, then a preference for 
retentions over external finance will result. Indeed, he observed that retentions were 
the dominant source of finance in all the countries he studied. This result implies both 
that transactions costs may be a significant determinant of the corporate capital 
structure, which is in turn entirely dominated by the firm's use of internally generated 
finance. However, in addition to transactions costs, risk may also be an important 
cause of the popularity of internal finance over debt finance. 
Firms employ internal finance for investment (retentions) up to the point where such 
funds no longer cover outlays, and at this point the decision about the form of external 
finance is made. Marsh (1982) conducted a logit analysis based on a sample of 748 
issues of equity and debt made by UK companies over the period 1959-70. He 
hypothesized that a company's stream of retentions will result in a steady reduction in 
the book value debt ratio over time and thus it might be expected that firms with high 
retentions will be more willing to issue debt. He included, then, a retentions ratio 
variable, defined as the level of retentions as the percentage of capital employed in the 
firm, as a proxy for the expected level of retentions. Marsh found that increases in the 
retentions ratio were in fact more likely to lead to equity issues in a univariate model, 
rejecting his hypothesis. Thus, contrary to theory, the higher the level of retentions, the 
greater is the likelihood of firms issuing equity securities at the margin. 
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Therefore, theory suggests that in an imperfect world, transactions costs would cause 
the firm to prefer retentions to external finance, a hypothesis which is strongly 
supported by evidence. This supports, to some extent, a pecking order theory, but only . 
of a preference for internal over external finance. However, it is unclear what effect 
transactions costs have upon the external finance mix of firms, as the evidence is 
mixed, and what effect the level of retentions has upon the choice of debt over equity, 
as the theory conflicts with the available evidence. 
3.3.5.3 The relationship between the payout ratio and the corporate capital 
structure 
Martin and Scott (1974) defined the dividend payout ratio as cash dividends divided by 
net earnings per share available to the common shareholders, thus expressing it as a 
measure of the relative level of dividends. They argued that an increase in the payout 
ratio should lead to an increase in leverage usage, at least in bookkeeping terms, and 
that it might be expected that firms issuing new equity have lower payouts than firms 
issuing new debt. Their study of 112 US firms that issued securities during 1971 
revealed the dividend payout ratio to be a significant variable at the 5 per cent level as 
a discriminating variable between debt and equity in a univariate model, thus 
supporting their hypothesis. Therefore, increases in the payout ratio appear to be 
related to an increased likelihood of issuing debt rather than equity at the margin. 
Marsh (1982), in his logit analysis of the issue decision of UK firms over the period 
1959-70, found increases in the payout ratio to increase the likelihood of an issue of 
debt, at least on a univariate basis. 
Rozeff (1986) argued that existing literature suggested that new long-term debt has a 
negative influence on the amount of dividends paid. It is notable that this relationship is 
opposite in sign from the other studies, but the direction of causation is also opposite, 
that is, he looked at the determinants of the payout ratio rather than the converse. He 
113 
conducted a multiple regression analysis to model the target dividend ratio of 1,000 
US firms over the period 1974-80, using beta as a surrogate measure for financial 
leverage (and operating leverage), and found evidence of a negative relationship. He - 
interpreted this result as showing that firms viewed dividend payments as "quasi-fixedil 
charges and that firms with higher fixed charges (related to higher debt) will pay lower 
dividends to reduce the total costs of external financing. Thus, Rozeff hypothesized, 
and found evidence of, a negative relationship between the payout ratio and the degree 
of gearing, but, notably in a model with the payout ratio as dependent. 
As the study of Rozeff (1986) exanýned the relationship between the payout ratio and 
the degree of gearing whilst employing the payout ratio as dependent, its negative 
relationship result is not capable of questioning the implied positive relationships found 
by Martin and Scott (1974) and Marsh (1982). Thus, an increase in the payout ratio of 
the firm increases the likelihood that the firm will increase the proportion of debt in its 
capital structure. 
3.3.5.4 Summary 
The costs associated with the issue and servicing of financial securities, then, have a 
varied effect on the corporate capital structure. Clearly, firms will endeavour to fund 
internally if they have not exhausted such funds due to the transactions costs 
associated with external finance in the real world, and there is strong evidence that 
firms do finance predominantly from retentions. However, the exact influence, if any, 
of transactions costs on the extent and mix of external financing is unclear. Increases in 
the servicing cost of equity, the dividend payout, appear to favour debt rather equity 
issues at the margin, although the sign of the relationship depends on the direction of 
causation. 
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3.3.6 The influence of firm size and growth upon the corlRorate capital structure 
3.3.6.1 Introduction 
Many authors have suggested that firm size and growth are strong determinants of the 
corporate capital structure. They argue that scale influences market conditions, 
financial risk, management perceptions, and so on, to such an extent as to cause large 
firms to finance differently from smaller firms. Firms experiencing growth, particularly 
fast growth, may finance differently from firms which are static, as demands for 
external finance may be greater and pecking order effects may arise. The theory 
relating to the influence of size and growth factors is considered in turn, along with 
empirical evidence to support such theory. 
3.3.6.2 The influence of size on the corporate capital structure 
Most authors would agree that size is positively related to the degree of gearing 
employed by the firm, and thus theory and evidence supporting this hypothesis is 
examined first. However, other authors hypothesize a negative relationsl-ýip, which is 
also examined in turn. The apparent conflict is then discussed to arrive at a more 
precise understanding of the influence of firm size on capital structure. 
Martin and Scott (1974) argued that larger firms in the US were located in mature 
industries and enjoyed a wider range of financing options than smaller firms. They thus 
hypothesized a positive relationship between debt issues and firm size at the margin. In 
their multiple discriminant analysis of 112 US firm issues during 1971, they found size 
to be the most important discriminator of all the variables they studied, and that, as 
hypothesized, larger firms were more likely to issue debt than equity. 
Taub (1975) hypothesized a positive relationship between the debt-equity ratio and the 
size of the firm, because larger firms have larger assets to fall back on if a variation in 
earnings risks results in debt interest default. He found evidence consistent with this 
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hypothesis in a model of the US firm's choice of new financing based on 89 firms over 
the period 1960-69. 
Marsh (1982) proposed a positive relationship between size and the debt-equity ratio, 
because, he argued, there existed size-related differences in long-term debt flotation 
costs and asset composition. He found evidence to support this proposition in a logit 
analysis of 748 US firm security issues over the period 1959-70. Thus, larger firms 
appear to offer greater security for debt and experience lower flotation costs than 
smaller firms. 
'J'Kajan and Zingales (1994) noted that larger firms tended to be more diversified and fail 
less often than smaller firms, and so size may be an inverse proxy for the probability of 
bankruptcy. They also noted that size may also be a proxy for the information which 
outside investors have about the firm, which should increase their preference for equity 
relative to debt. However, they do not explain why this latter information effect should 
not also increase demand for potential debt holders, thus weakening their argument. In 
a cross-sectional analysis of leverage in US firms during 1991, they constructed a 
Tobit model which revealed the relationship to be positive and highly significant. 
Therefore, the theory and evidence discussed above supports the hypothesis that 
corporate gearing increases with firm size. However, Remmers et al (1974) 
hypothesized a positive relationship, again arguing that size was a proxy for risk, but 
found no evidence of significant differences between the debt ratios of small, medium 
and large firms for a number of countries for the years 1966 and 1970. They noted, 
however, that the firms studied were the largest firms within each country and thus 
possibly did not represent enough variation in scale for differences to become 
significant. I 
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The research of authors who found evidence of a negative relationship between firm 
size and gearing is discussed next. 
Gupta (1969) hypothesized that a negative relationship exists between debt and firm 
size because, he argued, smaller firms would find outside equity issues very costly and 
would be reluctant to share ownership with new equity owners, thus encouraging the 
use of debt more than for larger firms. In his study of 173,000 US manufacturing firms 
over the period 1961-62, he found evidence of such a negative relationship, supporting 
his hypothesis. However, he did note that much of the debt was short-term debt, as 
similar constraints existed for long-term debt as those for outside equity. 
Titman and Wessels (1988) hypothesized that small firms would be more highly 
levered than large firms, though most of the leverage would be short-term debt such as 
bank loans. Indeed, they found in a factor analysis of 469 firms over the period 1974- 
82, that size was negatively related to short-term debt ratios. 
Dp 
Remolona (1990) observed that large firms were much less leveraged than small firms 
in his Global Vantage data study of firms in four major countries in the 1980's. 
Therefore, a number of authors found a negative relationship between firm size and 
leverage. However, this relationship is mainly explained by the fact that such authors 
generally studied short-term rather than long-term debt. Short-term debt would 
obviously be used by smaller firms to a far greater extent than larger firms, as such 
firms may have only a limited access to long-term funds, whether debt or equity 
generated. 
On balance, then, there is a posItiVe relationship between firm size and long-term debt 
arising from the reduced risk, larger securable assets, lower flotation costs, greater 
diversification, and so on, of larger firms than smaller firms. However, there is also 
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evidence of a negative relationship between short-term debt and firm size, as smaller 
firms find long-term outside funding more costly and are probably more averse to the 
owner-manager dilution than larger firms. 
3.3.6.3 The influence of growth on the corporate capital structure 
It has been observed already that firm size is positively related to the proportion of 
long-term debt in the corporate capital structure. Firm growth, the change in firm size, 
should also have an influence on the capital structure. Most of the literature suggests a 
positive relationship, the theory and evidence of which is considered below. 
Gupta (1969) found in his study of 173,000 US manufacturing firms over the period 
1961-62 that growth firms tended to have high debt to total assets ratios. He argued 
that this positive relationship was due to the fact that growth firms required greater 
flexibility, and also that debt was easier to acquire and to liquidate. 
Toy et al (1974) hypothesized that high growth rate firms, ceteris paribus, would have 
higher debt-equity ratios, at least until firms' retained earnings caught up with their 
market opportunities. They found evidence to support this hypothesis over the period 
1966-72 for firms in the US, Japan, Norway and Holland, but found a negative 
relationship for French firms. Thus, high growth firms may require large amounts of 
long-term debt relative to equity until their internal cash-flows start to benefit from the 
growth of sales and profits. 
Martin and Scott (1974) argued that firms experiencing a rapid growth in sales would 
be more willing to accept higher financial risk funding, and thus more debt, than non- 
growth firms. They found evidence to support this proposition in their analysis of 112 
US firm issues during 1971. 
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King (1977) found evidence in his time-series regression analysis of UK firms over the 
period 1950-71 that the growth of the corporate sector capital stock was significantly 
positively related to the ratio of equity-to-retentions as well as to the ratio of debt-to- 
retentions. He argued that such growth might be considered as a proxy for the need to 
finance externally. Thus, growth firms need external finance to a greater extent than 
non-growth firms. Alternatively, it may be argued that those firms which issue 
relatively large amounts of external finance become growth firms by definition, and 
thus the direction causation is uncertain here. 
Finally, Titman and Wessels (1988) argued that there might be either a positive or a 
negative relationship between growth and the long-term debt ratio. They suggested 
that equity-dominated firms may invest sub-optimally to transfer wealth away from the 
debt holders and that the costs of this agency relationship would be higher for firms in 
growing industries which have more flexibility in their choice of future projects. This 
would lead to a negative relationship between future growth and long-term debt. 
However, Myers (1984) argued that this problem may be mitigated if short-term debt 
is used instead of long-term debt, implying a positive relationship between short-term 
debt and growth rates. In their factor analysis of 469 US firms over the period 1974- 
82, they found that there is actually no effect of expected future growth on debt ratios. 
Therefore, it appears that firm growth is generally positively related to the proportion 
of debt in the corporate capital structure, because growth firms require greater 
flexibility, exhaust retained earnings more easily, and would be more receptive to 
higher financial risk funding than non-growth firms. More generally, growing firms are 
more likely to use a greater proportion of external funding to total funding than non- 
growth firms, as there may be a significant lag between investment and increased cash 
flows. I 
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3.3.6.4 Summarv 
There appears to be a positive relationship between firm size and long-term debt, but a 
negative relationship between firm size and short-term debt. Factors which influence - 
such relationships include financial risk, asset structure, manager-ownership-dilution, 
and flotation costs. Growing firms appear to require greater external funding than non- 
growth firms, and when they issue long-term external funds they appear to prefer debt 
to equity financing for reasons of flexibility and reduced risk aversion. Thus, the scale 
of the firm, and the change in the scale of its operations, impact significantly on its 
choice of capital structure. 
3.3.7 The influence of accounting structure factors on the corporate capital 
structure 
3.3.7.1 Introduction 
The accounting structure of the firm is basically the relationship between variables in 
its financial accounts. Ratios are constructed by expressing accounts items relative to 
other items such as total assets, sales, market value, and so on, to enable comparison 
across firms of different size. Management of firms will often use such ratios to 
monitor the progress of the firm, often comparing them with the ratios of other firms in 
the same industry. Therefore, it is likely that managers will make their capital structure 
decisions after considering, amongst other factors, these accounting ratios. Such 
accounting ratios (or accounting structure factors) as profitability, tangibility, and 
liquidity may, then, be determinants, to some extent, of the corporate capital structure. 
3.3.7.2 The influence of profitabilill on the corporate capital structure 
Profitability is widely suggested to impact significantly on the level of debt that firms 
employ in their capital structures. Drury and Bougen (1980) suggested that the 
relationship between profitability and the gearing level might be either positive or 
negative. Higher profitability firms might prefer higher gearing (a greater proportion of 
cheaper debt capital) to maximise the earnings per share of ordinary shareholders. 
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Alternatively, they argued, lower profitability firms may find it difficult to obtain debt 
capital, at least at an "affordable" price, thus resulting in a preference for equity capital. 
These two arguments support a positive relationship. However, highly profitable firms 
are likely to have substantial retained earnings and would find it relatively easy to raise 
equity capital, producing a negative relationship between profitability and gearing. 
Alternatively, lower profitability firms, which have meagre retentions, may find it 
difficult to attract equity funds and would have to raise funds from fixed interest debt, 
again supporting a negative relationship. Thus, Drury and Bougen demonstrate that the 
relationship between profitability and gearing is theoretically unclear, and thus it is 
necessary to discuss the evidence, as well as the supporting theory, of a wider range of 
authors. 
Toy et al (1974) hypothesized that high earnings rate firms, ceteris paribus, would 
maintain relatively lower debt because of their ability to fund themselves internally. 
They conducted a regression analysis of the debt ratio of 816 firms in 5 countries upon 
profitability, the average earnings rate over 7 years. They found that profitability was 
significantly negatively related to the debt ratio in four of the five countries studied, 
and was in fact the most important differentiating factor among the countries. 
Martin and Scott (1974) argued that profitability may be either positively or negatively 
related to the probability of a debt over an equity issue. Greater profitability creates a 
higher cash flow which should support more fixed-interest debt than equity. 
Alternatively, highly geared firms may experience higher rates of return on equity- 
contributed funds and may thus seek to reduce their gearing by issuing equity. They 
found profitability to be a very significant discriminator, at the 5 per cent level, 
between debt and equity, such that more profitable firms would more likely issue 
equity than debt, but did not find profitability to be a significant discriminator in their 
multivariate analysis. 
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Drury and Bougen (1980), whose theoretical explanations for the relationship between 
gearing and profitability have already been discussed, conducted a study of the gearing 
determinants of 700 UK firms over the period 1968-77. Their cross-tabulation exercise 
revealed that high profitability firms are more likely to employ low gearing ratios, 
confirming the negative relationship found by other authors. 
Marsh (1982) conducted an analysis of variance of 748 security issues made by UK 
firms over the period 1959-70, and found that highly profitable firms were more likely 
to issue equity at the margin, thus producing a negative relationship. 
Titman and Wessels (1988) argued that profitability should be an important 
determinant of the debt-equity ratio as a result of the pecking order theories of Myers 
(1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984). In their factor analysis of 469 US firms over the 
period 1974-82 they found significant evidence of a negative relationship between 
measures of past profitability and current debt levels scaled by the market value of 
equity. 
Rajan and Zingales (1994) also noted that the relationship between profitability and 
gearing may be theoretically either positive or negative. They argued that the Myers 
and Majluf (1984) theorem, already discussed, should lead to a negative relationship. 
Also, managers may prefer to issue equity rather than debt to avoid the disciplinary 
role of debt. This disciplinary role of debt, as proposed by Jensen (1986), predicts a 
positive relationship if the market is effective and it forces firms to pay-out cash 
through higher gearing. In their study of US firms using a Tobit model, they found a 
very significant negative relationship between profitability and book-value-leverage, 
market-value-leverage, and also flow-leverage. Furthermore, they found evidence that 
the negative relationship between'leverage and profitability occurs in all of the G7 
countries over the period 1987-9 1. 
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To summarise, there is a very strong negative relationship between profitability and the 
proportion of debt in the corporate capital structure. This may be because more 
profitable firms find it easier to issue equity due to the higher earnings of their equity 
holders, do not need to resort to debt finance as they have substantial internal funds, 
supporting Myers and Majluf s (1984) theorem, or, that firms may wish to avoid the 
disciplinary role of debt as described by Jensen (1986). Thus, more profitable firms 
appear to prefer to finance internally, but if they do require external finance they prefer 
to extend their equity ownership. 
3.3.7.3 The influence of asset structure upon the corporate capital structure 
The assets of the firm may be divided into fixed assets and current assets. The ratio of 
fixed-to-total assets plus the ratio of current-to-total assets sums to unity, with the 
former measure often being referred to as the tangibility of the firm and the latter 
referred to as the liquidity of the firm. The nature of any relationship between these 
accounting ratios and corporate gearing is examined below. 
Marsh (1982) argued that firms with a higher proportion of assets-in-place should 
employ higher long-term debt, citing Myers' (1977) theory that debt may cause firms to 
pass up some investment projects due to the extra servicing costs of the outstanding 
debt. Indeed, Marsh found evidence that the fixed asset ratio was a significant 
determinant in his logit analysis of 748 issues made by UK companies over the period 
1959-70. Thus, the fixed asset ratios of UK firms (tangibility) were found to be 
positively related to their gearing ratios. 
Rajan and Zingales (1994) argued that a firm with a large proportion of tangible assets 
has collateral sufficient to reduce the agency costs of debt to the lender, such as the 
costs related to the transformatiori of business risk. He also argued that firms with a 
greater proportion of tangible assets will retain more value in the event of liquidation. 
Therefore, the greater the fixed asset ratio, the more willing lenders should be to lend 
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to the firm, and the greater the degree of gearing should be. In their Tobit analysis of 
US firms for 1991 data, they found tangibility to have a significant positive influence 
on gearing. They also found such a relationship for Japan, Germany and Canada, . 
though not for the remaining G7 countries over the period 1987-91. 
Thus, both theory and evidence supports a positive relationship between the tangibility 
of a firm's assets and the degree of gearing that the firm employs. 
Martin and Scott (1974) sought to test Van Home's (1974) statement that the greater 
the firm's projected liquidity posture, including its cash flow generating capacity, the 
greater is its debt capacity. They extended this argument to the incremental issue 
decision of the firm, arguing that higher liquidity firms should be more likely to issue 
debt rather than equity. They studied a sample of 112 US firms that issued either debt 
or equity during 1971, and conducted a multiple discriminant analysis of the data, 
finding that higher firm liquidity (the ratio of the firm's current assets divided by total 
assets to that of the industry norm) was associated with equity rather than debt-issuing 
firms. They explained this apparently counter intuitive result by arguing that the higher 
liquidity of equity issuers implied a lower than industry-average operating leverage, 
and as they noted that equity-issuers had higher gearing than debt-issuers: 
"Their low degree of operating leverage might indicate a trade-off between 
financial and operating leverage as a conscious part of management policy. " 
(Martin and Scott (1974), p. 77) 
Therefore, firms with high liquidity ratios appear to favour equity rather than debt 
issues at the margin. 
Stonehill et al (1975), in their survey of 87 manufacturing firms in France, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway and the US over the period 1972-73, found that liquidity ranked 
I highly in Norway alone as a perceived debt ratio determinant. The reasoning for this, 
they argued, was that Norwegian financial executives were more concerned with the 
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impact of liquidity on financial risk than on any desire to produce a similar liquidity 
ratio to other firms within their industry. Thus, evidence confirms a positive 
relationship between liquidity and the gearing ratio in the perceptions of Norwegian 
corporate managers, but, markedly, not for firms in the other countries in the study. 
Thus, although theory would generally suggest that firms with greater liquidity could 
support more debt, the evidence is mixed and generally questions the significance of 
liquidity as a determinant at all. 
Therefore, while the theory and evidence strongly supports a positive relationship 
between the tangibility of a firm's assets and the degree of gearing that it employs, 
there is little evidence of a clear relationship between gearing and liquidity, even 
though the theory supporting a positive relationship is intuitively plausible. 
3.3.7.4 Summarv 
The accounting structure of the firm appears to influence the gearing ratio chosen by 
that finn, in that profitability and tangibility are positively related to gearing. Though 
the theory supporting a positive relationship between liquidity and gearing is intuitive, 
the evidence supporting such a relationship is very weak. It may be, then, that firms in 
general maintain their liquidity ratios to industry-norms, for example, and that not 
enough variation exists across such ratios to be able to establish a statistically 
significant relationship with gearing. However, both profitability and tangibility 
(collateral) do appear to significantly influence the firm's choice of capital structure, as 
such factors are far better measures of a given firm's ability to support current and 
future debt than liquidity. 
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3.3.8 The influence of production and investment factors upon the corporate 
capital structure 
3.3.8.1 Introduction 
Myers (1977) argued from an agency perspective that firms with a greater proportion 
of assets-in-place, and lower intangible future investment opportunities, are likely to 
supply a higher proportion of debt. Thus, a link has already been established, in the 
literature reviewed so far, between the financial and investment decisions of the firm. 
Other less direct influences on the capital structure, such as tax exhaustion due to 
excess non-debt allowances, have also been discussed in some detail. However,, many 
authors (such as Modigliani and Miller) assumed the two decisions to be entirely 
separate, and assume one decision to be given whilst examining the other. Only in the 
last decade or so has this restrictive assumption been relaxed, leading to theories of the 
corporate capital structure which also incorporate production and investment factors. 
These capital structure-investment theories are discussed first, and then production 
factors are examined as they broaden consideration of a firm's projects to the markets 
in which goods are sold, the type of product) the level of output and the technology of 
production. 
3.3.8.2 The influence of investment factors upon the corporate capital structure 
Myers' (1977) assets-in-place agency theorem has already been discussed in some 
detail. Myers (1986) broadened discussion of this concept, arguing that the costs of 
possible financial distress were most important for risky firms and for firms whose 
value depends on intangible assets. Debt contracts may be costly for the firm and 
monitoring costs may be expensive for creditors if the firm has a high proportion of 
intangible assets, and these costs may cause the firm to pass up positive NPV 
investments. Myers argued that the tendency of such firms to under-invest may explain, 
for example, the low debt ratios observed in the US pharmaceutical industry, where 
firm value depends on the continued success of research and development. Thus, the 
type of investment may influence the firm's choice of capital structure. 
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Long and Malitz (1986) also argued that the type of investment opportunities facing 
the firm determines, at least in part, its ability to support debt. They hypothesized that 
firms with relatively high levels of intangible investment, such as research and 
development expenditure and advertising expenditure, should use less debt financing. 
Conversely, firms investing predominantly in tangible assets, such as plant and 
equipment, should employ higher debt levels. They explained this hypothesis by 
arguing that in the event of financial distress a firm will find it difficult to cash in on 
intangible firm-specific assets, particularly assets which have value only as part of a 
going-concem. If bankruptcy occurs, the loss in value will be much higher for firms 
with intangible assets than for firms with tangible assets such as capital equipment. 
Investors realise this and insist on more stringent firm monitoring, increasing the level 
of monitoring and bonding costs. Such costs will directly impact on the premium 
demanded by investors, making the debt a more expensive financing option. Thus firms 
which invest a large proportion of funds raised in research and development and 
advertising expenditures (intangible investments) should employ lower debt levels than 
those with more tangible investments. Long and Malitz studied the data of 545 firms 
from 39 US industries and found, in a regression analysis, that leverage was negatively 
related to advertising and research and development expenditure and positively related 
to the amount of plant, thus supporting their hypothesis. 
Therefore, the type of investment undertaken by the firm may significantly influence its 
capital structure decision. Firms which invest more in research and development and 
advertising, and less in plant and machinery, should employ less debt relative to equity 
than firms with more tangible investments. Not only may the level of investment be 
potentially reduced by debt finance, but the type of investment may also influence the 
degree of gearing that the firm employs. 
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3.3.8.3 The influence of production factors on the corporate cal2ital structure 
Various characteristics of production may impact upon the corporate capital structure, 
such as competitive factors, product characteristics, and technology. The effect of each 
of these is discussed in turn, along with any evidence available to support each theory. 
Spence (1985) hypothesized that firms under competitive pressure in their product 
markets might optimise their capital structures more carefully than firms that are 
sheltered from competition. He observed that the US firms which experienced 
sheltered markets appeared to have widely divergent capital structures, whereas firms 
operating in very competitive markets appeared to have much less variable capital 
structures. He studied data from 1,183 US firms over the period 1970-74 and found 
that deviations of actual from calculated optimal (average) capital structures were not 
related to competitive conditions. However, he did find that actual capital structures 
were positively related to the degree of diversification, and negatively related to the 
degree of labour intensity. Thus, while the greater spread of debt-use for sheltered 
market firms may not be explained by competitive conditions, actual capital structures 
appear to be strongly related to the degree of diversification and labour intensity. 
Brander and Lewis (1986) produced a model which suggested that gearing creates an 
incentive to increase output. They started with the assumption, as explained by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), that increases in gearing cause holders of equity to choose 
riskier investments. Brander and Lewis, by means of a Cournot model, argued that 
oligopolist firms gear themselves to pursue a more aggressive strategy. Harris and 
Raviv (1990) created a simple model to explain the Brander and Lewis results. Two 
firms simultaneously gear themselves and then simultaneously choose their output 
levels. One firm's profits (and marginal profits) are negatively related to the other firm's 
profits and increase with random shocks. When shocks are large, in good states, the 
marginal profit of output is large and the firm will choose a higher output than if the 
marginal profit is low. However, before this marginal profit is known, the firm must 
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choose its output level. Due to limited liability, equity holders assume that the marginal 
profit cannot be low, and as a result gearing creates an incentive to increase output. 
Thus, this encourages firms to produce larger outputs, since this means that their rivals , 
must produce less. The Brander and Lewis model, then, proposed a positive 
relationship between gearing and the level of output in an oligopolistic market. 
Therefore, the Spence, and Brander and Lewis models suggest that the level of gearing 
that a firm employs is significantly related to the production factors: the degree of 
diversification, the degree of labour intensity, and the level of output. Such 
relationships arise from the competitive nature of product markets. 
Titman (1984) argued that firms which produce unique goods, durable goods, and/or 
goods which require after-sale servicing and parts will employ less debt in their capital 
structures. This is because the costs suffered by customers are higher in the event of 
liquidation for these types of goods than for "normal" goods (non-unique, non-durable, 
"service-free"). The costs are ultimately passed on to equity holders who should (for 
an optimal solution) liquidate only if these costs are exceeded by the gains to 
liquidation. However, as equity holders ignore these costs in the event of a liquidation 
decision, the capital structure may be used to force them to make the optimal 
liquidation decision described above. Thus, equity holders should never liquidate, debt 
holders will always want to liquidate, and the firm compares customer costs to the 
gains from liquidation before it makes a decision to default. Thus, the more unique, 
durable, and/or service-intensive a good is, the less debt the finn producing that good 
will employ in its capital structure. 
Titman and Wessels (1988) extended the concept of uniqueness and tested whether 
such uniqueness was negatively related to the degree of firm gearing. Again, they 
argued that customers, workers, and suppliers of firms producing unique products 
should bear relatively high costs if the firm liquidates. In their factor analytic study of 
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469 US firms over the period 1974-82, they found that firms with relatively high 
research and development expenditures, high selling expenses and low employee 
turnovers (quit rates), have low debt ratios, thus confirming that uniqueness is , 
negatively related to gearing. 
Maksimovic and Titman (1991) argued that consumers cannot distinguish the quality 
of the good until consumed, but that firms will endeavour to produce high quality 
goods to build a reputation for doing so. In the event of bankruptcy the firm's 
reputation would be destroyed and firms would no longer want to produce quality 
goods. The tendency to produce higher quality goods is reduced by debt finance. 
Therefore the firms likely to have less debt are those which can reduce quality with 
relative ease, as equity holders would want to reduce the risk of bankruptcy, and 
ultimate loss of reputation, by restricting gearing in the firm. 
The more unique, durable, and service-intensive a firm's goods are and the easier it is 
to adjust the quality of those goods, the less debt will be employed by the firm in its 
capital structure. 
Authors such as Stonehill et al (1975), Anderson (1990), and Maksimovic and Zechner 
(199 1), all sought to determine the influence that firm technology has on corporate 
capital structures. 
Stonehill et al (1975) conducted a survey of 87 firms from five countries over the 
period 1972-73 and found that the technology of the industry was perceived by 
Norwegian firms to impact significantly on the corporate capital structure, but was not 
rated as an influence by the other countries studied. 
Anderson (1990) conducted a Tobit regression of 4,917 Canadian firms for the year 
1982 to determine whether technology was related to the capital structure. He found 
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that industrial classification, firm legal status and location, all influence the amount of 
long-term debt raised by firms. Long-term debt was also found to be positively related 
to repairs and maintenance costs and negatively related to employee costs. Thus, - 
Anderson found that the positioning (industrial, legal, locational) of the firm 
significantly influences its capital structure choice and that the extent of long-term debt 
should increase as capital inputs increase and labour inputs decrease (the latter 
measures relative to total revenue). 
Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) developed a model which suggests a link between 
technology choice and financial structure. Indeed, they found that: 
"Within an industry, firms that adopt the technology chosen by the majority of 
firms generate higher expected earnings before interest and taxes and are less 
levered than firms that deviate and adopt a technology which is only chosen by 
a few firms. " (Maksimovic and Zechner (199 1), p. 163 5) 
Thus, firms using a different technology from that used by most firms in the industry 
tend to employ more debt than firms using a more common technology, as internal 
funds will be less for "technology-deviates" and greater external funds are required to 
fund investments. 
Therefore, technology has an important influence on the corporate capital structure, 
with factors such as the labour-to-capital ratio having a negative influence on the 
gearing ratio. 
To summarise, various production factors do appear to exert a significant influence on 
the corporate capital structure, questioning the assumption made in most of the central 
capital structure literature that real and financial decisions are separate. The 
competitiveness of markets may cause firms to optimise their capital structures more 
carefully and the extent of debt may even cause firms to produce more output than 
they otherwise would have done due to such competitive pressures. Firms with more 
durable, unique, or service-intensive goods should use less debt, and the technological 
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development has a significant impact on the debt-equity ratio, particularly the degree 
of capital intensity which exerts a positive influence. 
3.3.8.2 Summary 
Various capital structure theories examining the influence of investment and 
production factors on corporate capital structures sought to suggest a link between the 
financial and real decisions of the firm. The "investment" theories suggest that debt 
may not only cause firms to pass up valuable investment opportunities but suggest also 
that firms with less tangible investment expenditure, on research and development 
expenses and selling expenses, should employ less debt. The "production" theories 
suggest more sophisticated real to financial interactions than merely the relationship 
between capital structure and the type of investment. The degree of competition, the 
type of product and the type of technology all influence the degree of debt funding. 
Important capital structure influences thus arise from investment, production and 
marketing pressures on the firm. Thus, the firm's finance manager must not only bear in 
nýind the financial accounts factors, but must also consult other managers within the 
firný such as the production manager and the marketing manager, before making a 
decision to significantly adjust the capital structure mix. 
3.3.9 The influence of industry classification on the corporate capital structure 
3.3.9.1 Introduction 
Many authors have argued that the industry to which a firm belongs should impact 
significantly upon an individual firm's capital structure. Furthermore, they argued that 
each firm may target the average debt-equity ratio of their industry, and, in this sense, 
strive towards an optimal debt-equity ratio. Indeed, Ang (1976) argued that: 
"The existence of an optimum leverage ratio implies the existence of a target 
ratio, but not necessarily vice versa. However, the existence of the target ratio 
will raise some hard questions concerning whether there is an optimum 
leverage ratio. " (Ang (1976), p. 555) 
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Thus, if it can be shown that firms target the debt-equity ratios of their industry, this 
suggests, though does not prove, that individual firm optimal debt-equity ratios exist. 
The next issue to be addressed is why firms would target their capital structures on the 
average of the industry to which they belong. Scott and Martin (1975) argued that the 
finance manager of the firm lacks a valuation formula to determine the best capital 
structure for his/her individual firm, relying instead on analysis and judgement. They 
suggested that judgement may be improved by examining the funding mixes of other 
firms in the same industry. Indeed, Drury and Bougen (1980) noted that any deviation 
from industry norms is viewed by both lenders and investors with some suspicion, 
further encouraging a strong industry convergence effect. Scott (1972), however, 
rationalised this targeting behaviour by arguing that firms choose capital structures 
which suit their particular business risk. As firms within the same industry should have 
a similar degree of business risk, a range of leverage will exist which firms will seek to 
locate within. Remmers et al (1974) argued that firms in the same industry face the 
same environmental and economic conditions which should produce clustering of 
earnings and sales. With respect to the relationship between target ratios and business 
risk, they argued that: 
"If it can be shown that debt ratios vary significantly by industry, it will be 
proved that financial decision makers have found different optimal financial 
structures that are a function of their business risk. " 
(Remmers et al (1974), p. 24-25) 
Therefore, the theory suggests that if firms target their capital structures upon the 
"norm" for their industry then optimal firm-level capital structures may indeed exist. 
The reason that firms target in this way is owing to the fact that finance managers often 
look for guidance from similar firms on financial structure decisions, as they recognise 
that similar firms will be exposed to similar environmental factors, especially business 
risk, and they realise that significant departure from published industry norms will be 
viewed with some suspicion. 
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Evidence supporting an industry effect on the capital structure will be discussed first, 
followed by evidence questioning such an effect. It will be quickly recognised that 
evidence in support of target capital structures based on industry norms far outweighs 
the evidence refuting such targets. Finally, the theory and evidence are brought 
together to summanse the impact of industry classification upon the individual firm's 
capital structure. 
3.3.9.2 Evidence supporting the existence of target capital structures based on 
industEy norms 
The evidence presented here concentrates mainly on providing support for the 
hypothesis that debt-equity ratios (or other capital structure variants) vary more 
between industries than they do within industries. However, evidence using other 
techniques is also discussed. 
Schwartz and Aronson (1967) studied the common stock equity ratios for four US 
industry classes for the years 1928 and 1961. They compared the sample means using 
an F-ratio to test that the means of the different industry equity ratios were statistically 
equivalent. They found that the differences between industries were significant whereas 
the differences within the industries were not and could be explained by random 
variability. They also studied the period 1923-62 and found that structural differences 
between the industries were remarkably stable. 
Lev (1969) employed least squares regressions to estimate partial adjustment models 
to examine the periodic adjustment of financial ratios to industry means. The models 
allowed for the assumption that at any particular time only a fraction of the desired 
adjustment to the target may be accomplished. They examined data for 245 US firms 
from 18 industries over the period 1947-66, studying a variety of financial ratio 
measures. Although only some of the adjustment coefficients were significant, they 
found the coefficients to lie between zero and unity, finding generally that firms did 
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indeed adjust their financial ratios to industry-wide averages in a partial adjustment 
manner. 
Scott (1972) argued that if an industry effect was significant then this supported the 
existence of an optimum financial structure for the firm, and that testing for such an 
effect was in fact a surrogate for testing the effect of leverage on the cost of capital. 
He studied 12 US industries containing 77 firms over the period 1959-68, using a one- 
way analysis of variance and found that the financial structures of firms in various 
industry classes were significantly different at the I per cent level for each of the ten 
years studied. He also conducted a multiple comparison test which confirmed that the 
differences were not the result of one strongly deviant industry. 
Scott and Martin (1975) conducted a Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance by 
ranks to determine if samples from different industries came from different populations. 
They applied the test to book value common equity to total assets data from up to 277 
US firms from 12 industries over the period 1967-72 and found industry class to be a 
significant determinant of financial structure. Furthermore, they conducted an analysis 
of covariance to discover whether the differences were merely the result of differing 
firm sizes within industries, but found that the test still supported a significant industry 
effect on capital structure. 
Briscoe and Hawke (1976) conducted a one-way analysis of variance test for 120 UK 
firms for the periods 1965-69 and 1970-74 and found evidence of significant industry 
differences in gearing at the 5 per cent and I per cent levels, respectively. 
Ang (1976) constructed a list of models, from naive target models through to complex 
partial adjustment models, which may explain how firms target their capital structures. 
He then estimated each model on a data set of 133 US firms and sought to discover 
135 
which model was the most significant. The best performing models were found to be 
those listed below: 
A simple partial adjustment model with constant payout ratio: 
A(, vTA - D, -, 
) + et Equation 3.1 
Where: 
D, the change in the debt level 
the speed of adjustment 
,V the target 
leverage ratio 
TA total assets 
D, 
-, 
last period's debt level 
et = disturbance 
A first order Markov process model: 
L, =a + bLt-, + et Equation 3.2 
Where: 
Lt = the leverage ratio 
Lt-I = last period's leverage ratio 
b= the drift parameter 
et = disturbance 
A historical average leverage model: 
'6ý4 :: ': 
4t-l- L, 
-, + e, 
Equation 3.3 
Where: 
ALt the change in the firm's leverage 
LH, 
t-I last period's industry average leverage 
4-1 last period's firm leverage 
et = disturbance 
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The power of these models, Ang concluded, suggested that firms do indeed operate in 
a manner consistent with a concept of a target leverage ratio, whether firms move in a 
partial adjustment process towards the target, whether they merely drift around their 
own concept of a target, or whether they target their capital structure on the historical 
average of their industry. 
Marsh (1982) conducted a logit analysis of 748 debt and equity issues made by UK 
companies over the period 1959-70. He assumed that a company's choice of debt or 
equity was a function of the difference between current and target debt ratios, and that 
the target ratio was only observed through its determinants such as size, risk, and asset 
composition. As he found these detern-linants to be significant, he concluded that firms 
did choose to issue either debt or equity as though they strived towards target long- 
term debt ratios. 
Cordes and Sheffiin (1983) used the UK Treasury Corporate Tax Model to examine 
data associated with 1978 corporate returns. They found that the marginal incentives 
to use debt varied significantly across industries, suggesting that observed differences 
between industry debt-equity ratios occurred partly because the tax advantage to debt 
varied across industries. Thus, industry differences in capital structures may not merely 
be a result of differing business risk, but may be for taxation reasons. 
Titman and Wessels (1988) estimated a factor analytic model of the corporate capital 
structure choice, using data from 469 US firms over the period 1974-82. They 
incorporated into their model a dummy for manufacturing firms as opposed to non- 
manufacturing firms and found that the former employed significantly less debt than the 
latter. Thus, "industry-type" appeared, in their study, to influence the corporate capital 
structure. 
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In summary, there is considerable evidence to support the concept that firms target 
their capital structures with respect to the norms of their particular industry, evidence 
which derives from various empirical techniques. Some authors suggest that firms are 
only partially adjusted towards their target at a given time. Cordes and Sheffrin (1983) 
even suggested that an industry effect may in fact be owing to variations in financial 
instrument tax incentives across industries. However, whether this behaviour may be 
explained by taxation, business risk, or other factors as yet unrecognised, it is clear that 
the industry to which a firm belongs may significantly influence the capital structure 
which that firm chooses. In addition, it may be that such targeting in turn goes towards 
support for a firm-level optimisation of the capital structure. 
3.3.9.3 Evidence guestioning the existence of target capital structures based on 
industrv norms 
The theory and evidence in this area both point towards the existence of firm-level 
optimal capital structures, as firms adjust their capital structures towards the norm for 
their particular industry. Alternatively, the evidence may merely suggest that the capital 
structure ratio is irrelevant but firms lack the confidence to deviate from the norm for 
their industry. However, there is evidence which questions such firm behaviour, 
evi ence which shall be discussed in this section. 
Dp 
Remmers et al (1974) conducted a one-way analysis of variance of the book-value 
total debt to total assets ratio of Fortune 500 firms from nine industries for the years 
1966) 1970, and 1971, but found no evidence of an industry effect. They then 
conducted a similar analysis of variance test for four manufacturing industries in five 
countries. They found that industry was a significant determinant of corporate debt 
ratios in France and Japan, but not in the Netherlands, Norway and the US. On 
balance, then, they concluded that the industry influence on the firm capital structure is 
very weak, which may be because industry category is not a good proxy for business 
risk. 
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Stonehill et al (1975), in their survey of 87 firms from France, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Norway, and the US, over the period 1972-73, found that firms did not perceive 
industry norm to be an important debt ratio determinant in any of these countries. 
Drury and Bougen (1980) analysed 700 UK firms in 45 industries over the period 
1968-77. They constructed gearing distributions for each industry but observed no 
evidence of clustering of firms within each distribution around a norm. They concluded 
that if an industry optimal capital structure does exist then it must be spread over a 
very wide range, thus questioning the significance of any industry effect on corporate 
capital structures. 
Sekely and Collins (1988) conducted a Kruskal-Wallis test upon a sample of 677 firms 
in 9 industries in 23 countries for the period 1979-80. They found that the differences 
in median rank between industries were not significant even at the 10 per cent level, 
and thus the industry effect appeared to be insignificant. They argued that the industry 
effect was insignificant owing to a reduction in the distinction between industries, a 
significant increase in the use of debt across the sample, and the highly imperfect and 
incomplete markets that exist outside the US. However, their study did examine 
multinational corporations, which would be expected to complicate the results, 
rendering minimal any industry effect. 
In summary, the evidence questioning the existence of firm target debt-equity ratios 
based on industry norms is weak compared to that lending support to the target debt- 
equity ratio concept. Even though Stonehill et al (1975) found that firms may not 
perceive such targeting to be important, it may be either that firms are subconsciously 
practising such behaviour or even that they would not want to adrnit "following the 
leader" as such an admission might be embarrassing. Some authors, such as Sekely and 
Collins (1988), criticised those papers supporting the industry-target concept on the 
grounds that the data distributions tested were often non-parametric and thus the 
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standard analysis of variance tests could not be validly used. However, authors both 
supporting and questioning the industry-target concept have used such methods, and 
thus the conclusions are not biased one way or another as a result of this problem. 
3.3.9.4 Summarv 
The evidence available strongly supports the proposition that individual firms target 
their capital structures on the norm for the industry to which they belong. This may 
result from the fact that firms within an industry are subject to similar business risk, tax 
incentives, or other factors. There is some evidence that firms are generally in a state 
of partial adjustment towards a target at any given moment in time, as the adjustment 
process is lumpy for transactions costs and time reasons. Firms may refuse to admit 
such behaviour as it makes finance managers appear as if 'sheep following a shepherd'. 
Alternatively, it may be that finance managers are simply not aware that they are 
conforming to industry norms, but are guided to do so by institutional lenders and 
private investors who would frown upon very significant capital structure deviations 
from other firms in a particular industry. Thus, evidence of the targeting of the firm's 
capital structure with respect to its industry norm suggests that by so doing firms are 
engaging in the equivalent of capital structure optimising behaviour. Industry effects, 
then, impact significantly upon the corporate capital structure, implying firm-level 
optimal capital structures. 
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3.4 SummarY 
Chapter 3 sought to determine the nature and significance of macro economic and 
corporate factors to the firm's capital structure choice. Many of these factors were not - 
considered by the pivotal papers which shaped early capital structure theory. However, 
these factors exert such an important influence on the firm's capital structure choice 
that no literature review of the theory and evidence would be complete without 
considering their influence. 
The previous chapter concluded that it was difficult to isolate individual taxation 
measures which are significantly related to gearing, even though it was clear that the 
taxation environment as a whole significantly impacted upon the corporate capital 
structure. In particular, it was difficult to relate computed tax advantage to debt figures 
to actual gearing levels. The proposed reason for this was that tax exhaustion may 
reduce any tax advantage to debt and that the computed tax advantage to debt outside 
the US classical system was very much reduced anyway. Another possible explanation 
for the apparent lack of relationship between computed tax incentives to debt and 
observed gearing ratios was the possibility that non-tax factors introduced costs and 
benefits related to different forms of finance which might to some extent 
counterbalance any tax advantage to debt. 
Macro economic factors provide the framework within which firms can operate, 
affecting both the operational and strategic decisions of the firm. On an operational 
level, the macro economic environment affects the day-to-day success of the firm, 
setting the parameters of internal firm operations as well as the external environment of 
the firm's competitors, customers and investors. On a strategic level, the macro 
economy influences the firm's long-term financial and investment plans. The firm may 
only adjust its capital structure , then, to the extent which the institutions, 
legal 
frameworks, market conditions, international trading conditions, and culture of a 
particular country will allow. The macro economic environment, then, defines the 
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boundaries of the taxation and corporate environments. In addition, changes in various 
macro economic variables may, at times, cause significant shifts in the corporate capital 
structure which the finance manager distinguishes from the overall macro economic , 
environment, such as a sharp increase in inflation, which may encourage him/her to 
issue more debt. 
The finance manager, then, understands the constraints of the macro economic 
environment, and after taking account of these constraints, he/she may examine the 
taxation and corporate influences on the capital structure decision in order of their 
importance. Such factors may be classed as primary, secondary and tertiary factors, 
With the primary factors representing the priority influences on the finance decision. 
The primary factors include tax incentives, the extent of tax exhaustion, investor 
premiums and transactions costs. Of these factors, the finance manager is likely to 
consider the influence of any tax advantage to debt first of all, as there is evidence that 
firms perceive the tax characteristics of debt to be of great importance. A forward- 
thinking manager will also consider the extent to which any tax advantage to debt may 
be utilised by considering the amount of non-debt tax shields the firm has, as well as 
the average taxable profits that the firm has earned in recent years. The premiums that 
potential debt and equity holders demand also directly impacts on the capital structure 
choice. Transactions costs of issuing funds may be an important influence, particularly 
for smaller firms. Thus, these primary factors are the easily observable direct costs of 
finance decisions which are likely to be foremost in the minds of finance managers. 
The secondary factors include risk, ability to service funds, collateral, and industry- 
norm targeting. The finance manager will only raise new external funds, particularly 
I. debt, if the risk of insufficient earnings and ultimately financial distress are relatively 
low. Firm profitability and liquidity ratios serve as a guide to the individual manager of 
the "health" of the firm and may serve as measures of debt capacity. Intuitively, the 
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greater the debt the firm already has relative to equity finance, the less willing the 
manager will be to issue more debt at the margin, unless the firm has less debt than it 
requires to achieve its target capital structure. Whilst considering all of these factors, 
the firm will also be mindful of any deviation of its capital structure from the capital 
structures of similar firms within its industry as such industry capital structure norms 
should guide the firm to finance in a similar manner to firms with similar degrees of 
business risk. The manager should recognise that any significant deviation from an 
industry norm capital structure may be viewed by private investors and institutional 
lenders with some suspicion and may result in higher premiums demanded. The firm's 
collateral, in the form of fixed assets, may also influence the premium demanded by 
investors, particularly potential debt holders, as the higher the level of fixed assets, the 
higher is the liquidation value of the firm. The level of dividends paid to investors may 
also influence the firm's capital structure choice because, although the dividend paid 
out does not represent a mandatory cost of equity, dividend reduction or passing-up 
altogether is viewed as "bad news" by the market, resulting in "sticky" dividends which 
are regarded as quasi-fixed servicing commitments. Thus, the secondary factors, 
though not considered first by the manager, impose direct costs and represent real 
influences on the manager's choice between debt and equity external finance. 
The tertiary factors inelude size and growth, production and investment factors, 
agency costs and benefits, and the information signalling nature of financing decisions. 
There are important influences on the capital structure related to the scale of the firm. 
Larger firms may find it easier to issue long-term debt due to their greater collateral 
value, reduced risk, and economies with respect to the direct and indirect costs of debt. 
In faster growing firms, the finance manager may rely greatly on external funds as 
internally-generated funds become exhausted, and may prefer debt to equity as he/she 
is willing to bear the greater risk as higher expected future earnings should easily cover 
debt costs. Thus, the size of the firm and the rate of growth may alter the manager's 
degree of risk aversion, and thus scale and changes in scale will alter the manager's 
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willingness to take on more debt. Managers will also be aware that the nature of their 
investment projects as well as their current operations and markets has an impact on 
their capital structure. The marketing strategy of the firm may require that the firm , 
decides to grow as quickly as possible, and thus the scaling factors discussed above 
become important. Firms producing durable or unique goods will be inclined to 
moderate their debt as they realise that product prices will greatly reduce if it is 
believed that there is a chance of the firm arriving at a position of financial distress. If 
the manager has a large proportion of projects which are marginally worthwhile then 
d -1- ebt financing may severely reduce this portfolio of projects, causing the firm to under- 
invest. Managers in this position may prefer to fund using equity. Thus, production and 
investment factors do appear to influence the manager's capital structure decision, 
though in an indirect manner. There may be agency costs and benefits related to 
different financial instrumentsl which the finance manager is less likely to consider at 
the time of the capital structure decision, but which nonetheless may result in extra 
costs and benefits arising from that decision. Bonding costs and monitoring costs may 
later increase the costs of such financial instruments in the form of independent 
auditing costs and bond covenant costs. The choice of funding at the margin may send 
signals to the market about the value of the firm, and managers may find that this effect 
restricts their choice to some extent. Firms may even maintain a pecking order of 
financing which they follow to finance investment, which further influences their choice 
of investment, particularly with respect to external financing. However, many of these 
tertiary factors are less intuitive to the finance manager as some of the implicit costs 
and benefits related to each form of finance are often unobservable and, at times, fairly 
abstract. 
To conclude, given the macro economic environment, the finance manager makes 
his/her choice of the financial ins&ument to be used to raise new funds by prioritising 
influences on this choice in a similar manner to the ordering of the primary, secondary 
and tertiary factors discussed above. Different firms may prioritise differently due to 
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differences in risk, scale, industry, length of establishment, sophistication, and so on. It 
may be that some managers only ever consider the more direct primary factors and that 
others always meticulously examine all of the influences: primary, secondary and 
tertiary. However, what becomes clear from this synthesis of macro economic, taxation 
and corporate influences, is that the myriad of influencing factors should be different 
for each individual firm, and thus each firm may choose its capital structure by trading- 
off the influences in an optimising manner. As each firm's objective function for this 
optimisation is different, in any economy there occur optimal capital structures at the 
level of the firm. The analysis of this report seeks to determine which of the factors, 
discussed in the literature review, determines the capital structure of the European 
firm. The objective for the rest of the report, then, is to firstly test hypotheses deriving 
from the literature which were largely produced from the experience and evidence 
P-- - from US firms and, less frequently, UK finns, and were rarely tested for a wider range 
of countries. Secondly, new hypotheses deriving from the body of the research are 
developed and tested. Finally, a synthesis model of the many competing determinants 
of the European corporate capital structure is developed, deriving from tests of the 
hypotheses, from new empirical capital models, and from new ideas which attempt to 
explain the nature of firm-level capital structure determination. The literature suggests 
the existence of firm-level optimal capital structure solutions, and it is thus the purpose 
of this report to detern-fine whether this proposition holds for European firms. 
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CHAPTER 4 
A STATEMENT OF RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
AND PRELIMINARY TESTING 
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4.1 Introduction 
The main purpose of chapter 4 is to introduce the hypotheses to be tested throughout 
the report, as well as the methodology employed for the empirical work. Section 4.2 
lists the central, supporting and subsidiary hypotheses to be tested, and discusses some 
of the methods used, as well as problems and issues that may arise in the testing 
process. Section 4.3 examines the methodology used throughout the empirical 
research. Section 4.4 describes the five European data sets upon which the empirical 
analyses are to be conducted. Section 4.5 defines and discusses the two main capital 
structure measures used throughout the report: the stock debt-to-debt-plus-equity 
ratio measure and the flow funding issue measure. Section 4.6 provides a perspective 
on corporate capital structures across Europe by examining DDE ratios, and their 
relationship with tax factors. In addition, the section conducts a test of Nfiller's (1977) 
financial leverage clientele hypothesis as a means of further testing the central 
hypothesis. Section 4.7 examines the corporate environment of the European firm and 
describes tests of the effect of location (country) and tax system upon the stock capital 
structure, the marginal funding choice, and accounting structures generally. Finally, 
section 4.8 draws together the results of the analyses to determine what progress has 
been made towards addressing the central and supporting hypotheses. 
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4. 
On balance, the existing body of literature reviewed supports the existence of firm- 
level unique capital structures, as macro econornic,, taxation and corporate factors 
drive each firm to pursue the unique mix of external funds which best suits its 
environment. It is impossible to test this proposition of firm-level capital structure 
optimality directly, and thus a less direct approach is used. It is proposed that if macro 
economic, taxation and corporate factors are all found to impact significantly on the 
corporate capital structure, then capital structures are responsive to those stimuli and 
may well reflect some unique optimum value. Whilst macro economic factors may only 
impact on capital structures within a countTy or economic unit, taxation and corporate 
factors are capable of producing unique capital structures at the firm level. Optimality 
is thus affected at the aggregate level and then at the disaggregated level, and thus the 
firm may optimise its capital structure given the influences of the country within which 
it operates, and also given those factors which impact in different ways on different 
firms. 
The hypotheses listed consist of a central hypothesis, three supporting hypotheses, and 
20 subsidiary hypotheses. If evidence is found supporting the relationships detailed in 
the subsidiary hypotheses, then this provides a test of the supporting hypotheses. If the 
supporting hypotheses suggest that macro economic, taxation and corporate factors 
significantly impact upon the corporate capital structure then the central hypothesis is 
supported. The hypotheses are addressed in this manner because the issue of firm-level 
capital structure optimality is complex and may not be answered by merely conducting 
one or two tests of surrogate optimality measures. Some of the hypotheses, however, 
are concerned with such optimality tests, such as H24, and to some extent H6, but the 
results of testing these hypotheses must be interpreted in conjunction with results of 
the complete set of hypotheses. 
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it is recognised that not all of the hypotheses which might be drawn from the literature 
are tested in the new empirical research, as some theories do not lend themselves to 
easily testable propositions whilst others add little to the hypotheses already listed. 
However, it is argued that the hypotheses to be tested should enable comprehensive 
testing of a wide variety of capital structure determinants, thus providing the 
justification for addressing the central hypothesis. This justification is further 
strengthened by the statement and testing of additional hypotheses, deriving from the 
new analyses of this research, in addition to the bivariate and multivariate modelling 
exercises undertaken to study the interaction of the capital structure with its potential 
determinants. 
The hypotheses listed are not hypotheses in the strict statistical sense, whereby each 
one is matched to a specific empirical test, but are better considered general 
hypotheses, each one of which may be tested using a number of separate methods. 
Whether an individual hypothesis is accepted or rejected, then, depends on the overall 
results of a variety of supporting tests. 
The listed hypotheses are tested throughout the empirical research, but are not 
necessarily addressed in the order presented here as hypothesis testing is often better 
ordered by empirical method rather than determinant type. However, the results are 
drawn together once the analyses are completed, to enable examination of the 
European evidence in the hypothesis order given in this section. By utilising different 
empirical methods, hypotheses may be addressed within cross- sectional, marginal, 
dynamic time-series, and long-term time-series perspectives. Not only does this allow 
a more comprehensive testing of the hypotheses, but often highlights important 
differences in capital structure-determinant interactions which cannot be captured in a 
single method alone. Additionally, some hypotheses are tested using descriptive 
statistics, some using bivariate techniques, and some using multivariate techniques I 
aggain producing some interesting results deriving merely from different perspectives. 
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It may be noted that the nature of the relationship described in each hypothesis is 
dictated by the theory and evidence of the literature reviewed, thus prescribing a 
positive or negative relationship, for example. Where reviewed evidence is weak or 
mixed, the form of relationship generally proposed by the theory is the one which 
mlides the hypothesis. C7- 
Where hypotheses are supported by the empirical tests, that theory which appears 
most supported by the evidence may be discussed and expanded upon. Conversely, 
where hypotheses are questioned by the empirical tests, an attempt to explain such 
divergence is made. Results which question hypotheses may occur because much of 
the literature review was developed from the theoretical framework and empirical 
evidence of US (and to a lesser extent, UK) firms, which may not have universal 
application. The questioning of certain hypotheses may, then, be anticipated. F 
Many of the tests do not imply any direction of causation, even though much of the 
theory does. Indeed, it may be, in certain circumstances, that the corporate capital 
structure is itself a determinant of other factors, rather than being determined with the 
causation flowing from the non-capital structure variables. For example, it is noted 
that the bankruptcy risk hypothesis, H15, implies a different causation from the other 
hypotheses to be tested. Whilst most factors related to the capital structure are 
hypothesized, at least initially, to be detemfinants of the capital structure, the capital 
structure measure is more accurately expressed as a determinant of bankruptcy risk. 
However, as the empirical research progresses, the direction of causation with respect 
to bankruptcy risk may change, and where such a change is anticipated, or indeed 
imposed, this is discussed in the relevant section. The potential problem of causation 
uncertainty is also separately addressed in the time-series analyses of later chapters. 
Finally, the results of the hypothesis testing and the results deriving from empirical 
models of the corporate capital structure are all drawn together in the conclusion in 
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chapter 8, where the question of capital structure optimality is ultimately answered. 
The implications of the central hypothesis for the individual firm are then discussed 
within a theoretical model of the corporate capital structure. 
Table 4.1 
The central hypothesis, and the supl2orting and subsidiag h. 112otheses 
Central hypothesis: 
HI: There exist firm-level optimal capital structures. 
Supporting hypotheses: 
H2: Taxation factors significantly influence the corporate capital structure. 
HI Macro economic factors significantly influence the corporate capital structure. 
H4: Corporate factors significantly influence the corporate capital structure. 
Subsidiary hypotheses: 
Taxation hypotheses: 
H5: Corporate debt-equity ratios distributions are bimodal in shape. 
H6: The corporate debt-equity increases as the tax advantage to debt increases. 
H7: The corporate debt-equity ratio is determined by the degree of the firm's tax 
exhaustion. 
H8: The corporate debt-equity ratio increases with the corporate tax rate. 
H9: Corporate debt-equity ratios vary significantly across tax systems. 
Macro economic hypotheses: 
HIO: The corporate debt-equity ratio increases with increases in the inflation rate. 
HI 1: Corporate debt-equity ratios vary significantly across countries. 
H12: The corporate debt-equity ratio is negatively related to stock market 
performance. 
H13: The corporate debt-equity ratio increases as debt interest rates decrease. 
H14: The average corporate debt-equity ratio of a country is related to the cultural 
realm to which the country belongs. 
Corporate hypotheses: 
H 15: The degree of bankruptcy risk increases as the corporate debt-equity ratio 
increases. 
ýH16: Retentions are the main source of investment finance. 
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Table 4.1 (cont. 1 
iesis, and the supporting and subsidiary hypotheses 
ý Corporate hypotheses (cont. ): 
H17: The corporate debt-equity ratio increases as the payout ratio increases. 
H18: The long-term corporate debt-equity ratio increases with firm size. 
H19: The short-term debt-equity ratio increases as firm size decreases. 
H20: The corporate debt-equity ratio increases with the rate of firm growth. 
H2 1: The corporate debt-equity ratio increases with the degree of liquidity. 
H22: The corporate debt-equity ratio increases as firm profitability decreases. 
H23: The corporate debt-equity ratio increases as the tangibility of the firm's assets 
increases. 
H24: Individual firms target their debt-equity ratios on the norm for the industry to 
which they belong. 
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4.3 Methodology 
This section briefly introduces the empirical research methodology employed 
throughout the report. The main objective of the project is to establish whether firm- , 
level optimal capital structures exist by testing hypotheses from the existing literature, 
testing new hypotheses arising from the analysis, and by studying the interaction of the 
corporate capital structure and factors influencing it within empirical models. This 
section merely seeks to introduce the nature of the empirical work. More detailed 
descriptions of methods, used are given when required throughout the report. 
The central, supporting and subsidiary hypotheses have already been detailed in 
section 4.2. Existing hypotheses are restated and tested throughout the report. New 
hypotheses, deriving from the analysis are stated, discussed to explain why they are 
proposed, and tested in turn. The expected signs of the variable coefficients of the 
models are also hypothesized before estimation. 
Various data sets are collected to enable the testing of hypotheses and the estimation 
of models of the capital structure decision of the European firm, and these will be 
described in section 4.4. along with the data preparation techniques used to render the 
data sets ready for analysis. 
The methodology of this report includes the following: descriptive statistics, 
distribution analysis, univariate and multivariate analysis of variance, bivariate 
correlation tests, Granger causality tests, bivariate regression models, multivariate 
logistic regression models, unit root and cointegration tests, autoregressive distributed 
lag models, bivariate error correction models, and Johansen procedure multivariate 
error correction models. The broad spectrum of methods utilised reflects the diversity 
of hypotheses to be tested, and should provide stronger confirmation of rejection of 
hypotheses where different methods produce similar results. However, where the 
results of different methods apparently conflict, a closer examination of such 
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circumstances may reveal new processes and interrelationships hitherto not discussed 
in the existing literature. 
The level of significance employed in statistical tests for critical values is the generally 
accepted five per cent level, but this is varied when the nature of the data set or 
method used demands. 
The remainder of chapter 4 describes: analyses of capital structure ratios and other 
accounting ratios across Europe; the ranking of capital structure ratios by tax system 
type and the corporate tax rate; a test for the existence of bimodal corporate capital 
structure distributions across Europe as a means of testing the Nfiller (1977) investor 
clientele hypothesis; and a multivariate analysis of variance to determine the 
importance of differences between accounting ratios, debt and equity issuing firms, as 
well as differences within countries, tax systems, and so on. This chapter thus provides 
a comprehensive perspective of the structure of the modem European firm and its 
capital structure, as well as determining the general influence of tax factors, country 
factors, and the differences between firms more likely to issue one form of external 
finance over another. 
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4.4 The European data sets 
The main source of the information used in the empirical analyses is the Datastream 
on-line financial database. This database contains information which includes company , 
accounts items, macro economic variables, equity and bond market prices and 
conditions, amongst many other variables and series. The system is mainly used by 
brokers, though it is also often employed in academic research projects where large 
samples of accurate data are required. The data are available for current variables and 
their historical values, enabling reasonable length time-series studies for firms in 
certain countries. 
There are five main data sets used throughout the empirics of this report. Different 
data sets are required to capture average, marginal and time-series effects, as well as 
to enable tests for the significance of industry classification and tax exhaustion. A brief 
description of the data sets is given in table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 
The data sets of the European corporate capital structure research 
Data set 1 
Cross-sectional capital structure data set 
Countries analysed: Belgium (63 firms), Denmark (46 firms), Eire (14 firms), 
France (346 firms), Germany (201 firms), Italy (92 firms), 
the Netherlands (59 firms), Spain (47 firms), Sweden (119 firms), 
Switzerland (142 firms), the UK (1,497 firms). 
Number of observations: 2,626 firms. 
Period: year ending October 1992. 
Data type: Corporate capital structure ratios and firm characteristic variables. 
Data set 2 
Marginal capital structure data set 
Countries analysed: Germany (66 firms), Belgium (8 firms), Denmark (12 firms), 
Spain (2 firms), France (63 firms), Eire (6 firms), Italy (19 firms), 
the Netherlands (24 firms), Switzerland (23 firms), the UK (172 firms). 
Number of observations: 395 firms. 
]Period: capital structure issues - year ending March 199 1. 
accounting ratios: year ending March 1990. 
Data type: Corporate capital structure issues and accounting ratios. 
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Table 4.2 (cont. ) 
The data sets of the European corporate capital structure research 
Data set 3 
Time-series capital structure data set 
Countries analysed: the UK (up to 314 firms, 1968-93) 
the Netherlands (up to 56 firms, 1978-92) 
Germany (up to 204 firms, 1981-92) 
France (up to 354 firms, 1983-92). 
Number of observations: up to 928 per annum, up to 26 years. 
Period: November 1968 to November 1993. 
Data type: Corporate capital structure ratios, accounting ratios, macro economic 
variables,, and other measures. 
Data set 4 
Industry-effect capital structure data set 
Countries analysed: the UK only. 
Number of observations: 486 firms from 12 industries. 
Period: year ending February 1993. 
Data type: Corporate capital structure ratios and industry classifications for firms in 
industries containing greater than or equal to 20 firms. 
Data set 5 
Tax exhaustion capital structure data set 
Countries analysed: Belgium (40 firms), Denmark (3 8 firms), Eire (13 firms), 
France (292 firms), Germany (I firm), Italy (56 firms), 
the Netherlands (9 firms), Spain (37 firms), Sweden (0 firms), 
Switzerland (131 firms), the UK (1,460 firms). 
Number of observations: 2,077 firms. 
Period: year ending March 1993. 
Data type: Corporate capital structure ratios and corporation tax-paid measures. 
As can be readily observed, the main data sets are the first three, as data sets 4 and 5 
are merely those used to test subsidiary hypotheses. Indeed, the first three data sets are 
those which enable the majority of the hypotheses to be tested as well as enabling the 
empincal models to be estimated. 
Once the raw data are collected from Datastream, unwanted information is removed 
within a word-processing or spreadsheet package. Each row then represents a case (an I 
individual firm) and each column represents a separate variable. The data are then 
imported into the SPSS statistics package Version 5.02 (1993), within which 
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accounting ratios and various other measures are computed. SPSS is used to conduct 
all of the cross-sectional and marginal analyses. However, other packages such as 
PCGIVE Version 7.0 (1992) and MICROFIT 3.0 (199 1) are utilised to analyse the 
time-senes data. 
Problems encountered with the data include: unavailable data; missing observations; 
significant variations in the number of quoted companies across countries; and 
comparability of accounting measures across countries. Difficulties were encountered 
when seeking certain data types across the European sample, particularly those 
variables related to taxation. Where precisely comparable measures are unavailable, 
approximately comparable measures are used instead, but in such circumstances 
attention is drawn to this substitution. Missing observations constitute a fairly general 
problem with Datastrearn data. For example, when a multivariate model is to be 
estimated, if the data for just one of the independent variables is missing then all of the 
data for that particular firm will be omitted from the model estimation process, 
reducing the sample size and the validity of the model. Various instrumental variable 
and averaging "n-ýissing observations rectification" techniques were found to have an 
insignificant effect on the problematic data sets and thus were not used. Some 
countries have relatively few quoted companies compared to countries such as the 
UK, and therefore valid models may be produced for firms in these countries only with 
some difficulty. Thus, in some of the analyses, only a subset of countries is used as 
hypothesis tests or models would be meaningless for very small samples. Finally, 
authors such as Rutterford (1988) and Rajan and Zingales (1994) noted that inter- 
country comparisons of accounting measures are plagued by problems such as 
differences in cost conventions, the degree of consolidation of accounts, debt 
composition, assets composition, the presentation of leasing finance, institutional 
structures, and differences in the treatment of provisions and pensions in the accounts. 
Other differences which limit inter-country comparability are noted as the report 
progresses. In summary, data restrictions are seen to limit the ability to test certain 
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hypotheses and estimate models on the corporate data from certain countries, thereby 
reducing, in some cases, the broadness of the results presented. However, it is asserted 
that by studying the five different data sets with their differing perspectives, a 
reasonably comprehensive coverage of European firms is achieved. I 
Therefore, hypotheses are tested and models estimated using the five data sets 
described, to enable consideration of the central optimality hypothesis of the existence 
of firm-level optimal capital structures and the processes by which that hypothesis 
comes about. 
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ture measure 
There is no capital structure measure which is common to the literature. Authors have 
argued from different theoretical standpoints as to why certain measures should be 
preferred to others, though often restrict their choice of measure when faced with the 
constraints imposed by the data available. Probably the most popular measure 
employed is the straight long-term debt to equity measure. 
Marsh (1982) argued that the theory suggests that debt ratios should be measured in 
market value terms, even though most of the finance textbooks prescribe the use of 
book value ratios. Stonehill et al (1975) found that corporate treasurers generally 
worked in book values rather than market values. Support for book value measures is 
also provided by Myers (1977), as he argued that such measures were strongly related 
to a firm's "assets-in-place". However, Marsh employed both market value and book 
value debt ratios in his study, mainly due to the difficulties involved in calculating the 
market value of a firnfs debt. Incidentally, he found the results of using both measures 
to be very similar in his analysis. 
Titman and Wessels (1988) studied long term debt, short term debt and convertible 
debt-to-equity ratios, measuring equity in book and market values. They used book 
values for debt and they argued that they did not suspect the cross-sectional 
differences between the market values and book values of debt to be correlated with 
any of the capital structure determinants in their study, suggesting that the use of 
either book value or market value equity was acceptable. Furthermore, they cited 
Bowman (1980), who demonstrated that the cross-sectional correlation between the 
book value and market value of debt was very large, which should minimise any 
misspecification arising from using book value debt measures. 
-Harris and Raviv 
(1990) used a book value debt to equity (the latter in book or market 
value) measure, and also used debt to market value equity plus book value debt. Rajan 
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and Zingales (1994) also used a total debt to total debt plus equity ratio, expressing 
equity in market value terms. However, this ratio may be biased, they argued, as firms 
in different countries employed differing levels of trade credit. They considered and 
criticised three other measures of the corporate capital structure: the long term debt to 
long term debt plus equity ratio, the non-equity liabilities to total assets ratio, and the 
ratio of earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation to interest payments. They 
criticised the first measure as it ignores short term debt, which represents a very 
significant proportion of debt in some countries, especially Japan where it is 
automatically rolled over and thus acts very much like long term debt. The second 
measure may be considered too broad a measure of leverage as it even includes claims 
such as pension liabilities in some countries. The third measure is criticised because 
continental European firms tend to under-report profits due to "conservative" 
accounting, in effect inflating leverage in this measure. 
The literature clearly demonstrates the broad range of measures used to gauge the mix 
of the firm's finances. However, most authors suggest a debt to equity type ratio, 
measuring debt in book value and equity in market value, the former due to data 
constraints. The research of this report employs a slight variation on this measure: the 
long term debt to long term debt plus equity ratio, consistent with authors such as 
Harris and Raviv (1990) and Rajan and Zingales (1994), consisting of book value debt 
and market value equity, and is referred to throughout this research as the DDE ratio. 
The DDE ratio was chosen as the main measure of the corporate capital structure for a 
number of reasons, both theoretical and practical. Firstly, as most of the literature 
discusses the effect of various determinants on a stock capital structure ratio, a stock 
measure was used in preference to a flow measure. Secondly, the DDE ratio was 
chosen in preference to debt to equity ratios because it is the proportion of total funds 
(debt plus equity) represented by debt that concerns the firm finance manager. By 
considering the percentage of total funds, the finance manager quickly gauges the 
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degree of gearing, whereas the debt-equity ratio is a more abstract measure. Thirdly, a 
ratio containing long term debt is required, as this research seeks to determine the long 
term external funding behaviour of European firms. Furthermore, it is the strategic 
external funding choice which is of interest here, whereas including short term debt in 
the capital structure measure may force the examination of short term, operational 
funding which is not of central importance. However, debt structure is considered 
separately within this research. Finally, it is extremely difficult to ascertain the market 
value for a firm's debt, whereas the market value of equity is readily available. This 
necessitates examination of a quasi-market value capital structure measure. Thus, the 
long-term-debt (book value)-to-debt-plus-market-value-equity ratio fulfils all of these 
criterion and is readily computed from the data available. 
A potential difficulty with the DDE ratio, however, is that because the equity 
component of the denominator is measured in market value terms, then the DDE ratio 
may be negatively related to variables which are measured in nominal values through 
time merely because of its definition. This may produce a negative bias on the 
coefficients of models of the DDE ratio which contain time series variables measured 
in nominal terms. Where such models are discussed later, this potential problem is 
again discussed. 
The debt constituent of the ratio is defined as Datastream item code 321, total loan 
capital, which comprises all loans repayable in more than one year, including 
debentures, convertible loans, promissory notes and commercial paper repayable in 
more than one year, leasing finance and HP, and other loans repayable in more than 
one year. The equity constituent is defined as Datastream item code MV, the market 
value of equity by issue (or HMV, the historical market value of equity, in the time- 
series analyses). 
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Another important capital structure measure, used in the marginal capital structure 
choice models, is a dichotomous, "zero/one" variable. "Zero" represents predominantly 
equity issuing firms, where equity represents at least 75 per cent of the total funds 
issued in a given year, and "one" represents predominantly debt issuing firms, where 
debt represents at least 75 per cent of the total funds issued in a given year. The 
amount of equity issued is defined as Datastrearn item code 406, total equity issued, 
and is defined as equity issued for cash, equity issued for acquisition, plus any share 
premium. The amount of debt issued is defined as Datastrearn item code 418, the 
change in loan capital, and is defined as loans issued for cash and loans issued for 
acquisition, less loans redeemed. 
In summary, the two main measures used throughout this research are the long-term- 
debt-to-debt-plus-equity ratio (known generally as the debt-equity ratio, though more 
specifically as the DDE ratio), and the dichotomous "zero/one" marginal issue 
variable, which classifies firms by predominant issue type. 
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4 vidence of European corporate capital structure patterns 
4.6.1 Introduction 
This section provides evidence produced from observation of European corporate 
capital structures. Firstly, mean DDE ratios are computed and ranked to determine the 
spread across Europe, and standard deviations are calculated to observe the spread 
within each country. Secondly, the ranking of mean DDE ratios within Europe is 
considered in conjunction with the tax system and corporate tax rate applicable in each 
country during the study period. Thirdly, the distributions of corporate capital 
structures are plotted as part of an indirect test of Nfiller's (1977) general equilibrium 
model. Finally, the results of this observational evidence are drawn together and 
summarised. 
4.6.2 The pattern of corporate capital structures within Europe 
Computing corporate DDE ratios across Europe enables the testing of hypotheses 
HI I and HK which propose that DDE ratios vary significantly across countries, and 
that DDE ratios are related to the cultural realm to which a country belongs, 
respectively. 
Summary statistics of corporate capital structure ratios across Europe are given in 
table 4.3, where countries are ranked by the mean DDE ratio of their constituent firms. 
Perusal of the ranking of DDE ratios supports hypothesis HII as the variation in 
European corporate capital structures is indeed wide, ranging from 20 per cent to 55 
per cent long-term debt as a proportion of total external funds. If short-term debt were 
included in the ratio, it would be expected that the degree of gearing would be much 
larger. Swiss firms have the highest proportion of long-term debt in their capital 
structures, which may be a result of the highly developed system of banking 
intermediaries, the banking culture and the large influx of foreign deposit funds into 
Switzerland. The latter may reduce the cost of debt within the country, which, when 
coupled with the extremely efficient banking system, means that debt finance may be 
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cheaper both in terms of the direct and indirect costs of borrowing to Swiss firms, 
encouraging them to employ relatively high gearing levels. Conversely, UK firms have 
the lowest proportion of long-term debt in their capital structures. This may be owing 
to the fact that the UK is considered a world centre of equity institutions, providing 
efficient financial intermediaries, buoyant investor markets and many specialised 
secondary markets for the efficient allocation of funds. It may be, then, that UK firms 
have a cost advantage over the other European firms with respect to the ease of access 
to equity markets or lower transactions costs, or simply that UK firms have more of an 
equity culture than other European firms. This result is consistent with the research of 
Rutterford (1988), who explained this apparent equity culture, arguing that the UK has 
a well developed equity market: 
"With efficient information dissemination, stringent auditing and monitoring 
procedures and low issue costs, which keep the agency costs of equity to a 
minimum. " (Rutterford (1988), p. 206) 
Thus, institutional factors may explain the hierarchy of debt-preference across Europe. 
Table 4.3 
European firm DDE ratios and summary statistics ordered by mean DDE ratio 
rank country mean 
DDE ratio 
standard 
deviation 
minimum 
value 
maximum 
value 
number o 
observs. 
1 Switzerland 0.55 0.28 0.00 1.00 142 
2 Belgium 0.51 0.35 0.00 0.99 63 
3 Italy 0.45 0.34 0.00 1.00 92 
4 Eire 0.40 0.22 0.00 0.74 14 
5 Denrnark 0.34 0.29 0.00 0.92 46 
6 France 0.34 0.28 0.00 1.00 346 
7 Germany 0.30 0.29 0.00 0.98 201 
8 Sweden 0.27 0.28 0.00 0.98 119 
9 Netherlands 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.99 59 
10 Spain 0.25 0.26 0.00 0.80 47 
II UK 0.20 0.24 0.00 1.00 1497 
The standard deviations all fall within a fairly narrow range, indicating a fairly similar 
spread of DDE ratios within each country. The maximum of 1.00 or thereabouts in 
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most of the countries reveals that some firms indulge in almost 100 per cent gearing, 
issuing only small amounts of equity to conform to legal obligations. 
Hypothesis H14 proposed that the mean DDE ratio of a country is related to the 
"cultural realm" (Broek and Webb, 1973) to which a country belongs, following a 
study of Sekely and Collins (1988) who found weak evidence of this. Table 4.4 shows) 
however, that countries within cultural realms do not have similar DDE ratios, as each 
group contains both high and low ranking DDE ratios. The cultural diversity within 
Europe does not appear to enable the grouping of countries into cultural realms, at 
least with respect to corporate capital structures. 
Table 4.4 
Cultural realm 2rouping and mean DDE ratios across Europe 
cultural realm country DDE ratio rank standard 
deviation 
Anglo-Amencan Eire 0.40 4 0.22 
UK 0.20 11 0.24 
Westem Central Europe Switzerland 0.55 1 0.28 
Belgium 0.51 2 0.35 
Germany 0.30 7 0.29 
Netherlands 0.26 9 0.26 
Mediterranean Europe Italy 0.45 3 0.34 
France 0.34 5 0.28 
Spain 0.25 10 0.26 
inavia Denmark 0.34 5 0.29 
Sweden 0.27 8 0 
In summary, then, there are very wide corporate capital structure differentials across 
Europe, supporting hypothesis HI 1, which may be explained, at least in part, by 
differences in institutional factors across countries, particularly the state of 
development of debt and equity markets. Countries of similar cultures (cultural realms) 
do not have similar firm DDE ratios, questioning hypothesis H14, as the countries are 
I 
too diverse to be grouped in such a naive manner. 
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tax system and the corporate tax rate on mean DDE ratio 
rope 
Table 4.5 again shows the ranking of mean DDE ratios across Europe, but in addition 
shows the type of tax system and the corporate tax rate employed by each country 
during the study period. The table thus provides some preliminary evidence to test 
hypothesis H9, that corporate DDE ratios vary significantly across tax systems, and 
H8, that the corporate DDE ratio increases with the corporate tax rate. 
Table 4.5 
The ranking of European countries by the corporate DDE ratios and showing 
taxation system types and the corporate tax rates 
Rank Country DDE ratio Tax system Corporate tax 
rate % 
I Switzerland 0.55 Classical 10 to 27 
2 Belgium 0.51 Imputation/Tax 39 
Credit 
3 Italy 0.45 Imputation/Tax 36 
Credit 
4 Eire 0.40 Imputation/Tax 40 
Credit 
5 Denmark 0.34 Imputation/Tax 38 
Credit 
5 France 0.34 Imputation/Tax 34 
Credit 
6 Germany 0.30 Imputation/Tax 50 
Credit 
7 Sweden 0.27 Imputation/Tax 30 
Credit 
8 Netherlands 0.26 Classical 35 
9 Spain 0.25 Classical 35 
10 UK 0.20 Imputation/Tax 33 
Credit 
Apart from the two extremes, Switzerland and the LJK, the countries with the highest 
mean DDE ratios employ imputation/tax credit tax systems and the countries with the 
lowest ratios employ classical tax systems. This is interesting because, apart from the 
two extremes, the result is counter intuitive because the classical tax system effectively 
taxes the returns on equity twice, first at the corporate level and then at the personal 
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level, thus iscrinunating against equity returns. One thus might expect countries with 
classical tax systems to use more debt in their corporate capital structures than 
countries of non-classical tax systems. However, the result is supported by Rutterford 
(1988) who found in her international study of corporate capital structures that: 
"Despite the reductions in the tax advantage of debt as Japan, France, 
Germany, and the UK moved towards an imputation tax system during the 
1960's and 1970's ... 
leverage ratios appear in most cases to have increased 
over time. " (Rutterford ( 19 8 8), p. 202) 
The result appears to lead to one of two possible explanations: either the tax system 
type does not significantly affect the corporate DDE ratio within a country, at least to 
an extent observable in a cross-sectional study, or the tax incentives produced by 
different tax systems are not clearly captured and modelled in the existing literature. 
However, the counter intuitive result holds only for the majority of the country mean 
DDE ratios, and not for the countries with the highest and lowest DDE ratios, and 
therefore it is a very tentative result, suggesting only weak support for hypothesis H9. 
The table also lists the corporate tax rate applicable at the date of data collection, 
though it is clear that the corporate DDE ratio bears no relation to the corporate tax 
rate. Therefore, hypothesis H8 is not supported by cross-sectional European firm 
evidence. This may imply that, even if higher corporate tax rates increase the tax 
incentive to corporate debt, this has little cross-sectional impact, as other factors 
mi-hin a particular country may counterbalance or dominate this effect. 
Therefore, corporate capital structures do vary with the tax system chosen by a 
country, supporting hypothesis H9 to some extent, although there is some weak 
evidence questioning the relationship proposed by the literature of the double taxation 
of equity returns under the classical system. The corporate tax rate exerts no clear 
impact on corporate DDE ratios across the countries studied, questioning hypothesis 
H8, as other factors appear to counterbalance or dominate this effect. 
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4.6.4 An anal sis of European corporate capital structure distributions 
Kim, Lewellen and McConnell (1979) argued that, if Miller's (1977) capital structure 
irrelevance theory held, then the distribution of capital structures within a country 
should be bimodal if investor leverage clienteles exist. They argued that investors 
would specialise their equity holdings in those firms whose capital structures satisfy 
their personal tax requirements because they would gain higher returns, after tax, for a 
given amount of gearing and a given amount of investment, by specialising in such a 
manner. Low tax bracket investors would buy the equity of highly geared firrns, 
whereas high tax bracket investors would buy the equity of firms with low gearing or 
no gearing at all, thus obtaining the gearing they require through personal borrowing. 
They inferred from this that low tax bracket investors demand the equity of firms with 
low gearing policies and high tax bracket investors demand the equity of firms with 
high gearing policies. Thus, firms accommodate investors by employing either no debt 
or high debt relative to overall funding. A bimodal capital structure distribution will 
thus arise, whereby low (high) tax bracket investors will hold the equity of firms in the 
higher (lower) model. 
The Kim, Lewellen and McConnell argument therefore gives rise to a testable 
implication of the Miller capital structure theory. Hypothesis H5 of this research states 
that corporate debt-equity ratio distributions are bimodal in shape. If the hypothesis is 
not supported then this provides some evidence questioning the presence of investor 
leverage clienteles and questioning, although indirectly, the Nfiller capital structure 
irrelevancy proposition. 
To test hypothesis H5 DDE ratios are plotted for each European country to determine 
whether this implication of Nfiller's leverage clientele hypothesis, which is central to his 
1977 model, holds. Figures 4.1 toAll show the separate DDE ratio distributions for 
each country, and table 4.6 summarises the results. The table shows that such bimodal 
distributions can only be said to exist in Belgium, Italy and Spain, where even then the 
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distributions are only roughly bimodal, and that most distributions are of an 
exponential decay shape. Hypothesis H5 is therefore not supported by evidence from 
European corporate capital structures, thus questioning firm-level capital structure 
irrelevancy and providing indirect support for the central hypothesis, HI, of the 
existence of firm-level optimal capital structures. Miller's theoretical model cannot 
hold without investor leverage clienteles, and it is clear that these do not generally 
occur across Europe. 
Table 4.6 
SummaEy of European firm debt to debt plus eguity ratio distribution types 
Country Debt to debt plus equity 
distribution shape 
Bimodal Distribution 
(Yes/No) 
Belgium bimodal Yes 
Denmark exponential decay No 
Eire flat No 
France exponential decay No 
Germany exponential decay No 
Italy bimodal Yes 
Netherlands exponential decay No 
Spain bimodal Yes 
Sweden exponential decay No 
Switzerland flat/unimodal No 
UK exponential decay No 
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4.6.5 Summary 
There are very wide differentials in DDE ratios across Europe, supporting hypothesis 
HI 1, which may be explained, at least in part, by institutional factors. The range of 
DDE ratios therefore justifies further examination of European corporate capital 
structures and the factors which influence them, as the wide differentials must arise 
from macro economic (including institutional), taxation or ýcorporate differences 
between countries. Cultural realms do not bear any impact on DDE ratios across 
Europe, questioning hypothesis H14, perhaps because of the significant corporate 
diversity within realms. Indeed, it may merely be that the concept of cultural realms is 
too vague to be of any use in this context. DDE ratios do vary across tax systems, 
supporting hypothesis H9 to some extent, although the precise nature of any 
relationship is unclear. DDE ratios appear to bear no relation to corporate tax rates, 
questioning hypothesis H8, which may be due to other factors dominating any tax 
advantage to debt effect arising from variations in the corporate tax rate. Financial 
leverage clienteles did not generally exist within separate country financial markets, 
which questions Miller's (1977) capital structure irrelevance model. Thus, the naive 
analyses of this section suggest that further examination is warranted by the degree of 
capital structure differentials observed, and that the tax system may cause part of this 
differential. 
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4.7 An analysis of the corporate environment and country, tax system-and issue 
decision variations across Europe 
4.7.1 Introduction 
Section 4.6 demonstrated that significant differentials in corporate capital structures 
exist across Europe. This section seeks to give perspective to the corporate 
environment within which the capital structure choice is made, by means of descriptive 
statistics concerning the more important accounting ratios of European firms. As the 
evidence here is again observational, it provides merely preliminary testing of 
hypotheses concerning the importance of retentions (H16), and the relationship..., _ 
between the DDE ratio and firm size (H 18). In addition, a multivariate analysis of 
variance is computed to determine statistically the significance of the country and tax 
system to which a firm belongs as a determinant of firm accounting ratios, as well as 
determining the significance of differences between debt and equity issuing firms at the 
margin, across Europe, and within tax system types and separate countries. This 
necessitates the statement of new hypotheses which do not derive directly from the 
literature, but are of importance towards a greater understanding of capital structure 
determination and ultimately the testing of the central hypothesis. This technique also 
enables more formal testing of the hypotheses that corporate DDE ratios vary 
significantly across Europe (H9) and vary significantly across countries (HI I). The 
results are then summarised and discussed. 
4.7.2 A descriptive study of the European corporate environment 
This section describes the mean accounting ratios of European firms (excluding 
Sweden for data availability reasons) for the year ending March 1990, computed from 
data set 2. The ratios should provide a perspective on the European corporate 
environment and should enable the testing of a number of hypotheses, though only to 
the limited extent that casual empiricism permits. 
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The results of computing the mean accounting ratios are given in table 4.7. As data set 
2 consists of much larger firms than data set 1, on average, higher DDE ratios are 
expected in table 4.7 than those of table 4.3 if hypothesis H18 holds. However, the 
range of DDE ratios in the former is 0.14-0.43 and in the latter is 0.20-0.55, which 
questions hypothesis H 18 as larger firms appear to employ less rather than more long- 
term debt in their capital structures than smaller firms. 
Table 4.7 
Means of European accounting ratios 
BD BG DK ES FIR IR IT NL SW UK R 
DDERATIO 0.24 0.33 0.25 0.22 0.29 0.29 0.27 0.24 0.43 0.14 0.32 
DEPRATIO 0.22 0.2 0.14 0.12 0.22 0.1 0.15 Oý 16 0.14 0.1 0.17 
DIVCOVER 
- 
2.45 3.53 4.95 2.73 3.51 4.06 2.94 2.68 4.18 2.83 3.4 
AXRAT UT' 0.02 -0.02 0.17 0.19 0.06 0.08 0.29 0.03 0.16 0.16 
FARATIO 0.45 0.45 0.4 0.53 0.46 0.4 0.43 0.54 0.51 0.67 0.431 
TATC-OVER 10.86 13.22 3.22 3.26 4.96 2.52 4.17 8.321 4.6 16.56 5.14 
LARATIO 0.52 0.54 0.78 0.26 0.65 0.53 0.68 0,34 0.64 0.53 0.47 
NPMARGIN 3.35 11.27 4.79 ; 9.04 , 
6.22 3.36 4.33 5.15 4.39 8.3 5.67 
PAYRATIO 0.47 0.52 0.17 0.43 0.43 0.32 0.21 038 0.19 0.41 0.38 
QARATIO 1.09 1 1.48 0.77 1.04 1.17 1.09 0,97 1.3 1.01 1.07 
RETRATIO 0.38 0.52 0.76 0.42 0.77 1.24 0.43 0.64 0.56 OM 0.46 
; ROCE 14.39 12.9 10.57 13.67 15.24 14.32 11.771 2t56 10.15 23.11 14.36 
SRLRDEBT 1.65 Oý59 1.36 0.83 1.21 0.64 1.67 Z07 0.62 2.45 2.02 
STKRATIO 60.63 43.82 52.65 48.33 63.52 48.27 63.7 46.04 68.96 53.28 54.18 
TAXONPTP 1 0.43 -0.26 Mi 0,27 0.26 -0.06 0.37 Oý27 0.07 0. OM 
TAXRATIO 43.93 18.33 15.09 25.27 17.13 -20.91 38.7 26 32.4 34.47 41.95 
WCRATIO 1.71 1.35 1.9 1.08 1.44 1.6 1 1.39 147 1.93 1.47 1.43 
1 
V40RKCAP 0.41 0.06 0.24 0.1 0.25 0.12 1 0.22 1 0.24 1 0.34 0.21 0.18 
Where: DDERATIO = debt-to-debt-plus-equity ratio; DEPRATIO = depreciation ratio; DIVCOVER = 
dividend cover; DTAXRAT = depreciation-adjusted tax ratio; FARATIO fixed assets ratio; 
INTCOVER interest cover; LARATIO = liquid assets ratio; NIPMARGIN net proflt margin; 
PAYRATIO payout ratio; QARATIO quick assets ratio; RETRATIO = retentions ratio; ROCE = 
return on capital employed; SRLRDEBT short-run-to-long-run-debt ratio; STKRATIO = stock ratio; 
TAXONIPTP tax-to-pre-tax-profit ratio; TAXRATIO = tax ratio; WCRATIO = working capital ratio; 
WORKCAP net current assets ratio. 
A general result arising from this table is that the majority of ratios are of the same 
order of magnitude, which shows that although significant variation occurs across 
Europe, this variation still occurs within certain boundaries. 
Hypothesis H16 states that retentions are the main source of investment finance. 
Although this is not tested directly here, it appears that European firms retain 
approximately half of their profits, to fund growth internally (RETRATIO), and thus it 
is likely that retentions constitute an extremely important form of finance, producing 
weak evidence in support of H16. Short-term debt is on average twice the value of the 
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long-term debt (SRLRDEBT) employed by the firm across Europe, and thus 
overdrafts and short-term bank loans are of far greater importance to firms as a form 
of finance than long-term debt. This may imply that the funding requirements of , 
European firms are erratic or that they require significant funds to finance working 
capital. However, ratios for Belgium, Spain, Eire and Switzerland are less than unity, 
indicating a preference for short-term over long-term debt funds in these countries. 
Dividend cover (DIVCOVER) and interest cover (INTCOVER) are examined to 
gauge the ability, on average, of European finns to cover their finance conunitments. 
Such firms are able to cover dividend payments between 3 and 4 times over on 
average and thus are generally quite prudent with respect to their dividend policies. 
Firms are able to cover interest payments, on average, in excess of 5 times over, and 
could therefore greatly extend long-term borrowing if they so desired. Substantial 
spare debt capacity suggests that, although firms are capable of significantly extending 
their gearing, they choose not to, possibly because any tax advantage to debt is 
significantly reduced or even eliminated by factors such as tax exhaustion, bankruptcy 
and agency costs, and so on. European firms are therefore very prudent in the extent 
to which they are able to cover fixed and quasi-fixed financing commitments. 
Four liquidity ratios were examined. Liquid assets ratios (LARATIO's) reveal that, on 
average, 50 per cent of short-term liabilities are covered by very liquid funds. Quick 
assets ratios (QARATIO's) generally appear to be around unity, the ideal ratio 
prescribed in finance texts, and thus immediate liabilities can easily be covered by fairly 
liquid assets. Similarly, working capital ratios (WCRATIO's), which include stocks, 
average out at approximately 1.5 and net current asset ratios exhibit a mean of 0.2. 
Therefore, European firms are generally very liquid and find it easy to cover short- 
term liabilities either to banks or trade-creditors as they fall due. 
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The relative measure of profitability before taxation, the return on capital employed 
(ROCE), is approximately 15 per cent on average across Europe, but after taxes 
(NPMARGIN) is reduced to about 6 per cent. Thus taxes significantly impact upon 
corporate profits. Of the profits earned, European firms pay out approximately 40 per 
cent to investors as dividends, and thus, capital gains must also be a significant element 
of equity returns. 
Taxation represents a significant cost to European firms, representing a mean of 32 per 
cent of profits including associates (TAXRATIO) and 42 per cent of profits excluding 
associates (TAXONPTP). When depreciation is added back to pre-tax profits, the 
relative tax ratio (DTAXRAT) is reduced to 16 per cent of such profits, It may also be 
noted that the extent of taxation varies significantly across countries, which may 
provide indirect evidence in support of hypothesis H9. If the relative tax bill varies 
across countries then this is likely to cause variations in DDE ratios. 
Two ratios which show remarkable consistency across Europe are the stock ratio 
(STKRATIO) and the fixed asset ratio (FARATIO). The stock ratio shows that most 
European firms maintain about two months of stock at any time, and the average fixed 
asset ratio of approximately 43 per cent reveals that the asset structure of most 
European firms consists of fixed and current assets in roughly similar proportions. 
In summary, retentions are indeed an extremely important form of finance, producing 
weak evidence in support of hypothesis H16, and larger firms appear on average to 
employ less long-term debt, questioning hypothesis H18. Some weak evidence is 
found to support hypothesis H9, as the relative tax bill varies significantly across 
Europe, which is likely to impact, in turn, upon corporate DDE ratios. Short-term debt 
is twice as important as long-term'debt to the average European firm, though it must 
be remembered that this study is concerned with the long-term external funding 
decision of the firm and not the short-term financing. Firms appear prudent with 
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respect to their liquidity and coverage ratios, and it is possible that such risk aversion 
may imply that the costs of financial distress are large. Firm profitability is very sirnýar 
across Europe, and is significantly reduced by taxation. As firm accounting ratios are . 
observed to vary greatly, and are hypothesized to impact significantly upon DDE 
ratios, this may constitute preliminary evidence that corporate factors are one of the 
causes of significant differences in DDE ratios across Europe. 
4.7.3 A multivariate analysis of variance of accounting ratio variations within 
Europe 
multivariate analysis of variance allows the user to determine whether statistically 
significant differences exist between distinct groups. In such an analysis there are 
usually two grouping variables and a number of dependents, the latter being termed 
"dependent" variables as the purpose of the test is to determine whether the value of 
such variables depends upon the group to which they belong. The analysis is employed 
within the European corporate capital structure perspective to determine whether 
significant differences occur in accounting ratios (which describe the accounting 
structure of the firm) between and within groupings which include the funding issue 
decision, countries, and tax systems. New hypotheses are developed to structure the 
analysis, including macro economic, taxation and corporate hypotheses, which are 
given in table 4.8. The new hypotheses presented here, and subsequent new 
hypotheses are formulated and tested to produce a wider perspective on the question 
of capital structure optimality, culminating eventually in a more coherent hierarchy of 
hypothesis tests than those arising merely from the diverse existing literature studies. 
Table 4.8 
New (null) h1potheses to support the multivariate analysis of variance tests 
I Macro economic hypotheses: 
Tff n 
H25: There are no differences in'accounting ratios between countries. 
H26: There are no differences in accounting ratios between debt and equity-issuing 
firms across Europe. 
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Table 4.8 
New (null) hypotheses to support the multivariate analysis a variance tests I. I 
Taxation hypotheses: 
H27: There are no differences in accounting ratios between classical tax system 
countries and imputation/tax credit tax system countries. 
H28: There are no differences in accounting ratios between debt and equity-issuing 
firms in classical tax system countries. 
H29: There are no differences in accounting ratios between debt and equity-issuing 
firms in imputation/tax credit tax system countries. 
Corporate hypotheses: 
H30: There are no differences in accounting ratios between debt and equity-issuing 
firms within each separate country. 
The analysis of variance test statistic used is Hotelling's T-squared, as it is a 
multivariate generalisation of the univariate t-value. The hypotheses H25 to H30 are 
stated in the null hypothesis form that the variances of the two groups are equal. The 
decision rule states that the null hypothesis is rejected if the significance of F is less 
than 0.05. 
Table 4.9 
Multivariate analysis of variance tests on the accounting ratios of European 
firms 
hypothesis Hotelling's 
T-squared 
Approx/ 
Exact F 
Hypothesis 
degrees of 
freedom 
Error 
degrees of 
freedom 
Significance 
of F 
Accept/ 
Reject 
H25 5.1801 17.44687 153 4637 0.000 Reject 
H. 26 0.14417 1.8919 18 237 0.017 Reject 
H27 0.16937 3.20868 18 341 0.000 Reject 
H28 1.57205 1.47958 17 16 0.219 Accept 
H29 0,14390 1.81468 18 227 0.025 Rej ect 
H30: FR 
H30: NL 
H30: UK 
&ý 
0,39791 
3.08010 
0.27838 
0.92845 
0.90591 
2.35075 
18 
17 
18 
0 
42 
5 
152 
0.552 
0.605 
0.003 
Accept 
Accept 
Reject 
The macro economic hypotheses tested seek to discover whether the accounting ratios 
of different countries are significantly different (H25), and whether the accounting 
ratios of debt and equity-issuing European firms are significantly different (H26). 
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Table 4.9 shows that both of the null hypotheses are rejected. The fact that there are 
significant differences in corporate accounting structures between countries suggests 
that a disaggregated approach is warranted. In addition, hypothesis HII is tested to - 
discover whether there are statistically significant differences in DDE ratios between 
countries. The result is given is table 4.10. 
Thus, the null hypothesis of no differences is rejected, that is, there are statistically 
significant differences in DDE ratios between countries, supporting hypothesis HI 1. 
Hypothesis H26 is rejected, as there are significant differences between predominantly 
debt and equity-issuing firms across Europe. This suggests that models of the marginal 
issue decision of the firm are justified because significant differences exist in 
accounting ratios between the two groups. 
Table 4.10 
A Univariate anallsis of variance to test the significance of differences in DDE 
ratios between countries 
Hypothesis degrees of freedom 9 
Error degrees of freedom = 533 
Hypothesis sum of squares 1.76687 
Error sum of squares - 14.56098 
Hypothesis mean squares 0.19632 
Error mean squares 0.02732 
F statistic = 7.18619 
igni cance oF 0.000 
Tests of the taxation hypotheses seek to discover if significant differences in 
accounting ratios occur between classical and imputation/tax credit tax systems (H27), 
and whether significant differences occur between debt and equity-issuing firms within 
each separate tax system (H28, H29). Significant differences do occur between the 
different tax systems, and thus the tax system significantly affects the accounting 
structures of European firms. Hypothesis H9 may also be tested here by employing a 
univariate analysis of variance test in order to determine whether corporate DDE 
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ratios vary significantly across tax systems, the results of which are given in table 4.11. 
There is strong evidence, therefore, that DDE ratios do indeed vary significantly 
between tax system types across Europe. 
Table 4.11 
A Univariate analysis of variance to test the significance of differences in DDE 
ratios between tax systems 
Hypothesis degrees of freedom I 
Error degrees of freedom = 358 
Hypothesis sum of squares 0.44377 
Error sum of squares = 9,89628 
Hypothesis mean squares 0.44377 
Error mean squares 0.02764 
F statistic = 16.05338 
Significance of F- 0.000 
Hypotheses H28 and H29 seek to determine whether there are significant differences 
in accounting ratios within each of the two tax system types. The results, shown in 
table 4.9, reveal that debt and equity-issuing firms are not significantly different within 
classical tax system countries, but are significantly different within imputation/tax 
credit system countries, as hypothesis H28 is accepted and H29 is rejected. Therefore, 
multivariate models of the marginal corporate capital structure choice may prove 
weaker for classical than imputation/tax credit systems, as debt and equity-issuing 
firms are not clearly distinguishable by their accounting ratios in the former system. 
The result implies, interestingly, that the classical tax system exhibits greater neutrality 
with respect to the marginal issue decision of the firm than the imputation/tax credit 
system. This is clearly counter intuitive as it is the imputation/ tax credit tax system 
which should exhibit greater neutrality, as it does not tax equity returns twice and thus 
should reduce the relative tax advantage to debt over equity. 
The "corporate" null hypothesis, H30, states that there are no differences in 
accounting ratios between debt and equity-issuing firms within each country. This 
hypothesis is not tested for the majority of countries, owing to the problem of data 
availability, missing observations and multicoflinearity. However, the hypothesis is 
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tested for France, the Netherlands and the UK. Of these countries, only in the UK do 
significant differences occur between debt and equity-issuing firms, as the hypotheses 
for France and the Netherlands are rejected. Thus, the issuing decisions of UK firms 
may be clearly distinguished on the basis of the complete set of accounting ratios. 
Although most of the other countries are not tested, and hypotheses for France and the 
Netherlands may not be rejected, it must be noted that the multivariate analysis of 
variance tests were computed on the basis of the entire set of accounting ratios. It is 
possible, indeed probable, that non-UK countries' corporate issue decisions may be 
clearly differentiated on the basis of a subset of the accounting ratios, a proposition 
which is tested in the multivariate logistic regression models of chapter 5. 
In summary, multivariate analysis of variance tests using Hotelling's T-squared statistic 
were computed to test new hypotheses, H25-H30,, concerning variations in accounting 
ratios between and within a number of important groupings across European firms. 
There are significant variations in accounting structures between firms in different 
European countries. Hypothesis H1 I is supported as the DDE ratios of different 
countries are significantly different. Debt and equity issuing firms may also be 
significantly distinguished across Europe. Thus, macro economic factors significantly 
influence both accounting structures and DDE ratios across Europe. Different tax 
systems produce different accounting structures within Europe, though the accounting 
structures of debt and equity-issuing firms are only clearly differentiated within 
imputation/tax credit systems. Hypothesis H9 is supported by the evidence as there are 
significant differences in DDE ratios between tax system types. Therefore, the tax 
system type impacts significantly on the firm's marginal capital structure decision as 
well as its stock of funds. However, firms issuing different instruments within classical 
tax systems are not differentiated by their accounting structures. Furthermore, within 
each separate country, debt and e4uity-issuing firms are not generally distinguished by 
their accounting structures, but pjay be if a subset of the accounting ratios is modelled 
in later multivariate marginal finance decision models. Overall, the tests described in 
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this section provide justification for separate country corporate capital structure 
models, and it is clear that the tax system type impacts significantly upon the capital 
structure. 
4.7.4 Summary 
Section 4.7 represents the transition from casual empiricism towards more analytical 
testing methods, enabling the testing of some fundamental hypotheses, which include 
both the initial hypotheses stated at the outset as well as new hypotheses. Corporate 
accounting ratios were computed as a measure of the firm's accounting structure, and 
it was observed that such structures varied significantly across Europe. Thus, this 
degree of variation should enable valid models of the corporate capital structure to be 
estimated using such accounting measures, and, indeed, it may be that the degree of 
variation itself is a cause of the wide variation in DDE ratios across Europe. 
Observation of the computed ratios provides weak evidence in support of hypotheses 
that retentions are the main source of investment finance (H16) and corporate DDE 
ratios vary significantly across tax systems (H9), though questions hypothesis H18, as 
there is some evidence of a negative relationship between firm size and the DDE ratio. 
Finn profitability appears to be significantly reduced by taxation, firms employ twice 
as much short-term debt as long-term debt, on average, and are very prudent with 
respect to liquidity and the coverage of finance commitments. Thus, the observational 
analysis suggests that enough variation should exist, prima facie, to enable the 
modelling of separate country capital structure models, and that the tax system and 
extent of taxation may significantly influence funding decisions. However, evidence 
from casual empiricism is necessarily weak as it requires the support of rigorous 
statistical testing. The multivariate analysis of variance produces such testing as it 
gauges the importance of differences between chosen groupings. In particular, 
hypothesis H9 is tested more formally, as is hypothesis HI 1, the results of which are 
that corporate DDE ratios are significantly different between tax systems and 
countries, respectively. More generally, accounting structures vary significantly across 
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countries and tax systems. The marginal funding choice of the firm is studied, and 
hypotheses to test the significance of differences between the accounting structures of 
firms within debt and equity-issuing groups reveal that such groups are quite distinct . 
across Europe as a whole and within imputation/tax credit systems, though are not 
distinct within classical tax systems and within each separate country. The results 
justify modelling stock capital structure measures within separate countries, but 
question the modelling of the marginal funding choice in a country-specific manner, at 
least using a wide set of independent variables. Firms in countries employing similar 
tax systems appear to have similar accounting structures and capital structures, a result 
which highlights the importance of the taxation system (a macro economic 
characteristic) in setting the parameters of the corporate environment. Thus, the macro 
economic environment sets the framework within which the taxation and corporate 
environments impact upon the firm generally, and its capital structure in particular. 
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4.8 Summarl 
The purpose of chapter 4 was to formulate the main hypotheses to be empirically 
tested in this research, to describe the methodology used and the data sets analysed, . 
and to conduct some preliminary analysis and testing upon those data sets. The central 
hypothesis to be tested, which is consistent with the literature review discussion, is 
that there exist firm-level optimal capital structures. To allow a comprehensive testing 
of this hypothesis,, three supporting hypotheses are also formulated concerning the 
importance of macro economic, taxation and corporate factors to the capital structure 
decision. In turn, these supporting hypotheses may only be addressed by testing a 
number of subsidiary hypotheses which are divided into macro economic, taxation and 
corporate factors. Thus, testing the subsidiary hypotheses enables the supporting 
hypotheses to be addressed, which in turn enable the central hypothesis to be 
addressed. The methodology described, in addition to addressing the main hypotheses, 
should also allow consideration of the average, marginal, short-term, and long-term 
determination of the corporate capital structure, by means of both explicit hypothesis 
testing procedures and the construction and estimation of empirical models. The data 
analysed in the empirics was drawn from Datastrearn and divided into five distinct data 
sets. The main capital structure measure analysed and modelled, the long-term debt-to- 
debt-plus-equity, was defined and discussed, as was the marginal issue "debt or equity" 
dichotomous variable. 
? reliminary evidence suggests that the country to which a firm belongs is a significant 
Jeterminant of its capital structure, and more generally its accounting structure, 
hough there is no evidence of a cultural realm effect. This result appears to warrant 
he construction and estimation of country-specific capital structure models within 
I I wrope, as European-wide models could not take into account the country effect 
vhich is associated with significant capital structure variation. There is also evidence 
if the influence of taxation factors. Although the corporate tax rate is not related to 
I ie DDE ratio across Europe on a cross-sectional basis, the influence of the tax system 
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appears to be a significant determinant. Again, the accounting structures of firms also 
appear to vary significantly between tax systems. Financial leverage clienteles do not 
generally occur within European financial markets, a result which questions the Nfiller 
(1977) capital structure irrelevance model, and thus lends more support to the central 
hypothesis. Focusing on the marginal funding choice, instead of the stock DDE ratio, 
reveals that debt-issuing firms and equity-issuing firms exhibit accounting structures 
which are statistically distinct across Europe, but not within separate countries. The 
classical tax system appears to exhibit greater neutrality with respect to the marginal 
issue choice since the two issue groups are not distinct within classical tax system 
countries, though these groups may be distinguished within imputation/tax credit 
system countries. The greater apparent neutrality of the classical tax system towards 
the marginal choice, whereby firms operating within such a system may not be clearly 
divided into debt and equity-issuing groups, is surprising because it might be expected 
that this system would be less neutral, due to the double taxation of dividends and 
consequent higher tax advantage to debt which it brings. Therefore, in summary, the 
results of this chapter suggest that country-specific models of corporate capital 
structure (measured in stock form) determination are justified, but that marginal 
funding choice models may not be valid, unless a greatly reduced set of accounting 
variables are modelled. It is clear that macro economic and taxation factors impact 
significantly upon the corporate capital structure, and it is extremely likely that the 
significant variation in corporate-level factors (accounting ratios) will cause different 
corporate capital structures across Europe. The preliminary results presented are, 
therefore, entirely consistent with the firm-level optimal capital structure solution 
hypothesis, HI. 
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CHAPTER 5 
A STATISTICAL AND ECONOMETRIC MODELLING ANALYSIS 
OF THE CROSS-SECTIONAL AND MARGINAL DETERMINANTS 
OF THE CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
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5.1 Introduction 
The objective of chapter 5 is to more formally test and model the relationships between 
measures of the European corporate capital structure and the factors which influence 
these measures. Section 5.2 describes an analysis of variance to determine whether the 
data are consistent with UK firms targeting their capital structures on the norm of the 
industry to which they belong. Section 5.3 describes a simple descriptive analysis 
which seeks to determine the extent of tax exhaustion within European firms. Section 
5.4 develops the more formal analyses of cross-sectional bivariate corporate capital 
structure relationships, by means of bivariate regression modelling, to discover whether 
the determinants arising from the Anglo-American orientated literature are indeed 
determinants across European firms. Section 5.5 develops corporate capital structure 
modelling in two respects: by modelling both the marginal issue decision and modelling 
the multivariate perspective. Section 5.6 summarises the results of the tests and 
models, to determine the perspective which is provided by the more formal gauging of 
the cross-sectional and marginal corporate capital structure relationships which are 
described in the hypotheses deriving from the literature review and those deriving 
from this research. 
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5.2 An univariate analysis of variance to determine whether UK rirms tamet 
their capital structures on the norm of the industry to which thex belon 
The literature review described empirical evidence which provided very strong support 
for the hypothesis (H24 in this study) that individual firms target their DDE ratios on 
the norm (or average) for the industry to which they belong. To be consistent with the 
literature, a univariate analysis of variance is conducted upon UK corporate data from 
data set 4. Similar studies for other countries were not possible as the number of 
quoted companies are generally not large enough to allow sensible division into 
industry types. DDE ratios are computed for 486 UK firms from 12 industries for the 
year ending February 1993. The criterion for selection of industries is that only those 
industries containing greater than 20 firms should be included in the analysis. 
For the purposes of the analysis of variance, the industries were coded one to twelve 
so that they form distinct groups within the test, as shown in table 5.1. The univariate 
analysis of variance basically compares the variance between the groups (the 
industries) to the residual variance, that is, the variance within the groups. The method 
is desirable as it does not require the groups to be of equal size. The null hypothesis is 
that there are no differences in DDE ratios between UK firms of different industry 
groups. The results of the analysis of variance test are given in table 5.2. 
Dividing the between-groups mean square by the within-groups mean square produces 
an F-ratio of 14.736 and a probability of 0.000. The null hypothesis is rejected well 
beyond the I Per cent level, and thus there is greater variation between groups than 
within them. Hypothesis H24 is therefore supported by evidence from UK firms as it 
appears that the DDE ratios of these firms are clustered within a particular industry. 
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Table 5.1 
Industry groupings of UK firms within the an "Isis of variance 
Industry Code No. of Firms 
Chemicals 1 22 
Water 2 31 
Breweries 3 33 
Conglomerates 4 24 
Construction 5 55 
Mechanical Engine 6 69 
Food Retailing 7 25 
Oil Industry 8 24 
Financial Services 9 27 
Property Development 10 98 
Multiples I1 45 
Clothing 12 33 
TOTAL 486 
Table 5.2 
A univariate anal-ysis of variance to test the effect of industry classification on 
corporate capital structures 
source of 
variation 
degrees of 
freedom 
sum of 
squares 
mean 
squares 
F-ratio significance 
of F 
between groups I1 9.302 0.846 14.736 0.000 
within groups 455 26.112 0.057 
total 466 35.414 0.076 
This clustering may imply that firms within an industry target their capital structures 
upon the norm for their industry, possibly reflecting the similar degrees of business 
risk, tax incentives and other factors experienced by firms within an industry. 
Alternatively, it may be that the more sophisticated and/or larger firms in an industry, 
having access to better quality information and analysis techniques, select their optimal 
capital structures, and the other firms in the industry merely follow their example. 
Indeed, firms may even be penalised by investors and institutional lenders for deviating 
too far from industry norms. Therefore, UK firms, and possibly European firms, appear 
to target their capital structure ratios on the norm for their industry, and in this sense, 
as discussed in some depth in the literature review, are engaging in optimising 
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behaviour as they are attempting to achieve the capital structure mix considered 
optimal by firms of similar business risk in their industry. 
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5.3 An observational analvqi,, q of the extent of tax exhaustion across 
European firms 
The literature suggests that the presence of non-debt tax shields may "crowd-out" the 
tax benefits of corporate debt, reducing the incentive for firms to engage in higher ' 
gearing levels. Hypothesis H7 thus states that the corporate DDE ratio is determined 
by the degree of the firm's tax exhaustion. Whilst this hypothesis is not directly tested, 
it is argued that if a significant proportion of firms in a particular country are entirely 
tax exhausted, that is they do not pay any corporation tax, then tax exhaustion may 
very well be a significant determinant of the corporate capital structure in that country. 
Data from data set 5 are examined to test hypothesis H7. The data studied consist of 
2,054 firms from 7 European countries for the year ending March 1993. The variable 
analysed is the corporation tax paid by individual firms (Datastream code 160). Those 
firms which paid a positive amount of corporation tax in the year studied are coded "0" 
whereas those firms which paid zero or negative amounts of corporation tax are coded 
"I". Where data are not available for a particular firm, that firm is eliminated ftom the 
analysis. Samples for Eire, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden are also eliminated 
from the analysis, as these samples contain less than 20 firms and thus can not be 
considered representative of the respective financial sectors. The number of firms 
which are coded "I" is then expressed as a fraction of the total number of firms studied 
within each country. This represents the percentage of tax exhausted firms in each 
country. The results are given in table 5.3. 
The table shows that corporate tax exhaustion is a significant and widespread 
phenomenon across Europe, with an average of 29.8 per cent of European firms 
experiencing complete tax exhaustion in the year of study. The extent of tax 
exhaustion varies across countries, with only 13.36 per cent of French firms 
experiencing complete tax exhaustion, but a surprisingly high 72.52 per cent of Swiss 
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firms experiencing complete tax exhaustion. Thus, hypothesis H7 is very strongly 
supported by evidence from European firms. 
Table 5.3 
The extent of complete corporate tax exhaustion across Eurol2e 
country number of tax 
exhausted firms 
total number of 
valid cases 
percentage of 
firms that are 
tax exhausted 
Belgium 15 40 37.50 
Denmark 19 38 50.00 
France 39 292 13.36 
Italy 12 56 21.43 
Spain 14 37 37.84 
Switzerland 95 131 72.52 
UK 419 1460 28.70 
total 613 2054 29.8 (mean) 
An additional point to note is that the study only identifies those firms which pay no 
corporation tax at all, and are thus completely tax exhausted. The analysis does not 
identify those firms which are "partially tax exhausted", that is, those firms which can 
only partiaUy utilise the tax benefits of debt. Tax exhaustion is thus, if anything, 
underestimated by this study, as "crowding out" is more widespread than revealed in 
the analysis. 
An interesting result is that Swiss firms appear the most tax exhausted of all European 
firms studied, whereas they exhibit the highest gearing ratios in Europe. The higher the 
degree of tax exhaustion, the lower gearing might be expected to be, as tax exhausted 
firms cannot benefit from the tax incentives to debt. The high gearing levels of Swiss 
firms are therefore inconsistent with the high degree of tax exhaustion observed. 
However, it is likely that tax exhaustion may only affect the marginal funding choice 
and thus may bear little relation to the stock DDE ratio measure. Alternatively, it may 
I 
be that the tax incentive associated with debt is dominated by other factors such as 
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bankruptcy and agency costs, and this is not an important determinant of the firm's 
capital structure strategy. 
Thus, although hypothesis H7 is tested only indirectly, there is strong evidence to 
support it, as at least 30 per cent of European firms are severely affected by corporate 
tax exhaustion. However, highly tax exhausted firms do not necessarily become low- 
geared firms as tax exhaustion is more likely to influence the marginal issue decision 
rather than the overall stock of funds. 
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5.4 A bivariate regression analysis of the corporate capital structure and the 
factors which influence it 
5.4.1 Introduction 
Though tests of many of the initial hypotheses have been conducted, in addition to ' 
tests of the new hypotheses, none of the methods described have yet modelled the 
stock DDE ratio measure. The nature of the evidence up to this point has been either 
casual or has been conducted to determine if there are distinct groupings within the 
European corporate finance market. Therefore, bivariate least squares regression is 
utilised to test, statistically, whether a factor supposedly influencing the DDE ratio is 
linearly associated with the DDE ratio. 
5.4.2 The hypotheses to be tested and the bivariate regression modelling method 
The bivariate regression method enables a number of hypotheses concerning the 
corporate capital structure to be tested. The hypotheses to be tested are presented in 
table 5.4. The majority of the hypotheses derive from the literature, though two new 
hypotheses, H31 and H32, are also added. 
Table 5.4 
The h3: potheses tested within the bivariate regression analysis 
Corporate hypotheses: 
H15: The degree of bankruptcy risk increases with the corporate debt-equity ratio. 
H17: The corporate debt-equity ratio increases as the payout ratio increases. 
H18: The long-term corporate debt-equity ratio increases with firm size. 
H2 1: The corporate debt-equity ratio increases with the degree of liquidity. 
H22: The corporate debt-equity ratio increases as firm profitability increases. 
I New taxation hypothesis: 
I H3 1: The corporate debt-equity ratio increases as the relative tax bill increases. 
I New corporate hypothesis: 
LH32: The corporate debt-equity ratio increases as dividend yield increases. 
197 
The hypotheses are tested using the proxies commonly used in the existing literature, 
and thus are in some cases tested using a number of measures in turn. A number of 
proxies for bankruptcy risk, which is the subject of hypothesis H 15, are tested: interest 
cover, equity beta, and current dividend cover. Interest cover is defined as adjusted 
operating profit plus total non-operating income, expressed as a percentage of total 
charges. The equity beta measure relates the return on a stock to price movements in 
the stock market as a whole. Current dividend cover expresses the number of times 
earnings cover the payment of a dividend. As discussed in chapter 4, the bankruptcy 
risk hypothesis is stated such that it implies that the DDE ratio is more accurately 
described as a determinant of bankruptcy risk rather than the converse. Whilst this is 
the opposite direction of causation from that implied by the majority of other 
hypotheses (excepting the dividend yield hypothesis), it is argued that the bankruptcy 
risk hypothesis is stated in a manner consistent with the propositions most common to 
the existing literature. Therefore, the hypothesis seeks to test whether increased debt 
significantly increases bankruptcy risk. It may be that the coefficient sign of the 
estimated bivariate models confirms whether the causation implied by the hypothesis is 
supported. 
The liquidity measures used to test hypothesis H21 are the quick assets ratio and the 
current assets ratio. The quick assets ratio is defined as the ratio of current assets, less 
total stock and work in progress, to total current liabilities, whereas the current assets 
ratio is merely the current assets of the firm divided by total current liabilities. 
The profitability measures used to test hypothesis H22 include: the return on capital 
employed, the net profit margin, and two measures which are better regarded as 
earnings measures: earnings per share and the price/earnings ratio. The return on 
capital employed measure is defined as the ratio of profit before interest and taxes to 
capital employed, and the net profit margin is the ratio of net profit before interest and 
taxes to turnover, Earnings per share is the total earnings in the last 12 months 
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expressed as a percentage of the share price, whereas the price/earnings ratio is the 
price of a share divided by the earnings per share. Whilst earnings measures may not be 
regarded as proxies for profitability., firms with high earnings are often highly profitable 
firms. 
Hypothesis H31 states that there is a positive relationship between the DDE ratio and 
the relative tax bill, because firms which experience a significant increase in their 
relative tax bill may seek to reduce future tax bills to "acceptable" levels by issuing 
more debt to utilise the associated tax benefits. The relative tax measures tested are the 
tax ratio and the depreciation-adjusted tax ratio. The former measure is defined as the 
corporation tax charged on profit for the current period divided by pre-tax profit, 
whereas the latter measure is defined as the former measure with depreciation per the 
profit and loss account added back to the profit measure. 
Hypothesis H32 states that there is a positive relationship between the DDE ratio and 
dividend yield as equity investors may demand relatively higher dividends to 
compensate them when the DDE ratio is high. Dividend yield is defined here as the 
dividend per share divided by the share price, It is noted that the causation implied by 
this hypothesis is the opposite of that implied in the other hypotheses, excepting the 
bankruptcy risk hypothesis. Within a cross-sectional analysis of this type, causation 
may not be determined with any degree of certainty, and therefore in this hypothesis, 
the most intuitive direction of causation is implied by the hypothesis stated. 
The bivariate relationships are estimated separately for each country, and then the 
coefficient estimates are tested using one-tail t-tests at the 5 per cent level. The one-tail 
test is computed because the sign as well as the significance of the coefficient are to be 
tested 
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5.4.3 The data 
The data set upon which the bivariate regression models are estimated is data set 1. 
which consists of cross-sectional data for 2,626 European firms from II countries for . 
the year ending October 1992. 
5.4.4 Results of the bivariate reeression models 
Table 5.5 gives the results of the individual t-tests. Only those relationships which are 
significant are shown in the table, along with the sign of the independent variable 
coefficient. The table shows that certain of the bivariate, relationships between the 
DDE ratio and the variables modelled exhibit widespread significance across Europe, 
whereas other relationships do not. The signs of the coefficients for each separate 
variable are consistent across countries in every case. 
Table 5.5 
Summary results of the bivariate regression t-tests 
VARIABLE 
B 
G 
D 
K 
I 
R 
F 
R 
B 
D 
I 
T 
N 
L 
E 
S 
S 
D 
S 
W K 
Interest cover - -I - -I - - - 
Beta + 
Current dividend cover 
Payout ratio 
Total assets employed (size) + + + 
Quick assets ratio 
Current assets ratio 
Return on capital employed 
Net profit margin 
Earnings per share 
Price/earnings ratio 
Tax ratio 
Tax ratio (depreciation adjusted) 
Dividend yield + 1 
+ + 
Wicy. 
significant positive relationship at the 5% level (I tail) 
significant negative relationship at the 5% level (I tail) 
BG = Belgium; DK = Denmark; IR = Eire; FR = France; BD = Germany; IT =: Italy; 
NL = the Netherlands; ES = Spain; SD = Sweden; SW = Switzerland; UK = the UK. 
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The bankruptcy risk measure coefficients are consistent with hypothesis H15, that is', 
that the degree of bankruptcy risk increases as the corporate DDE ratio increases. 
Both interest cover and dividend cover are measures of "financial safety" or "inverse 
risk" measures, and thus the widespread negative relationship across Europe supports 
the hypothesis. European firms which can cover their debt interest and principal 
commitments and their dividend payment "quasi-commitments" easily, are generally 
those which employ lower gearing levels. Higher debt not only threatens the ability of 
the firm to cover the increased debt interest commitmentsl but also "crowds out" the 
ability to cover dividend commitments. Firms which reduce or miss dividend payments 
are likely to be approaching a position of financial distress, and thus both coverage 
measures are good proxies for bankruptcy risk. The equity beta measure is not a 
significant factor influencing the DDE ratio, as a significant positive relationship is only 
found to hold for three of the countries studied. Although the equity beta is not 
consistently significant as a bankruptcy risk proxy across Europe, results for both 
interest and dividend cover ratios reveal that European firms with higher gearing ratios 
find it more difficult to cover their financial commitments, and run a higher risk of 
bankruptcy as a result, thus supporting hypothesis H 15. It is noted that the direction of 
causation hypothesized and supported by the evidence is such that the DDE ratio is a 
determinant (independent variable) of this bivariate relationship rather than a 
dependent variable. Indeed, a positive relationship would be inconsistent with the 
theory, as an increase in bankruptcy risk should encourage firms to reduce gearing 
levels, not increase them. Thus, the sign of the coefficient estimate often leads to one 
possible causation direction being eliminated within a cross-sectional perspective, 
otherwise the relationship observed is theoretically counter intuitive. 
The payout ratio is found to be negatively related to the DDE ratio, but for the 
Netherlands only. This relationship is therefore not only generally not observed across 
European firms, but also has a negative rather than the expected positive coefficient 
sign. It might have been argued that an increase in the payout ratio leads to firms 
201 
substituting away from the increasingly costly equity towards debt, but the negative 
relationship found for the Netherlands suggests that when dividends increase in such a 
manner, firms increase their equity relative to debt finance, possibly because they find 
the market more receptive to new equity issues after recent dividend increases. Thus, 
hypothesis H17 is questioned by evidence from European firms. 
Firm size is positively related to the DDE ratio in only three of the countries in the 
study. The sign of the relationship is consistent with the existing literature, which 
suggests that larger firms exhibit higher gearing and they are less risky, have greater 
collateral, lower flotation cost, and are more highly diversified than smaller firms. 
Thus, hypothesis H 18 is only weakly supported by evidence from European firms. 
The liquidity ratio measures, the quick assets ratio and the current assets ratio, are 
both negatively related to the DDE ratio in roughly half of the European countries. 
The theory of the existing literature proposed a positive relationship, as more liquid 
firms should be able to service higher debt commitments, and thus should have greater 
debt capacity and ultimately higher gearing. The evidence from the existing literature 
was mixed with respect to the nature of the relationship between liquidity and the DDE 
ratio. The negative relationship found in the European bivariate regression analysis not 
only questions the theoretical relationship, but also questions the mixed evidence 
because the relationship is found to be consistently negative in those European 
countries where the relationship is significant. The result may simply be a result of 
causation uncertainty, as it is theoretically unclear whether high liquidity firms tend to 
exhibit higher gearing or whether high gearing firms experience reduced liquidity as a 
result of the high gearing. The positive relationship of hypothesis H21 implicitly 
assumes liquidity to be the determinant of the DDE ratio, whereas the actual direction 
of causation may be the converse. 'Therefore, the negative relationship found questions 
the hypothesis as the causation appears to be the converse for European firms, that is, 
high corporate gearing results in reduced liquidity. 
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The profitability measures generally exhibit a negative relationship with the DDE ratio 
across the majority of European countries. Thus, more profitable firms may find it 
easier to issue equity due to the higher earnings of their equity holders or may fund 
predominantly internally, as such internal funds will be large for profitable firms. Thus, 
the relationship may merely reflect the relative abundance of internal funds of more 
profitable firms, or firms may actually find it easier to issue equity when they are 
perceived to be successful by potential investors. The earnings per share measure, and 
to a lesser extent the price/earnings ratio, reinforce this last argument. However, 
whether due to a preference for internal funds or an increase in potential investor 
interest in the firds equity, it is clear that hypothesis H22 is supported, as more 
profitable firms exhibit lower gearing levels than less profitable firms. 
The bivariate regression relationship between European corporate DDE ratios and 
relative tax bill measures is generally very weak, though of a negative coefficient sign. 
Thus, cross-sectional evidence from European firms strongly questions hypothesis 
H31, as firms do not react to relatively higher tax bills by increasing their gearing 
levels. The reason for this may be causation which could theoretically be in either 
direction. Indeed, the negative relationship found might suggest that increases in 
gearing reduce the relative tax bill of the firm. 
Finally, a significant positive relationship exists between the corporate DDE ratio and 
dividend yield in half of the European countries. This may be because equity investors 
demand higher dividends to compensate them for the increased risk associated with 
higher gearing levels. Thus, hypothesis H32 is supported by evidence from European 
firms. 
5.4.5 Summary 
Bivariate regression models have enabled a more formal testing of hypotheses arising 
from the existing literature as well as new hypotheses. As the models are disaggregated 
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to the level of each separate country, and are constructed using cross-sectional data, 
only taxation and corporate hypotheses are tested. 
One problem that arises is that a cross-sectional bivariate analysis cannot statistically 
, determine the direction of causation between the two variables modelled. However, it 
is often the case that only one direction of causation is theoretically consistent, and this 
direction is supported by the sign of the regression coefficient estimate. The Granger 
causality analysis of chapter 6 should resolve some of the interpretation problems 
associated with causation here. Another problem is that of variable coefficient bias 
owing to omitted variables, although this problem is inherent to all bivariate analyses 
unless one variable truly accounts for all of the variation in the other variable modelled. 
The hypotheses supported by the empirical evidence are H15, H22 and H23. It 
appears, then, that increases in corporate gearing increase the risk of financial distress 
(hypothesis H 15), a relationship which is an example of corporate gearing determining 
other corporate factors, rather than the converse, more commonly proposed 
relationship. More profitable firms either find it easier to issue equity rather than debt 
funds, or prefer to finance internally before resorting to external finance, and thus 
appear to employ lower gearing levels than less profitable firms (hypothesis H22). The 
positive relationship between dividend yield and the corporate DDE ratio of hypothesis 
H32 is another example where the latter is the determinant. Fhgher gearing levels 
require higher dividend payments to compensate equity holders for this increased 
bankruptcy risk. From these findings, it is possible that increased dividend payments 
may be associated with either increased profitability and a reduction in gearing gr may 
be associated with demands from equity holders for increased returns to compensate 
them for an increase in bankruptcy risk resulting from an increase in gearing. This 
result leads to the proposition that equity investors should not monitor dividend 
returns in isolation when purchasing new equity, but must also consider the capital 
structure stocks and flows underpinning them. 
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There is no evidence to support hypothesis H17 (proposing a positive relationship 
between the DDE ratio and the payout ratio), H21, and H3 1, as the first of these 
hypotheses finds little support across Europe, and the other hypotheses propose 
coefficient signs which are opposite to those estimated in the models. Thus, 
contradicting hypotheses H21 and H31 respectively, the higher corporate gearing is, 
the less liquidity the firm has at its disposal, and, higher gearing levels reduce the 
relative tax bill of the firm. The liquidity relationship is fairly widespread across 
Europe, whereas the taxation relationship is not. Thus, the direction of causation 
appears, yet again, to flow from the corporate DDE ratio to the other factor in the 
bivariate relationship, that is, changes in the level of gearing cause changes in taxation 
or corporate factors. Finally, a positive relationship exists between corporate gearing 
and firm size in only a few European countries. 
Changes in corporate gearing, then, appear to determine changes in bankruptcy risk, 
dividend yield, liquidity, but corporate gearing is determined by changes in firm 
profitability. Even at this early stage of the research, it appears that many authors have 
overlooked the issue of causation uncertainty, or have misinterpreted their results. 
However, it is impossible to infer causality with any degree of certainty from a cross- 
sectional analysis,, and thus studies which involve time-lags, such as marginal or time- 
series analyses, may help resolve this problem. Furthermore, chapter 6 attempts to 
determine the possible directions of causation within some of the more important 
bivariate corporate capital structure relationships of this research. 
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5.5 Mu-t. variate lqgLs-tic regression modelling of the marginal corporate capital 
structure decision 
5.5.1 Introduction 
The empirical tests conducted so far have concentrated on bivariate relationships 
between the corporate capital structure and the factors believed to influence it. 
However, a multivariate modelling approach is required to establish the groups of 
variables which the firm considers before making a capital structure decision, as well as 
to establish the interactions between these variables. Another benefit of multivariate 
analysis as opposed to bivariate analysis is that the bias in parameter estimates arising 
from omitted variables should be reduced. Additionally, hypothesis tests and models up 
to this point have generally concentrated upon relationships concerning the stock 
capital structure measure, the DDE ratio. It may, however, be that the European firm 
only reacts to changes in important determinants as such changes occur, that is, at the 
margin. Thus, a detailed analysis of the marginal ffinding decision of the European firm 
appears to be warranted, and such an analysis may be conducted by constructing and 
estimating multivariate logistic regression models for each European country. 
The method allows many of the taxation and corporate hypotheses to be tested, though 
in a somewhat indirect manner. Most of the initial hypotheses are concerned with the 
factors influencing the stock corporate capital structure measure,, the DDE ratio. With 
regard to the stock measure, changes in determinants may produce changes in the 
DDE ratio. However, changes in determinants may produce a different influence on the 
marginal issue decision of the firm. Nevertheless, if the change in a determinant causes 
the DDE ratio to increase, for example, it is likely that the change will also cause the 
firm to issue predominantly debt at the margin. After all, it is through these occasional 
discrete, lumpy issues of securities that firms make alterations to their stock measure 
capital structures. 
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5.5.2 The hypotheses to be tested and the multivariate logistic regression 
modelling method 
The hypotheses to be tested in this analysis are listed in table 5.6. The hypotheses 
consist of the initial hypotheses deriving from the literature, hypotheses deriving from 
previous analyses, and new hypotheses deriving from consideration of the marginal 
corporate capital structure environment. 
Table 5.6 
The hypotheses to be tested within the multivariate logistic regression analysis 
ý Taxation hypothesis: 
I H3 1: The corporate debt-equity ratio increases as the relative tax bill increases. 
I Corporate hypotheses: 
H17: The corporate debt-equity ratio increases as the payout ratio increases. 
H19: The short-term debt-equity ratio increases as the firm size increases. 
H2 1: The corporate debt-equity ratio increases with the degree of liquidity. 
H22: The corporate debt-equity ratio increases as firm profitability increases. 
H23: The corporate debt-equity ratio increases as the tangibility of the firm's assets 
increases. 
New hypotheses: 
H33: The firm is more likely to issue debt at the margin, the lower is the corporate 
debt-equity ratio. 
H34: The firm is more likely to issue debt at the margin, the higher are coverage 
ratios. 
The taxation variables to be modelled are the depreciation-adjusted tax ratio (labelled 
DTAXRAT), the tax-to-pre-tax-profit ratio (labelled TAXONPTP), and the tax-to- 
pre-tax-profit (including associates) ratio (labelled TAXRATIO). The tax charge 
component of the first of these ratios is the corporation tax charge, whereas the tax 
charge of the other two ratios is the total tax charge. Hypothesis H31 may imply that 
as the relative tax bill increases, the firm is more likely to issue debt than equity, 
implying a positive variable coeffiqient in the marginal models. 
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Hypothesis H33 implies that the higher the DDE ratio already is, the more likely the 
firm would be to issue equity rather than debt, to avoid increasing the risk of financial 
distress. Such a relationship is consistent with a positive variable coefficient. If there is . 
a positive coefficient it may be that firms are increasing debt towards some optimum 
capital structure which they have not yet achieved, possibly based upon the target 
capital structure of the industry to which they belong. Such a result would provide 
support for the central hypothesis, HI, which states that there exist firm-level optimal 
capital structures. Thus, the nature of the relationship between the stock and the flow 
capital structure measures across Europe enables two hypotheses to be tested. 
increases in the payout ratio (labelled PAYRATIO) should increase the likelihood of 
the firm issuing debt, if evidence from the European marginal models is to be 
consistent with evidence from Marsh (1982). The payout ratio is defined as dividends 
per share divided by adjusted net earnings per share. Thus the payout ratio variable is 
generally expected to have a positive coefficient across models. 
The short-term to long-term debt ratio (labelled SRLRDEBT) is a measure of debt 
structure, and is defined as borrowings repayable within one year divided by total loan 
capital. It might be hypothesized that firms with relatively high ratios are smaller firms 
which rely to a greater extent on short-term debt, particularly bank debt, in keeping 
with hypothesis H19. Therefore, the higher this debt structure ratio is, the less likely 
the firm is to issue long-term external debt at the margin, which suggests a negative 
variable coefficient due to corporate capital structure scale factors. 
The liquidity variables modelled are the liquid assets ratio (LARATIO), the quick 
assets ratio (QARATIO), the working capital ratio (WCRATIO), and the net current 
assets ratio (WORKCAP). These are standard textbook liquidity ratios and are defined 
in appendix A. If hypothesis H21 holds then this implies that an increase in liquidity 
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should also lead the firm to issue debt rather than equity at the margin, thus producing 
a positive variable coefficient. 
The profitability variables modelled are the net profit margin (labelled NPMARGIN) 
and the return on capital employed (labelled ROCE). The net profit margin is defined 
as after-tax profit divided by total sales, and the return on capital employed is profit 
before interest and taxation as a proportion of capital employed. Hypothesis H22 
proposes a negative relationship between profitability and the DDE ratio; at the 
margin, if an increase in profitability causes firms to issue equity rather than debt, 
producing a negative coefficient sign, then this result would provide indirect support 
for the hypothesis. 
The fixed assets ratio (labelled FARATIO) is a measure of the tangibility of the firm's 
asset structure, and is merely the proportion of total assets represented by total net 
fixed assets. Hypothesis H23 may be indirectly supported if the coefficient of the fixed 
assets ratio is found to be positive, as firms with highly tangible assets can provide 
greater security to debt investors, thus increasing their debt capacity and encouraging 
them to issue relatively more debt at the margin. 
The financial risk variables modelled are the dividend cover ratio (labelled 
DIVCOVER) and the interest cover ratio (labelled INTCOVER). Dividend cover is 
defined as adjusted net earnings per share divided by dividends per share and interest 
cover is defined as operating and non-operating profit divided by total interest charges. 
Thus the former measures the ability of the firm to cover its quasi-commitments to 
equity holders and the latter measures the ability of the firm to cover its commitments 
to debt holders and thus both are measures of financial safety. Hypothesis H34 states 
that "safer" firms with relatively high coverage ratios may be more likely to issue debt 
than equity at the margin and thus coefficients are expected to be positive. 
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The retentions ratio (labelled RETRATIO) is a measure of the proportion of after-tax 
profits retained by the firm. A hypothesis relating to this measure is not explicitly 
stated above because the theoretical underpinning of such a hypothesis is unclear. 
However, it might be hypothesized that firms which retain more are those firms which 
have not yet exhausted their borrowing capacity and thus do not yet have to resort to 
external equity finance, an argument deriving from pecking order hypotheses. This 
hypothesis would, then, suggest a positive coefficient. 
The depreciation ratio (labelled DEPRATIO) is defined as depreciation divided by 
total net fixed assets. It might be hypothesized that firms with a higher depreciation 
ratio, that is, firms which depreciate their fixed assets more rapidly, may issue debt 
rather than equity to fund new investment, in keeping with the pecking order theory of 
finance. Such a hypothesis implies a positive coefficient in the logistic regression 
models. 
The stock ratio (labelled STKRATIO) is a measure of the amount of stock the firm has 
at a point in time in terms of days of sales. It might be hypothesized that firms with 
higher stock ratios will experience reduced liquidity (as measured by the quick assets 
ratio which adjusts for stock) and thus have a lower debt capacity. Alternatively, the 
fact that a large proportion of funds are caught up in the stock of a firm with a high 
stock ratio may mean that it is more inclined to seek external fiinding, which could 
come from either debt or equity investors. Thus, the variable coefficient is expected to 
be either negative or otherwise mixed across models. However, as stocks have a short 
duration, they may be funded by short-term debt, due to the maturity structure of 
assets and funding, and thus the stock ratio may show a far clearer relationship with 
short-term rather than long-term debt, a relationship which is not modelled here. 
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The above hypotheses are therefore tested by means of the construction and estimation 
of multivariate logistic regression models. However, before the testing process and 
results may be discussed, the logistic regression method must be examined. 
Logistic regression analysis is a method which estimates the probability that an event 
will occur for a dichotomous dependent variable. Multivariate logistic regression 
models consist of a dichotomous dependent variable and a number of independent 
variables (known as predictor variables). The objective of the method is not only to 
predict whether an event will occur or not, given a particular data set, but also to 
identify those variables which are most significant to the determination of a "correct" 
prediction. 
Logistic regression is used in preference to normal multivariate regression analysis and 
discriminant analysis for a number of statistical reasons. Firstly, the dependent variable 
under consideration is dichotomous, the distribution of errors is unlikely to be normal, 
and predicted values may not be interpreted as probabilities, as they are not bounded 
by 0 and 1. Thus, normal multivariate regression is inappropriate for modelling a 
dichotomous capital structure variable, even though it is capable of adequately 
modelling the stock capital structure measure. Secondly, multiple discriminant analysis 
requires that independent variables are multivariately normally distributed and that the 
variance-covariance matrices for the two groups to be studied are equal, if the 
prediction function is to be optimal. Thus, multiple discriminant analysis also appears 
to be inappropriate. Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) show that logistic regression 
model requires far fewer assumptions than multiple discriminant analysis and 
multivariate regression analysis, whilst generally producing models which exhibit 
similar predictive powers, and therefore it is the method chosen to model the marginal 
capital structure decision of the European firm. 
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The multivariate logistic regression model is such that the probability of an event 
occurring, in this case the probability of an individual firm issuing predominantly debt 
rather than equity,, equals: 
Probability (event) 
I+e-' 
Equation 5A 
Where Z is a linear function of the independent variables such that: 
Z= BO + BIX, + B2X2 +---+ BpXp Equation 5.2 
The probability is not linearly related to the independent variables, and due to the 
logistic transformation the probability estimates will always be between 0 and 1, 
whatever the value of Z. 
The coefficients of the independents are computed using a maximum-likelihood 
technique, such that the coefficients which make the observed results most likely are 
selected. Coefficients are estimated using an iterative computation procedure, or 
algorithm, as the model is non-linear and thus does not lend itself to direct estimation 
methods 
If the estimated probability of the event under consideration is less than 0.5, then it is 
inferred that the event will not occur. Conversely, if the probability of the event is 
greater than 0.5, it is inferred that the event will occur. If, however, the estimated 
probability exactly equals 0.5 then no inference concerning the occurrence of the event 
may be made. 
Modelling the marginal capital 'structure decision of the firm is not commonly 
undertaken in the existing literature. However Martin and Scott (1974) and Mackie- 
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Mason (1990) are probably among the most renowned proponents of such an analysis. 
Martin and Scott (1974) hypothesized that: 
"Companies choosing to issue debt instead of common equity (or vice-versa) 
possess distinctive financial characteristics. " (Martin and Scott (1974), p. 72) 
They modelled the marginal capital structure of the firm using multiple discriminant, 
analysis, both to investigate the variables important to the firm when making its 
marginal decision, and to develop the model as a decision-making tool to be used by 
finns. 
Mackie-Mason (1990) conducted a marginal analysis to model the debt/equity choice 
of the finn because: 
"Focusing on actual decisions, made at the margin, is likely to provide more 
powerful tests than the studies of debt/asset ratios because the ratios cumulate 
numerous decisions made over many years, taken under varying 
circumstances. " (Mackie-Mason (1990), p. 1489) 
Therefore, they argued that it is better to model the marginal capital structure decision 
of the firm because the stock capital structure measure is merely a cumulative result of 
many separate funding decisions, and that debt-issuing firms should possess 
characteristics which are distinct from equity-issuing firms. Modelling the marginal 
capital structure decision is thus a fundamental process to undertake within any 
analysis of the European corporate capital structure environment, and the method 
chosen to conduct such an analysis is multivariate logistic regression. 
Although the statistical basis of logistic regression has already been explained, it is 
necessary to explain the application of the method to the marginal corporate capital 
structure decision. in the marginal capital structure choice model, "0" represents 
predominantly equity-issuing firms and "I" represents predominantly debt-issuing 
firms. A firm is said to be a predominant equity issuer if equity issued represents at 
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least 75 per cent of the total long-term funds it issues during 1991. A similar definition 
applies to predominant debt-issuing firms. The independent variables are the 
accounting ratios (accounting structure measures) from the marginal capital structure 
data set, data set 2. A twelve month tag is introduced between the accounting ratios 
and the issue choice variable. The reason for this is that it is hypothesized that the 
European firm makes its marginal capital structure choice based on recent historical 
accounting information. As the choice to raise new external long-term finance is a 
strategic decision of the firm, it is likely that the accounting structure of the firm for 
the recent past will be considered when making that decision, rather than the current 
accounting ratios. In addition, if the study period were the same for both the marginal 
issue decision variable and the accounting ratios, a situation could arise whereby an 
issue decision made in April 1990 might be modelled upon accounting ratios as at 
February 1991, which, although both are data from the same accounting year, is 
entirely counter intuitive. Furthermore, the year lag also helps to resolve any causation 
uncertainty, as a capital structure decision made in 1991 cannot be a determinant of 
1990 accounting ratios, as the 'future cannot cause the past. ' Thus, the one year lagged 
marginal capital structure model addresses the strategic nature of the issue decision, 
avoids potential timing difficulties, and resolves, at least in part, the problem of 
causation uncertainty. 
Before explaining the model construction and estimation process, the statistical 
measures of significance used in this process, as well as those used to gauge the 
validity of the final models, must be discussed. 
The Wald statistic is used to test the hypothesis that a particular independent variable 
coefficient is zero, and the critical value with which to compare the statistic is from a 
Chi-square distribution (Norusis, '1992). The ratio is merely the variable coefficient 
divided by the respective standard error, all squared: 
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B2 
Wald statistic Equation 5.3 
se 
Where: 
B= the logistic regression variable coefficient 
se = the standard error of the coefficient 
The significance level used in the statistic tests is the five per cent level. The Wald 
statistic, then, enables each individual independent variable (in this case, an accounting 
ratio) to be tested for significance, thus creating a criterion by which variables may be 
eliminated from models on a stepwise basis during the model construction process. 
The rate of correct classification enables the logistic regression model predictions to be 
compared with observed outcomes. The percentage of predominant debt and equity 
issuers correctly classified is calculated. The classification procedure allocates cases 
(firms) to a particular outcome based on whether the estimated probability is greater or 
less than 0.5. If the estimated probability is greater than 0.5 then the model predicts 
that the firm will issue predominantly debt, whereas if the estimated probability is less 
than 0.5 the model predicts that the firm will issue predom inantly equity at the margin. 
The rate of correct classification, then, is one of the means by which the "success" of 
the model may be gauged, that is, its ability to correctly predict the issue decision of 
the firm at the margin. 
The model C tests the null hypothesis that all of the model coefficients, 
except the constant, are zero, and in this respect is similar to the F-test in normal 
multivariate regression models. It is equal to the difference between minus two 
multiplied by the log likelihood for a model with only a constant and minus two 
multiplied by the log likelihood for the model being tested. The number of degrees of 
freedom is the difference between the number of parameters in the two models. The 
likelihood is merely the probability of the observed results, given the estimated 
coefficients. The likelihood is logged and multiplied by minus two because it is small 
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and less than 1, thus producing the expression -2LL. Therefore, the model Chi-square 
is compared to a Chi-square distribution to gauge how well the model fits the data. 
Thus, the Wald statistic enables the signIficance of individual independent variables 
(accounting ratios) to be gauged and the more important variables, in terms of 
discriminating power, to be identified, whereas the rate of correct classification and 
model Chi-square both measure the power of the multivariate models. 
To demonstrate the great variety of possible model development processes from which 
the utilised process was drawn, models may be developed by: adding new variables in a 
stepwise manner (forward development) or removing variables from a model 
containing all of the possible variables in a stepwise manner (backward development), 
in addition to employing any of the following statistics as a criterion for variable 
inclusion or exclusion: the Wald statistic, the model Chi-square, the rate of correct 
classification, or other statistics. Various combinations of forward and backward 
development processes on the basis of one or more of these statistics may be imagined. 
Any of these model development processes may achieve a satisfactory model, although 
processes which represent 'general-to-specific' (or backward development) approaches 
are preferable, as they produce models which suffer less from omitted variable bias in 
the estimators. Additionally, the backward development process enables variables to be 
removed on the basis of their individual significance relative to the other variables 
whereas the forward development process does not facilitate such comparison. Finally, 
the Wald statistic is employed as the criterion for individual variable inclusion or 
elimination, as it enables individual variables to be measured for significance, rather 
than each variable's contribution to the overall power of the model. 
The process chosen starts with a full, non-restricted modell and variables are generally 
eliminated on the basis of the Wald statistic, both because the resulting models appear 
to exhibit higher classification power and because misspecification is reduced as a 
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result. Misspecification is generally a problem in econometric modelling when not all 
of the variables in a model are known, or can be modelled, but the inclusion of 
irrelevant variables is better than the exclusion of variables. This is because, although 
the presence of irrelevant variables may cause a loss of efficiency, it does not cause a 
loss of consistency, and perhaps, more importantly, it does not cause coefficient 
estimates to become biased, whereas wrongly excluded variables will yield biased, as 
well as inconsistent, parameter estimates. Thus, the stepwise elimination of variables 
from a non-restricted model should in theory produce a more statistically robust 
model. 
The model development process is a three stage procedure, conducted with the 
objective of producing a high power predictive model, as well as to identify the 
individual variables which most significantly influence the marginal capital structure 
choice of the European firm. Thus, separate models are constructed, estimated and 
developed for firms in each European country (except Sweden owing to data 
availability problems) which make issues of debt and/or equity during the study period. 
Firstly, then, the number of missing observations is determined by means of a 
frequency calculation. This calculation is important because variables with many 
missing observations may be eliminated at this early stage if no Wald statistic may be 
computed to measure their univariate significance. Although this may appear to be a 
somewhat crude elimination process: it is only practised in those weaker estimated 
models which are estimated on very few firms; there is no strictly optimal procedure 
for variable elimination anyway; and such variables are later tested more formally using 
the Wald statistic when the model is in its restricted (reduced) form. Secondly, where 
Wald statistics may be computed, variables are eliminated in a stepwise manner, with 
the least significant on the basis of this statistic being eliminated first, and progressing 
until the rate of correct classification is optimised, that is, until the resulting model 
attains the highest classification rate possible, given the data set. Thirdly, variables 
eliminated in the first stage, merely on the basis of large numbers of missing values, are 
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reintroduced, and are either added or eliminated again from the model, so that they 
may be tested formally by means of the univariate Wald statistic. 
Once final models have been developed, the rate of correct classification and Chi- 
square statistics are computed, and each model is interpreted in detail, examining the 
model as a whole as well as the separate independent variables which comprise the 
model. 
5.5.3 The data 
The data for the multivariate logistic regression models is taken from data set 2, which 
contains capital structure and accounting information on 395 firms ftom 10 European 
countries. As discussed earlier, the marginal issue variables are those applicable to the 
year ending March 1991, whereas the accounting ratio variables are those applicable to 
the year ending March 1990. Detailed definitions of the variables are given in appendix 
A. The data set is obviously much smaller than data set 1, used for the bivariate 
regression models, because it examines only those firms which made predominantly 
debt or equity long-term external capital structure changes during the year ending 
March 1991. The estimated model results to be given greatest importance are those for 
the UK, Germany and France, as data sets for these countries contain somewhat more 
firms than the data sets of other countries. 
5.5.4 Results of the multivariate logistic regression models 
It is necessary to examine how the marginal European corporate capital structure 
models may be used to predict the outcome of a decision to raise new external finance, 
before the full set of European models are examined. Therefore, the UK logistic 
regression marginal corporate capital structure model is used to demonstrate how such 
a model works. Accounting ratio data from predominant debt and predominant equity 
issuing firms are substituted into the model as an example of model predictions which 
are consistent with observed marginal corporate capital structure behaviour, as 
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demonstrated in table 5.7. The model consists of a set of variable coefficients and a 
constant. The model coefficients are multiplied by the respective observed accounting 
ratio data for a particular firm, and the constant is added to the sum of these . 
calculations to produce a linear function sum. The linear function sum is then 
transformed using equation 5.1, where the linear function is Z in the equation, to 
produce a probability of the outcome occurring, that is, the issue of predominantly 
debt by the firm. 
Table 5.7 
Table showim the computation of a predicted outcome of either predominant 
debt or eguit-v issue from the UK marginal corporate capital structure model 
Coefficient 
name 
Coefficient 
value 
Observations 
for case 4 
Albert Fisher 
Linear 
Function 
Observations 
for case 1 
AAH 
Holdings 
Linear 
Function 
DDERATIO -3.3989 0.13 -0.441857 0.02 -0.067978 
DEPRATIO -6.3344 0.08 -0.506752 0.16 -1.013504 
DIVCOVIER -0.3115 2.92 -0.90958 2.46 -0.76629 
DTAXRAT -4.2166 0.16 -0.674656 0.23 -0.969818 
FARATIO 1.9885 0.33 0.656205 0.49 0.974365 
INTCOVIER -0.0146 6.3531 -0.0927553 5.8235 -0.0850231 
LARATIO 0.7449 1.67 1.243983 0.33 0.245817 
PAYRATIO -1.7817 0.34 -0.605778 0.41 -0.730497 
QARATIO -2.0027 2.21 -4.425967 0.91 -1.822457 
ROCE -0.0125 20.86 -0.26075 18.50 -0.23125 
SRLRDEBT -0.0028 0.09 -0.000252 14.12 -0.039536 
STKRATIO -0.0223 30.51 -0.680373 32.58 -0.726534 
WCRATIO 2.4235 2.79 6.761565 1.28 3.10208 
Constant 1.9810 1.9810 1.9810 
Observed 
outcome 
1 0 
Predicted 
linear 
function sum 
2.04403274 -0.1496251 
The model correctly predicts that the firm Albert Fisher, case number 4 of data set 2, 
will issue predominantly debt, beýause the probability of the outcome, which in the 
marginal capital structure models is an issue of predominantly debt, is 0.88534, which 
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is merely the predicted linear function sum transformed in equation 5.1. It is noted that 
a value of unity would represent a certain probability of a predominant debt issue at the 
margin, The model also correctly predicts that the firm AAH Holdings, case number I 
of data set 2. will issue predominantly equity, because the probability of the outcome is 
only 0.46266, which again is the predicted linear function sum transformed in equation 
A value of zero would represent a certain probability of a predominant equity 
issue at the margin. 
Table 5.8 shows the optimal marginal capital structure decision models for firms in 
each of the separate European countries studied. The variable coefficients are not so 
easily interpreted as the coefficients of linear regression models such as those discussed 
in section 5.4. A positive coefficient multiplied by its respective (non-negative) 
observation will increase the probability of the event occurring, in this case the firm 
issuing predominantly debt. A negative coefficient multiplied by its respective (non- 
negative) observation will reduce the probability of the firm issuing predorninantly 
debt. Thus, the higher the profitability ratio, ROCE, for example, the greater the 
probability of a firm issuing predominantly equity, as the variable has a negative sign in 
the models in which it is employed. 
Table 5.8 
The individual European logistic regression marginal funding models 
BD BG DK ES FR IR IT NL Sw UK 
DDERATIO 2.2673 47.3864 46.171 3.1951 -15.199 -3.3989 57EPRAT10 5.1406 128.079 
1 
-73.463 -6.3344 
DiVCOVER -0.0326 1.3503 -0.3115 
DTAXRAT 
- 
1.086 -4.2166 
FAMT 10 7.9344 -53.126 3.8637 6.4877 1.9885 
! NTCOVER 
'- 
0.1166 -0.0855 -0.183 -0.3998 -0.0146 
LARATIÖ -1.601 -6.6559 -5.6261 0.7449 
NPÜ9RGiN -0.6846 
PAYRATIO 
- - 
5.9406 9,041 -14.352 -1.7817 
QAiý ß =TIO 
-- 
2.3006 -2.0027 
RE7i7T 10 2.2368 -1.5504 5.424 6.5788 
ROCE -0.0724 -0.394 -0.7213- -0.0125 
SRM--EBT 0.6912 0.5843 -0.1957 -0.0028 
STKiU71-10 -0.0223 
TAXONPTP 8.5713 8.2934 
TAXRATIO -0.0643 -0.1808 7.3378 
wcigTi-o 3.4593 3 2.4235 
WORRU-P 6.124 
-- - 
# 
-c -0. 14.433 , 30.443 -4.4116 rConstin-t ' -3. -5M 751 2 
. 512 . -9.2518 
we -6. -2.5635 1 3.1805 1 7.1441 1 0-2677 1 4.8346 1. 
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Before the results of the models are interpreted, it is necessary to examine the power 
of the models by computing the rate of correct classification and the Chi-square 
statistic for each of the European models estimated. Table 5.9 details the rate of 
correct classification statistics for each of the separate country marginal corporate 
capital structure choice models. 
The table reveals that the models are generally very effective at predicting the outcome 
of the marginal issue decision of the European firm. However, the models appear more 
able to correctly identify issues of debt than issues of equity. This may be due to the 
fact that the data set contained more marginal issues of debt than equity, thus to some 
extent weighting the coefficients towards correction prediction of debt issue outcomes. 
All of the models have predictive powers such that they correctly predict the outcome 
of a marginal funding decision correctly in at least two out of three issues, with most 
models attaining predictive powers in the range 80 to 100 per cent. Therefore, the 
models appear to be able to successfully predict the outcome of the marginal corporate 
capital structure decision of the European firm. 
Table 5.9 
Table showing the percentage of correct predictions made b3: the European 
marginal corporate capital structure models 
(the number of firms is shown in parentheses) 
Country Equity 
issuers 
classified 
correctly 
Equity 
issuers 
classified 
incor 
Debt 
issuers 
classified 
correc 
Debt 
issuers 
classified 
incorre 
Percentage 
classified 
correctly 
overall 
Germany 58.82 41.18 100.00 (49) 0.00 (0) 89.39 
-#qg!!! m 
100.00 0.00 80.00 20.00 87.50 
Denmark 75.00 (3) 25.00 (1) 100.00 (8) 0.00 (0) 91.67 
_ýpain 
0.00 (0) 100.00 (0) 100.00 0.00 66.67 
France 60.00,115) 40.00(10) 81.58(31 18.42 (7) 73.02 
Eire 50.00 (1) 50.00 (1) 100.00 (4) 0.00 (0) 83.33 
80.00 (4) 20.00 (1) 100.0 0.00 94.74 
Netherlands LO. 91_klO)_ 9.09 92.31 (12) 7.69 (1) 91.67 
Switzerland __ ! ý. ý00 i(IL 25.00 (1) 100.00 (19) 0.00 (0) 95.65 
UK 68.29 (56) 31.71 (26) 81.11 (73) 18.89(17) 75.00 
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The Chi-square statistics for the models are given in table 5.10. The table shows that 
most of the models are very significant, with models for Germany, Denmark, France 
and the UK exhibiting significance at the 5 per cent level, and models for Italy, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland becoming significant at the 10 per cent level. The 
estimated models for Belgium, Spain and Eire are not significant, even at the 10 per 
cent level, probably because they are estimated upon very small data sets, and they 
consist of only a few variables. 
The models estimated for the UK, France and Germany are the most robust on the 
basis of two criteria. Firstly, they are highly significant, producing Chi-square statistics 
which are significant at the 5 per cent level and classification powers in excess of 73 
per cent. Secondly, they are estimated upon samples of greater than 60 issues (UK= 
172 observations, France = 63 observations, Germany = 66 observations). It is 
reasonable to regard the results from these models, then, with the greatest weighting in 
this marginal corporate capital structure analysis. However, the results of the other 
models are also examined for the sake of completeness. 
Table 5.10 
Chi-scluare tests of significance for the European marginal corporate capital 
structure models 
Country Model 
Chi-square 
Degrees of 
freedom 
Significance Significant at 
5% level? 
Germany 20.082 11 0.0442 YES 
_Belgium 
6.093 3 0.1072 NO 
Denmark 9.293 3 0.0256 YES 
0.276 1 0.5993 NO 
France 17.869 9 0.0367 YES 
Eire 2.873 2 0.2377 NO 
jLaly 12.750 7 0.0784 NO 
Netherlands 12.961 7 0.0731 NO 
Switzerland 9.838 5 0.0799 NO 
UK 39.990 13 0.0001 YES 
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A more graphic means of examining model power is provided by presenting histograms 
of observed issue groups and predicted probabilities, as shown in figures 5.1 to 5.11, 
found at the end of this section. The predicted probabilities are the estimated 
probabilities of firms being predominant debt issuers. In a good model, debt-issuing 
firms should appear to the right of 0.5 (those firms represented by the number I in the 
histogram) and equity-issuing firms should appear to the left of 0.5 (those firms 
represented by the number 0). In very powerful models, firms will cluster at the 
respective ends of each group. The histograms not only confirm the results of the Chi- 
square significance test results of table 5.10, but also reveal the extent to which firms 
cluster on either side of the 0.5 probability mark. It is apparent that debt issuing firms 
are generally far more clustered than equity-issuing firms, and that many debt-issuing 
firms are clustered along, or near to, the 1.0 probability mark) whereas the probabilities 
of equity-issuing firms appear to be more dispersed, though with many of the predicted 
probabilities positioned around the 0.5 mark. Again, it is observed that the models are 
generaUy far better at predicting the correct marginal capital structure choice for debt- 
issuing firms than equity-issuing firms. 
'PV 
Examination of the coefficients allows the hypotheses deriving from the literature to be 
tested, albeit in a somewhat indirect manner. As already discussed, most authors in the 
area of corporate capital structure concentrate on the stock measure of the capital 
structure, the debt-to-debt-plus-equity ratio (the DDE ratio) or variants of this 
measure, probably more for reasons of data availability than being guided by the 
underlying theory. Thus most of the hypotheses relate to the stock capital structure 
measure and it is not necessarily the case that they hold at the margin. This is because 
marginal capital structure adjustments are likely to be more erratic and "lumpy", 
different processes are at work at the margin, and firms may be pursuing a target 
capital structure and a target accounting structure. Therefore, the relationship between 
the accounting ratio and the marginal issue decision of the firm may appear to be 
inconsistent with the theory, particularly if firms are pursuing targets. 
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Wald statistics are computed for the individual accounting ratios which make up the 
models, and these are presented in appendix B. To summarise the results of such 
univariate tests of significance, it is found that in none of the models are any of the 
variables significant at the 5 per cent level, with only a few variables becoming 
significant at the 10 per cent level. However, many of the variables are significant at 
the 20 per cent level and almost all variables are significant at the 40 per cent level. 
This general lack of significance of the individual accounting ratios which make up the 
models is both disappointing and surprising. It is disappointing in the sense that if some 
of the variables were individually significant then their relative importance to the 
marginal funding decision might be gauged. The lack of significance is also surprising 
as the overall models are generally significant and exhibit high predictive powers. 
Therefore, it must be the multivariate relationship between the marginal issue variable 
and the accounting ratios, and/or the interaction betweýen the accounting ratios 
themselves, which produces such high powered models, in a manner analogous to 
multicollinearity. 
The magnitudes of the variable coefficients require a somewhat complex interpretation, 
and thus it is the sign of the coefficient which shall be considered in this analysis. Table 
5.11 summarises the signs of the coefficients for ease of exposition, whereas the actual 
coefficient values are given earlier in table 5.8. 
It is useful to exanfine which variables are most commonly used in the marginal 
models. The variables most commonly employed in the models are, then, the DDE 
ratio, the fixed assets ratio, interest cover, and the net current assets ratio, as these 
ratios are used in at least half of the marginal capital structure models. Thus, before 
even examining the coefficients of the variables, it is possible to observe the most 
important factors considered by European finance managers before making a decision 
to raise either debt or equity at the margin. It is not surprising that the manager first of 
all considers the stock of finance claims already owed before making a flow decision 
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which will alter that stock. Only a foolish manager of a firm with a very high gearing 
level, for example, would not carefully consider and reconsider a decision to issue yet 
more debt. 
Table 5.11 
The sign of model coefficients and their freguency of employment in the 
marginal corporate capital structure models (P=Positive, - N=negative) 
BID BG DK ES FIR IR IT NL Sw UK SIGN TOTAL 
5-D-ERATIO P P p p N N p 6 
DEPRATIO p N N P/N 4 
DIVCOVER N p N N 3 
TrAOX R MAT p N P/N 2 
FARATIO p N p p p p 5 
INTCOVER p N N N N N 5 
LARATIO N N N p N 4 
NPMARGIN N N I 
PAYRATIO p p N N P/N 4 
OARATIO p N P/N 2 
RETRATIO p N p p p 4 
ROCE N N N N N 4 
SRLRDEBT p p N N P/N 4 
STKRATIO N N I 
TAXONPTP p p p 2 
TAXRATIO N N p N 3 
WCRATIO p p p 2 
WORKCAP p N p p N p 5 
Constant N P N N N P P P P P P 10 
The other most important variables all describe the firm's ability to support new debt, 
in addition to old debt. Thus, the manager examines the firm's fixed assets ratio to 
gauge the firm's collateral for new borrowing. He or she considers the firm's interest 
cover to determine whether or not a new tranche of debt is likely to materially alter the 
firm's probability of financial distress. Finally, by considering the net current assets 
ratio, the manager examines the ability of the firm to meet current liability 
commitments as well as the net current assets margin as a proportion of total assets. 
Therefore, the finance manager of the European firm, when considering the form of a 
new tranche of financial securities, appears primarily preoccupied by the existing stock 
af capital structure claims and possibly the strategic reasoning behind the mix of such 
funds, as well as the firm's ability to support new external flands. 
It is clear that the finance manager examines the most important and intuitive 
determinants of the firm's capital st, ructure as a priority before examining less important 
influences on the marginal funding choice. However, the above priority order of 
considerations does not enable examination of the nature of such influences. To 
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facilitate such an analysis, variables are divided into the following groupings to aid 
interpretation and hypothesis testing: capital structure variables, financial risk variables, 
taxation variables, profitability variables, liquidity variables, and miscellaneous , 
variables. Quick perusal of table 5.11 shows that the variable coefficient signs are fairly 
erratic and are not consistent across country models. 
The capital structure variables utilised are the DDE ratio, the retentions ratio, and the 
ratio of short-term to long-term debt. The DDE ratio is seen to have a positive 
coefficient in the majority of the models where it is present, and thus the more debt a 
firm already employs in its capital structure, the more likely it is to issue more debt 
again. This supports hypothesis HI and questions hypothesis H33, and thus finns 
appear to be acting in an almost counter intuitive manner by making marginal capital Y 
structure choices which exacerbate the risk of financial distress, though this may be 
rationalised by targeting behaviour. 
The estimated coefficient of the retentions ratio is generally positive in the models in 
which the variable is employed, supporting the hypothesis stated earlier. Thus, firms 
which have not exhausted their external borrowing capacity and are generally the more 
buoyant firms which make relatively large retentions, are more likely to issue debt than 
equity at the margin. 
Hypothesis H19 states that the short-term debt-equity ratio increases as the firm size 
increases. Firms with relatively high short-term-to-long-term debt-equity ratios are 
likely to be smaller firms and thus the higher this ratio is, the less likely the firm is to 
issue long-term debt at the margin, a relationship which proposes a negative 
coefficient. However, the signs of the coefficients in the models in which the variable 
appears are mixed, and thus the hypothesis is neither supported nor questioned by the 
models. 
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Hypothesis H34 proposes that safer firms with higher interest and dividend cover 
ratios are more likely to issue debt than equity at the margin, as their risk of financial 
distress is lower and debt capacities are higher than riskier firms with lower coverage 
ratios. However, the coefficients of both of the variables are generally negative, 
suggesting that safer firms are more likely to issue equity rather than debt at the 
margin. This may merely be a result of causation, as safer firms are by definition those 
which employ relatively less debt and probably issue more equity at the margin. 
However, owing to the twelve month lag, the causation should flow from the coverage 
ratio rather than the converse. It is thus possible that even a twelve month lag is not 
sufficient to resolve the problem of causality. It appears also that interest cover is more 
widely employed in models than dividend cover, which is intuitive as it suggests that 
firms give more consideration to fixed commitments than quasi-fixed commitments. 
Therefore, the financial risk variables reveal that safer firms appear to issue equity at 
the margin, and that the problem of causation uncertainty may not be entirely resolved 
by introducing a short lag in the marginal corporate capital structure models. 
The coefficients of the taxation variables are not consistently positive, except for the 
tax-to-pre-tax-profits ratio, and thus hypothesis H31 is neither supported nor 
questioned by the coefficients of the marginal corporate capital structure models. 
Therefore, firms do not consistently react to relatively high tax bills by issuing more 
debt in an attempt to drive down future tax bills by utilising the tax benefits of debt. 
Although the profitability ratios are not employed widely in the marginal corporate 
capital structure models, particularly the net profit margin, it is observed that in all 
models which do contain a profitability measure the sign of the coefficient is negative. 
Thus, indirect support is provided for hypothesis H22, as more profitable firms prefer 
to issue equity rather than debt at the margin. 
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The coefficients for the liquid assets ratio are generally negative, although this ratio is 
complicated by the inclusion of stock in the numerator, whereas the coefficients for the 
quick assets ratio are mixed. However, the coefficients of the other liquidity ratios are 
generally positive. On balance, then, positive coefficients were observed for the 
liquidity ratios, thus providing some support for hypothesis H21. More highly liquid 
firms appear to prefer to issue debt rather than equity at the margin, as their debt 
capacity increases with the degree of liquidity. 
Finally, the remaining "miscellaneous" variables are the payout ratio, the depreciation 
ratio, the fixed assets ratio, and the stock ratio. Hypothesis H17 proposes a positive 
relationship between the stock DDE ratio and the payout ratio, and implies a positive 
coefficient for the logistic regression coefficient for the payout ratio. However, it can 
be seen that there is a mix of coefficient signs across the models which employ this 
variable, and thus the hypothesis may neither be questioned nor supported. It may be 
that firms do not consider the cost of dividend payments to be a direct cost of equity 
finance, as they are only quasi-commitments, that is, they may be passed up if the firm 
so wishes. Indeed, this appears consistent with the observation that more models 
contain the interest cover variable than the dividend cover variable, as European firms 
are generally more concerned with interest commitments than the payment of 
dividends, and this indifference may produce the mix of coefficient signs observed. 
The coefficients of the depreciation ratio are mixed. Thus, it may be that European 
finns which operate rapid depreciation policies, such as high technology firms, do not 
prefer debt to equity finance at the margin, questioning a pecking order preference for 
debt over equity at the margin. 
The coefficients of the fixed assets ratio measures are predominantly positive, 
supporting hypothesis H23. Thus, firms with highly tangible assets appear to prefer to 
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issue debt rather than equity at the margin, as they can offer lenders a high degree of 
collateral with which to support such borrowing. 
The stock ratio is seen to exhibit a negative coefficient, but the variable is only 
employed in a single European modet, and thus little inference may be drawn from this 
result. 
In summary, evidence which is generally of an indirect nature supports hypotheses Hl, 
H21) H23, and H22. Therefore, issues of debt at the margin (and higher DDE ratios) 
are generally associated with higher DDE ratios, higher liquidity, higher asset 
tangibility, and lower profitability, and such relationships are consistent with the 
existing literature. Hypotheses H33 and H34 are questioned by the signs of the model 
coefficients. Thus, highly geared firms are more likely to issue debt than equity at the 
margin and "safer" firms are more likely to be those risk averse firms which issue 
equity at the margin. However, the model results neither support nor question 
hypotheses H17, H19, and H31, as issues of debt at the margin (and higher DDE 
ratios) are not associated with higher payout ratios, a lower proportion of short-term 
debt, or higher relative tax bills. 
Less profitable firms may find it easier to issue debt rather than equity at the margin 
because their equity holders will not be very receptive to new equity issues owing to 
lower equity earnings. More tangible and liquid firms are able to provide greater 
collateral against which to borrow and are more able to service the principal and 
interest commitments of debt, and are therefore more likely to issue debt than equity at 
the margin. The curious result that, firms which are already relatively highly geared 
appear more likely to issue debt at the margin may be explained by capital structure 
targeting, that is, firms may be increasing their gearing even though it is already high, 
to reach the target capital structure which is based upon the norm of the industry to 
which they belong. This supports hypothesis HI, as an optimising behaviour is 
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apparent at the level of the firm, as well as hypothesis H24 to some extent, as such 
behaviour must be explained in terms of industry targeting. 
Taxation, in the form of the relative tax bill, appeared to have an unclear effect on the 
marginal capital structure choice of the firm. Hypothesis H31 states that there should 
be a positive relationship between the DDE ratio and the relative tax bill, implying a 
possible positive coefficient of the relative tax bill variables in the models. The fact that 
the coefficients exhibited a mixture of signs may indicate that firms in some countries 
are proactive, whereas firms other in countries are reactive, to changes in the extent of 
their tax burden. If firms were proactive, they would increase debt to drive down their 
relative tax bills, producing a negative tax variable coefficient. Conversely, if firms 
were reactive, they would observe an increase in their relative tax bills and then would 
issue relatively more debt than equity at the margin to drive the tax bill down, 
producing a positive tax variable coefficient. The reactive relationship is that 
hypothesized in H3 1, and that tested here, because of the twelve month lag which is 
incorporated to address the problem of causation uncertainty. The fact that a number 
of negative tax variable coefficients are observed implies that the causation uncertainty 
problem is not solved in these models. Thus, capital structure changes may cause 
changes in the relative tax bill or vice versa. 
Other results deriving from the marginal capital structure models are that debt issues 
are more likely the higher is the relative level of retentions, and the lower is financial 
risk and the stock ratio, although the results for the depreciation ratio are mixed. 
Therefore, more buoyant firms, which still have considerable debt capacity and make 
relatively large retentions, are more likely to issue debt than equity. Somewhat 
surprisingly, "safer" firms, that is, firms with lower financial risk, are more likely to 
issue equity than debt at the margin. This is possibly because, by definition, "safer" 
firms are those risk averse firms which generally do not engage in heavy gearing and 
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thus issue predominantly equity at the margin. The remaining results add little to the 
marginal corporate capital decision perspective. 
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5.5.5 Summarv 
Section 5.5 set out to extend the analysis of the European corporate capital structure 
in two important respects: to introduce a Multivariate perspective and to model the 
marginal issue decision. Marginal models are vital to a greater understanding of 
corporate capital structure determination, as it is at the margin that the finance 
manager looks at the firm's stock DDE ratio and stock accounting ratios before 
making a decision to raise new external funds. The multivariate logistic regression 
method allows the dichotomous, "debt or equity" choice to be modelled upon 
accounting ratio measures from the year prior to the issue year, for various theoretical 
reasons, and in an attempt to resolve the causation uncertainty which was seen to 
greatly affect the cross-sectional bivariate regression models. A complex iterative 
model development process is described to enable the modelling of small data sets 
within a "general to specific" framework. 
Models are seen to perform effectively, correcýly predicting an outcome in at least two 
thirds of issues, though individual variables are generally insignificant at conventional 
levels of significance. Contemporary holdout samples on which to test the models are 
not used in the analysis, owing to the fact that the data sets are small and thus do not 
enable division. Holdout samples for preceding or subsequent years are also not used 
as the factors influencing the marginal capital structure decision are likely to evolve 
ftom year to year. 
The ftequency of employment across the European models, as well as the sign of the 
logistic coefficients, is used to gauge those determinants important to the marginal 
funding decision of the firm. 
Finance managers appear to examine two key factors when considering raising new 
external finance: their current capital structure policy and their ability to adjust that 
Policy. Thus, the finance manager considers the current capital structure policy of the 
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firm first, that is, he or she considers the cumulative effect of past marginal funding 
decisions - the DDE ratio. However, somewhat curiously at first glance, the manager 
appears to be more likely to issue debt the higher the gearing the firm already has. 
Such behaviour may only be rationalised by an optimisation strategy, as the firm may 
be in a continual state of partial adjustment towards some perceived optimum, possibly 
targeting the norm of the industry to which the firm belongs. 
The ability to adjust the capital structure policy is bounded by three key variables: the 
fixed assets ratio, interest cover, and liquidity. The finance manager recognises that the 
more tangible the assets of the firm are, that is, the higher the fixed assets ratio, the 
higher is the collateral that may be utilised to support borrowing. Thus, the tangibility 
of the firm's assets, and possibly its future investment projects, affects its ability to 
engage in higher gearing. "Safer" firms appear to be those with a low gearing policy, 
and thus the finance managers of such firms with a low risk of financial distress will 
generally issue equity rather than debt at the margin, to maintain their risk aversion 
stance. In addition, interest cover appears more consistently important as a marginal 
issue determinant than dividend cover, probably because the debt interest is regarded 
by the finance manager as a finance commitment whereas dividends are only a quasi- 
commitment. This result is reinforced by the apparent indifference of managers to the 
size of the payout ratio. Thus, the degree of risk aversion and the contractual nature of 
new claims will influence the finance manager's decision. The manager looks at the 
wider liquidity of the firm after considering its ability to cover commitments, 
recognising that the liquidity of the firm determines its debt capacity. Whether 
considering an issue of debt or negotiation with a bank or other lender over the terms 
of new long-term borrowing, the finance manager will examine the two key factors 
described, either using them to decide on potential investor returns or to negotiate a 
reasonably favourable deal with bankers or lenders. 
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More generally, the finance managers of healthy firms may decide to issue either debt 
or equity, depending on the extent of their requirements for external finance. Those 
firms making relatively large retentions will be able to fund largely internally, but if 
they decide to supplement this funding externally, they are more likely to issue debt 
than equity because they have not yet exhausted their debt capacity. flighly profitable 
firms which require large tranches of external funds may prefer to issue equity rather 
than debt, as it is likely that such heavy users of external funds may have exhausted 
-their debt capacity and must therefore resort to equity finance. Such results are 
consistent with the pecking order hypothesis of the existing literature. 
With regard to taxation, firms in some European countries appear proactive with 
respect to their tax-reduction strategies, increasing gearing, at least in part, to drive 
down their tax bills, whereas firms in other countries are reactive, substantially 
increasing gearing only in response to relatively high tax bills. 
It is possible that the variables which exhibit mixed coefficient signs across models are 
those which the firm targets individually with regard to industry norms. This certainly 
might explain the mixed results for variables such as the depreciation ratio and payout 
ratio. 
In summary, then, the finance manager of the European firm examines two key factors 
before making a marginal finance decision: the current capital structure of the firm and 
its ability to adjust that capital structure. There is some evidence of finance managers 
targeting their capital structures of their firms, to some extent, on the norm for the 
industry to which such firms belong. Regardless of the presence of any industry 
targeting behaviour, the fact that managers consider such a range of complex factors 
before making a marginal issue decision implies that managers are choosing optimal 
capital structures which are specifically optimal to their firms alone. Thus support is 
provided for the central hypothesis, HL 
244 
5, j. Summart 
Chapter 5 represents the transition from naive, indirect testing of corporate capital 
structure patterns, to a more direct testing of hypothesized relationships by means of . 
econometric models. 
The chapter begins by examining the influence of two factors which the -existing 
literature suggests are key determinants of the corporate capital structure. Firstly, 
evidence from UK firms strongly supports the fact that the finance managers appear to 
target the capital structures of their firms upon the norm for the industry to which the 
firm belongs, a result which the existing literature suggests would hold for a wider 
range of countries, although data limitations restricted a more comprehensive study for 
European firms. It is argued that such industry targeting represents a bounded 
optimisation Policy by the firm, whereby finance managers match their DDE ratios to 
the norm for their industry, believing this to be the optimal capital structure for their 
particular degree of business risk or believing that they are gaining from the more 
sophisticated information gathering efforts of other firms in their industry. Secondly, at 
least 30 per cent of European firms, on average, are completely tax exhausted and 
many other firms are likely to be partially tax exhausted. As the degree of tax 
exhaustion results directly from the level of non-debt tax shields such as investment 
allowances that the firm attempts to utilise, and because the value of such allowances 
varies with the investment strategy of each firm, for example, the effective tax 
advantage to debt for each individual firm is different and therefore so is the optimal 
capital structure mix for each firm. Therefore, industry norm targeting and the effect of 
tax exhaustion may bring about optimal firm-specific capital structure solutions as the 
former causes firms to engage in bounded optimisation and the latter causes firms to 
arrive at unique capital structure solutions. 
Bivariate regression analysis is employed to specifically test many of the hypotheses 
arising from the existing literature. Although many of the hypotheses have been tested 
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Table 12 
Cointegration tests for the French weighted sample capital structure 
constituents, showing Dickey Fuller and Augmented Dickey Fuller statistics at 
different lag-lengths (without constant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat lower upper degrees DW test DF/ADF Mack Inference" 
DW DW of A=accept stat. critical A=accept 
critical critical freedom R=reject R=reject 
I=inconc. 
LNPLUSEQlagO 2.20/1.80 0.824 1.320 1,9 A1 -4.78 1 -3.5690 R jLNPLUSEQ1ag1 2.20/1.80 0.559 1.777 2,8 A -2.822 -3.6443 A 
Table 13 
Cointegration tests for the French non-weighted sample capital structure 
constituents, showing Dickel Fuller and Augmented Dickey Fuller statistics at 
different lag lengths (without constant or trend) andDurbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
DF/ADF 
stat. 
Mack. 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
HMVEQUITYlagO 1.75 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -1.479 -3.5690 A 
HMVEQLTITYlagl 1.99 0.559 1.777 2,8 A -1.432 -3.6443 A 
LNPLUSEQlagO 1.90 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -1-991 -3.5690 A 
LNPLUSEQlagl 2.07/1.93 0.559 1.777 2,8 A -1.955 -3.6443 A 
A98 
in the preceding chapter by means of observational analyses of apparent relationships 
and analyses of variance of corporate finance patterns, bivariate regression analysis 
enables the tentative results of such initial analyses to be formalised. The most 
important result arising from the bivariate models is that the stock corporate capital 
structure measure, the DDE ratio, is often better considered as a determinant itself of 
other corporate environment factors. The importance of this result derives fi7orn the 
fact that most of the existing literature implicitly assumes the corporate capital 
structure ratio to be the dependent variable in any bivariate relationship, whereas the 
new research suggests that it often acts as an independent variable, determining other 
variables in the analysis. The evidence suggests that changes in the DDE ratio cause 
changes in bankruptcy risk, dividend yield and liquidity, although corporate gearing is 
determined by changes in firm profitability. Increases in gearing, then, increase the risk 
of financial distress, increase the returns required by equity holders to compensate 
them for the higher gearing, and decrease the liquidity of the firm, whereas increases in 
profitability appear to reduce gearing. This suggests that the DDE ratio measure is 
exogenous with respect to many corporate ratios, thus resulting in causal inequality 
between the variables. This may be because the DDE ratio is a long-run measure which 
is the result of the cumulative funding adjustments of numerous years and contains 
components which are adjusted to accommodate long-term funding requirements. It is 
interesting to note that taxation variables do not prove to be significant in the bivariate 
modelling exercise, and that the only influences which are consistently significant 
across European firms are those which suggest a detrimental influence of debt. The 
main tangible benefit of debt is the tax deductibility of corporate interest payments, 
whereas the tangible costs of debt finance are numerous. Therefore, either the 
modelling of taxation is naive in the bivariate regression models or debt is 
characterised by most European finance managers by the costs rather than the benefits 
which it imposes. 
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multivariate logistic regression modelling introduced two new dimensions to the 
corporate capital structure modelling of this research. Firstly, a marginal or flow 
perspective on the capital structure choice of the firm is vital as it is at the margin that 
the finance manager examines the stock DDE ratio and stock accounting ratios of the 
firm before making a decision to raise new external funds. Secondly, a multivariate 
perspective allows consideration not only of the interaction between the capital 
structure issue decision and each separate influence on that decision, but also enables 
consideration of the manner in which the accounting variables interact to multivariately 
determine the type of issue as well as some measure of the more and less important 
variables to the issue decision. The results of the models suggest that the finance 
manager appears to examine two fey factors when considering raising new external 
finance: the current capital structure policy of the firm, as measured by the DDE ratio, 
and his or her ability to adjust that policy. The stock of finance claims which the firm 
has is the most important influence upon the marginal decision, although highly geared 
firms are not necessarily more likely to iss' e equity rather than debt at the margin. 
Such a result may arise as firms are continually in a state of partial adjustment towards 
an industry norm target capital structure, rather than seeking to limit the risk of 
financial distress by issuing relatively more equity when gearing is high. The finance 
manager's ability to adjust the firm's capital structure is bounded or limited by three 
factors: the fixed assets ratio, interest cover, and liquidity. Firms will find that they are 
more able to expand gearing if the firm's fixed assets ratio and liquidity are relatively 
high, as the former represents collateral to potential lenders and the latter is a measure 
of the firm's debt capacity. However, "safer" firms which can easily cover debt 
servicing commitments somewhat surprisingly do not appear to be those firms which 
are more willing to increase gearingl but instead appear to be risk averse and wish to 
maintain low gearing as an implicit part of their financial strategy. Therefore, the 
finance managers of European firms monitor the two key factors discussed before 
making a decision to issue new external financial securities, whilst considering the 
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effect of a new issue decision upon the risk aversion stance and targeting policy that 
the firm maintains. 
Measures of the relative extent of taxation liabilities do not appear to influence the 
firm's marginal capital structure choice to any great extent, and additionally firms in 
certain countries appear more proactive in their tax reduction strategies than firms in 
other countries. Again, either taxation is less important as an influence on the 
corporate capital structure decision of the firm or the taxation measures modelled are 
too naive to adequately represent the influence of taxation. 
The apparent inconsistency of variable coefficients in the logistic regression models 
across countries may be the result of accounting ratio targeting which occurs in 
addition to capital structure targeting ratio behaviour, as firms target such ratios upon 
the norms for the industry to which they belong. Thus, targeting behaviour may be 
wider than capital structure targeting alonýe, as firms seek to set their ratios to be 
consistent with other firms in the industry to which they belong, targeting in an 
attempt, perhaps, to emulate the behaviour of the larger of more successful firms in the 
industry. 
It is noted that whether the cross-sectional or marginal perspective is modelled, similar 
influences upon thecorporate capital structure of the European firm emerge. Both the 
stock DDE ratio and the marginal issue decision appear to be significantly related to 
measures which describe the firm's abLlity Lo suppo debt. The ability to support debt 
may be measured in terms of the risk of financial distress, liquidity, interest cover, asset 
tangibility, and so on. However, although such factors are significantly related to the 
DDE ratio and the marginal issue choice, the causation between the separate measures 
and the capital structure measures'may differ between the cross-sectional and marginal 
models. In the cross-sectional models, the DDE ratio is a determinant itself of the 
11,1, 
ability to support debt" factors, whereas in the marginal models the "ability to support 
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debt" factors actually determine the issue decision. This causation reversal is induced 
by the twelve month lag introduced to the marginal models to help address the 
causation problem, as it is based upon the conventional wisdom that "the future cannot 
cause the past". Therefore, by means of the introduction of a short lag to help resolve 
causation uncertainty, it is observed that causation may work in either direction and it 
may be inferred, then, that circular causation exists within the corporate environment. 
Such an inference is fairly intuitive, as, for example, increases in liquidity increase the 
ability to support greater debt, and if the firm increases gearing as a result then 
liquidity is decreased due to the increased principal and interest payments of debt. The 
former relationship is positive whereas the latter is negative, but both co-exist within 
the corporate environment, even though at a particular moment in time the firm may 
only perceive half of the circular flow. For example, at the margin, the finance manager 
may only perceive the increased liquidity of the firm and decide to issue debt to fund 
new investment as a result, and if the investment is successful and yields an increased 
cash flow then the second half of the circular flow does not cause a problem and is 
therefore not perceived by the manager. 
An alternative perspective on causation is that the stock DDE ratio is a determinant of 
other corporate factors at the cross-section because it is a large stock measure which 
dwarfs flow measures such as liquidity, whereas, at the margin, measures such as 
liquidity may be regarded more as stock measures than a pure marginal capital 
structure flow of debt or equity, and are more likely to be of a similar order of 
magnitude to such funding flows. 
Therefore, causation introduces a new degree of complexity into consideration of the 
corporate capital structure environment of the European firm, as the corporate capital 
structure decision is made after consideration of all or part of the circular flow of 
causation, bearing in mind the magnitudes and stock or flow natures of the variables 
under consideration. The issue of causation is more formally tested in chapter 6. 
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Therefore, the European firm appears to make its capital structure choice after 
consideration of its ability to support new debt and the influence that the new debt will 
have, in turn, upon other corporate factors. There appears to be a circular flow of 
corporate factors such that the stock and flow capital structure measures are merely 
part of the circle and may only be isolated as dependents or independents in certain 
perspectives. Finance managers may target certain accounting ratios, in addition to the 
capital structure ratio, upon the norms for the industry to which the firm belongs. 
Industry capital structure targeting may be considered "bounded" optimisation and the 
strong influence of corporate tax exhaustion must produce unique capital structure 
solutions. These phenomena in conjunction with the partial adjustment capital structure 
behaviour of the firm all point towards unique optimal capital structure solutions at the 
level of the individual European firm. 
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CHAPTER 6 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TIME SERIES ANALYSIS 
OF THE CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
251 
6.1 Introduction 
6.1.1 rspective 
The analyses so far have identified some of the more important situations where the 
DDE ratio may be determined by, or itself determines, key corporate and taxation 
variables. However, in the preceding chapters, hypothesis testing and modelling have 
been restricted to the cross-sectional and marginal perspectives, from which little may 
be inferred about the determination (and influence) of the European corporate capital 
structure through time. Static and marginal analyses enable examination of the capital 
structure environment at a particular moment in time, but are not able to examine the 
-I- snort-term and long-term processes of capital structure determination which may be 
more important, particularly with respect to their influence upon the corporate capital 
structure strategy of the firm. Time series analysis is therefore essential to a greater 
understanding of the strategic determination of the European corporate capital 
structure. 
At a particular point in time, it may be that only a disequilibrium capital structure 
relationship may be observed. Whilst analyses of a static nature contribute to a greater 
understanding of the operational capital structure decisions of the firm, they reveal 
nothing about the long-run equilibrium relationships between a measure of the capital 
structure and variables related to it. Thus, up to this point, analyses have not been able 
to distinguish between a capital structure relationship which is in equilibrium and one 
which is in disequilibrium. The time series analyses enable long-run equilibrium 
relationships to be identified and exarnined, in addition to the extent to which capital 
structure relationships may be in a state of disequilibrium at a point in time. 
The introduction of time series analysis, which comprises a number of modem and 
fairly complex techniques, allows short-run and long-run time series perspectives to be 
considered, in addition to the average (cross-sectional) and marginal perspectives 
already considered. Indeed, within a time series relationship, short-run and long-run 
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processes often co-exist. Separation of the processes would aid a clearer examination 
of their exact nature. Probably the only method currently available to enable the 
examination of both processes within a single relationship is known as cointegration 
. 
The short-run processes studied may correspond to a state of disequilibrium 
of the capital structure ratio with respect to the factors which influence it, whereas the 
long-run processes in a cointegrating relationship correspond to a state of equilibrium 
of the capital structure ratio with respect to the factors which influence it. In addition 
to enabling the consideration of the state of equilibrium of the capital structure ratio 
within a time series relationship, cointegration analysis is extremely important in 
modem econometric analysis as the statistical properties of regression analyses using 
non-stationary time series are dubious (Phillips, 1986). The concepts of integration and 
cointegration are discussed in some detail in the relevant sections of this chapter, and 
thus, at this stage it is sufficient to argue that time series analyses which are not 
conducted within a cointegration analysis methodology are highly questionable as 
many of them ignore the distinction between the equilibrium and disequilibrium states 
of the variables modelled. 
6.1.2 The data 
The data set analysed throughout the time series research of chapters 6,7 and 8 is data 
set 3, which consists of corporate, taxation, and macro economic annual time series 
data over the period November 1968 to November 1993. The UK samples consist of 
up to 314 firms over the period 1968-93, the Dutch samples consist of up to 56 firms 
over the period 1978-92, the German samples consist of up to 204 firms over the 
period 1981-92, and the French samples consist of up to 354 firms over the period 
1983-92. The data set may be subdivided, then, into eight samples, as there are two 
samples for each of the four countries studied: one which represents weighted data and 
the other which represents non-w6ighted data. The distribution of firm size within the 
European time series data sets is explored in detail in section 6.1.5. 
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Each country sample contains corporate, taxation and macro economic variables. 
Appendix C defines each of the variables. Variable definitions vary across countries 
although the variables chosen are believed to achieve the greatest consistency possible - 
across countries, given the constraints of data availability. All of the data used are 
drawn from the Datastrearn financial database. The following corporate environment 
variables are defined is chapter 5: the DDE ratio (DDERATIO), dividend cover 
(DIVCOVER), interest cover (INTCOVER), the return on capital employed (ROCE), 
the total tax ratio (TAXRATIO), and the working capital ratio (WCRATIO). Total 
assets (ASSETS) is employed as a proxy for firm size. Therefore, many of the 
variables found to be important to the models of chapter 5 are also studied in the time 
series analyses. 
A number of new taxation measures are introduced: the corporation tax ratio, the 
corporate tax rate, the basic rate of income tax, and the tax advantage to debt, 
although such measures may only be computed for selected countries in the study. The 
corporation tax ratio (CTAXRATIO) is a measure of the relative corporate tax liability 
of the firm. The corporate tax rate (CTRATE) and basic rate of income tax (INCTAX) 
are self explanatory measures, and are macro economic rather than corporate variables. 
The tax advantage to debt (TAXADV) variable is an estimate of the tax advantage to 
debt, computed by substituting the above tax rates into naive tax advantage to debt 
models. Thus, it is anticipated that the tax advantage to debt measure should be a 
significant determinant of the DDE ratio across European countries as its computation 
is based upon a theoretical model of the tax incentives to debt in a particular country. 
The relative tax bill variable, the corporation tax ratio, is included in the analysis as it 
may be the only taxation variable which non- sophisticated firms perceive and 
understand, and thus may impact upon the corporate capital structure decision. The tax 
rates are included as a means of computing the tax advantage to debt and because the 
corporate tax rate is highly correlated with any tax advantage to debt. 
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Other macro economic variables include: short-medium, and long-term interest rates, 
stock market indices , inflation indices, aggregate 
investment, and aggregate output. 
The short-term (SRINT), medium-term (MRINT), and long-term (LRINT) interest , 
rates are used to determine if a relationship exists between such rates and the stock 
capital structure measure, and to determine which of the rates exerts an important 
impact upon the decision to adjust the relative extent of debt in the firm's capital 
structure. Stock market indices (SMIND) are examined as they are believed to be 
related to the firms willingness to issue equity. Inflation indices (INFLATE) are 
modelled as the literature review demonstrated their potential effect upon the external 
financial instrument choice. Aggregate investment (INVEST) and output (GDP or 
GNP) are employed to examine any relationship which exists between the corporate 
funding mix in a country and the performance of the country's economy. 
The Q-ratio (QRATIO) is also introduced as a new corporate environment variable. It 
is introduced to determine whether firms with higher expected future profitability (as 
defined by the market value of the firm divided by the replacement costs of its capital 
stock) choose debt rather than eýquity to fund their investment projects. 
Therefore, although the majority of the corporate environment variables modelled are 
those already examined in chapter 5, chapters 6,7 and 8 analyse the time series nature 
of such variables in addition to modelling new taxation, macroeconomic and corporate 
vana es. 
6.1.3 Data set restrictions 
Unfortunately, the time series data set is fairly restrictive for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, reasonable length data time-spans are only available for four of the eleven 
European countries studied in chapters 4 and 5: the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, 
and France. Secondly, even then, the data time-spans for Germany and France are very 
short,, and even the data sample for the Netherlands may be questioned with respect to 
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its ability to test theoretical models. However, it is argued that a time series analysis, 
and a cointegration analysis in particular, of European corporate capital structures is 
justified by the lack of empirical investigation of cointegrating European corporate 
capital structure relationships within the existing literature, as well as the argument that 
the empirical investigator must work with the data available,, even if the results of the 
estimated models must be somewhat qualified. Additionally, even though data time- 
spans may be short for certain samples, each data point of the time-span is generally 
made up of very many (up to 354) separate firm observations and thus even short data 
time-spans still implicitly contain very large amounts of information. Samples are not 
analysed for the majority of European countries merely because many European 
countries do not contain large numbers of quoted companies. 
Therefore, although data set 3 contains only a very restricted data set, the benefits of 
time series analysis of such data arguably outweigh their shortcomings. It is, however, 
noted that the results of the estimated models must be qualified to some extent owing 
to the paucity of data time-spans. 
6.1.4 The macroeconomic perspectiVe 
The time series analysis also enables macro economic variables to be incorporated into 
models of European corporate capital structure determination for the first time in this 
research. Intuitively, macro economic variables are by definition aggregates and thus 
could not be included in cross-sectional or marginal analyses as the macro economic 
variable would be the same for each firm. Therefore, to observe the influence of the 
macroeconomy on the corporate capital structure of the firm requires aggregation of 
individual firm data and a record of such observations through time. Hence samples 
consist of either weighted or simple mean data points for each variable for each year. A 
time series analysis of the corporate capital structure decision, then, enables the 
statistical nature of the more important macro economic influences to be gauged. 
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Time series modelling does not require a wide selection of different country corporate 
data to be analysed because it is the inter-temporal variation rather than the inter- 
country variation which is being modelled. Therefore, the inclusion of macro economic 
variables in time series models requires the analysis of data from less countries than for 
cross-sectional models. 
6.1.5 The distribution of firm size within the European time series data sets 
Before conducting any time series analyses, it is necessary to examine the distribution 
of firm size within each European time series data set. The importance of this exercise 
stems from the fact that time series analysis necessarily involves the aggregation of 
firm-specific data before testing and modelling may take Place. To examine the 
distribution of firm size within each European sample, firms are given a weighting to 
represent the value of the total assets employed by the firm as a proportion of total 
assets employed in the sample. Thus a weighting of 0.01 would mean that the total 
assets employed by the firm represent 1/100th of the total assets employed in the 
sample as a whole. The weighting variables are computed for each firm in each of the 
four country samples, and then the five year average weighting for the period 1988-92 
is computed for each firm. A histogram of these five year average weighting variables 
is then plotted for each of the four European country samples to show the distribution 
of firm sizes over the period. The weighting exercise avoids problems related to the 
measurement of asset values as the weighting variable represents a fraction and thus 
need not be adjusted for inflation year-on-year. Additionally, firm growth is accounted 
for as firm size is represented by a proportion of the whole sample total assets 
employed. The mean asset weighting histograms for the European time series data sets 
are given in figures 6.1 to 6.4. In the figures, the horizontal axes represent the five year 
average total assets weighting variable (labelled MEAN5Y) and the vertical axes 
represent the number of firms. 
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it is clear that, although the scales on the axes of the figures vary across the samples, 
the weighting distributions all approximate an exponential decay curve, showing that 
there are many smaller firms and fewer larger firms within each sample. This is an 
unsurprising result as it simply reflects the general size distribution of firms in any 
economy. 
As firm size appears to vary significantly across firms within each sample, the sample 
for each country is expressed in both a weighted and a non-weighted form, whereby in 
the weighted sample corporate and taxation variables are weighted by the total assets 
of individual firms, which is a widely used proxy for firm size. The data set thus 
contains, for each country studied, a weighted sample within which the larger firms are 
given greater weighting, and a non-weighted sample within which all firms are given 
the same weighting (and thus the latter sample type gives greater representation to 
firms which are smaller). It is argued that the weighted samples should represent, to a 
greater extent, the larger, more sophisticated firms within a country which are likely to 
be the more established firms with relatively low levels of risk resulting from high 
reserves and diversification; they should engage in sophisticated capital structure 
monitoring and adjustment procedures; and they are likely to make more frequent 
changes to their capital structures due to the economies of issue costs. In some 
respects the weighted samples represent the "true" average of particular corporate- 
level aggregated time series variables. Conversely, the non-weighted samples should 
over-represent smaller, less sophisticated firms which are more risky; may engage in 
the monitoring only of those variables essential to the operation of the firm; and are 
less likely to make frequent changes to their capital structures due to the costs of issue. 
The two sample types within each country, although containing exactly the same firms, 
enable two distinct types of firm to be distinguished and studied, as it is expected that 
the two firm types will adjust their capital structures in very different fashions. Indeed, 
the non-weighted samples highlight the behaviour of smaller firms compared to the 
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weighted samples which are a more accurate representation of the respective 
economies as a whole. 
Weighting is used in preference to dividing each sample into smaller and larger firms 
for a number of reasons, mainly related to the difficulty of the latter compared to the 
former method. Firstly, it is unclear exactly how to define and distinguish a "larger" 
ftom a "smaller" firm, and it is noted that what is defined as a larger firm in one year 
may become a smaller firm in a later year. The parameters change so radically over 
time that it is better to compute a relative measure of firm size and to conduct a 
weighting exercise to represent larger in relation to smaller firms. Secondly, firms 
within industries, and particularly across industries, grow at different rates so that a 
firm which is classed as a small firm at the beginning of a sample time series may be 
classed as a large firm at the end of a sample time series. Dividing the sample into 
larger and smaller firms would thus be very difficult because of differential growth 
rates across industries, and firms would have to be divided differently between larger 
and smaller firm classifications in each year of the sample. Thirdly, the division of firms 
into larger and smaller classifications would be arbitrary as what is classified as a larger 
firm in one country sample may be different from what is classified as a larger firm in 
another country sample. By arbitrarily dividing firms into size groupings, comparability 
across samples is lost. 
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Thus, there are a number of reasons why the sample for each country is expressed in 
weighted and non-weighted forms to proxy for larger and smaller firms, most of which 
are related to the deficiencies and inconsistencies of the alternative method of firm-by- 
firm division. Regardless of the rationale underpinning the weighting exercise, it is 
argued that the weighting method achieves the same end as firm-by-firm division into 
smaller and larger firms. Larger firms are given a more correct or representative model 
weighting and smaller firms are given a negligible weighting for each of the weighted 
samples. With respect to the non-weighted samples, all firms are given the same 
weighting and thus the larger firms are dwarfed in significance by the relatively 
abundant smaller firms in any models constructed and estimated. 
6.1.6 The structure of the time series anallses 
The structure of the time series analyses is somewhat different from the structure of 
the analyses of the preceding chapters. This chapter describes an inter-temporal 
analysis of the corporate capital structure ratio and the macroeconomic and taxation 
factors which potentially influence it. The casual analysis employed seeks to identify 
patterns in the movement of the DDE ratio through time, and to determine which 
macroeconomic and taxation factors, at first glance, appear to exhibit some 
relationship with the DDE ratio through time. Chapter 7 discusses in some detail the 
methodological development of bivariate time series models, in addition to the 
hypotheses to be tested by means of such methods, Chapter 8 presents and discusses 
the results of the bivariate time series analyses, concentrating on the interpretation of 
the bivariate ADL and EC models. The chapter also extends the application of 
cointegration analysis to the study of corporate capital structure targeting behaviour, 
and examines multivariate error correction models of the corporate capital structure. 
The salient results are then drawn together and discussed in the conclusion in chapter 
9. 
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n to the inter-temporal analysis of the corporate capital 
stry -ture ratio 
Before conducting econometric time series analyses of the corporate capital structure 
ratio and its potential determinants, it is useful to plot the time series data to determine 
patterns in the movement of such data through time. The importance of this casual 
empiricism lies in the ability to determine: apparent trends in each time series variable, 
particularly with respect to key macroeconomic and taxation events; similarities and 
differences in time series between European countries; and apparent relationships 
between time series within a particular country. As this chapter seeks only to provide 
an introduction to the wider macroeconomic and taxation environment of the 
European firm with particular reference to its capital structure decision, the more 
precise consideration of causal relationships is postponed until later in chapters 7 and 8 
when the econometric techniques required to facilitate such consideration are 
discussed. 
There are some important caveats to be made before discussing the various time series 
data plots: nothing may be inferred about the direction of causation of any relationships 
which are identified; it is difficult to gauge the extent of deviation of one variable from 
its apparent relationship with another variable through time; and the plots do not 
readily enable lag structures to be identified in a relationship between the corporate 
capital structure ratio and another variable. Such potential shortcomings inherent in a 
graphical analysis are all addressed in the econometric analyses of chapters 7 and 8. 
In section 6.3. the corporate capital structure ratio, the debt-to-debt-plus-equity ratio, 
is plotted for each of the four European countries studied, and separate plots are 
produced for the weighted and non-weighted samples. This enables broad trends in the 
data to be determined and the influence of key macroeconomic and taxation events to 
be discussed. in section 6.4, the corporate capital structure ratio is plotted in addition 
to various key macroeconomic time series, again producing separate plots for the 
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weighted and non-weighted samples. The purpose of this is to establish which of the 
factors may potentially exert some influence on the corporate capital structure ratio 
through time. In section 6.5, the corporate capital structure ratio is plotted in addition 
to various taxation factors, again producing plots for the weighted and non-weighted 
samples, to determine the effect of changes in European fiscal policy. Finally, section 
6.6 draws together the results of this casual analysis to provide a general perspective 
within which the time series econometric analyses to follow may be better interpreted. 
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ral movement of the European corporate capital structure 
peconomic and taxation events which may influence that 
movement 
Figure 6.5 and figure 6.6 give the weighted and non-weighted corporate capital 
, 
structure ratios for UK, Dutch, German and French firms over the period 1968 to 
1993, although only the UK samples span the whole period. There are a number of 
patterns readily apparent in the data time series. 
Firstly, corporate capital structures appear to be converging through time, particularly 
in the decade approaching 1992. Convergence may be the result of a gradualist 
approach to fiscal harmonisation; the greater internationalisation of financial markets 
which should reduce taxation disparities across European countries; and a general 
reduction in the reliance on debt finance across Europe in the last decade as a result of 
reductions in corporate tax rates and therefore the tax advantage to debt. 
Secondly, comparing the plots for weighted and non-weighted corporate capital 
structure ratios, the weighted DDE ratios are generally much higher than the non- 
weighted DDE ratios. This result appears to lend some support to hypothesis H185, 
which states that the long-term corporate debt-equity ratio increases with firm size. 
This is because the weighted DDE ratio sample gives greater weighting to the larger 
quoted firms in the sample, which have greater access to debt markets than smaller 
firms due to the fact that they are more diversified, have lower levels of risk and higher 
reserves, and they benefit more from economies of issue costs. However, other than 
the differential in the level of debt between larger and smaller firms, the patterns appear 
at first glance to be very similar for larger and smaller firms within a country. 
Thirdly, there are various shocks which appear to influence corporate capital structure 
across the countries studied. The, stock market crash of 1987 affected all of the four 
markets to some extent, although the German finance market appears to be the least 
affected. The reaction to the stock market crash is intuitive in that investors apparently 
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withdrew their funds from corporate equity and bought corporate debt instead, causing 
the DDE ratio to increase sharply after the crash. Thus, the stock market crash caused 
a reversal of the downward trend in reliance on corporate debt, although there are , 
signs that this may be a mere fluctuation in the longer-term trend, particularly for the 
UK and Dutch financial markets. The oil crises of 1973-74 and 1978-79 appear to have 
exerted an important effect on European financial markets, causing firms to rapidly 
expand debt to fund the supply shock. Such a reaction appears to be only temporary, 
however, as the proportion of debt to total funds is then reduced in the years following 
D p_ the crises. Re unification in Germany also appears to have reversed the decline in the 
use of debt finance, as firms sought new funds for restructuring. The figures show that 
this effect is most pronounced for the non-weighted sample, which gives greater 
representation to smaller firms, possibly because such firms have less retentions to 
draw upon than larger firms. Therefore, financial markets are extremely sensitive to 
various macroeconomic shocks, and the effects of such shocks may be either 
temporary or more protracted. 
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ral movement of the European corporate capital structure 
inomic factors which may influence that movement 
The literature review of chapter 3 identified a number of important macroeconomic 
influences upon the corporate capital structure. Before embarking upon complex 
econometric analyses of the relationship between various macroeconomic variables and 
the corporate capital structure ratio through time, it is useful to plot the data to 
provisionally identify where the most significant relationships might occur. However, 
as the time series are not necessarily transformed into the variables which are later 
modelled, such a plotting exercise is naive and provides, at best, merely a general 
perspective within which to frame the later modelling exercises. The macroeconomic 
variables plotted may be classed as: financial markets factors, inflation factors, and 
macroeconomic activity factors. Each of these sub-groupings is discussed in turn to 
describe the relationship deriving from the existing literature hypotheses, to describe 
the results observed from the figures plotted, and to compare the existing literature 
hypotheses with the actual prima facie relationships. 
The financial markets factors comprise stock market indices and long-run interest 
rates. Marsh (1982) found evidence to suggest that higher equity prices should 
encourage equity issues and lower interest rates should encourage debt issues. 
Evidence from Martin and Scott (1974) supports this result for equity issues, although 
the result is questioned by evidence from King (1977). Two hypotheses are tested, 
then, concerning the relationship between the corporate capital structure and stock 
market indices and interest rates, respectively. Hypothesis H12 states that the 
corporate debt-equity ratio is negatively related to stock market performance. The 
relationship between these variables is observed in figures 6.7 to 6.16, where the stock 
market indices for the UK samples are plotted separately from the other 
macroeconomic variables due to its high variance over the period. There is clear 
evidence of a negative relationship between the DDE ratio and the percentage change 
in the stock market index in the LJK, the Netherlands and France, although the 
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relationship is not so clear in the German samples. Therefore, hypothesis H12 is 
generally supported as firms tend to issue relatively more equity when the stock market 
is buoyant, thus reducing the DDE ratio and producing a negative relationship. 
Hypothesis H13 states that the corporate debt-equity ratio increases as debt interest 
rates decrease. Interestingly, there is some evidence of a positive relationship, thus 
questioning hypothesis 1113. It appears, then, that the DDE ratio of the firm increases 
as debt interest rates increase. This seems counter intuitive from a supply-side 
perspective, although intuitive ftom a demand-side perspective as investors would find 
debt more attractive when interest rates are higher (particularly when they are set at a 
higher premium over the underlying rate of inflation). Therefore, overall, financial 
markets factors appear to be related, at least at first glance, to the DDE ratio through 
time. 
Inflation figures in the existing literature as a key macroeconomic determinant of the 
corporate capital structure. Authors such as Zwick (1977), Corcoran (1977), Holland 
and Myers (1977), Rudolph (1978), and Kim and Wu (1988) found evidence of a 
positive relationship. Most of these authors argued that such a relationship exists 
because firms perceive borrowing to be more worthwhile at times of higher inflation as 
they are essentially repaying "cheaper" pounds to investors. However, this argument is 
questioned if it is assumed that expected inflation is subsumed within the price that 
investors are willing to pay for corporate bonds. From the perspective of the UK 
economy, where a large proportion of debt investors are large institutions rather than 
individuals, it may be argued that such investors are unlikely to be consistently "fooled" 
by firms in this manner through time, and thus any positive relationship found must be 
the result of some other unexplained relationship. Hypothesis HIO states that the 
corporate debt-equity ratio increases with increases in the inflation rate. The price 
indices in each country are expressed in percentage change terms to enable them to be 
plotted within the same range as the DDE ratio. There is some evidence of a positive 
relationship in the UK and Dutch samples, but no relationship is readily observable for 
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the German and French samples. Therefore, there is some weak evidence supporting 
the hypothesis, weakened perhaps because the relationship may involve lag structures 
which are difficult to discern from the figures. There may, then, be a weak positive 
relationship between the DDE ratio and the rate of inflation, but the theoretical 
underpinning of this relationship is perhaps questionable. 
The macroeconomic activity factors examined here comprise gross domestic product 
(or gross national product for Germany due to data constraints) and gross domestic 
fixed capital formation. Both measures are transformed into percentage change form to 
enable them to be plotted on the same scale as the DDE ratio. In the literature 
reviewed, Rudolph (1978) proposed that as an economy moves from a recession into a 
recovery period, firms should employ a relatively higher proportion of long-term debt, 
although he found no evidence to support this proposition. The relative change in the 
gross domestic product and aggregate investment are good measures of the position of 
an economy within a particular economic cycle. It may be argued that firms greatly 
increase their long-term debt financing towards the perceived end of a recession to 
finance investments to cope with the increased demand associated with eventual 
recovery. Debt financing may occur at this stage in preference to equity financing as 
firms may be unwilling to issue equity when equity prices are perceived to be low 
during a recession. However, it might be argued that all investors have the same 
information as firms about the nature of recovery and the increased demand which it 
brings, and therefore debt should not be preferred to equity as the price of both forms 
of finance should reflect such expectations. The figures suggest that there is generally 
little observable relationship between the DDE ratio and the percentage change in GDP 
through time, excepting perhaps the UK weighted sample. However, there is indeed 
some evidence of the investment variable exhibiting a positive relationship with the 
DDE ratio, such that an increase in investment precedes an increase in debt by a short 
lag of one or two years. This may be because firms make a decision to invest their way 
out of the recession, financing such investment through retentions initially. When 
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retentions become exhausted or greatly depleted, the new investment projects are then 
financed using corporate debt, in a pecking-order fashion. Therefore, the figures 
suggest that it is not so much the economic cycle as a whole which determines changes 
in corporate financing, but the timing of recovery-phase investments which determines 
such changes. 
Overall, financial market factors and the timing of recovery-phase investments appear 
to be determinants of the corporate capital structure in the four countries studied. The 
influence of inflation and the economic cycle appear to be weaker. However, this 
casual/observational approach is somewhat naive as the time series are generally fairly 
noisy and little account can be made of lag structures and other model components. 
What may be argued with some degree of certainty is that macroeconomic factors do 
appear to have some impact upon the corporate capital structure, although the nature 
of that impact is difficult to gauge without conducting further, more formal empirical 
analysis. 
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ratio and taxation changes which may-influence that movement 
There have been a number of changes in corporate taxation across European countries 
which have exerted a significant impact on the corporate capital structure over the last 
three decades. Such changes are based upon ideological shifts, tax competition and 
convergence effects, dramatic shifts in corporate tax rates, changes in tax systems, and 
specific measures to encourage the greater use of equity finance. 
Figures 6.17 to 6.22 show the movement of the DDE ratio, the corporate tax rate and 
the tax advantage to debt in those countries for which such data are available. Data for 
Germany are not shown as 90 per cent of German firms are not incorporated and are 
thus not subject to corporate tax, and additionally the tax advantage to debt in 
Germany is zero through time due to full imputation. The tax advantage to debt is also 
not presented for the Netherlands, as it is merely the corporate tax rate multiplied by 
the amount of debt and is thus represented clearly already by the corporate tax rate in 
figures 6.19 and 6.20. The computation of the tax advantage to debt is discussed in 
more detail later in chapter 7. 
The figures show that corporate tax rates (and thus the tax advantage to debt) 
generally exhibit an upward trend until the early 1980's, and then exhibit a fairly steady 
decline thereafter. One of the main explanations for the growth phase of this trend is 
that public expenditure rose dramatically in response to the oil crises of the 1970's, 
particularly in response to the significant increases in unemployment during that 
period. Tax rates had to rise to fund the public expenditure expansion. However, from 
the early 1980's onwards, economic growth rates began to recover and governments 
feared that the size of the public sector might be "crowding-out" private investment. 
Therefore, the reduction in the size of the public sector and the reduced need for 
higher tax rates enabled the corporate tax rate to be reduced. Running parallel to these 
developments, there was a general desire across European countries to shift the 
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emphasis from direct towards indirect taxation in the 1980's. Indeed,, Briotti (1994) 
argued that: 
"The fiscal reforms concerning the taxation of corporate income have generally 
broadened the taxable base thus making it possible to reduce the actual tax 
rates while maintaining the same tax revenue. " (Briotti (1994), p. 69) 
Thus the broadening of the tax base has facilitated the reduction in European corporate 
tax rates. As corporate tax rates in the last decade have declined fairly steadily, this 
impacts upon the value of the tax advantage to debt, which has been radically reduced 
or even eliminated in countries such as France and the UK in the last few years. 
The Ruding Committee Report (1992) argues that the reduction or convergence of 
corporate tax rates observed across Europe in the 1980's may be the result of tax 
competition, such that low-tax countries may attract more foreign companies than 
high-tax countries to limit the erosion of their tax base or even improve it by attracting 
such foreign direct investment. The consistency of reductions across countries implies 
that governments are concerned about the detrimental consequences of merely 
maintaining tax rates and not reducing them, and thus tax competition may indeed be 
an important factor. The report notes that the standard deviation of tax rates reduced 
from 7.8 percentage points in 1980 to 6.7 percentage points in 1991, thus providing 
some evidence of convergence. Therefore, the Europeanisation of finance markets 
brings with it a steady reduction in the level of the corporate tax rate and thus causes a 
steady reduction in the tax advantage to debt through time, making equity more 
attractive. 
The Ruding Committee Report shows that corporation tax rates within the Community 
fell substantially during the 1980's, such that the average tax rate on retained earnings 
in 1980 was 46 per cent, falling to 40.1 per cent by 1991. This overall trend is 
observed quite clearly in the figures, where corporate tax rates fell from approximately 
50 per cent to 33 per cent over the decade to 1992. As a result, the tax advantage to 
286 
debt is dramatically reduced or even eliminated, particularly in the UK and France, 
where the difference between the corporate tax rate and the imputed rate becomes very 
sinall or even negative. 
Specific tax system changes impact upon the corporate capital structure in addition to 
changes in the structure of tax rates. Currently, of the four countries studied, the 
Netherlands operates a classical corporation tax system whereas Germany operates a 
total imputation system, and France and the UK operate a partial imputation system. 
The classical tax system essentially taxes dividends twice - at the corporate level and 
then at the shareholder leveL thus discriminating against equity finance in favour of 
debt. By granting imputation credits, this discrimination is reduced, as seen in the other 
countries studied. Indeed, in Germany, where there is a full imputation system, the tax 
advantage to corporate debt with respect to equity is zero. Over the periods studied 
for each individual country, the only major tax change is that in the UK, whereby the 
classical tax system was abandoned in favour of an imputation system. The majority of 
, tax system changes occurred in the 1960's and 1970's in other European countries, thus 
representing periods not covered by the graphs plotted. The switch to the imputation 
system in the UK should relieve to some extent the double taxation of equity returns, 
thus reducing the tax advantage to debt. This change is not clearly observable in the 
figures because it occurred at the same time as the first oil crisis, the rapid growth of 
public expenditure, and the upward trend in corporate tax rates. Thus, these 
macroeconomic effects masked the impact of the tax system change. What might have 
been expected is that firms would employ more equity after the change than before it 
as equity returns are taxed less. The longer-term trend, however, does support this 
expected behaviour as DDE ratios have a long-term downward trend due to the 
increased use of equity finance. Indeed, this downward trend in the DDE ratio is 
interrupted only in the late 1980's due to the investor response to the 1987 stock 
market crash, causing a resurgence in the employment of debt finance. 
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In addition to the general ob ective across Europe to relieve the double taxation of j 
dividends by switching to imputation tax systems, there have been other specific 
government actions which have had the effect of explicitly encouraging the use of 
equity finance. As a matter of ideology, the Conservative government in the UK have 
sought to promote wider share ownership as a key part of their 1979 election 
manifesto. They attempted to achieve this by such measures as reducing the stamp duty 
on transactions and abolishing the income tax surcharge on investment income in 1984 
(which corresponds to a sharp decrease in the DDE ratio in figures 6.17 and 6.18) and 
by promoting the use of personal equity plans to stimulate portfolio investment in 
1986. The German tax system now exhibits a more or less zero corporate tax burden 
on all profit distributions to nationals as a result of full imputation and the lack of 
capital gains taxes for most private shareholders. However, the main method of 
encouraging equity finance has been the sharp reduction in the corporate tax rate over 
the decade to 1992. 
The corporate capital structure response to changes in the corporate tax rate and thus 
the tax advantage to debt is observed in the figures of the samples studied. Hypothesis 
. 
H8 states that the corporate debt-equity ratio increases with the corporate tax rate. 
There is some evidence of a positive relationship in the UK and Dutch samples, 
although the relationship is less clear in the French samples. Thus, there is some 
evidence to support hypothesis H8. Hypothesis H6 states that the corporate debt- 
equity ratio increases as the tax advantage to debt increases. Again, there is some 
evidence of a positive relationship for the UK samples, but the relationship is less clear 
for the French samples, where the relationship even appears at times to be negative. 
Thus, only weak support is given to hypothesis H6 on the basis of this casual 
empiricism. Overall, there is only some fairly weak evidence of a positive relationship 
between the DDE ratio and the'corporate tax rate or the tax advantage to debt, 
although such a casual analysis does not enable the lag structures which may be 
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important characteristics of bivariate taxation relationships to be adequately accounted 
fo r 
In summary, perhaps the most important taxation events in the last few decades have 
been the switch to imputation systems in the majority of European countries in the 
1960's and 1970's and the dramatic reduction in corporate tax rates in the last decade. 
Such events have been grounded in the desire to reduce the size of the public sector, to 
achieve convergence (or increase tax competition), to reduce the tax distinction 
between debt and equity finance, and to promote wider share ownership. Most of these 
objectives have had the effect of greatly reducing or even elinýnating any tax 
advantage to debt and thus reducing debt finance as a proportion of total corporate 
finance over the last decade. The only interruption to this longer-term trend was the 
stock market crash of 1987 which encouraged some resurgence in the popularity of 
debt finance. Although there is likely to be a positive relationship between the 
corporate DDE ratio and taxation variables such as the corporate tax rate and the tax 
advantage to debt, such relationships are not clearly ascertainable from the casual 
analysis undertaken. 
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ý. 6 Summary 
This chapter set out with two objectives. Firstly, the chapter introduces, and justifies 
the need for, a time series extension of the analysis of the European corporate capital 
structure. It outlines the nature of the data set analysed, identifies potential limitations 
of the data, and discusses a method of data manipulation which enables the influence of 
firm size upon the capital structure decision to be determined. Secondly, the 
descriptive inter-temporal analysis undertaken determines patterns in the movement of 
the DDE ratio and potential macroeconomic and taxation determinants through time. 
There is some evidence of the convergence of DDE ratios through time, possibly as a 
result of tax competition across Europe. Larger firms appear to employ more long- 
term debt as a proportion of total long-term finance than smaller firms. Various 
macroeconomic events have encouraged the use of debt as opposed to equity finance 
over the study period, such as the oil crises of the 1970's, the stock market crash of 
1987, and German re-unification in 1989. There is some evidence of a positive 
relationship between the DDE ratio and the stock market index, long-run interest rates, 
and aggregate investment. However, the positive relationship between the DDE ratio 
and the inflation measures is weak, and there is little readily observable relationship 
between the DDE ratio and the gross domestic product. With respect to taxation, the 
most important influence upon the corporate capital structure in the last three decades 
has been the general switch from classical towards the imputation system, and in the 
last decade, the dramatic reduction in corporate tax rates across Europe. These factors 
have led to a significant reduction, or more recently an elimination in certain countries, 
Of any tax advantage to corporate debt. Underlying these trends is the desire to reduce 
the size of the public sector and to encourage equity financing, which highlights the 
imPortance of government ideology changes on corporate markets. Whilst the longer- 
term trend has been the reduction in debt financing, the stock market crash and 
German re-unification have more' recently caused a resurgence in the use of debt. 
There is some evidence of a positive relationship between the DDE ratio and taxation 
measures such as the corporate tax rate and the tax advantage to debt across the 
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samples, although the apparent weakness of the relationship is possibly caused by the 
inability to adequately account for the dynamic processes inherent in such 
relationships. Overall, as debt and equity are no longer distinguished significantly by , 
tax systems across Europe, characteristics of financial instruments other than their 
inherent tax effects, such as the riskiness of the instrument, should become more 
important both to investors and to firms. 
However, examining relationships on a merely graphical basis may not determine the 
true undeLlying relationships or the timing of factors which exert an influence upon the 
corporate capital structure policy. Chapter 7 thus describes the methods necessary to 
examme, in a more robust manner, relationships between the variables which may not 
be obvious from a graphical examination alone. Indeed, the co-movement of variables 
may be masked by short-run fluctuations which must be taken into account before 
longer-term co-movements may be identified. Cointegration analysis facilitates the 
simultaneous examination of the short-run and long-run processes present within a 
capital structure relationship. Additionally, the timing of factors which exert an 
influence upon the capital structure policy is examined in detail in the autoregressive 
distributed lag modelling analysis, described methodologically in chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE METHODOLOGY EMPLOYED AND HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED 
IN THE BIVARIATE CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE ANALYSES 
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7.1 Intro 
_uction 
The general objective of the time series analyses is to determine whether firm-level 
optimal capital structures exist in order to test the central hypothesis of this research. 
In order that this hypothesis might be explored in an structured manner, it is first 
necessary to examine the nature of the key bivariate time series relationships governing 
the determination of the corporate capital structure ratio. This chapter thus describes 
the methodology and hypotheses necessary to test the central hypothesis from a 
bivanate time series perspective. 
Section 7.2 discusses in some detail the methods employed in the development of 
bivariate time series models. The methods described include: unit root testing to 
determine the order of integration of the time series variables; cointegration testing to 
identify those time series variables which are cointegrated with the DDE ratio; Granger 
causality analysis to determine the direction of causation within a bivariate corporate 
capital structure relationship; the construction and estimation of autoregressive 
distributed lag (ADL) models to determine the factors which influence the DDE ratio 
in the short-term; and the construction and estimation of bivariate error correction 
(EC) models to determine the short-run and long-run processes present within key 
capital structure relationships. Thus, this methodology section provides an econometric 
underpinning to the time series testing and modelling which enables the results of the 
analyses to be described in a more succinct and precise manner. The methodology 
enables the determination of the operational capital structure policies of the firm 
through the ADL modelling exercise, and the determination of both the operational 
and strategic capital structure policies of the firm through the EC modelling exercise. 
Section 7.3 discusses the hypotheses to be tested by means of the methodology 
outlined in section 7.2. The disc'ussion of the time series hypotheses to be tested 
follows the methodology section rather than preceding it as a number of the 
hypotheses relate to concepts of an econometric nature, such as model specification 
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and characteristics, which may not be readily understood until the respective methods 
are discussed. The hypotheses are grouped into taxation, macroeconomic and 
corporate hypotheses, and they are presented in a manner such that they may be tested - 
across the time series methods whilst maintaining each variable grouping. Each 
hypothesis is framed within the literature from which it is derived, or within the 
conceptual arguments which give rise to its creation, in the case of new hypotheses. 
Finally, a short summary is given in section 7.4 to place the overall structure of the 
time series analyses within the wider context of the central research objectives of the 
European corporate capital structure research. The results of the bivariate time series 
analyses are examined in chapter 8. In addition, chapter 8 extends the time series 
analysis to a multivariate perspective by means of the Johansen multivariate error 
correction modelling approach, as well as determining which capital structure measures 
the European firm actually targets. 
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7.2 A description of the methods eMDIOVed in the time series analyses towards 
the creation of bivariate corporate capital structure models 
7.2.1 Introduction 
The methodology described in this section outlines the econometric underpinning and ' 
application of each of the methods which contribute towards the construction and 
estimation of bivariate autoregressive distributed lag models and bivariate error 
correction models. The former models enable an examination of the processes which 
describe the operational capital structure policies of European firms whereas the latter 
models enable a simultaneous examination of the processes which describe both the 
operational and strategic capital structure policies of European firms. 
Each method is introduced in relation to the objectives set for its application in the 
European corporate capital structure research. The econometric underpinning of the 
method is then presented, in addition to consideration of any adaptations which must 
be made to the method to facilitate its application in the European capital structure 
context. The format of the hypothesis testing approach deriving from each method is 
then briefly discussed. The bivariate analyses methodology is considered separately 
P. - from the hypotheses and results so that the hypotheses and results can be grouped 
more usefully under conceptual groupings. Breaking the research down into discrete 
tests and models across the entire set of hypotheses may lead to a discussion of the 
literature and theoretical background to each hypothesis which becomes repetitive and 
somewhat disjointed. Thus, separation is undertaken to enable a more comprehensive 
and considered examination of the variables hypothesized to be related to the 
corporate capital structure ratio, under the conceptual factor groupings of taxation, 
macroeconomic and corporate variables. 
Section 7.2.2 describes the method employed to determine the order of integration of 
the European taxation, macroeconomic and corporate time series variables. Variables 
must be integrated of the same order as the DDE ratio if they are to be sensibly 
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modelled against it in the ADL models, and more notably, variables must be integrated 
of the same order as the DDE ratio if they are to be cointegrated with it. Section 7.2.3 
describes the method employed to determine which taxation, macroeconomic and . 
corporate factors are cointegrated with the European corporate DDE ratio. This 
method identifies those variables which display a significant long-run relationship with 
the DDE ratio, such that firms engage in strategic behaviour by continually adjusting 
the level of the DDE ratio in relation to the movement of the cointegrating variables, in 
an error correcting fashion. Section 7.2.4 describes a Granger causality analysis to 
detennine which variables are capable of "causing" the DDE ratio, and conversely, 
which variables are capable of being "caused by" the DDE ratio. Section 7.2.5 
describes the method employed to construct and estimate autoregressive distributed 
lag models. Such models enable the processes which govern the short-term or 
operational capital structure policies of European firms to be examined, as well as 
enabling the testing of specific capital structure hypotheses. Section 7.2.6 introduces 
the concept of error correction modelling and describes the method employed to 
construct and estimate bivariate error correction models, which enable the processes 
governing both the operational and strategic capital structure decisions of firms to be 
examined simultaneously. Section 7.2.7 briefly summarises the methodological 
approach undertaken in the bivariate time series European corporate capital structure K- 
analysis and discusses briefly how this structures the hypotheses stated in section 7.3. 
7.2.2 Determination of the order of integration of European corporate, taxation 
and macro economic time series variables 
7.2.2.1 Introduction 
The objective of testing to determine the order of integration of a particular time series 
variable is that such testing must be undertaken before any time series modelling is 
attempted, as the modelling of nonstationary data produces spurious estimates. 
Perhaps more importantly, the variables which are to be tested for the existence of a 
cointegrating relationship must be integrated of the same order. However, before 
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engaging in such testing, the key concepts of stochastic processes, time series data, 
stationarity, and integration are explained. 
A stochastic process is defined by Charemza and Deadman (1992) as a family of real 
valued random variables, indexed by t, where t represents time. A time series is merely 
data ordered by time, and is a specific type of stochastic process. Charemza and 
Deadman define a stochastic process to be stationaU (in a weak-form sense) if. 
"The means and the variances of the process are constant over time, while the 
value of the covariance between the two periods depends only on the gap 
between the periods, and not the actual time at which the covariance is 
considered. " (Charemza and Deadman (1992), p. 118) 
If one of these conditions is not met then the time series (stochastic process) is 
nonstationary. If, for example a time series appears to move in a particular direction 
through time then that series is nonstationary as it contains a trend. For example, if a 
time series appears to be described by a random walk, then its variance increases over 
time and it is considered to have a stochastic trend. Alternatively, if the mean of a time 
series is a function of time then the time series has a deterministic trend, which may 
coexist with a stochastic trend in some circumstances. 
Authors such as Phillips (1986) argue that regression models of data characterised by 
stochastic or deterministic trends are not robust because, for example, a relatively high 
"goodness of fit" statistic may merely be the result of the trends inherent in the models' 
variables. As most time series data contain trends, authors until recent times have used 
first-differencing as a method of removing the trend. Consider a time series with a 
stochastic trend: 
Yt ----: yt-I + ct Equation 7.1 
Where 6t is a series of identically 
I distributed random variables with zero means, that 
is, a stationary disturbance. This trend may be removed by first differencing: 
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Ay 
y= 
yt - yt-I = et Equation 7.2 
However, it is sometimes the case that a time series must be differenced more than 
once to achieve stationarity. Engle and Granger (1987) recognised this and defined a, 
nonstationary time series in terms of the number of times it must be differenced before 
achieving stationarity: 
"A series with no deterministic component which has a stationary, invertible 
ARMA (autoregressive moving average) representation after differencing 
dtimes is said to be integrated of order d, denoted Xt -I (d) 
(Engle and Granger (1987), p. 252) 
Thus, for example, where a variable is first differenced twice to achieve stationarity 
(second ýdifferenced) it is said to be integrated of order two. Banedee et al (1993) 
define an integrated series in a fairly intuitive manner: 
"A series is said to be integrated if it accumulates some past effects; such a 
series is non-stationary because its future path depends upon all such past 
influences, and is not tied to some mean to which it must eventually return. 
(Banerjee et al (1992), p. 13 6-13 7) 
However, the differencing of time series variables before modelling them may eliminate 
any long-run processes within a relationship between the variables, and it is thus only 
through cointegration analysis that the both short-run and long-run processes within a 
time series relationship may be modelled concurrently. 
Therefore, determination of the order of integration of the variables in the European 
data set is an essential precursor to statistically robust time series modelling as both 
series in a bivariate relationship must be of the same order of integration to permit the 
possibility of cointegration. 
7.2.2.2 The method emploxed to determine the order of integration of the 
EuroDean time series variables 
The method employed to determine the order of integration of the European time 
series variables is the Dickey and Fuller (1979) test, hereafter known as the DF test or 
unit root test. 
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Before the DF test is undertaken, all of the variables are tested to determine whether a 
deterministic trend is present within a variable, that is, whether the time series variable 
is generated by a stochastic process wherein the mean of that process is a function of - 
time. The test for the presence of a deterministic trend involves the regression of the 
differenced dependent variable on a constant, a time trend, and the variable lagged one 
period, as given in equation 7.3. 
Ayt =a+ bT + cy, -, + v, 
Equation 7.3 
The null hypothesis is that b =C = 0, that is, that there is no detem-dnistic trend, only 
a stochastic trend. The alternative hypothesis is that b#c#0, that is, that a 
deterministic trend is present. Each variable is tested in turn against the critical value of 
10.61 for 25 observations at the one per cent level (Dickey and Fuller (198 1), p. 1063, 
table 6). if the F-test for equation 7.3 is greater than the DF critical value then the null 
hypothesis of no deterministic trend is rejected, and thus a deterministic trend is 
present. 
Once the deterministic trend test is undertaken, the DF test be may computed for each 
of the time series variables. The DF test is analogous to a Student-t test of the 
autoregressive coefficient in equation 7A 
Yt :::::: A Yt -I+ 
Ct Equation 7.4 
If 0=I in equation 7.4 then the process generating a variable, yt, is nonstationary, 
whereas if the P coefficient is 
1ý <I then the variable yt is integrated of order zero, 
that is, it is stationary. However, testing the order of integration by estimating the 
autoregressive coefficient in this equation using ordinary least squares regression may 
produce a biased estimate of p, Charemza and Deadman (1992) argued, and 
furthermore the Student-t test distribution is not known where the variable tested is 
nonstationary. 
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Alternatively, then, the DF test gauges the negativity Of 
6 in equation 7.5, which is 
equivalent to equation 7.4, expressing the time series in a differenced form, where 
p= (1+ 8): 
Ayt = 9. yt-I + et Equation 7.5 
The null hypothesis of the DF test is that the variable is nonstationary, that is, that 
i5= 0. The alternative hypothesis is that the variable is stationary, that is, that 15 <0 
(and thus P< 1). Initially, if the null hypothesis is rejected, then, the variable, yt, is 
integrated of order zero and is thus stationary. If the null hypothesis is not rejected 
then the variable, yt, is integrated of some order above zero and is thus nonstationary. 
Therefore, if the null hypothesis is not rejected in the first DF test then the variable 
must be differenced and retested, as shown in equation 7.6. 
AAyt = 15. Ayt -I + ct 
Equation 7.6 
If a variable achieves stationarity after differencing once and retesting then it is 
integrated of order one. If the variable achieves stationarity only after differencing n 
times then it is integrated of order n. Testing for the order of integration is thus a 
sequential process of testing and differencing until the variable in question achieves 
stationarity. However, it is possible that a variable might not be integrated at all and 
thus cannot achieve stationarity by any amount of differencing, although Charemza and 
Deadman (1992) note that it is rarely the case that economic time series variables are 
integrated of an order greater than two. Variables integrated of a higher order than the 
DDE ratio variable are expressed in percentage change terms and retested, as it is 
essential in the analyses to follow that each variable to be tested for the existence of a 
cointegrating relationship with the DDE ratio is of the same order as that ratio. 
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Again, the Student-t distribution may not be employed to test the DF statistic, 9, 
because, where for example yt is an I(I) variable, equation 7.5 involves the regression 
of an 1(0) variable, AYt. upon an I(I) variable, yt-1, for which the Student-t , 
distribution is not known. Charemza and Deadman (1992) note that due to the 
specification of equations such as that of equation 7.5, the t-ratio does not have a 
limiting normal distribution, but has instead a negatively skewed distribution with most 
of its mass below zero. The distribution for the DF test must therefore be simulated, 
and simulations have been conducted by authors such as Mackinnon (199 1). 
Mackinnon produced a formula and a table of coefficients to enable critical values from 
the distribution to be computed. The formula is presented in equation 7.7 below: 
-2 C(P, T) -, 6. +AT-' +, fl2T Equation 7.7 
The critical values are thus computed by substituting the coefficient values, 
and 82 from Mackinnon's tables into equation 7.7, where T equals the number of 
observations. The tables from which critical values are taken for the DF unit root 
testing are presented in appendix D, which includes critical values for variables with 
and without trends. The Mackinnon coefficients are given at the head of each table and 
the total critical value for a particular number of observations is calculated. It is noted 
that no upper and lower bounds are computed for the DF statistic critical values 
because the standard errors with which they are calculated are very small and may be 
considered negligible. Indeed, the DF statistics produced in the unit root tests are 
rarely, if at all, marginal between acceptance and rejection of the null hypothesis and 
therefore the onýssion of bounds in preference for a single critical value in no way 
compronuses the validity of the tests. 
The null hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected if the DF statistic estimated is lower 
than the Mackinnon critical value for the number of observations, T. If the DF statistic 
is higher than the Mackinnon critical value, then the null hypothesis may not be 
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rejected, and the variable must be of some higher order of integration, or possibly may 
not be integrated at all. In cases where DF tests do not reject the null hypothesis, the 
variable is differenced and then tested, in a sequential manner, until it becomes , 
stationary, that is, until the null hypothesis may be rejected. 
The level of significance for the hypothesis test of the unit root testing is the I per cent 
level. Although this is more stringent than the 5 per cent level which is used more 
generally throughout this research, it is found that, as discussed above, the DF 
statistics are rarely marginal with respect to the acceptance or rejection of the test and 
therefore it does not appear to be important which of these levels of significance are 
employed. 
In cases where a deterministic trend is seen to be present in the deterministic trend 
tests conducted, the DF unit root tests must be estimated with a trend positioned in the 
right hand side of equation 7.5, that is: 
Ayt = ýt + oc. T+6. y, -, + F,, 
Equation 7.8 
Therefore, if a trend is present in the variable tested, a DF test including a trend is the 
correct test to determine the true order of integration of the variable. 
Some authors employ a more refined version of the DF test known as the Augmented 
Dickey Fuller test, which allows for autocorrelation in the error process, Et, by 
including additional lagged dependents to the right hand side of equation 7.5. This test 
is not employed in the European corporate capital structure unit root testing as none of 
the variables modelled are integrated of order zero and fbrthermore differencing 
removes any autocorrelation present in the vast majority of cases, as confirmed by the 
Durbin Watson test statistics. However, ADF tests are later used for the purposes of 
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testing for the existence of cointegrated variables because the sequential differencing to 
remove autocorrelation is not part of the cointegration testing procedure. 
The Durbin Watson (DW) test for autocorrelation, then, is computed at each stage of 
the sequential DF test. The null hypothesis of the test is that there is no residual 
autocorrelation. The alternative hypothesis is that residual correlation is significant. 
The null hypothesis is rejected if the DW statistic is less than the lower bound DW 
critical value and is accepted if the statistic is greater than the upper bound. If the DW 
statistic falls between the lower and upper critical bounds then the inference 
concerning residual autocorrelation is inconclusive. To support the results of the DF 
test, the null hypothesis must not be rejected, that is, an autocorrelation coefficient Ij 
which is not significantly different from zero supports a stationarity result. 
To summarise, each variable is tested to determine the order to which it is integrated in 
a regression equation of 7.4. The Durbin Watson statistic is also calculated every time 
the DF statistic is computed. Additionally, each variable is tested for the presence of a 
detern-ýinistic trend using the DF F-test of equation 7.7, and if such a trend is found 
then the DF unit root test is repeated, including a trend in the right hand side of the 
equation, as in equation 7.8. After this exhaustive process is completed, those variables 
integrated of the same order as the DDE ratio may go to form part of either the 
autoregressive distributed lag short-run models or may be employed in the error 
correction models, the results of which are given in chapter 8. 
7.2.2.3 Summary and implications of the method for the structure of the 
hyootheses 
The unit root testing method described enables the order of integration of the time 
series variables of this study to be determined. This is important as the modelling of 
time series of differing orders of integration may produce spurious estimates, and 
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variables which are to be tested for the existence of a cointegrating relationship with 
the DDE ratio must be of the same order of integration as that capital structure ratio. 
As this section describes a method which is merely a preparatory stage towards the 
time series modelling which follows, there are no explicit hypotheses to be tested other 
than the hypotheses implicit in the unit root tests themselves. Thus, the objective is to 
determine the order of integration of a particular time series variable so that explicit 
hypothesis testing and modelling may then be undertaken. 
7.2.3 The determination of the taxation, macro economic, and corporate factors 
which are cointeirated with the European corporate DDE ratio 
7.2.3.1 Introduction 
The unit root testing identifies those variables which are integrated of the same order 
as the corporate DDE ratio within each sample. Although two variables must be 
integrated of the same order as an essential pre-condition of a cointegrating 
relationship, this is only one of the essential conditions. A cointegrating relationship 
only exists when variables are integrated of the same order and the residuals from a 
static regression of those variables are integrated of order zero, that is, the residuals 
must be stationary. The objective of the cointegration testing is therefore to identify 
those bivariate relationships which fulfil the second condition, in addition to the first. 
As this section discusses a testing procedure to identify cointegrating DDE ratio 
relationships across the European samples, it is essential that the concept of 
cointegration be formally defined. Engle and Granger (1987) define the conditions 
necessary for a cointegrating relationship to exist: 
"The components of the vector Xt are said to be co-integrated of order d, b, 
denoted Xt - CI (d, b), if (i) all components of Xt areI(d); (ii) there 
exists a vectora(# 0) so that Zt = axt -- I(d - b), b>0. 
The vectorais called the co-integrating vector. " 
(Engle and Granger (1987), p. 253) 
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The vector Xt in this research is a linear function of the DDE ratio and each variable 
hypothesized to influence it, considered in turn. Where the variables are integrated of 
the same order, and the special case, d=b holds, they may be transformed by the 
cointegrating vector to become stationary. The parameters of this cointegrating vector 
are defined by the long-run estimated relationship between the variables, the residuals 
of which are known as the error correction mechanism. Therefore, if the error 
correction mechanism computed from the residuals of a long-run estimated equation 
between the variables is integrated of order zero then those variables are cointegrated. 
Where cointegrating relationships are found to exist between variables, those 
relationships may then be modelled within an error correction model, which describes 
both the long-run and short-run processes present within the overall relationship 
between the variables. The purpose of the cointegration testing, then, is to identify 
occurrences of cointegrating relationships containing the DDE ratio so that error 
correction models of corporate capital structure determination may be constructed and 
estimated. 
A cointegrating relationship between two variables implies that those variables "drift 
together" through time, as if there is some correction process which continually 
restores the relationship between the variables. The error correction mechanism 
contains information about the long-run relationship between the variables, and if a 
long-run relationship exists between the variables then the error correction mechanism 
will be stationary, as the disequilibrium errors fluctuate around zero through time. If 
the disequilibrium errors do not fluctuate around zero then this will cause the error 
correction mechanism to be integrated of an order higher than zero and there is no 
long-run relationship between the variables. For example the disequilibrium errors may 
be integrated of order one. I 
311 
it is thus essential to identify occurrences of those relationships where the corporate 
capital structure measure, the DDE ratio, is cointegrated with the corporate, taxation, 
and macro economic variables within the European time series data set. 
7.2.3.2 The method employed to determine the occurrence of cointe2rating 
relationships between the DDE ratios of European firms and the taxation, 
macro economic and corporate variables 
The test for the existence of a cointegrating relationship between two variables, in this 
case the DDE ratio and a taxation, macro economic, or corporate variable, is 
analogous to the DF unit root test. There are two main methods of testing for the 
existence of a cointegrating relationship between two variables: the ADL approach 
(Phillips and Loretan, 1991) and the Engle and Granger (1987) approach. The ADL 
approach involves the testing of the residuals from an ADL model of the variables, I- 
whereas the Engle and Granger approach involves the testing of the residuals from a 
static long-run model of the variables. 
The chosen Engle and Granger (1987) method involves two stages. Firstly, the order 
of integration of both the DDE ratio and the time series variable upon which it is to be 
modelled are determined. Only those variables integrated of the same order may 
proceed to the second stage of the procedure. Secondly, either a Dickey-Fuller or 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is computed upon the residuals of a static long-run 
regression model of the bivariate relationship between the DDE ratio and the 
influencing variable. 
However, as in the case of unit root testing, before this second stage is undertaken, the 
residuals of the estimated static long-run regression model must be tested for the 
presence of a deterministic trend. The test for the presence of a deterministic trend 
involves the regression of the differenced residuals of the estimated static long-run 
regression model (the error correction mechanism or ECM) upon a constant, a trend, 
and the error correction mechanism lagged one period, as given in equation 7.9. 
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AECMt -a+ bT + cECM, -, + 
Et Equation 7.9 
The null hypothesis is that b= c- 0, that is, that there is only a stochastic trend 
present within the ECM. The alternative hypothesis is that b# C# 0, that is, that a 
deterministic trend is present. Each error correction mechanism is tested in turn against 
the critical value of 10.61 for 25 observations at the one per cent level (Dickey and 
Fuller (1981), p. 1063, table 6). If the F-test for equation 7.9 is greater than the DF 
critical value then the null hypothesis of no deterministic trend is rejected, and thus a 
detertninistic trend is present. 
Once the deterministic trend test is undertaken, stage two of the Engle and Granger 
procedure is undertaken. As the cointegrating vector is not known, a priori, it must be 
estimated by conducting a regression of a static long-run model of the variables to be 
tested for cointegration. The exact nature of the long-run equation for each bivariate 
relationship is not known because the coefficients of the independent variables in the 
bivariate relationships are not predicted by the underlying capital structure theory. This 
renders the cointegration. testing procedure more of an experimental exercise rather 
than a strict exercise in hypothesis testing. The long-run relationship between the two 
variables is estimated, as shown in equation 7.10. 
yt =g+ PýX, + vt Equation 7.10 
Where: 
yt = the dependent variable, in this case, the DDE ratio 
Xt = the independent variable, in this case, a taxation, macro economic, or corporate 
factor 
The estimated residuals from this equation, Vt, are the deviations of the DDE ratio 
from its long-run path, that is, Vt represents the error correction mechanism or ECM. 
I 
The estimated residuals are then tested using the Dickey-Fuller (DF) or Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests, in a similar manner to the tests computed to determine the 
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order of integration of the variables. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test differs from 
the standard Dickey-Fuller test in that it takes account of possible autocorrelation, 
ensuring that the estimates of the DF test are efficient by introducing lagged dependent 
variables to the left hand side of the test equation to approximate the autocorrelation. 
Thus, the DF statistic is computed for the non-lagged ECM and the ADF statistic is 
computed for the ECM lagged up to 5 years, the lag length depending on the data 
time-span available, as given in equations 7.11 and 7.12 respectively. 
6. v Avt t-I + ýt Equation 7.11 
Av 15. v + 
I: k 
t5. Av + Equation 7.12 t t-I j=l i t-i 
Where: 
Vt = the ECM, which equals the residuals from the static long-run equation, given in 
equation 7.10 
8= the DF or ADF statistic 
The null hypothesis of the DF or ADF test is that the ECM is nonstationary (that 
6= and thus that the variables tested are not cointegrated. As only those cases 
where the ECM is stationary are of interest, the test does not need to be conducted in a 
sequential manner until the order of integration of the ECM is determined. If the null 
hypothesis is rejected, then the DDE ratio and the variable tested are cointegrated as 
the ECM from an estimated long-run model of the variables is stationary. If the null 
hypothesis is not rejected then the DDE ratio and the variable tested are not 
cointegrated as the respective ECM is nonstationary. 
The critical values with which to compare the DF and ADF statistics are again 
computed using the Mackinnon (199 1) formula given by equation 7.7 of section 7.2-2. 
The critical values are computed by substituting the relevant )6 coefficients into 
equation 7.7. The tables from which the critical values are taken for the cointegration 
testing are presented in appendix G, which includes critical values for variables with 
and without trends. As discussed in the unit root testing, a single critical value is 
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presented for each number of observations, as the difference between the upper and 
lower bound values is insignificant in this research. The particular Mackinnon 
distribution used in the majority of the cointegration. tests is the 10 per cent 
significance table for two variables. The two variable table is computed as there are 
two variables in the cointegrating equation, in contrast to the one variable tables in the 
unit root testing. Where there is evidence of a deterministic trend, the equivalent table 
with a trend is used as the distribution for the critical values. 
The significance level employed in the cointegration testing is the 10 per cent level, 
which is less stringent than the 5 per cent level generally employed elsewhere in this 
research. Baneýee et al (1986) found that the cointegrating regression estimator in 
such testing can exhibit very large biases and that the tests have low power to reject 
non-cointegration. Therefore, taking this into consideration, a less stringent 10 per cent 
significance level is chosen for the critical values to guard against rejecting 
relationships (accepting the null hypothesis of no cointegration) which actually contain 
cointegrating variables. The validity of this approach is later re-examined in the testing 
of the significance of the ECM in the error correction modelling exercise, in which the 
more stringent 5 per cent level is again applied. 
The null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected if the DF or ADF statistic is lower 
than the Mackinnon critical value for the number of observations, T. If the statistic is 
higher than the Mackinnon critical value, then the null hypothesis may not be rejected, 
and the relationship tested reveals no evidence of cointegration. In cases where a 
deterministic trend is present, the cointegration testing must be performed with a trend 
in the right hand side of equation 7.11 and 7.12, that is - 
Av^t = a. T+5 v^t+ ýt Equation 7.13 
k 
t+1 (5 v -i 
+ Equation 7.14 Avt - a. T+5. V =1 j. 
A"t 
Where: T= the deterministic trend 
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If a deterministic trend is found within the residuals then this weakens the cointegrating 
relationship, though whether it refutes it altogether is unclear. Thus, the estimation of 
equations 7.13 and 7.14 should identify occurrences of cointegration, even in the 
presence of a deterministic trend. 
The Durbin Watson (DW) test for autocorrelation is also computed for each lag of the 
ADF test as well as for the non-lagged ECM of the DF test. The null hypothesis of the 
test is that there is no residual autocorrelation, and the alternative hypothesis is that 
residual autocorrelation is significant. The null hypothesis is rejected if the DW statistic 
is less than the lower bound DW critical value and is accepted if the statistic is greater 
than the upper bound. If the DW statistic falls between the lower and upper critical 
bounds then the inference concerning residual autocorrelation is inýconclusive. For 
those bivariate relationships where cointegration is found to exist in the DF/ADF tests, 
such a result is strengthened if the null hypothesis of the DW test is not rejected. 
7.2.3.3 Summary and implications of the method for the structure of the 
haotheses 
The DF/ADF cointegration testing enables those variables which are cointegrated with 
the DDE ratio to be identified, which is an essential pre-condition if those variables are 
to later form part of an error correction model. 
As the cointegration testing is again merely a preparatory stage towards the time series 
modelling to follow, the only explicit hypotheses are those which constitute the tests 
themselves. However, the procedure does enable the identification of those variables 
which exhibit a long-run relationship with the DDE ratio. Greater importance should 
be attached to such relationships as they are indicative of some long-run equilibrating 
mechanism which must be underpinned by a capital structure policy which is strategic 
in nature. The nature of the coefficients of each static equation estimated is neither 
hypothesized nor discussed in the results, as the information contained within such 
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equations is implicit to the autoregressive distributed lag models, which are to be 
discussed in some detail later in the time series analyses. 
7.2.4 Granger causality analysis to determine the direction of causation within a 
bivariate corporate capital structure relationship 
7.2.4.1 Introduction 
The objective of the Granger causality analysis is to determine the direction of 
causation within a corporate capital structure relationship. The direction of causation 
has not been formally tested in the modelling conducted up to this point in the 
European corporate capital structure research, although the results of the models in 
chapter 5 suggest that "circular" or "two-way" causation may be common in bivariate 
corporate capital structure relationships. This result contrasts with much of the existing 
literature which assumes that the factors which are related to the corporate capital 
structure are in fact its determinants. It is possible that most authors assume the DDE 
ratio to be the dependent variable in any model because the theoretical underpinning of 
the converse is not well established. 
However, consideration of causation on a purely theoretical basis quickly descends 
into the realms of philosophy and mere "chicken and egg" arguments. To elevate the 
causation issue from such arguments requires both a formal definition of causality and 
a method by which causality might be tested, both of which are provided by Granger 
(1969). 
7.2.4.2 The Granger causality testing method 
Granger (1969) produced both a formal definition of causation and created a fairly 
simple statistical test of causality to be applied to bivariate time-series relationships. 
Granger defined causality by arguing that one variable "Granger-causes" another 
variable if the current value of the latter can be predicted with greater accuracy by 
using past values of the former rather than by not doing so, ceteris paribus. The 
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method employed to test causality between two variables is, then, the Granger test, 
which is modified by Sargent (1976). The starting point for the method is to express 
the two variables concerned in an autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model, as 
explained by Charemza and Deadman (1992) and shown in equation 7.15. 
AOD, ajyt-j + 
k 
LIfli Xt-i +ct 
j=l 
Equation 7.15 
Where: 
Yt = the variable to be tested as a dependent 
AODt = the deterministic part of the equation ie. the intercept in this case 
k 
ajyt-j 
the autoregressive component of the equation ie. lagged dependent variables 
k 
)6jxt-i 
j=1 
the distributed lag component of the equation ie. lagged independent 
variables 
Ct = the model error 
The objective of the Granger causality test is to determine whether the coefficients of 
all of the independent variable coefficients are zero. If all of the fts are statistically 
equal to zero then the independent variable does not Granger cause the dependent 
variable under consideration. The test used to determine the significance of coefficient 
differences from zero is the Lagrange Multiplier F-test, known as the LMF test. The 
LNU test is computed by a two stage regression process. 
Firstly, the dependent is regressed upon the intercept and past values of the dependent. 
The residuals from this estimated equation are computed. Secondly, the residuals from 
the first regression are regressed upon the intercept, the past values of the dependent 
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variable, and the past values of the independent variable. The coefficient of 
determination is then computed, and is used to calculate the LNE statistic, as in 
equation 7.16. Under the null hypothesis, the LNW statistic has anF(k, (t - 
distribution. 
LMF = 
T-h 1ý 
Equation 7.16 
k 1-1ý 
Where: 
LMF= the Lagrange Multiplier F statistic 
T the sample size 
h the number of variables in equation 7.15 
k= the order of the distributed lag process tested 
2 
the coefficient of determination of the second regression, with the residuals 
as dependent 
The Granger causality testing method is fairly easily applied to the corporate capital 
structure data in an attempt to resolve incidences of causation uncertainty arising in 
this research. An autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model such as that of equation 
7.15 is constructed for each bivariate relationship which contains the DDE ratio. The 
order of the ADL is two for the UK, the Dutch and German samples, and one for the 
French sample for reasons of data availability. The Granger two-stage regression 
procedure, as described above, is undertaken for each bivariate relationship, with both 
the DDE ratio as dependent variable and as independent variable. Tests are thus 
undertaken for both possible causation directions for weighted and non-weighted firms 
from the UK, Dutch, German, and French samples in turn. For each bivariate 
relationship, if the LMF statistic is greater than the critical F value then the null 
hypothesis that the independent coefficients are all zero is rejected. If the null 
hypothesis for an individual Granger test is rejected, then, the independent variable 
"Granger causes" the dependent, that is, the independent variable is a determinant of 
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the dependent variable. Therefore the independent variable explains a significant part 
of the residual variation unaccounted for by its own past behaviour. 
7.2.4.3 Summary and implications of the method for the structure of the 
h Mo -tLh e -se 
s 
The Granger causality testing enables the direction of causation to be established 
within each bivariate, corporate capital structure relationship. 
As the Granger causality analysis seeks only to determine the strength of any causal 
relationship between the DDE ratio and another variable, the analysis gives rise only to 
one key hypothesis which is that the DDE ratio is best expressed as the dependent 
variable in any econometric corporate capital structure model. Test results for 
individual variables provide only a suggested causal orientation for the later modelling 
of such variables in relation to the DDE ratio. 
7.2.5 The construction and estimation of autoregressive distributed lag models 
describing the determination of the European corporate capital structure in the 
short-term, 
7.2.5.1 Introduction 
The objective of the autoregressive distributed lag modelling analysis is to produce 
models of the processes which govern the short-term or operational determination of 
the European corporate capital structure. Whilst it would be possible and indeed 
logical to model the DDE ratio as both a dependent and an independent variable within 
the time series research, only the former is discussed in this section. There are three 
reasons for this. Firstly, it would be a trivial exercise, though of radically different 
meaning, to merely repeat each test for the opposite direction of causation. Secondly, 
as lag structures are generally introduced in the modelling process, the conventional 
wisdom that 'the future cannot cause the past' resolves, at least in part, any causation 
uncertainty within each separate model. Thirdly, and most importantly, the one-way 
causation bias of the existing empirical literature, whereby the DDE ratio is 
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consistently expressed as the dependent variable, demands that the models be 
expressed as such to enable testing of hypotheses deriving from the literature. 
The modelling of the corporate capital structure up to this point has concentrated upon 
the cross-sectional and marginal perspectives. The former perspective enables the 
modelling of the DDE ratio within a country sample, to determine those influences 
which cause most of the variation in this ratio. The latter perspective enables the issue 
decision of the firm to be modelled, seeking to determine those influences which cause 
the firm to choose debt rather than equity, or vice versa. The construction and 
estimation of autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) models, examined in this section, 
enables the modelling of the DDE ratio to determine those influences which cause 
most of the variation in the ratio as it moves through time. The time series perspective 
modelled here represents the factors that influence the inter-temporal variation of the 
DDE ratio rather than the factors that influence the intra-country variation in the 
capital structure, as modelled in the cross-sectional and marginal models. 
The short-term time series perspective gained should allow the year-to-year 
determination of the corporate capital structure to be analysed. Such a year-to-year 
planning of the capital structure mix encompasses a series of decisions by the finance 
manager to raise external funds for the operational needs of the firm. The strategic 
financial management policy of the firm may not directly be reflected in the short-term 
Am%, + 
external financing models because both the long-term and dynamic capital structure 
determination processes are contained within any relationship modelled. The error 
correction modelling of this research enables these two processes to be separately 
modelled. However, the short-term modelling discussed in this section enables any lag 
structures present to be modelled, thus enabling the timing factors which characterise 
the short-term processes to be examined. Timing factors are an influence upon the 
DDE ratio in their own right, as it is recognised that there may be time lags between 
corporate, taxation and macro economic events and the subsequent collection of 
information describing such events. Additionally, there may be time lags between the 
321 
receipt of such information and the actual capital structure adjustment. Changes in 
corporate factors may exhibit the most immediate effect on the DDE ratio owing to the 
efficiency of modem accounting systems and the ready availability of such data, 
whereas taxation factor changes may exhibit a longer lagged effect owing to the lags in 
the liability incurrence/payment procedure. Changes in macro economic factors may 
have a far longer lagged effect as the whole economy necessarily takes time to adjust 
to such changes, producing a series of indirect "knock-on" effects before the full effect 
of a change upon the DDE ratio of the firm is known. Thus, the short-term perspective 
produced by the ADL models allows analysis of the operational financial decision- 
making process of the firm, as well as the timing effects which influence that process. 
The models are simple bivariate models as the objective of this method is to test 
existing literature hypotheses rather than to create all-encompassing multivariate 
empirical models. This method models only those variables within each sample which 
are integrated of the same order as the DDE ratio, thereby enabling the construction 
and estimation of statistically more robust models, as discussed in the unit root testing 
method. 
A further reason why only bivariate and not multivariate ADL models are produced 
here is that the estimation of bivariate short lag models allows enough degrees of 
freedom to enable valid testing of the models estimated. The addition of even a small 
subset of variables, along with their respective lag structures, would reduce the number 
of degrees of freedom so severely that tests of variable coefficients and diagnostic tests 
would become invalid as the critical values become large and the number of available 
observations become very small. This would cause the model estimators to become 
unstable. 
Although the method applied is ADL modelling, the framework within which the 
method is applied is known as "general-to-specific" modelling, pioneered by authors 
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such as Davidson et al (1978). The framework is a relatively new approach in 
econometrics, involving the construction of large general models which are reduced in 
size by means of various restrictions to produce specific models. The other time series 
models of this research also employ the general-to- specific framework, and it is thus 
necessary to explain the basic tenets of the approach in this section. 
7.2.5.2 The autoregressive distributed lag modelling method within a 
tgeneral-to-specific' framework 
Akipplication of autoregressive distributed lag models to economic time series within a 
general-to-specific framework is a relatively recent approach in econometrics, and it 
represents a departure from the wide range of model-building techniques prevalent in 
the empirical literature of the last few decades. Before explaining the ADL model and 
the general-to-specific framework, the reasons for this departure must be very briefly 
discussed, to justify the methodology applied here. 
Tinbergen (1951), in his pivotal work in the development of econometric theory, 
argued that safeguarding against incorrect variable omission and incorrect regression 
coefficient signs and lag lengths was essential to robust model inference, and could be 
considered as important as the strength of model correlation. Charemza and Deadman 
(1992) argued that, as a result of this influential work, empirical researchers 
concentrated mainly on the theoretical consistency of regression coefficients and 
goodness of fit measures to judge the success of a modelling exercise. However, they 
argued that the resulting methodology meant that more than one theory could often be 
supported by the data, thus qualifying any inference from a particular model upon the 
correctness of the underlying theory. Furthermore, economic researchers in the 1960's 
and 1970's engaged in widespread "data-mining", choosing models from a whole series 
of alternatives, merely on the basis of the Student-t ratio and the coefficient of 
determination. 
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Charemza and Deadman derive proofs that adding a new variable to a model will 
2 
always improve the goodness of fit measure, (the coefficient of determination), and 
will improve the 
k2 
measure (R 
2 
adjusted for the number of independent variables) 
where the t-statistics of new variable coefficients exceed unity (Dhrymes, 1970). They 
also demonstrate that the t-ratio is not a robust statistic as a criterion for new variable 
inclusion, particularly where the pre-testing of model components has occurred. 
in the European corporate capital structure research, general-to-specific modelling is 
introduced to reduce the potential errors inherent in conventional econometric 
approaches. The approach is defined by Charemza and Deadman (1992): 
"By general to specific modelling we mean the formulation of a fairly 
unrestricted dynamic model herewith called a general model, which is 
subsequently tested, transformed and reduced in size by performing a 
number of tests for restrictions. " (Charemza and Deadman (1992), p. 80) 
A general model consists of a very wide model specification approximating the data 
generating process, and as such may contain variables and lag lengths in excess of that 
required to adequately model a given dependent variable. Thus some of the variables 
and/or lags may be eliminated from the general model by the imposition of linear (and 
occasionally non-linear) restrictions, producing a restricted, or specific, model which is 
still consistent with the initial general model. 
The approach is advantageous in a number of respects. Firstly, a far more simple model 
is eventually produced, enabling a more intuitive interpretation. Secondly, the problems 
of incorrect variable omission and pre-testing are eliminated by the initial statement of 
theory and subsequent linear restrictions, in addition to the fact that it is better to have 
an overspecified model than an underspecified model. Thus, bias in model estimators is 
avoided. Finally, the specific model is a reduced-form model and thus "saves" degrees 
of freedom which should reduce the incidence of incorrect test statistic results within 
both the linear restrictions process' and the final model diagnostics. 
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The method central to this modern approach to econometric modelling is the 
autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) modelling method. The general model to be 
tested for linear restrictions is an ADL(2) model, that is an autoregressive distributed 
lag model of lag order two, which may be expressed as in equation 7.17. 
yt = ao + aly, + a2Yt-2+ Axt+ P2 Xt -I +AXt-2 + Et 
Equation 7.17 
In the capital structure perspective, yt is the DDE ratio measure owing to the 
assumed one-way causation required to test the hypotheses arising from the existing 
literature, and yt-1 and Yt-2 represent the DDE ratio lagged one and two years 
respectively. Xt, Xt-I and Xt-2 represent the independent or explanatory variables to 
be modelled in the bivariate ADL models lagged zero, one and two years respectively. 
The general model is of lag order two as it is believed that the short-term, year-to-year 
capital structure decisions are made on the basis of relatively recent corporate, taxation 
and macro economic variables. The time-span paucity which characterises the 
European data set necessitates only a short lag length, otherwise degrees of freedom 
are lost, thus increasing the possibility of statistically unsound models. A longer lag 
order is not chosen because it is argued that a two year time-span should be adequate 
to capture the decision making behaviour of most firms. 
A constant is included in each general model for various theoretical reasons. If no 
constant is included then many of the general models would become nonsensical. For 
example, say a particular country sample produces a model whereby the DDE ratio is 
estimated upon inflation alone, with no lagged dependent or independent variables. If 
inflation were zero, then by definition, the amount of debt in the firm's capital structure 
must also be zero. Although the UK, for example, experienced inflation rates in 1994 
approaching zero, it has not expe I nenced gearing levels approaching zero as a result. 
Thus, by implication, if a constant is not included in a bivariate ADL corporate capital 
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structure model then zero gearing is logically implied by zero valued independent 
variables. A constant thus reflects the fact that firms are expected to engage in 
corporate gearing regardless of the magnitude of any separate influencing factor, no 
matter how significant that factor is. Additionally, statistics such as R2, the coefficient 
of determination, requires redefinition and re-interpretation when a regression contains 
no constant. 
Before linear restrictions of a general model are tested for a particular corporate 
capital structure determinant, the theoretical specific models which are to be developed 
from the hypotheses in section 7.3 must be compared with the general model to note 
the restrictions that are implied. The statistic employed as the criterion for model 
reduction is the t-test. Although the F-ratio statistic is used by many researchers to 
jointly test linear restrictions on a general model, the t-test is employed here for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, the theoretical models of corporate capital structure 
determination are extremely general, often implying merely the sign of a static 
regression coefficient, with no lag structure expectations. Sequential reduction by 
means of a t-test should improve upon a general specification by introducing important 
timing effects in lag structures. Secondly, the F-ratio statistic may only sensibly be 
computed for general and specific models estimated upon identical numbers of 
observations. As this research is conducted upon very small data time-spans, each 
observation is extremely valuable and thus the t-test (and not the F-ratio statistic) 
enables the "released" observations arising from sequential reduction to be used in the 
estimation of the specific model. Thirdly, the t-test enables each stage of the sequential 
reduction process to be tested for validity, an advantage not inherent in the F-ratio test 
which tests linear restrictions. Finally, a joint test of linear restrictions using the 
F-ratio test is not essential to the reduction process in the situation where only a 
bivariate ADL model is gradually 'restricted, as the possibility of a specific model with 
an erroneous lag structure is less serious than a specific model with erroneously 
omitted variables, as in the case of a multivariate model. 
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The actual process of the linear restriction of a general model is best illustrated with an 
example of the general-to-specific modelling approach using the ADL method. Table 
7.1 exhibits the sequential stages of the linear restriction of an ADL (2) model with the 
DDE ratio as the dependent variable and the long-term interest rate, LRINT., as the 
independent variable, estimated upon the UK weighted sample data. 
Table 7.1 
An example of the seguential linear restriction and reduction of an 
autoregressive distributed lag model of the DDE ratio regressed upon the lonj! - 
term interest rate for the UK weijzhted samole 
(t-statistics are shown in parentheses) 
stage constant DDERATIO DDERATIO LRINT LRINT LRINT R-squared 
variable variable variable variable variable (t-critical 
lagged lagged lagged lagged value) 
1 year 2 years 1 year 2 years 
(1) 0.13345 0.43325 -0.013979 0.026211 -0.012620 -0.010953 0.46368 
general (1.399) (1.754) (-0.054) (1.931) (-0.597) (-0.745) (2.110) 
model 
(2) 0.13451 0.42549 elinAnated 0.025926 -0.012153 -0.011378 0.463586 
(1.482) (2.170) (2.130) (-0.647) (-0.941) (2.101) 
(3) 0.14307 0.38001 etindnated 0.020230 elhninated -0.017512 0.45111 
specific (1.618) (2.109) (2.445) (-2.367) (2.093) 
model I I 
1- 
1 1 
Stage I involves the specification and estimation of the general model, which is merely 
an ADL(2) model including a constant. The variable with the least significant 
coefficient is eliminated. In this case, the autoregressive, lagged two year component is 
eliminated, as its coefficient is only -0.054 standard errors away from zero, which is 
insignificant when compared to the critical t-value of 2.110 in a two-tail t-test at the 5 
per cent level (for 17 degrees of freedom). Stage 2 then involves the estimation of the 
stage I model with the least significant component eliminated. The next variable 
eliminated is the long-term interest rate measure lagged one year, as its coefficient is 
only -0.647 standard errors away from zero, and is insignificant when compared to the 
critical t-value of 2.101 in a similar t-test for 18 degrees of freedom. Finally, stage 3, 
1 
which is the final stage in this particular example, involves the estimation of the stage 2 
model specification with the elimination of the long-term interest rate measure lagged 
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one year. This is the final stage as all of the non-constant regressors are significant, 
because their t-values are all in excess of 2.093 standard errors away from zero. The 
stage 3 model is, then, in this case, the specific model for the LJK weighted sample, , 
representing the short-term time series relationship between the DDE ratio and the 
long-term interest rate. 
In the above example, all of the non-constant regressors in the final specific model are 
significant. However, this need not be the case. Models are reduced by means of linear 
restrictions until all of the remaining non-constant regressors are significant or until 
further reduction would result merely in an autoregressive model. Therefore, some of 
the models surnmarised in appendix K contain no significant regressors, but are still 
presented as they contain valuable information concerning the coefficient signs and lag 
structures of the hypothesized relationships. 
The example given in table 7.1 also demonstrates that the specific model remains 
entirely consistent with the general model, as coefficient signs are unchanged and the 
coefficient values are very similar. It is noted that the model experiences a slight 
reduction in the coefficient of determination, though this may be expected as the 
number of variables is reduced (as explained earlier by Chareraza and Deadman 
(1992)). However, the specific model is certainly an improvement upon the general 
model because all of its non-constant components are significant. 
Owing to the constraints of space, only the specific models are presented in this report, 
that is, the final stage of the model reduction process, otherwise a vast number of 
tables such as table 7.1 would be required, in addition to a similar number of additional 
diagnostic statistics tables. The specific models are given in appendix K. 
Once the final specific models are estimated, various diagnostic tests are computed to 
examine the statistical robustness of the models. The statistics computed, in addition to 
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the F-test and 
2 tests of appendix K are: the overall model F-test; the LM test for 
autocorrelated residuals; the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) 
test; the Chi-square test for normality; the F-test for heteroscedasticity; and the 
regression specification (RESET) test. These tests are ýdefined in appendix L, and the 
results of the tests are summarised in appendix M. 
Therefore, the general-to- specific modelling approach is not strictly applied to the 
ADL modelling of the European corporate capital structure decision, as the linear 
restriction is sequential rather than joint. The final specific models may differ from 
those postulated, as the latter are often based upon the dynamics of naive theory rather 
than clearly defined theoretical expectations. Thus, the approach adopted here is a 
hybrid approach, drawing from the benefits of the general-to-specific approach and 
statistical experimentation, whilst removing most of the deficiencies from the latter. 
Indeed, although the general-to-specific approach is widely explored in econometric 
literature, the actual methodological mechanics are not consistent across applications 
of the approach, and thus some adaptation to the peculiar circumstances of European 
corporate capital structure modelling appears warranted. 
7.2.5.3 SummaEy and implications of the method for the structure of the 
hypotheses 
The construction and estimation of autoregressive distributed lag models enables an 
examination of the processes which govern the operational (short-term) capital 
structure policies of European firms. 
Taxation, macroeconomic and corporate hypotheses arising from the existing literature 
as well as new hypotheses deriving from the development of the European capital 
structure research are tested by comparing the final specific ADL models to the general 
models which are governed by the hypotheses. In addition to the hypotheses dictating 
the expected coefficients in the specific models anticipated, the nature of each bivariate 
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capital structure relationship is discussed to predict the dynamics of each specific 
model. Thus, the general-to-specific approach provides the framework within which 
the bivariate ADL models are estimated, whilst their construction derives from the 
hypotheses to be tested and a careful consideration of the expected dynamics. 
7.2.6 The construction and estimation of error correction models to determine 
the short-run and long-run processes present within key capital structure 
relationshi s 
7.2.6.1 An introduction to error correction modelling 
The objective of the bivariate error correction modelling analysis is to model and study 
the processes governing both the long-run and short-run capital structure policies of 
European firms simultaneously, thus enabling the relative importance of such processes 
to be determined. 
The advantages of the error correction model (hereafter known as the EC model) are 
numerous. Firstly, such models enable both short-run (dynamic) and long-run 
processes present within a relationship between two (or more) variables to be taken 
into account within a single model. Secondly, they enable measures such as the 
coefficient of determination to be computed without the fear that it is measuring a 
spurious regression relationship. Thirdly, as the variables within an EC model are in 
levels and first-differenced forms, multicollinearity is not a problem, and thus the 
models may be built by means of linear restrictions using the "general-to-specific" 
approach. 
Only a subset of the time series data set (data set 3) is modelled using this method, as 
the EC models are estimated only for those variables which evidence a cointegrating 
relationship with the DDE ratio. 
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on to bivariate error correction mo 
The objective of this method is to develop bivariate error correction models (EC 
models) for those variables which are found to be cointegrated with the DDE ratio. . 
The reason why cointegrating variables must be examined within EC models is that: 
"Such models currently represent the most common approach to situations 
where it is wished to incorporate both the economic theory relating to the long- 
run relationship between variables and short-run disequilibrium behaviour. " 
(Charemza and Deadman (1992), p. 154-5) 
Thus, EC models enable the economist to examine the long-run and the dynamic 
processes within a relationship between two (or more) cointegrating variables. Engle 
and Granger (1987) developed the Granger Representation Theorený which states, in 
its simplified form, that time series variables which are cointegrated must have an error 
correction (EC) representation. 
To understand how error correction models are used to model simultaneously long-run 
and short-run processes within a bivariate relationship, it is necessary to derive a basic 
EC model to examine its statistical foundations as well as to establish the importance 
of disequilibrium errors to the mechanics of the model. Such a derivation is given by 
Thomas (1993). 
Two variables in equilibrium, Y. and , may 
be expressed in a simple multiplicative t 
Xt 
form given by equation 7.18. 
Jfft)"2 Equation 7.18 t 
Where: 
72 =a constant 
K= a constant 
If equation 7.18 is transformed by computing natural logarithms of its constituent 
variables, then a linear form given by equation 7.19 results. 
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Equation 7.19 Yt 71 + YA 
if the variables, Y, and Xt. are not continuously in equilibrium, then the extent of any t 
disequilibrium is given by Yt - IVI - Y2Xt. The presence of disequilibrium errors 
means that the relationship in equation 7.18 is not readily observable at any moment in 
time. However, past values of Y and X which describe the disequilibriurn can be 
employed to produce a disequilibriurn relationship such as that of equation 7.20. 
Yt --:::: A +AXt +)62Xt-I + ay, + ut Equation 7.20 
However, in this model, the components are expressed in levels and are therefore likely 
to be non-stationary. Reparameterisation of equation 7.20 yields a more useful 
representation, termed an error correction model. 
Ay, =AAx, - (I - a)[y, -l-, Vl-Y2Xt-l]+Ut Equation7.21 
Where: 
r, =, 80 /I a 
72 = (fl, + fl2) /(I- a) 
lyt-1 - rl - YA-l I= the disequilibrium error from the previous period 
The EC model shows that a change in the dependent variable depends upon a change 
in the independent variable and upon the disequilibrium error from the previous period. 
The further away the dependent is from its equilibrium value relative to the 
independent, the greater is the immediate increase in the dependent to correct the 
error, and thus the model is known as an error correction model, or EC model. Since 
the ECM is integrated of order zero, Yt and Xt must be integrated of order one for 
this to be a valid model. 
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The coefficient (I - a) in equation 7.21 measures the extent to which the 
disequilibrium of the previous period is corrected for in the current period. The 
disequilibrium term consists of the variables Xt-I and yt-I as well as the parameters 
yj and Y2, and thus information describing the long-run relationship between the 
levels and the parameters of that relationship is included in the EC model. A measures 
the immediate effect of a change in y given a change in X, and is therefore a short-run 
parameter, asisa. 
7.2.6.3 The bivariate error correction modelling method 
The error correction modelling method is conducted within the general-to-specific 
framework to enable the existing and new hypotheses to be tested, as well as to enable 
the short-run (dynamic) and long-run processes to be modelled simultaneously. The 
EC models are estimated using the Engle and Granger (1987) two-stage procedure. 
Firstly, the time series variables to be modelled are regressed upon each other in static 
long-run equations, with the DDE ratio expressed as the dependent and then the 
independent variable in each bivariate relationship. If the residuals of such regressions 
are found to be stationary in the DF/ADF tests then the Granger Representation 
Theorem states that the variables must have an error correction representation. 
Secondly, the lagged residuals from the cointegrating bivariate regressions are 
substituted into a general bivariate differenced dynamic ADL model. Each general 
model is then reduced using sequential linear restrictions to produce specific-form 
bivariate EC models. 
In the first stage, then, cointegration testing is conducted upon those bivariate 
relationships which evidenced a cointegrating relationship with the DDE ratio 
expressed as the dependent variable. However, the bivariate EC analysis seeks to 
determine whether cointegration aiso occurs in the opposite direction of causation. For 
example, although dividend cover and the DDE ratio may form a cointegrating 
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relationship when the DDE ratio is expressed as the dependent variable, it may not be 
assumed that the variables are also cointegrated when the DDE ratio is expressed as 
the independent variable. Thus, all of the incidences of cointegration with the DDE 
ratio as dependent variable are tested to determine whether cointegration also occurs 
with the DDE ratio expressed as the independent variable in the static long-run 
regression equations. The static long-run equations are reported for each pair of 
bivariate relationships, though the standard errors (and thus t-values) of the model 
coefficients are not reported because they are not consistent in a static regression of 
non-stationary variables, meaning that the standard errors are not close to the 
respective standard deviations for the independent coefficient of the underlying model. 
As undertaken in the cointegration analysis discussed earlier, detem-linistic trend tests 
and Durbin Watson tests are also computed, and where evidence is found of 
occurrences of the former then a trend is included in the cointegration test equation. 
Phillips and Loretan (1991), as an alternative to the Engle and Granger method, 
suggested that the EC models should be computed using the residuals of ADL models 
for each bivariate relationship so that the dynamics of any long-run equation are 
represented in the error correction mechanism. However, as the data time-spans of the 
European capital structure research are relatively short, this alternative method is not 
employed as it greatly reduces the number of data observations available for 
estimation. 
In the second stage of the approach, the lagged residuals from each static long-run 
equation form part of the error correction models to be estimated and tested for linear 
restrictions. Relating the application to the underlying theory of the EC model, the 
lagged residuals from the static equation correspond to the term in the square brackets 
in equation 7.21, and thus the residuals may be described as the disequilibrium errors in 
the long-run equation. The general form of the EC model to be reduced by linear 
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restrictions is basically a first-differenced ADL (1) model plus a lagged ECM, as given 
in equation 7.22. Equation 7.22 is merely a simplified, though lag-expanded, version of 
the EC model in equation 7.21. Initially, each bivariate model is estimated in its full 
general form. The models are then sequentially and linearly restricted using the two-tail 
t-test at the five per cent significance level to reduce the specification to a specific 
form. Models are reduced only up to the point where they still represent a basic EC 
model, that is, up to the point where the right hand side of the model contains at least 
one differenced independent variable plus the lagged ECM. 
AYt : --- Cl + C2AYt-I + C3AXt + c4Ax, -, + c5ECM, -, + ut 
Equation 7.22 
Where: 
Ayt 
, 
Ayt 
-I = the 
first differenced dependent variable, lagged zero and one years, 
respectively 
AXt 
. 
AXt_l = the first differenced independent variable, lagged zero and one years, 
respectively 
ECM, 
j = the error correction mechanism, or disequilibrium error, from the static 
long-run equation 
Ut = the disturbance 
For each bivariate relationship, an EC model is estimated with the DDE ratio as the 
dependent and the independent variable in turn, but only if the direction of causation 
for each relationship produces a cointegrating relationship. Once the specific-form EC 
models are estimated, various diagnostic tests are undertaken to test for model power, 
autocorrelation, autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity, and model mis- 
specification, and the results of these tests are presented in appendix N. 
The specification of each final specific model is then compared with specific models 
proposed by the existing literature hypotheses and the hypotheses of this research, as 
discussed in section 7.4. Differences and consistencies are both discussed to enable the 
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understanding of the short-run and long-run corporate capital structure processes to be 
developed. 
7.1 implications of the method for the structure of the 
hypotheses 
The construction and estimation of bivariate error correction models enables the 
exannnation of the processes governing both the long-run and short-run capital 
structure policies of European firms. 
The hypotheses to be tested consist mainly of existing literature hypotheses and new 
hypotheses deriving from the development of the European capital structure research. 
The issue of causality in a bivariate capital structure relationship is studied by means of 
hypotheses relating to the one-way or two-way causation of such relationships and 
hypotheses relating to the endo-exogeneity of a particular time series variable with 
respect to the DDE ratio. Thus, the hypothesis testing seeks to extend the examination 
of model coefficients and dynamics to also consider causality and the endo-exogeneity 
of variables which demonstrate a relationship with the DDE ratio. 
7.2.7 A summary of the methodological approach undertaken in the bivariate 
time series European corporate capital structure analyses 
The time series analyses are designed to determine whether there exist European firm- 
level optimal capital structures by modelling the inter-temporal variation in the DDE 
ratio in relation to the inter-temporal variation in various potential taxation, 
macroeconomic and corporate influences. The analyses examine the short-term 
(operational) capital structure policies of firms as well as the more important long-term 
(strategic) policies. Therefore, as well as studying the disequilibrium of the DDE ratio 
in relation to its key determinants, equilibrium relationships are also determined by 
studying the long-term error-correction mechanisms by means of cointegration 
analysis. 
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The bivariate time series analysis methodology represents a structured progression 
towards bivariate modelling, whereby the unit root testing, cointegration testing and 
Granger causality analysis are all preparatory analyses which are essential to the 
bivariate modelling. The unit root testing and Granger causality analysis enable more 
robust ADL and EC models to be constructed and estimated. The cointegration testing 
enables the identification of the most important long-term equilibrating capital 
structure relationships which may then be focussed upon in the bivariate EC models. 
Overall, the methodological approach extends the testing of the central hypothesis to 
encompass not only short-run disequilibrium relationships but also those long-run 
equilibrating relationships which characterise the strategic deterrnination of the 
European corporate capital structure. 
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7. 
- 
be tested in the bivariate time series analyses 
7.3.1 IntrOductiOn 
The objective of this section is to introduce the hypotheses to be tested in the bivariate 
time series analyses of the European corporate capital structure research. The 
hypotheses are discussed with respect to their theoretical underpinning, which derives 
both from the existing literature detailed in chapters 2 and 3 and from the new 
theoretical developments of the European corporate capital structure research. Firstly, 
the general hypotheses to be tested in the bivariate analyses are discussed, as these may 
not easily be placed in one particular theoretical grouping of determinants. The 
sections that follow proceed to develop hypotheses which relate to the taxation, 
macroeconomic, and corporate envirom-nents of the firm. The reason why the 
hypotheses are grouped by determinant type rather than by the econometric method 
employed to test them is that it is far easier to discuss the hypothesis linkages with the 
existing literature across all of the bivariate time series analyses when hypotheses are 
grouped by determinant type. The grouping of hypotheses by econometric method 
employed does not facilitate such strong linkages and may also lead to some repetition. 
Additionally, employing the determinant-grouping approach for the statement and 
development of hypotheses enables a useful progression from an examination of 
dynamic right through to a long-run perspective. After the hypotheses are discussed 
within their determinant groupings, a brief summary is made of the contribution of the 
set of time series hypotheses towards the testing of the central hypothesis of the 
existence of firm-level optimal capital structures. 
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7 eses to be tested in the bivariate time series analvses 
be tested in the analysis to determine the order of 
i )ean corporate, taxation and macroeconomic time series 
variables 
There are no explicit hypotheses arising from the existing literature to be tested within 
the integration testing procedure because the integration tests are performed only as a 
preparatory stage towards time series model construction and estimation, and such 
tests produce few insights into the firm's determination of its capital structure. 
However, it is useful to state a number of expectations concerning the results before 
the unit root testing is undertaken. Such expectations arise from consideration of the 
corporate capital structure literature and consideration of the limitations of the data set 
to be analysed. Firstly, it is expected that most of the variables identified as key 
variables in the capital structure models up to this point in the European research 
should be integrated of the same order as the corporate capital structure measure, the 
DDE ratio, otherwise such key determinants would not have formed significant capital 
structure relationships. Secondly, it is expected that the weighted sample variables may 
be integrated of lower orders than the non-weighted variables in certain cases, merely 
because the former samples give a high weighting to larger European firms within each 
country whose behaviour is less erratic through time than the sample population as a 
whole due to their long establishment and diversification. Thirdly, it is anticipated that 
the short time-span samples, particularly the French sample, may in certain cases 
contain variables integrated of higher orders than the respective variables in the other 
samples, as the paucity of the data-span may mean that a trend is identified which 
proves to be merely a fluctuation over the longer term, and which would have little 
importance if a longer data-span were available. Therefore, there are no explicit 
hypotheses to be tested in the unit root testing analysis, as the analysis seeks merely to 
identify those variables which may be further tested for the existence of a cointegrating 
relationship with the DDE ratio. There are, however, expectations to be tested which 
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relate to the order of integration of variables of different types and the order of 
integration of variables from different samples. 
7.3.2.2 Hypotheses to be tested in the cointegration tests 
There are generally no explicit relational hypotheses to be tested within the 
cointegration testing of this section, as such testing is conducted only as a preparatory 
stage towards the construction of error correction models. However, one new 
hypothesis that is to be tested is that concerning the effect of scale factors, or firm size, 
upon the occurrence of cointegrating capital structure relationships. Hypothesis H35 
states that the weighted data samples are more likely to contain cointegrating 
relationships than the non-weighted data samples. The reason for this expected 
phenomenon is that the larger firms across Europe, which are given greater weighting 
in the weighted samples, are more sophisticated and have access to better quality 
information, both with regard to their own organisations and in relation to the overall 
environment of the firm. As a result of this the finance managers of such firms are 
more likely to adjust their DDE ratios to changes in influencing factors, rapidly 
adjusting any divergence from a desired capital structure path to again reach an 
equilibrium. Smaller firms, which do not have access to the same level of information 
often may not realise that their capital structures are in disequilibrium with the desired 
capital structure path, given the prevailing influencing factors, and are thus less likely 
to exhibit cointegrating capital structure relationships because the disequilibrium errors 
are not continually adjusted to regain an equilibrium capital structure, and thus such 
errors do not have a mean of zero, producing an error correction mechanism which is 
non-stationary. Therefore, for the smaller firms these disequilibrium errors are allowed 
to drift, producing an "error correction mechanism" which does not have a mean of 
zero and thus is not stationary, but is integrated of some higher order or not integrated 
at all. I 
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In addition to this new hypothesis, two additional results are expected to arise from the 
tests. Firstly, it is expected that the majority of the time series will not be cointegrated 
with the DDE ratio, because it is argued that the finance manager will find it extremely 
difficult to adjust the desired path of the DDE ratio in the long-run to more than a few 
important long-term influences. Secondly, it is expected that the shorter the data time- 
span, the less likely are occurrences of cointegrating relationships to be found, as there 
may be an insufficient number of observations to produce a significant cointegrating 
relationship. 
Therefore, hypothesis H35 and the two expected results discussed are tested in the 
cointegration analysis. More importantly, the precise nature of anticipated 
cointegrating relationships is discussed in more detail when the nature of the error 
correction models to be estimated is examined. 
7.3.2.3 Hypotheses to be tested in the Granger causality tests 
The Granger causality testing procedure does not generally enable the hypotheses of 
this research to be tested individually, as it examines the strength of a particular causal 
relationship rather than setting out to construct and estimate carefully specified time 
series models. However, one hypothesis implicitly predominant in the existing 
empirical literature is that the DDE ratio is the dependent variable in a statistical model 
containing other capital structure variables, and thus a new hypothesis, H36, is tested 
in this section. Hypothesis H36 states that the corporate debt-equity ratio is best 
expressed as a dependent variable in any model containing significant time series 
capital structure variables. The hypothesis is a general one, to be tested on the basis of 
the results of the entire set of Granger causality tests. The results of tests for individual 
time series are discussed and employed later in this research, to support the results of 
the empirical models constructed and estimated. 
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7. 
- 
be tested in the bivariate autoregressive distributed lag 
models 
The nature of the models expected to result from the ADL modelling analysis derives 
from the hypotheses underpinned by the existing literature and from the theoretical 
developments of the European corporate capital structure research. Whilst the 
empirical literature generally does not suggest the form of lag structures that might 
appear in any of the bivariate ADL models to be estimated, it does suggest, in 
conjunction with the theoretical literature, the coefficient sign which forms the basis 
for each general model. However, it may be that a certain lag structure is anticipated 
for econometric or theoretical reasons which arise from the development of the 
European corporate capital structure research, and thus the anticipated lag structure is 
discussed and included in the general model specification where appropriate. The 
hypotheses to be tested for the taxation, macroeconomic and corporate determinants 
of the capital structure are framed within expectations for the overall model 
specification for each determinant tested. Thus, both hypotheses and model 
specification expectations are tested when the ADL models are estimated. 
7.3.2.5 Hypotheses to be tested in the bivariate error correction models 
As discussed in the general hypotheses to be tested in the bivariate ADL models, the 
existing literature generally produces hypotheses which merely propose the sign of the 
coefficient of the influencing factor in a bivariate EC model with the DDE ratio 
expressed as the dependent variable. Therefore, the theory and evidence of the existing 
literature produces general models with the DDE ratio as dependent variable, whereas 
it often does not consider the opposite direction of causation, that is, where the DDE 
ratio is expressed as the independent variable. This may not be problematic, however, 
as the EC models with the DDE ratio as independent variable are likely to be less 
common and generally less significant than the EC models with the DDE ratio as 
dependent variable. This is because the cointegration testing concentrates on 
identifying cointegrating influences upon the DDE ratio, and thus the EC modelling 
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seeks to discover whether cointegration works in the opposite direction only for those 
variables for which there is already evidence of a cointegrating relationship with the 
DDE ratio as dependent variable. Additionally, some of the variables, particularly the 
taxation and macro economic variables, are by definition strongly exogenous and 
therefore most likely produce an insignificant EC model when the DDE ratio is 
expressed as an independent variable. Therefore, the EC models expand upon the 
hypotheses arising from the existing literature by considering both possible directions 
of causation in addition to a simultaneous examination of potential short-run and long- 
run processes. 
The general model forms to be discussed throughout sections 7.3.3 to 7.3.5 are 
differenced ADL models of lag length one year, including the error correction 
mechanism lagged one year. The specific model proposed draws upon the hypotheses 
of the existing literature in addition to the results of the testing and modelling of the 
European corporate capital structure research. The scope for reducing the general 
model is restricted by the basic form that an EC model must take, as the final specific 
model should contain a differenced dependent variable, a differenced independent 
variable, and the lagged ECM as a minimum specification. 
To aid specification of the form of the specific models to be tested, two new 
hypotheses are proposed. Hypothesis H37 states that the European firm responds 
rapidly to exogenous influence changes, whereas there is a delayed response to 
changes in endogenous influences. The firm responds rapidly to exogenous changes, 
such as taxation and macro economic changes, because these generally apply to the 
whole economy, and if the firm does not adjust for such changes then it may be 
disadvantaged with respect to it competitors. Such changes are also generally more 
permanent in nature than changes in endogenous variables, which consist of mainly 
corporate-level variables, at least with respect to the EC models. The firm may not 
respond immediately to endogenous variable changes because the finance manager may 
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wait until changes in the internal structure and environment appear to be sustained 
before adjusting the firm's capital structure. As the DDE ratio may be classed as a 
fairly endogenous variable, EC models with the DDE ratio as the independent variable 
may exhibit delayed dependent variable response. Therefore, hypothesis H37 suggests 
that the greater the degree of exogeneity of the independent variable in each EC model, 
the more rapid will be the response of the dependent variable to changes in that 
independent variable. If the hypothesis holds, EC models with an exogenous variable 
as the independent variable should exhibit little evidence of a lag structure whereas 
models with an endogenous variable as the independent variable should exhibit greater 
evidence of a lag structure. 
Hypothesis H3 8 states that the greater the degree of exogeneity of a particular 
corporate capital structure influence, the more likely that variable is to be a 
determinant of, and not determined by, the DDE ratio. This hypothesis is based upon 
the concept of "causal inequality" which proposes that certain variables are so 
exogenous that there is no way in which changes in another variable may affect the 
exogenous variable. If hypothesis H38 holds, EC models with a highly exogenous 
variable as the dependent variable are likely to be very much less significant than EC 
models with the exogenous variable expressed as the independent variable. 
Therefore, the general hypotheses tested in the bivariate EC modelling exercise are 
generated to aid specification of the specific models to be tested. These hypotheses 
seek to facilitate an examination of the effect of the endo-exogenous division of 
variables with respect to the DDE ratio, so that a greater insight may be gained into the 
dynamics and causal inequality present within the EC models estimated. 
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7 ypotheses to be tested 
7.3.3.1 Introduction 
Before discussing the specific taxation hypotheses and the theoretical and empirical 
literature which underpins them, it is useful to re-examine the main conclusions drawn 
from the taxation literature in addition to the developments of the European corporate 
capital structure research up to this point, towards a greater understanding of the 
interaction between the capital structure and the tax environment. 
The main conclusion arising from the theoretical and empirical capital structure 
literature is that there may indeed be a distinct tax advantage to debt. However, this 
conclusion appears somewhat bold without further explanation and qualification. 
Firstly, although there may be a distinct tax advantage to corporate debt, there are 
some key influences of a taxation nature which have the effect of significantly reducing 
the tax advantage to debt from that proposed in the MM (1963) model, or even 
eliminating it altogether. Secondly, once it is understood that the tax advantage to debt 
might in reality be quite small or even insignificant, there may further exist factors 
which cause a breakdown in any relationship between the tax advantage to debt and 
the actual gearing employed by firms at a particular point in time. 
The Modigliani and Miller (1963) model was the first coherent model to correctly 
account for the influence of corporate taxes, although it logically implied that firms 
should employ 99.9 per cent debt in their capital structures to maximise their value. As 
such extreme gearing positions are not observed across firms, many authors sought to 
determine what factors might reduce this tax advantage to debt, possibly to the extent 
that any such advantage is eliminated. Probably the most influential development 
following the 1963 paper was the Miller (1977) model which proposed that the 
inclusion of personal taxation in the capital structure model reduced the tax advantage 
to debt for the individual firm to zero, even though there still occurred an optimum for 
the market as a whole. Perhaps the next most important influence which reduces the 
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tax advantage to debt is the occurrence of corporate tax exhaustion, whereby the firm's 
ability to claim the full, nominal tax advantage to debt is "crowded out" by non-debt 
tax allowances. Authors such as DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Mayer and Morris 
(1982), Mayer (1984), and Dammon and Senbet (1988) all produced theoretical 
models which suggest that the tax advantage to debt is impacted upon differently for 
different firms as each firm is likely to incur different non-debt tax allowances which 
produce firm-level optimal capital structure solutions. Other authors such as Franks 
and Broyles (1979), Pointon (1981), Mayer (1984), Rutterford (1988), and Ashton 
(1989) sought to determine the influence of the tax system upon the corporate capital 
structure decision, and proposed that the tax system employed in a particular country 
exerts a significant impact upon the corporate capital structure, generally reducing 
significantly, and at times eliminating, any tax advantage to debt. Classical tax systems 
appear to favour debt finance most, followed by partial imputation systems, although 
full-imputation systems eliminate any tax advantage to debt altogether. Finally, the 
structure of tax rates may reduce or eliminate the corporate tax advantage to debt. For 
example, if the gap between the corporate tax rate and the imputation rate is reduced 
then the tax advantage to debt is also much reduced. Therefore, although there may be 
a tax advantage to debt in theory, the effect of personal taxation, corporate tax 
exhaustion, the tax system in place, and the structure of tax rates may reduce that 
advantage or even eliminate it. 
Whatever the size of the "residual" tax advantage to debt after the additional taxation 
influences discussed above have been accounted for, there are many factors which may 
cause a breakdown in a potential positive relationship with the actual DDE ratios 
employed by firms. One such factor is the stickiness of tax regimes within each 
country. If the structure of tax rates within a country is constant for many years and 
then changes suddenly, it may take some time for firms to gauge the effect of this on 
their optimal capital structures, and therefore the relationship between gearing and the 
tax advantage to debt breaks down until the equilibrium relationship is again 
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established. Related to this, the general stickiness of tax rates across countries may 
mean that there is not enough variation in the gearing and the related tax variables to 
enable a clear relationship to be established. Another factor which may cause a 
breakdown in an observable relationship between corporate gearing and the tax 
advantage to debt is the fact that no single measure (such as the tax advantage to debt) 
can reflect all of the taxation changes in an economy which impact upon such a 
relationship. For example, the theoretical tax advantage to debt measure does not take 
into account the firm-specific nature of non-debt tax allowance changes or changes in 
the personal tax rates of investors in different firms. Finally, non-tax factors such as 
macroeconomic and corporate influences may be extremely important influences upon 
any breakdown in a relationship between the tax advantage to debt and observed 
gearing. Whilst such factors are considered separately in the hypothesis groupings that 
follow this section, their precise influence upon the relationship between gearing and 
individual taxation factors is not explicitly considered until the multivariate EC models 
of chapter 8 are constructed, estimated and interpreted. 
As this section describes only those tax hypotheses which are testable, it concentrates 
on examining those taxation factors which should exhibit a relationship with gearing 
when they are expressed in their "nominal" or theoretical form and those taxation 
factors which should exhibit a relationship with gearing when they are expressed in 
their "effective" form. Therefore, the influence of the nominal tax advantage to debt 
and the nominal corporate tax rate upon corporate gearing is discussed and expressed 
in hypotheses to enable such relationships to be tested. The influence of effective tax 
rates upon gearing is then discussed and hypotheses are expressed to test such 
relationships. 
347 
7 test the relationship between corporate gearing and 
ny iables 
The theoretical developments summarised in this section lead to taxation hypotheses of 
a relationship between the European corporate DDE ratio and the nominal 
(theoretical) tax advantage to debt and the nominal corporate tax rate, respectively. 
MM (1963) argued that a distinct tax advantage to debt exists, resulting from the tax- 
deductibility of debt interest payments, a model that is supported by evidence from 
MM (1966), Hamada (1972) and Masulis (1980,1983). However, the supporting 
empirics are questioned by Boness and Frankfurter (1977), Freear (1980) and Sametz 
(1964), mainly on the basis of the shortcomings of the data and method employed. 
Although Miller (1977) questioned this firm-level optimal capital structure solution, 
stating that there exists a market equilibrium capital structure ratio in aggregate but no 
optimum for the individual firm, the assumptions of his model are very restrictive and 
the model is strongly questioned by the empirics of Kim, Lewellen and McConnell 
(1979). Therefore, a distinct tax advantage to debt may indeed exist although it is 
unlikely to be of the magnitude proposed by MM (1963) for European firms, unless 
the country in which they are positioned employs a classical tax system and a similar 
structure of tax rates. Franks and Broyles (1979) and Ashton (1989) both note that the 
tax advantage to debt is different for countries (such as the UK) which have tax 
systems which do not tax dividends twice - once at the corporate level and then at the 
personal level, as embodied in the classical tax system. In countries such as the UK, 
part of the tax advantage can be replicated by the equity holder through home-made 
borrowing, and thus the net tax advantage to debt represents only that part of the tax 
advantage which cannot be replicated by equity holders. Therefore, the literature 
suggests that a tax advantage to debt may exist, but where non-classical tax systems 
are employed, and depending on the degree of imputation in place, the actual tax 
advantage to debt is likely to be much less than it is for US firms. It might be expected 
that this tax advantage to debt, although less than for US firms, should still be highly 
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positively correlated with actual corporate gearing ratios observed across countries, 
particularly as the capital structure literature of the last few decades has focussed upon 
taxation as the major determinant of the corporate capital structure. Although King 
(1977) and Rajan and Zingales (1994) found evidence of such a positive relationship 
for a range of countries and Norton (1991) found that firms perceived such an 
influence to be important, the wider ranging studies of Rutterford (1988) and Mayer 
(1990) found little evidence of a positive relationship. Thus evidence on the 
relationship between corporate gearing and the tax advantage to debt is mixed 
although the latter studies which question the relationship are static in nature. 
The literature therefore suggests that a tax advantage to debt may exist which is likely 
to be much less for firms in those European countries which employ some form of 
imputation tax systeni, but that little research has been undertaken to investigate the 
time series relationship between gearing and the tax advantage to debt. Therefore, it is 
essential to establish whether a positive relationship does exist between the DDE ratio 
and the tax advantage to debt whilst taking account of the differences in tax systems 
across the European countries studied in the time series analyses. Hypothesis H6, then, 
states that the corporate debt-equity ratio increases as the tax advantage to debt 
increases. 
The Miller (1977) formula is customised to produce a tax advantage to debt expression 
for each of the four countries to be analysed. The original tax advantage to debt 
expression in the Miller paper is given in equation 7.23. 
Tax advantage to debt 
((I 
- TC-) (I - TPS) B 
(1-T 
L pb 
Equation 7.23 
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Where: T= the corporate tax rate C 
T= the tax rate on investor income from equity investment PS 
T the investor tax rate on debt income pb 
B the market value of the firm's debt 
As tax systems and the degree of imputation vary across the countries studied, the tax 
advantage to debt expressions differ. The tax advantage to debt expressions for UK 
and French firms are given by equation 7.24, whereas for the Netherlands the 
expression is merely the corporate tax rate, T, multiplied by the market value of the 
finn's debt, B, and in Germany the tax advantage to debt is zero due to full 
imputation. 
T, b 
The tax advantage to debt in UK and French firms C 
i-b 
Equation 7.24 
Where: 
T= the corporate tax rate C b= the imputation rate (which equals the basic rate of income tax (INCTAX) in the 
UK and equals the constant 1/3 for France) 
In the ADL models to be estimated, the key model component should be the positive 
coefficient independent variable (labelled TAXADV in the analysis). As the current 
DDE ratio is strongly influenced by the current and past tax advantage to debt 
measures because the tax advantage has both stock and flow dimensions, then there 
may be lag structures present for the independent variable to represent this 
phenomenon, Another factor which may influence the strength of the DDE ratio 
response to a change in the nominal tax advantage to debt is the scale of the firm. As 
smaller firms do not have the sophisticated information systems in place to enable them 
to gauge the current and expected effective tax advantage to debt, they may exhibit a 
greater relationship between gearing and the nominal tax advantage to debt than larger 
firms. Larger firms are likely to better understand that they should adjust their capital 
structures only to changes in the effective tax advantage to debt, taking account of 
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factors such as current and expected tax exhaustion. Therefore, a behavioural. 
dichotomy may be exhibited in the estimated ADL models whereby the nominal tax 
advantage to debt models are stronger for the non-weighted than for the weighted 
samples. In summary, the nominal tax advantage to debt ADL models should exhibit 
positive coefficient independent variables, weak autoregressive processes, independent 
variable lag structures, and the estimated models should be stronger for the non- 
weighted than for the weighted samples. 
As the nominal corporate tax rate is a good proxy for the nominal tax advantage to 
debt, the theoretical and empirical underpinning of its relationship with the DDE ratio 
is only briefly discussed. Most of the theory discussing this relationship merely forms 
part of the wider tax advantage to debt theoretical models which dominate the capital 
structure literature. Few studies discuss the separate relationship between gearing and 
the nominal corporate tax rate alone. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), however, argued 
that firms will substitute debt for equity financing as the corporate tax rate is raised, 
although Litzenberger and Talmor (1989) argued that corporate tax rate changes exert 
a neutral effect as investors can hedge against such changes. Evidence supporting a 
relationship between gearing and the corporate tax rate is mixed, as Taub (1975) finds 
evidence of a negative relationship (1975), Zwick (1977) finds no evidence of a 
relationship and Holland and Myers (1977) find evidence of a positive relationship. The 
casual empirics of chapter 4 suggest that no such relationship exists, at least in a cross- 
sectional perspective. Therefore, the theory and evidence related to the relationship 
between the DDE ratio and the nominal corporate tax rate is mixed, although both 
intuition and the vast body of "tax advantage to debt" literature would advocate a 
Positive relationship as the nominal corporate tax rate is a good proxy for the nominal 
tax advantage to debt. 
Hypothesis H8, then, states that the corporate debt-equity ratio increases with the 
corporate tax rate. In the ADL models to be estimated, the model specification should 
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be very similar to that of the tax advantage to debt models discussed in this section. 
Indeed, for the Dutch samples, the tax advantage to debt measure equals the nominal 
corporate tax rate anyway, due to the classical tax system in the Netherlands, and for 
the UK and French models the nominal corporate tax rate proxies the nominal tax 
advantage to debt. However, it may be argued that the nominal corporate tax rate is a 
more direct measure for firms to understand than any computed tax advantage to debt, 
and thus the capital structure response to changes in the corporate tax rate should be 
fairly immediate, and not lagged. Therefore, the nominal corporate tax rate (CTRATE) 
ADL models should exhibit positive coefficient independent variables with no lags, 
weak autoregressive processes, and the estimated models should be stronger for the 
non-weighted than for the weighted samples. 
The bivariate EC model extends the analysis to examine not only the short-run, but 
also the long-run relationship between the corporate capital structure and the nominal 
corporate tax rate. As the nominal corporate tax rate is a readily available and easily 
understood taxation determinant of the corporate capital structure because it is a good 
proxy for the more complex nominal tax advantage to debt measure, it is far more 
likely that this measure forms an equilibrating long-run relationship with the DDE ratio 
than a computed tax advantage to debt measure. It is noted that, even though there 
may be a two-way cointegrating relationship between the DDE ratio and the nominal 
corporate tax rate measure, any model with the tax rate measure expressed as the 
dependent variable is not underpinned by theory and is not logical due to the super- 
exogeneity of the tax rate measure with respect to the DDE ratio. Therefore, such a 
model is not specified or discussed in this section. As the nominal corporate tax rate 
measure does not take account of the complex factors which are necessary to compute 
the effective corporate tax rate measure, it is expected that such a measure is more 
likely to be monitored by smaller quoted firms which do not have in place the 
sophisticated information systems necessary for such a computation. Therefore, it is 
expected that a long-run cointegrating relationship should be observed only for the 
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smaller firm, given greater representation in the non-weighted samples. The non-ýnal 
corporate tax rate EC model, then, should exhibit a positive coefficient dynamic 
independent variable, a significant ECM (error correction mechanism), and it is 
expected that such a model would be observed for non-weighted rather than weighted 
samples. 
Therefore, the existing theoretical and empirical literature, consideration of the 
developments of the European research, and the nature of the econometric techniques 
to be employed lead to hypotheses of the relationship between the DDE ratio and the 
nominal tax advantage to debt and the nominal corporate tax rate, respectively, and to 
specific-form models which embody these hypotheses. As the nominal taxation 
variables do not contain the information required to render them useful to more 
sophisticated (generally larger) firms, it is expected that, in general, smaller firms will 
demonstrate clearer bivariate relationships between their corporate capital structures 
and such nominal taxation variables. 
7.3.3.3 Hypotheses to test the relationship between corporate gearing and 
effective taxation variables 
This section discusses the theoretical underpinning of hypotheses to test a relationship 
between the European corporate DDE ratio and the effective corporate tax rate and 
the effective total tax rate, respectively. The effective tax rate measures take into 
account those factors which reduce the nominal tax advantage to debt to the effective 
tax advantage to debt. However, as the effective tax advantage to debt is extremely 
complex to compute across the samples and the time spans studied, the effective tax 
rates are instead modelled as proxies to the effective tax advantage to debt. Indeed, the 
lower is the effective corporate tax rate to the firm, the lower will be any effective tax 
advantage to debt as factors such as tax exhaustion reduce the firm's tax bill and thus 
crowd out" its ability to utilise the tax benefits associated with debt. 
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Many of the factors which are likely to reduce the tax advantage to debt from that 
proposed by the MM (1963) paper have already been accounted for in the nominal tax 
measure hypotheses discussed in the previous section. Indeed, the nominal tax 
advantage to debt measure computed takes into account the tax system, structure of 
tax rates, and the effects of personal taxation, whilst the nominal corporate tax rate 
measure takes into account the corporate tax rate applicable through each sample 
period. However, what is not taken into account in the "nominal" taxation measures is 
the possibility of corporate tax exhaustion, and thus it is useful to examine the actual 
tax bills paid by European firms to gauge the effective corporate tax rate and the 
effective total tax rate. It might be argued that the relationship between the corporate 
capital structure and the effective corporate tax rate (CTAXRATIO), and the effective 
total tax rate (TAXRATIO), also measure the interaction of the corporate capital 
structure and the magnitude of the relative tax bill, thus rendering such measures 
important to any strategic tax reduction policies. 
However, before the hypotheses concerning these two effective taxation measures may 
be stated and employed as the basis for any econometric modelling of bivariate 
corporate capital structure relationships, the theory underpinning the differential 
between the nominal and the effective tax rate (or tax advantage to debt) must first be 
reconsidered. This theory centres upon the influence of corporate tax exhaustion upon 
the gearing decisions of the firm. The occurrence of tax exhaustion may limit any tax 
advantage to debt by "crowding out" the ability of the firm to claim the full nominal tax 
advantage. Tax exhaustion occurs where a firm has a surplus of capital (or other) 
allowances or losses carried forward over taxable profits. DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980) argued that the mere presence of non-debt tax shields was sufficient to overturn 
the Mller capital structure irrelevancy proposition, and that tax exhaustion occurs well 
before bankruptcy costs might actas an offset to any tax advantage. Mayer and Morris 
(1982) extended this concept, arguing that the tax allowances which produce such tax 
Offsets depend on the asset structure, activity and earnings of the firm. Mayer (1984) 
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introduced uncertainty to the analysis, arguing that the tax deductions of the firm 
depend on both the financial and investment policies of the firm, and thus the financial 
and real decisions of the firm may not be isolated as they are intrinsically linked. 
Indeed, the presence of corporate tax exhaustion is capable of producing a capital 
structure optimum which holds even in the absence of institutional constraints. Finally, 
Dammon and Senbet (1988) extended the DeAngelo and Masulis model, distinguishing 
between the income and substitution effects of investment tax shields on the tax 
advantage to debt. Overall, the authors propose that there is likely to be a difference 
between the nominal and the effective tax advantage to debt (or corporate tax rate) 
due to the influence of non-debt tax allowances. 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), Mayer and Morris (1982) and the Government Green 
Paper on Corporation Tax (1982), provide empirical evidence that tax exhaustion is a 
significant phenomenon in US and UK finance markets. DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). 
Mayer and Morris (1982), Cordes and Sheffrin (1982), Long and Malitz (1983), 
Rutterford (1988), and Mackie-Mason (1990), further provide evidence that tax 
exhaustion is not only significant, but also significantly reduces the effective tax 
advantage to debt, thus reducing the demand for gearing across firms. 
In summary, there is strong theoretical reasoning to suggest that corporate tax 
exhaustion offsets to some degree the tax advantage to corporate debt, thus placing 
limits on the individual firm's demand for debt. Empirical evidence suggests not only 
that this tax exhaustion effect is a widespread phenomenon across various countries, 
but also that it is negatively related to the degree of gearing held by firms. 
The measures to be modelled in this section are theoretically underpinned from two 
similar yet distinct perspectives. The first measure to be modelled is the corporate tax 
ratio (labelled CTAXRATIO), which is merely the ratio of the corporation tax paid by 
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the firm to its profits. The second measure is the total tax ratio (labelled TAXRATIO), 
which is the ratio of the total tax paid to profits. 
The first theoretical perspective which proposes a relationship between the corporate 
capital structure and each measure is that underpinned by the taxation literature 
discussed above. There should be a positive relationship between the amount of 
gearing employed by the firm and the corporate tax rate, particularly where the 
nominal tax rate is adjusted to take account of factors such as tax exhaustion, to give 
the effective tax rate. This leads to the testing of hypothesis H8, this time for the 
effective rather than the nominal corporate tax rate. Hypothesis H8, then, states that 
the corporate debt-equity ratio increases with the corporate tax rate. Whilst it is the 
corporate tax ratio which is of main interest here, the more general total tax ratio may 
also exhibit a positive relationship with corporate gearing. 
The second theoretical perspective which proposes a relationship between the 
corporate capital structure and each measure is related to the tax-reduction strategies 
of firms. If the finance manager observes a tax ratio which is high relative to the 
historical average for that particular ratio, then he or she will be more willing to engage 
in a tax-reduction strategy to reduce that tax bill. It is proposed that the manager might 
achieve such tax-reduction either by adjusting the investment policy of the firm to gain 
the benefits of extra non-debt allowances or by adjusting the mix of the corporate 
capital structure to gain the benefits of extra debt-related tax allowances. It is argued 
that the latter response is more likely as the former response might detrimentally affect 
the investment projects of the firm, whereas the latter merely causes the nature of the 
total claims on the firm's cash-flow to change. Hypothesis H3 1, then, states that the 
corporate debt-equity ratio increases as the relative tax bill increases. This tax- 
reduction perspective on the relationship between corporate gearing and the two tax 
ratio measures differs from the effective tax rate perspective in that the former 
represents a more proactive firm response to changes in the "tax-attractiveness" of 
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gearing and the latter represents a more reactive corporate capital structure response 
to relatively higher than normal tax bills. 
Whilst the ADL models to be estimated may not clearly distinguish between the two 
perspectives, they do enable the two hypotheses to be tested, at least with respect to 
the short-run time-frame of the firm. If hypotheses H8 and H31 hold, the coefficients 
of the taxation independent variables should be positive because an increase in the 
effective tax rate signals an increase in the tax advantage to debt thus encouraging 
increased gearing and because an increase in the relative tax bill should encourage 
increased gearing as part of a wider tax-reduction strategy. Although the bivariate 
models of chapter 5 question a positive relationship, showing instead evidence of a 
weak negative relationship, the interpretation of these earlier models was made 
somewhat uncertain by the causation uncertainty which characterised them. 
Additionally, the logistic regression models do not lend support to the positive 
coefficient proposed, although such models sought to examine the marginal capital 
structure decision, rather than the short-term decision. The two theoretical 
perspectives may be distinguished to some small degree by the independent variable lag 
structures which they imply. The first perspective implies an immediate capital 
structure response to changes in the attractiveness of debt, thus suggesting the absence 
of a lag structure. The second perspective, however, implies a delayed capital structure 
response to a historically high tax bill. The delay may be caused by firms taking time to 
assimilate the new information contained within the higher than average tax bill, a 
delay which may be compounded by the "lumpiness" of capital structure issues, 
whereby significant economies of issue costs cause firms to issue new claims on block 
rather than continuously. The specific ADL models for the CTAXRATIO and 
TAXRATIO variables, then, are expected to be autoregressive distributed lag models 
which exhibit positive coefficient independent variables. The length of the independent 
variable lag structures may provide some evidence to distinguish between the two 
alternative theoretical underpinning perspectives. 
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The total tax ratio EC model is constructed and estimated for the purpose of testing 
hypothesis H31 in the long-run. Indeed, if hypothesis H31 holds then tax-reduction is a 
long-run strategy of firms rather than a change in the relative tax bill merely giving rise 
to an operational capital structure adjustment. Thus, such a model is extremely 
important as it seeks to test whether tax-reduction is a long-run strategic objective of 
the firm. The results of the model should be considered in conjunction with the results 
of the (nominal) corporate tax rate EC model, specified in the previous section, so that 
it may be ascertained not only whether firms' capital structures are affected by taxation 
changes in the long-run, but also whether such firms react to such changes as part of a 
wider tax-reduction strategy. As a long-run tax-reduction strategy requires 
sophisticated information systems to enable the utilisation of an optimal mix of 
financial and investment tax allowances, it is expected that larger firms, given greater 
representation in the weighted samples,, are more likely to track the movement of the 
capital structure ratio in relation to the total tax ratio in the long-run. The total tax 
ratio EC model, then, should exhibit a positive coefficient dynamic independent 
variable, a significant ECK and it is expected that such a model would be observed for 
weighted rather than non-weighted samples. 
In summary, the nominal tax advantage to debt and the nominal corporate tax rate are 
reduced in the real world by factors such as corporate tax exhaustion to give the 
effective tax advantage to debt and the effective corporate tax rate. To measure the 
latter measure, which is also a good proxy for the former measure, tax ratios are 
computed and are tested in bivariate capital structure models. The construction and 
estimation of such models enables the consideration of two theoretical perspectives 
which Suggest such a capital structure relationship - one of which is based in the 
effective tax advantage to debt literature and the other which is based on the reaction 
of the finance manager to a higher-than-normal tax bill. 
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7.3.3.4 
. -ýMum. 
MAEX 
This section sought to firmly link the existing theoretical and empirical literature and 
the results of the European corporate capital structure research up to this point to the 
hypotheses to be tested by means of the specification and estimation of bivariate ADL 
and EC models. It is argued that the tax advantage to debt is likely to be very much 
less than that proposed by the MIM (1963) model, due to the influence of personal 
taxes, the tax system in place, and the structure of tax rates. Such factors produce a 
reduced nominal tax advantage to debt for firms, which is then further reduced to the 
effective tax advantage to debt by the influence of factors such as tax exhaustion. In 
addition to the differential between the nominal tax advantage to debt proposed in the 
MM model and the effective tax advantage to debt, there are numerous other factors 
which cause a breakdown between corporate gearing and such tax benefit measures, 
the most important of which are considered in the hypothesis sections to follow. To 
test the relationship between the capital structure and the reduced nominal taxation 
measures, the tax advantage to debt and the corporate tax rate, ADL models are 
specified. Additionally, an EC model is also specified to test the relationship between 
gearing and the nominal corporate tax rate. To test the relationship between the capital 
structure and the effective taxation measures, the corporate tax ratio and the total tax 
ratio, ADL models are specified, in addition to an EC model for the total tax ratio. 
7.3.4 The macroeconomic h1potheses to be tested 
7.3.4.1 Introdyetion 
It is useful to re-examine the theoretical and empirical literature underpinning the 
macroeconomic hypotheses to explain how such hypotheses are to be tested in the 
bivariate time series models. The macroeconomic hypotheses to be tested are those 
related to the bivariate relationship between corporate gearing and inflation, financial 
market performance factors, and aggregate growth factors. Each of these relationships 
is explored with respect to its theoretical and empirical underpinning, to enable the 
respective hypotheses to be developed and, moreover, to enable the resulting 
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econometric models to be specified in such a manner that they correctly reflect the 
underlying theory. 
7- test the relationship between corporate gearing and 
inflation 
Reconsideration of the underlying literature leads to three possible causes of a positive 
relationship between corporate gearing and inflation. The first cause is that proposed 
by authors such as Corcoran (1977), who argued that the relationship depends on the 
extent to which inflation and interest rates rise together. If they rise equally then the 
real cost of debt finance will fall approximately by the amount of the increased real tax 
deductions. Therefore, a positive relationship arises because higher inflation causes 
higher interest rates and thus higher tax-deductions on corporate debt interest. The 
second cause is that proposed by authors such as Franks and Broyles (1979), who 
argued that the relationship between corporate gearing and inflation depends very 
much on the extent to which expectations are reflected in interest rates. If inflation 
exceeds that expected then firms will gain at the expense of investors and if inflation is 
less than expected then investors will gain at the expense of firms. If inflation exceeds 
expectations then the firm gains as it is essentially repaying "cheaper" pounds to 
investors whilst not compensating them fully through adequate interest rate increases. 
In this perspective, a positive relationship can only exist in the long-run if investors 
may be consistently fooled with respect to interest rate expectations. There are, 
however, two reasons why this is unrealistic. Firstly, investors are usually assumed to 
be rational economic agents who may not be fooled consistently through time - 
eventually they learn from their mistakes. Secondly, investors in a number of European 
countries are predominantly institutions, which are surely not naive enough to be 
fooled consistently. Both of these reasons depend upon whether rational expectations 
are believed to drive financial markets. Therefore, whilst both firms and investors are 
making "inflation bets", only if the former tend to "win" more often than the latter is 
there going to be a positive relationship between corporate gearing and inflation. The 
360 
third cause of a positive relationship is that proposed by authors such as DeAngelo and 
Masulis (1980) who argued that inflation decreases the real value of investment 
allowances thus reducing the "crowding out" of debt tax-deductions and encouraging 
extra gearing. Therefore, a positive relationship between inflation and geafing afises 
through the influence of inflation and non-debt tax allowances. 
Whilst there are many other papers which suggest other causes of a relationship, such 
as the papers of Zwick (1977) and Modigliani (1982), such papers tend to present 
variants of the three causes discussed and even then they predominantly propose a 
positive relationship. However, one exception is a paper by Schall (1984) who 
proposed a negative relationship because, in inflationary conditions, investors sell debt 
in exchange for equity because the real after-tax return on equity becomes relatively 
higher than the return on debt, while the net return on both declines. However, Kim 
and Wu (1988) explained this apparently conflicting argument by suggesting that 
inflation decreases the demand for debt if the debt yield becomes relatively lower than 
the equity yield, but the supply of debt will increase if the tax-deductibility effect 
related to debt exceeds the tax-deductibility effect related to inflation. 
Thus, there exists overwhelming theoretical underpinning for a positive relationship 
between corporate gearing and inflation. The empirical evidence of Zwick (1977), 
Corcoran (1977), Holland and Myers (1977), Rudolph (1978), and Kim and Wu 
(1988) supports such a relationship, and thus the hypothesis to be tested must reflect 
the strong theoretical and empirical support for a positive relationship. If a positive 
relationship is identified in the econometric time series models to follow, it may not be 
clear whether such a relationship exists for reasons related to the first, second or third 
cause discussed above. However, the second cause discussed may be strongly 
questioned as the demand-side of lEuropean bond markets is dominated by institutional 
investors who are unlikely to be consistently fooled with respect to inflation 
expectations. Thus, any positive relationship must be the result of either the interest 
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rate effect (the first cause) or the reduction in crowding out effect (the third cause). 
Hypothesis HIO, then, states that the corporate debt-equity ratio increases with 
increases in the inflation rate. 
The ADL model is expected to exhibit a positive coefficient independent variable if 
hypothesis HIO holds, due to the interest rate effect or the reduction in crowding out 
effect. As the inflation variable (labelled INFLATE in the analysis) is extremely 
exogenous with respect to the DDE ratio, there is expected to be little evidence of a 
lag structure because the increased utilisation of any tax advantage to debt and the 
diminution of the crowding out effect of non-debt tax allowances will have immediate 
effects. As the equity component of the denominator of the DDE ratio is measured in 
market value terms., it may be expected that the coefficient of any relationship found is 
negatively biased, as an increase in the rate of inflation will reduce the DDE ratio to 
some extent merely due to the definition of the DDE ratio alone. However, if a positive 
relationship is still found to exist, given this bias effect, then this strengthens any 
support for the hypothesized relationship. The model seeks to determine whether there 
is any inflation influence on the operational (short-term) capital structure decision of 
the firm, or whether it is better expressed as a strategic influence. Therefore, the 
specific inflation ADL model is expected to be a partial adjustment model, exhibiting a 
positive coefficient independent variable and no lag structure. 
The construction and estimation of the inflation EC models seeks to determine whether 
inflation is a strategic influence on the corporate capital structure as well as being an 
operational influence. Again, the dynamic independent variable is expected to be 
Positive if hypothesis HIO holds. The inflation dynamic independent variable modelled 
in the EC models is the relative change in inflation, known as the pace of inflation. If 
hypothesis H37 holds, then the'model dynamic variables should not exhibit lag 
structures as there should be an immediate capital structure response to a change in the 
pace of inflation. Although inflation may appear as a dependent variable in models for 
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certain samples, the specification of such models is not discussed due to the causal 
inequality caused by the super-exogeneity of inflation with respect to the corporate 
capital structure. Therefore, the inflation EC models are expected to exhibit positive 
coefficient non-tagged independent variables for the pace of inflation and significant 
ECM's. 
Therefore, there are A number of differing theoretical reasons why there should be a 
positive relationship between the corporate capital structure and gearing, and it is clear 
that the existing empirical evidence supports such a positive relationship. However, the 
theory which suggests that firms can consistently transfer welfare from investors 
appears somewhat unrealistic in the European corporate capital structure perspective 
as investors are predominantly institutions, which are not easily "tricked" by firms. (It 
is noted, however, that the strength of this assertion depends on the theoretical stance 
taken by the economist, as institutional economists, for example, may dispute it. ) There 
thus remain two alternative theories which suggest a positive relationship which are 
termed the interest rate effect and the reduction in crowding out effect. The theories 
lead to the hypothesis, then, of a positive relationship between gearing and inflation 
which is to be examined by means of model construction and estimation. The 
estimation of the ADL models seeks to determine whether inflation exerts an 
operational influence on gearing whereas estimation of the EC model seeks to 
determine whether the pace of inflation seeks to exert a strategic influence on the firrds 
gearing decision. 
7o test the relationship between corporate gearing and 
-Aormance factors 
The capital structure chosen by the finance manager of the firm may not be set without 
careful consideration of the state of the financial markets from which new tranches of 
I debt and equity are raised. Thus , 
it is essential for the finance manager to gauge the 
strength of demand for new debt and equity claims on the firm before issuing the form 
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of financial instrument which is most appropriate. The state of equity markets may be 
measured by the stock market index whereas the state of debt markets may be 
measured by various interest rate measures. 
Many authors proposed that finance managers were more likely to issue equity when 
the stock market is performing strongly. Martin and Scott (1974) argued that equity 
issues are more likely when equity prices are buoyant and price-earnings ratios are thus 
high. King (1977) and Marsh (1982) argued that managers are more likely to issue 
equity after periods of strong equity market performance. Therefore, the authors 
suggest that positive signals of stock market performance are likely to encourage 
finance managers to issue new equity in preference to new debt. Martin and Scott 
(1974) and Marsh (1982) found evidence of this, although King (1977) found no such 
evidence. 
Therefore, the theoretical and empirical literature generally support a positive 
relationship between the proportion of equity in total external funds and the stock 
market index in a particular sample. Hypothesis H12 states that the corporate debt- 
equity ratio is negatively related to stock market performance. This negative 
relationship between gearing and the stock market index arises because equity appears 
in the denominator of the DDE ratio. 
In the ADL models, there should be a negative coefficient independent variable 
(labelled SMIND in the analysis) if hypothesis H12 holds. Although the stock market 
index (the independent variable) is extremely exogenous with respect to the DDE ratio, 
there may still be a lag structure present as the finance manager may wait until there is 
some evidence of sustained improvements in stock market performance before issuing 
new equity as he or she is unwilling to issue equity when its current price is depressed. 
The lag structure may thus be up to one or two years to satisfy the manager's 
confidence in a new issue. Therefore, the specific model for the stock market index 
is 
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expected to be an autoregressive distributed lag model, exhibiting negative coefficient 
independent variables. 
Theoretically, there should be a similarly strong correlation between the likelihood of 
the firm to issue debt and conditions in bond markets. indeed, Marsh (1982) argued 
that the level of debt issuance is related to the performance of bond markets such that 
managers are more likely to issue debt when interest rates are low or are expected to 
rise, finding evidence in his empirical study to support this proposition. The key 
implication of Marsh's theory for the empirics of this research is that the finance 
manager is more likely to increase gearing when interest rates are low. Although this 
interest rate effect is more important at the margin, it should be observed through time 
even though the effect may be diluted by the examination of stock rather than flow 
measures. Therefore, there should be a negative relationship between the DDE ratio 
and the interest rate measures. 
Hypothesis H13 states that the corporate debt-equity ratio increases as debt interest 
rates decrease. This relationship, however, gives rise to the following question: which 
particular interest rate measure should demonstrate a clear relationship with corporate 
gearing? Interest rate measures might be classified into three types: short-term, 
medium-term, and long-term rates. It is argued that the finance manager is more likely 
to adjust the long-term external funding stock measure, the DDE ratio, to longer-term 
interest rate measures because he or she will largely ignore fluctuations in interest 
rates, particularly those embodied in the short-term rate. Indeed, it would be 
prohibitively expensive to make adjustments to the DDE ratio as a result merely of 
short-term interest rate fluctuations. However, evidence of sustained lower interest 
rates should be signalled to the manager by reductions in medium-term and long-term 
rates, and thus it is these latter rates which may exhibit a negative relationship with the 
DDE ratio. 
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In the ADL models, there should thus be significant, negative coefficient independent 
variables in models which describe the bivariate capital structure relationship with the 
longer-term interest rates (labelled LRINT and LRINT in the analysis). Shorter-term 
interest rate measures (labelled SRINT) should form weaker estimated models. A 
potential problem inherent in the interest rate models is that the equity component in 
the denominator of the DDE ratio is measured in market value terms and may thus be 
highly correlated with the interest rate measures which are expressed in nominal terms. 
This means that any relationship found is negatively biased as an increase in the rate of 
inflation will reduce the DDE ratio and will increase nominal interest rates by definition 
alone. This bias effect may strengthen any negative relationship found and weaken any 
positive relationship found between the DDE ratio and the interest rate measures. The 
effect of this may be that the DDE ratio will appear to be related to certain interest rate 
variables even if the underlying relationship is poor, due merely to the effect of 
inflation. This effect highlights the need to qualify the results of such models carefully. 
The estimated models are therefore expected to be more significant for the longer-term 
interest rate independent variables, and should exhibit autoregressive distributed lag 
specifications. 
Although there may be a relationship found between corporate gearing and the longer- 
term interest rate measures, this may be merely a significant influence on the 
operational capital structure decision of the firm thus exerting little influence on the 
strategic determination of the DDE ratio. In order to test this statement, it is necessary 
to construct and estimate a bivariate error correction model for interest rate measures 
demonstrating a cointegrating relationship with the DDE ratio. The only relationship of 
this nature is that between the DDE ratio and medium-term interest rates (labelled 
NUUNT in the analysis). If hypothesis H13 holds, then, the EC model is expected to 
exhibit a negative coefficient dynamic independent variable. It is noted at this point that 
if a Positive coefficient is found then this may question the supply-side bias inherent in 
the hypothesis, that is, why should the market for debt be "driven" by firms? From the 
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perspective of the demand side, investors would only demand debt when interest rates 
are relatively high, or expected to decrease in the near future, which is the antithesis of 
the Marsh (1982) theorem. If hypothesis H37 holds, then the capital structure response 
to a change in interest rates is likely to be rapid, due to the super-exogeneity of interest 
rates with respect to the capital structure. The interest rate EC model should, then, 
exhibit a significant negative coefficient independent variable with no lag structure, in 
addition to a significant ECM. 
In summary, the theoretical and empirical literature suggests that corporate gearing is 
strongly related to the performance of financial markets. Equity issues are more likely 
when equity markets have been performing strongly and debt issues are more likely 
when interest rates are low or are expected to rise. ADL models are estimated to 
examine the relationship between gearing and the stock market index, whereas both 
ADL and EC models are estimated to examine the relationship between gearing and 
various interest rates. 
7.3.4.4 Rypotheses to test the relationship between corporate gearing and 
aggregate growth factors 
The aggregate growth factors (or macroeconomic activity factors) are introduced to 
the analysis to determine what effect the economic cycle has, if any, on the gearing of 
firms. The two factors to be discussed and then modelled are aggregate output and 
aggregate investment, and these are considered not in levels form, but in percentage 
change form. This enables examination of the relative growth or decline of output and 
investment in the economy as potential influences upon corporate gearing. 
The theory underpinning the relationship between corporate gearing and the growth 
factors is relatively underdeveloped as authors generally concentrate on the influence 
of other characteristics of the macroeconomy such as inflation and financial markets 
performance factors. However, Rudolph (1978) constructed a theoretical model of the 
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effect of the economic environment on balance sheet items, predicting that as an 
economy moves from recession to recovery firms should raise their gearing ratios. 
However, the empirical testing that he conducted did not support this theoretical - 
hypothesis. 
Although the finance literature questions any clear relationship between corporate 
gearing and the aggregate growth factors, there are some intuitive reasons why such 
relationships might exist, in addition to some preliminary evidence supporting their 
inclusion as potential determinants. The discussion of section 6.4 argued that firms 
should greatly increase their long-term debt financing towards the perceived end of a 
recession to finance investments, to cope with the increased demand associated with 
eventual recovery. At such a stage in a recession, debt financing may be preferred to 
equity financing as firms may be unwilling to issue equity when equity prices are 
depressed. Casual evidence presented in the data plots suggests that there is little 
observable relationship between the DDE ratio and the percentage change in output 
through time, although there is some evidence of a positive relationship between the 
percentage change in investment whereby an increase in investment precedes an 
increase in gearing by one or two years. It is inferred that firms may be investing their 
way out of recessions, financing through retentions initially, then through long-term 
debt as retentions become exhausted, Thus, it is apparent from this casual empiricism 
undertaken earlier that it is not so much the economic cycle as a whole which 
determines changes in corporate financing, but the timing of recovery-phase 
investments which determines such changes. 
The bivariate time series analyses seek to determine whether the results of the casual 
empirics are supported or questioned by more formal econometric modelling and 
testing. Hypothesis H39 states that the corporate debt-equity ratio increases with 
increases in aggregate output. Hypothesis H40 states that the corporate debt-equity 
ratio increases with increases in aggregate investment. 
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The ADL models to be estimated seek to determine whether aggregate output (labelled 
GDP or GNP in the analysis) or aggregate investment (labelled INVEST) are 
significant influences upon the operational capital structure decision of the firm. Both 
measures are expressed in percentage change forms in the analysis. It is argued that 
both aggregate growth factors should exhibit a positive relationship with corporate 
gearing if hypotheses H39 and H40 hold. If the recovery-phase investment concept is 
supported then the investment models estimated should be more significant than the 
output models estimated. As there is likely to be some lag between a recovery in 
aggregate investment or output and corporate gearing, whilst firms are depleting 
intemal funds, it is expected that a lag structure of one or two years may be present 
within each model. The specific models for the aggregate output and investment 
measures, then, are expected to be deadstart models (exhibiting no significant 
contemporary independent variable effects), with lag structures of one or two years, 
exhibiting positive coefficient independent variables. 
Therefore, aggregate output and investment measures are introduced to the time series 
analysis to gauge the sensitivity of corporate gearing to wider macroeconomic cycles. 
Hypotheses are developed mainly from intuitive macroeconomic theory and 
preliminary casual empirics, suggesting a positive relationship between corporate 
gearing and each measure. Such hypotheses are tested by means of ADL models to 
exanune the influence of such aggregate growth factors on the operational capital 
structure decision of the firm. 
7.3-4.5 Summa[y 
The objective of this section was to discuss the theoretical underpinning of potential 
relationships between corporate gearing and various macroeconomic factors. There 
may be a positive relationship between corporate gearing which does not rely on a 
"inflation tax" effect, as it may be caused by other factors such as an "interest rate 
effect,, or a "reduction in crowding out effect". Such a relationship is examined 
by 
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means of both ADL and EC models. Corporate gearing may be negatively related to 
stock market performance and negatively related to longer-term interest rates, due to 
the desire of finance managers to raise additional external finance when market 
conditions are favourable to the firm. To examine the former relationship, ADL models 
are estimated, whereas for the latter relationship both ADL and EC models are 
estimated for the purpose of determining the nature of the relationship as well as 
determining which interest rate measure is most correlated with corporate gearing. 
Due to the scarcity of literature, intuitive macroeconomic theory is discussed to 
examine any relationship between gearing and aggregate output and investment, 
respectively. It is anticipated that investment will be a stronger determinant of 
corporate gearing as the expansion of investment in the recovery phase of an economic 
cycle is likely to require funds exceeding the internal funds of the firm. Therefore, ADL 
models are constructed and estimated for the relationship between gearing and 
aggregate output and investment, respectively. 
7.3.5 The corporate factor hylRotheses to be tested 
7.3.5.1 Introduction 
The importance of the bivariate relationships between gearing and corporate-level 
factors lies in the firm-specific nature of such factors. The taxation and macroeconomic 
hypotheses are developed to examine the influence of external factors upon the 
corporate capital structure. However, there are likely to be influences upon gearing 
which are specific to each individual firm. For example, a firm with very low 
profitability is unlikely to adjust its capital structure towards an extreme gearing 
position as the future income streams of the firm are unlikely to cover the 
comnýitments associated with servicing the additional debt. Thus, the current 
accounting structure of the firm has a potentially important impact upon the firm's 
capital structure decisions. Indeed, without such firm-specific influences it might be 
argued that a unique optimal capital structure might not occur. Examination of the 
370 
corporate factors, then, enables the uniqueness of any optimal capital structure solution 
to be considered. 
Another important extension to the analysis afforded by the examination of corporate- 
level capital structure influences is the consideration of factors which may be 
endogenous with respect to the firm's capital structure. The taxation and 
macroeconomic factors examined up to this point have largely been super-exogenous. 
The endogeneity of some of the corporate-level factors means that they may be better 
considered in models where the DDE ratio is itself the determinant or independent 
variable. Thus, the DDE ratio may not only be determined by its environment, but may 
also radically influence that environment, at least at the corporate level. As the 
interaction of the capital structure with its environment may occur from either 
direction of causation, factors which are exogenous or endogenous with respect to the 
capital structure must be examined. However, it is noted that the ADL models to be 
specified and estimated solely to test hypotheses arising from the existing literature 
model corporate variables as independent variables because such literature does not 
consider corporate variables to be anything other than determinants of the DDE ratio. 
Thus, such models are estimated only where the DDE ratio is specified as the 
dependent variable. The EC models, however, do enable key corporate factor variables 
to be examined in bivariate models which are estimated for either direction of 
causation. 
The corporate level factors are divided into three groups: those factors related to the 
scale of the firm; those factors related to the ability of the firm to support new debt; 
and those factors related to the returns from the firm's projects. The underlying 
theoretical and empirical literature for each variable grouping is reconsidered to enable 
the hypotheses to be framed within the perspective of the existing literature. The 
hypotheses are then employed to develop the bivariate time series corporate capital 
structure models to be estimated. 
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firm 
scale factors 
Many authors agree that the scale of the firm has a significant influence on its capital 
structure decision, particularly at the margin. The scale factors which are to be 
modelled are firm size and firm growth, by means of ADL models and an EC model 
respectively. The theory and evidence underpinning a relationship between corporate 
gearing and firm size is discussed first, followed by that underpinning a relationship 
with firm growth. 
Although many authors agree that firm size is an important determinant of the 
corporate capital structure, they do not all agree on the precise nature of such a 
relationship. The majority of authors propose a positive relationship between gearing 
and firm size, for differing theoretical reasons. Martin and Scott (1974) and Marsh 
(1982) propose a positive relationship as they argue that larger firms have greater 
opportunities in financial markets than smaller firms, in particular lower debt flotation 
costs. Remmers et al (1974), Taub (1975), and Rajan and Zingales (1994) all argue 
that larger firms are less risky and thus have greater ability to support higher gearing 
than smaller firms due to their reduced probability of bankruptcy risk, greater 
diversification, and stronger assets base. All of the authors except Remmers at al found 
evidence to support the positive relationship, and even Rernmers et al accept that the 
reason they did not find such a relationship may be related to the fact that they only 
exannne the very largest firms in each of the populations they studied. 
However, Gupta (1969), Titman and Wessels (1988), and Remolona (1994) all 
propose a negative relationship between gearing and firm size, because, for example, it 
is argued that smaller firms are less likely to issue equity than debt at the margin as 
they are reluctant to lose further control to external equity holders. Whilst they found 
evidence to support this negative relationship in their empirical testing, they note that it 
is likely that the higher debt levels of smaller firms may be short-term rather than 
372 
longer-term debt. As the European corporate capital structure research seeks to focus 
on the long-term financing mix of the firm, evidence of a negative relationship between 
short-term debt and firm size does not weaken the positive relationship proposed 
between long-term gearing and firm size. 
Therefore, the larger the firm is, the more likely it is to have higher gearing levels due 
to the greater opportunities for larger firms in debt markets and their reduced risk. 
Hypothesis H18, then, states that the long-term corporate debt-equity ratio increases 
with firm size. 
The firm size ADL models are specified and estimated to determine whether firm size 
significantly influences the operational capital structure decision of the firm. The casual 
empirics of chapter 4 suggest that smaller firms have higher DDE ratios, whereas the 
static bivariate regression models of chapter 5 reveal a positive relationship in only a 
few of the countries modelled. However, in the ADL modelling, the purpose is to 
determine whether a positive relationship exists on an inter-temporal rather than a 
cross-sectional basis. If hypothesis H18 holds, the firm size independent variables 
(labelled ASSETS in the analysis) should exhibit positive coefficients. As the size of 
the firm is a cumulative variable, or a stock variable, it is expected that it will 
demonstrate a fairly immediate relationship with the DDE ratio. This is because firms 
do not in general become large-scale within a short period of time, but evolve over the 
longer-term. There should exist little evidence of an independent variable lag structure, 
then, because large firms today have generally been established as such for many years 
and thus finance managers and debt markets do not require a lag of a number of years 
before they orientate firms' capital structures to reflect firm size. Therefore, the firm 
size ADL models should exhibit positive coefficient independent variables and no 
significant lag structures, thus resulting in partial adjustment specifications. 
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Before the bivariate EC models of the relationship between corporate gearing and firm 
growth are specified, it is necessary to examine the theoretical and empifical literature 
underpinning such a relationship as firm growth is related to corporate gearing in a 
slightly different manner than firm size. Most authors propose a positive relationship 
between gearing and firm growth. Gupta (1969) argues that a positive relationship may 
exist as high growth firms desire the greater flexibility offered by debt, particularly the 
relative ease with which it may be liquidated when required. Toy et al (1974) and King 
(1977) argue that growth is a proxy for the need to finance externally, and in particular 
the need for debt finance. Martin and Scott (1974) argue that high growth firms are 
likely to be more willing to accept higher financial risk funding and thus higher geafing. 
The empifical evidence of these authors supports a positive relationship between 
gearing and firm growth. However, Titman and Wessels (1988) argue that equity- 
dominated firms are likely to attempt to invest sub-optimally to transfer wealth from 
debt holders, and that if such firms are high growth firms then this effect is stronger, 
meaning that such firms will employ less gearing through time. It is noted that they 
found no empirical evidence to support this argument. 
Therefore, there exists fairly strong theoretical and empirical underpinning to a positive 
relationship between corporate gearing and firm growth. Hypothesis H20, then, states 
that the corporate debt-equity ratio increases with the rate of firm growth. As the firm 
size variable (labelled ASSETS in the analysis) is expressed in its relative change form 
in the EC models to be estimated, the models examine the long-run relationship 
between gearing and firm growth, rather than firm size. The EC models are specified 
and estimated to determine primarily whether firm growth exerts a significant influence 
upon the strategic corporate capital structure decision of the firm. As it is questionable 
whether gearing is more exogenous than firm growth, or vice versa, it is necessary to 
estimate bivariate EC models from both directions of causation. If hypothesis H20 
holds, the model with the DDE ratio as dependent variable should exhibit a significant 
Positive coefficient independent variable. Such a relationship exists due to higher 
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growth firms requiring the greater flexibility afforded by debt, their need for additional 
external funds, and their willingness to accept higher risk financing during their growth 
phase. As there may be a lag between increased growth and the need for extra gearing 
whilst the firm exhausts its retentions, there may exist a short independent variable lag 
structure. 
For the opposite direction of causation, where the firm growth variable is expressed as 
the dependent variable, the theoretical underpinning is unclear due to the strong bias in 
the literature which predominantly expresses the DDE ratio as the dependent variable 
in any model. However, intuitively, gearing may exert an important influence on firm 
growth. It is argued above that higher growth firms are likely to seek additional 
external funds, particularly debt due to its flexibility and ease of liquidation. This may 
imply that debt is an "enabler" for higher growth and thus higher geared firms may find 
themselves better able to expand their operations more rapidly. Conversely, higher 
gearing also increases claims on the future income streams of firms, possibly displacing 
marginal future investment projects, thus suggesting a negative relationship between 
firm growth and corporate gearing. Therefore, the bivariate EC model may exhibit 
either a positive or a negative coefficient independent variable depending on whether 
increased gearing is beneficial or detrimental to long-term growth. 
The models discussed are to be estimated to determine whether the scale of the firm 
exerts a significant influence on either the operational or strategic capital structure 
decision of the firm. ADL models to determine the influence of firm size on corporate 
gearing are expected to exhibit positive coefficient independent variables as larger 
firms enjoy greater opportunities in debt markets and reduced risk, enabling them to 
employ higher gearing. The EC models to determine the relationship between 
corporate gearing and firm growth are complicated by the possibility of two-way 
causation. The long-run influence of firm growth on gearing is expected to be positive 
if higher growth firms need new external funds to expand further, are attracted by the 
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greater flexibility of debt, and are less risk-averse than smaller firms. The long-run 
influence of gearing on firm growth is unclear, as it may be argued that additional 
gearing may be either beneficial or detrimental to long-term growth. 
7.3.5.3 Hypotheses to test the relationship between corporate gearing and those 
factors describing the firm's abilily to support debt 
Although the taxation and macroeconomic environments within which the firm is 
positioned determine the firm's interactions with the financial markets and the direct 
costs of new external finance adjustments, the finance manager will not even consider 
approaching such markets if the firm cannot support the servicing of the new funds 
required. The servicing of debt is a legal commitment of the firm whereas the servicing 
of equity is a quasi-commitment as dividend payments are not mandatory. The risk of 
not being able to cover the commitments of debt servicing is perhaps better described 
as the risk of bankruptcy, along with the costs associated with such a risk. It is possible 
that these costs are of such a magnitude as to counterbalance any tax advantage to 
debt. Thus, bankruptcy risk is one of the most widely discussed causes of a breakdown 
in the relationship between corporate gearing and the tax advantage to debt. 
Authors who contribute to the argument that bankruptcy costs may counterbalance the 
tax advantage to debt to produce firm-level optimal capital structures include Robichek 
and Myers (1966), Baxter (1967), Hirschleifer (1970), Stiglitz (1972), Kraus and 
Litzenberger (1973), Scott (1976), and DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). However, other 
authors such as Stiglitz (1969), Miller (1977), and Haugen and Senbet (1978,1984) 
argue that the corporate capital structure remains irrelevant to the firm even when 
bankruptcy costs are accounted for, although they do employ some fairly restrictive 
assumptions to support this argument. Evidence from authors such as Van Home 
(1976), Baxter (1967), and Warner (1977), suggests, on balance, that the direct costs 
of corporate bankruptcy may be small, although the indirect costs may significant but 
extremely difficult to measure. It is clear, then, that most authors agree that bankruptcy 
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costs are capable of counterbalancing any tax advantage to debt, although evidence on 
the magnitude of such an offset is inconclusive. As the magnitude of the full costs of 
bankruptcy remains largely unknown, other authors have instead studied the influence - 
of bankruptcy risk on the corporate capital structure chosen by firms. Empirical studies 
by Stonehill et al (1975), Marsh (1982), and Mackie-Mason (1990) suggest that 
bankruptcy risk variables are significant determinants of corporate gearing. Thus, 
although bankruptcy costs may not be of the same magnitude as the tax advantage to 
debt, it is clear that they do in fact restrain finance managers from choosing the 
extreme gearing position apparently advocated by the MM (1963) model. Bankruptcy 
costs or bankruptcy risk, then, are capable of causing a breakdown in the relationship 
between corporate gearing and any tax advantage to debt. 
The literature demonstrates that it is extremely difficult to measure the costs of 
bankruptcy. Additionally, for the individual firm the risk of bankruptcy is a more 
important determinant of corporate gearing. Two measures of bankruptcy risk 
introduced are interest cover (labelled INTCOVER in the analysis) and dividend cover 
(labelled DIVCOVER). If the firm is in a position of financial distress, with a relatively 
high probability of eventual bankruptcy, then it is unlikely to be able to adequately 
cover either the interest payments on its debt (a debt-servicing commitment) or the 
dividend payments on its equity (an equity- servicing quasi-commitment). Therefore, 
when interest cover or dividend cover are low, the firm is in greater danger of 
defaulting on debt and beconýng bankrupt. Hypothesis H15 states that the degree of 
bankruptcy risk increases as the corporate debt-equity ratio increases. Although there 
may be a two-way causal relationship between the coverage ratios and gearing, the 
DDE ratio is imposed as the dependent variable in the AIDL models, although this 
assumption is relaxed in the EC models. 
I 
In the ADL models, where the DDE ratio is imposed as the dependent variable, there 
should be positive coefficient independent variables (fNTCOVER and DIVCOVER). 
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This is because an improvement in financial safety (a reduction in bankruptcy risk) 
should encourage the firm to increase its gearing. It is noted that this implies a negative 
relationship between bankruptcy risk and gearing, which conflicts with hypothesis H 15, 
but only because the opposite direction of causation from that discussed in the 
literature is to be tested in the ADL models. As there may be a delay before an 
improvement in the firm's financial safety is perceived by the finance manager to 
warrant an increase in gearing, the models may exhibit a lag structure for the 
independent variables. If, however, the ADL models are merely measuring a static 
relationship between gearing and coverage, such that increased gearing reduces the 
coverage ratios, then negative coefficient independent variables are expected. 
Therefore, the specific ADL models of the bivariate relationship between the DDE 
ratio and the coverage ratios (inverse bankruptcy risk measures) are expected to 
exhibit positive coefficient independent variables with lag structures of one or two 
years. 
The EC models express the DDE ratio as either the dependent variable or the 
independent variable in a bivariate relationship with the coverage ratio, dividend cover 
(labelled DIVCOVER in the analysis). The two-way causation arises from the fact that 
the DDE ratio and dividend cover are both internal accounting structure measures and 
thus one measure is unlikely to be more exogenous with respect to the other. The 
purpose of the model is to determine whether bankruptcy risk is a significant 
determinant of the strategic corporate capital structure decision, and conversely 
whether gearing greatly affects financial risk in the long-run. As in the ADL models to 
be estimated, hypothesis H 15 is not tested directly in the EC model with the DDE ratio 
as dependent variable as the hypothesis implies that the DDE ratio is the independent 
variable in a particular model. When the DDE ratio is expressed as the dependent 
variable, it is expected that an increase in financial safety encourages further gearing, 
implying a positive coefficient dynamic independent variable. 
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When the DDE ratio is expressed as the independent variable in the dividend cover EC 
model, hypothesis H 15 may be tested directly. If hypothesis H 15 holds, dividend cover 
(an inverse bankruptcy risk measure) should decrease as the DDE ratio increases, that 
is, the firm becomes riskier as gearing increases. Increased gearing in the firm's capital 
structure, then, brings with it extra debt-financing commitments which may reduce the 
probability of the firm being able to pay future dividends. The dynamic independent 
variable in the model should thus exhibit a negative coefficient. 
Therefore, models are to be estimated for the inverse bankruptcy risk proxies (interest 
cover and dividend cover) to test the proposition that increased financial safety leads to 
firms expanding their gearing, both on an operational and strategic capital structure 
decision-making basis, whereas increased gearing should feedback in the long-run to 
increase the financial risk of the firm (and reduce its coverage ratios). 
In addition to financial risk determining the firm's ability to support debt, and in turn 
impacting upon corporate gearing, the liquidity of the firm places a constraint on the 
ability of the firm to support new debt. A highly liquid firm will have no difficulty 
meeting debt-servicing commitments whereas a firm with low liquidity or a liquidity 
which fluctuates greatly through time may consider it prudent not to extend its gearing. 
Van Home (1974) argued that the greater the firm's projected liquidity posture, the 
greater is its debt capacity. Martin and Scott (1974) argue that firms with higher 
liquidity are more likely to issue debt rather than equity at the margin. Evidence from 
Martin and Scott (1974) and Stonehill et al (1975), however, questions the existence 
of any such relationship. Therefore, although firms with higher liquidity are intuitively 
more able to support increased gearing than firms with lower liquidity, the few 
empirical studies that have been undertaken provide little evidence to support this. 
Hypothesis H21, then, states that the corporate debt-equity ratio increases with the 
degree of liquidity. As liquidity is determined within the firm, there is likely to exist a 
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two-way causal relationship with respect to corporate gearing. A firm which 
experiences an improvement in liquidity also experiences an improvement in its debt 
capacity, which encourages that firm to increase its gearing. Conversely, a firm which 
increases its gearing is likely to experience a reduction in its liquidity due to the 
increased servicing commitments associated with the extra debt. Therefore, the nature 
of the relationship between gearing and liquidity depends upon the direction of 
causation considered. 
In the ADL models, however, the DDE ratio is imposed as the dependent variable to 
expressly test hypothesis H21 in a time series perspective. It is noted that a negative 
relationship is found in the bivariate regression models examined in chapter 5, although 
such models merely describe the static perspective. The logistic regression models, 
however, do produce some evidence of a positive relationship, as the perspective they 
describe is marginal and thus inter-temporal in nature. If hypothesis H21 holds, then, 
the liquidity independent variable of the models (labelled WCRATIO in the analysis) 
will exhibit a positive coefficient, demonstrating that an improvement in liquidity 
should lead to increased gearing. However, there may be a time lag between the 
improvement in the firm's liquidity and the increased gearing as finance managers may 
require evidence of a sustained improvement before adjusting the long-term capital 
structure mix. Therefore, the specific model for liquidity is expected to be an ADL 
model exhibiting a positive coefficient independent variable with a lag structure of one 
or two years. 
The EC models extend the study to examine the influence of liquidity upon the 
strategic, in addition to the operational, capital structure decision of the firm, whilst 
also enabling the potential two-way causation discussed to be modelled and thus better 
understood. The EC model with the DDE ratio as the dependent variable is expected 
to exhibit a positive coefficient dynamic independent variable if hypothesis H21 holds. 
Therefore 
, if 
improved liquidity leads to increased debt capacity, thus encouraging 
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increased gearing, then this should be reflected in the dynamics of the model. The EC 
model with the DDE ratio expressed as the independent variable is specified and 
estimated to determine whether increased gearing has a detrimental effect upon firm 
liquidity both in the short-run and the long-run. If such an effect occurs in the short- 
run then the gearing dynamic independent variable should exhibit a negative 
coefficient. 
Thus, liquidity may be considered a proxy for the debt capacity of the firm, and as such 
is an alternative measure to bankruptcy risk to gauge the ability of the firm to support 
increased debt. The influence of liquidity upon the operational and strategic capital 
structure decisions of the firm is examined by means of ADL and EC models whereas 
the detrimental feedback effect of increased gearing on future liquidity is examined by 
means of an EC model. 
Overall, firm coverage ratios and liquidity describe the ability of the firm to support 
increased debt, which the finance manager considers before even approaching the 
finance markets for new funds. Both types of measure describe factors which may 
counterbalance any tax advantage to debt in the real world and thus the short-term and 
long-term influence of such factors must be examined in ADL and EC models, in 
addition to the feedback effect of increased gearing on these important accounting 
structure measures. 
7.3-5.4 Hypotheses to test the relationship between corporate gearing and those 
factors related to the returns of the firm's projects 
The returns of the firm's projects influence the financing of its future investment 
projects in numerous ways. The firm that has a record of consistently high returns is 
likely to benefit from greater financing opportunities, although such higher returns also 
change the finance manager's preference for one type of claim on the firm's income 
streams over another. 
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Two measures are considered as factors related to the returns of the firm's projects 
which may impact upon the corporate capital structure decision. The first is the 
profitability of the firm, or the return on capital employed. The second is a q-ratio 
proxy, which measures the value of the firm over and above the replacement cost of its 
assets. Profitability is likely to exert a more direct influence upon the corporate capital 
structure because it is essentially another measure of the firm's ability to support new 
external funds. However, the q-ratio proxy essentially measures the firm's incentive to 
conduct additional investment, which impacts less directly upon its capital structure. 
Although most authors agree that profitability is likely to be a significant determinant 
of corporate gearing, there is some disagreement concerning the precise nature of such 
a relationship. Martin and Scott (1974) and Drury and Bougen (1980) argue that a 
positive relationship may exist between gearing and profitability because more 
profitable firms can obtain debt at a lower price and are able to support more fixed- 
interest debt than less profitable firms. However, authors such as Toy et al (1974), 
Martin and Scott (1974), Drury and Bougen (1980), Jensen (1986), Titman and 
Wessels (1988), and Rajan and Zingales (1994) argue that a negative relationship may 
exist as highly profitable firms rely more on retained earnings and thus demand less 
debt; lower profitability firms may find it extremely difficult to attract new equity funds 
and thus must engage in additional gearing; firms with higher equity returns will find it 
relatively easy to expand their equity base; and more profitable firms may wish to avoid 
the disciplinary role of debt, choosing additional equity finance instead. Therefore, 
there exists a theoretical underpinning to either a positive or negative relationship 
between corporate gearing and profitability. However, these conflicting arguments may 
be resolved by examining the empirical evidence which considers such a bivariate 
relationship. Toy et al (1974), Martin and Scott (1974), Drury and Bougen (1980), 
Marsh (1982), Titman and Wessel's (1988), and Rajan and Zingales (1994) consistently 
found evidence of a negative relationship between corporate gearing and firm 
profitability, 
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Therefore, whilst there are conflicting theoretical arguments underpinning the 
relationship between corporate gearing and profitability, the empirical evidence 
consistently supports a negative relationship. Furthermore, evidence from the bivariate 
and logistic regression models of chapter 5 supports a negative relationship. The time 
series models thus seek to determine whether the negative relationship found at the 
cross-section also holds on a longer-term inter-temporal basis. Hypothesis H22, then, 
states that the corporate debt-equity ratio increases as firm profitability decreases. 
Although the ADL models impose the DDE ratio as the dependent, there is likely to be 
a two-way causal relationship between gearing and profitability. An increase in 
corporate gearing might reduce future profitability by means of the greater demands 
placed on future income streams for debt servicing, leading to a negative relationship 
for the opposite direction of causation. 
The ADL models are estimated to determine the nature of the influence of profitability 
upon the operational capital structure decision of the firm. If hypothesis H22 holds, 
there should be a negative relationship between corporate gearing and profitability 
through time, as finance managers are likely to demand less debt and find it relatively 
easier to attract new equity funds when their profitability is high. Thus, the coefficient 
of the profitability independent variable (labelled ROCE) in the models should be 
negative. There may be a lag between an improvement in the firm's profitability and 
increased equity financing (reduced gearing) as finance managers may be wary of 
increasing the equity base unless the firm's improvement in fortunes is perceived to be 
sustained. The profitability model specification, then, should exhibit a negative 
coefficient independent variable with a lag structure of one or two years. 
The EC models are specified and estimated to determine whether profitability exerts an 
influence on the strategic capital structure decision of the firm, and vice versa, as well 
as determining the relative significance of the strategic influence compared to the 
operational influence of profitability on corporate gearing. 
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The EC model with the DDE ratio expressed as the dependent variable is expected to 
exhibit a negative coefficient dynamic independent variable if hypothesis H22 holds. 
The relative strength of the profitability model with the DDE ratio as dependent 
variable and the model with the DDE ratio as independent variable depends upon 
whether profitability is a stronger determinant of corporate gearing than gearing is a 
determinant of profitability. The EC model with the DDE ratio as the independent 
variable should also exhibit a negative coefficient dynamic independent variable if 
increased gearing exerts a detrimental effect on firm profitability. 
Therefore, the theoretical underpinning to the influence of profitability changes on 
gearing is unclear, although the empirical evidence strongly supports a negative 
relationship. The bivariate relationship is further complicated as it is likely that gearing 
changes also impact upon firm profitability through time. ADL and EC models are 
specified for the former hypothesized relationship, whereas an EC model only is 
specified for the latter relationship to enable the relative strengths of the two possible 
directions of causation to be examined and compared. 
The q-ratio proxy is a measure which approximates Tobin's q-ratio, given the data 
constraints of the European corporate capital structure research. Badrinath and Kini 
(1994) define Tobin's q as the ratio of the firm's market value to the replacement costs 
of its assets. If the q-ratio is greater than unity then financial wealth holders on the 
stock market are prepared to pay more for a claim to a unit of real capital than it costs 
the firm to buy and install it. However, Tobin (1969) argues that if the q-ratio is less 
than unity then there will be an increase in acquisition activity since assets can be 
acquired directly in the market. The key relationship hypothesized in the literature is 
that a positive relationship exists between the q-ratio and corporate investment. This 
relationship is supported by the theoretical developments of Tobin (1969), Summers 
(1981), Dornbusch and Fischer (1990), Backhouse (1991), Turner (1993), Badrinath 
and Kini (1994), and Bond and Meghir (1994). Firms will invest, then, as long as each 
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pound spent purchasing capital increases the market value of the firm by more than one 
pound. Although there is a theoretically strong underpinning to a positive relationship 
between the q-ratio and investment, there is no clear relationship between the q-ratio 
and the corporate capital structure. Why should increased demand for investment lead 
to a preference for one financial instrument over another, ceteris paribus? To address 
this question requires a somewhat lateral approach. As the q-ratio basically measures 
the value added by the firm over and above the cost of its assets, it may be argued that 
the q-ratio is merely another form of profitability ratio. Once this assumption is made, 
the propositions arising from the profitability literature discussed earlier in this section 
may be applied and thus a negative relationship should exist between the q-ratio and 
corporate gearing as firms with higher q-ratios are more profitable and have higher 
retentions, thus reducing their demand for extemal debt. Additionally, higher q-ratio 
finns should find it relatively easier to attract new equity funds than lower q-ratio firms 
due to the attraction of their high value-added potential. Hypothesis H41, then, states 
that the corporate debt-equity ratio increases as the q-ratio proxy decreases. 
An 
ru-., L models are specified and estimated to determine whether the q-ratio proxy exerts 
a significant impact upon the operational capital structure decision of the firm. If 
hypothesis H41 holds then the models should exhibit negative coefficient independent 
variables, such that firms experiencing an increase in their q-ratio (value-added) will 
find equity-financing relatively more attractive than debt-financing. Therefore, the 
bivariate q-ratio proxy specific model is expected to be an autoregressive distributed 
lag model, exhibiting negative coefficient independent variables. 
In summary, profitability changes cause changes in the external financial preferences of 
finance managers. It is proposed that firms which experience improvements in 
profitability are more likely to finAnce by means of new equity issues rather than debt 
issues, because of the relative ease for such firms of issuing new equity, the reduced 
reliance of highly profitable firms on gearing generally, and the desire of successful 
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firms to avoid the disciplinary role of debt. Negative relationships are thus expected 
between corporate gearing and the profitability ratio and the q-ratio proxy, 
respectively, which should compose the central elements of the ADL and EC models to 
be estimated. 
7.3.5.5 Summarv 
The objective of this section was to discuss the theoretical underpinning of potential 
relationships between corporate gearing and key corporate environment factors. 
Whereas the taxation and macroeconomic models developed are to be estimated to 
examine the exogenous influences on corporate gearing through time, the results of 
such models are unlikely to suggest firm-level optimal capital structure solutions. It is 
only through the development of corporate factor hypotheses that circumstances 
unique to the individual firm may be taken into account, albeit on an aggregated basis, 
to demonstrate how such unique capital structure solutions may result. The influence 
of the scale of the firm, its ability to support debt, and its profitability are all 
hypothesized to impact upon the capital structure decision, both at the operational and 
the strategic level. ADL models are specified from the hypotheses, expressing the DDE 
ratio as dependent variable only, whereas the EC models are generally specified such 
that two-way causation may be examined, as the endo-exogenous division of variables 
proposed for the taxation and macroeconomic variables discussed earlier does not 
apply to the corporate environment. 
7.3.6 A summary of the ob V-Potheses and jectives set for the bivariate time series h 
the resulting models 
The objective of this section was to set in place the hypotheses to be tested in the 
bivariate time series analyses and to employ these hypotheses as the basis for the 
models to be specified. The hypotheses are firmly underpinned by the theoretical and 
empirical literature reviewed in chapters 2 and 3, although such literature is 
reconsidered in this section within a time series rather than merely the static 
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perspective discussed to develop the earlier models. The salient results of the European 
corporate capital structure research are also briefly reviewed, wherever they aid the 
specification of the time series models. Therefore, the literature and empirical results 
arising from this research and the research of other authors underpins the hypotheses 
to be tested, and the hypotheses developed are then utilised to underpin the model 
specifications proposed. 
Whilst a wide range of detailed hypotheses are developed to examine specific bivariate 
capital structure relationships, their collective purpose is to examine the central 
hypothesis of the existence of firm-level optimal capital structure solutions. The 
hypothesis has already been examined from a static perspective which provides an 
insight into the year-to-year operational capital structure decisions of the firm. 
However, only evidence of a cointegrating relationship between corporate gearing and 
its determinants may be considered synonymous with full optimisation behaviour 
employed by the finance manager to make strategic capital structure decisions for the 
firm. 
The hypotheses to be tested in the bivariate time series analyses should provide 
clarification of whether a tax advantage to debt measure actually influences the gearing 
decision of the European firm. It may be that effective tax measures impinge upon this 
decision to a greater degree than nominal tax measures. Factors which may lead to a 
"breakdown" in a relationship between corporate gearing and the tax advantage to debt 
are examined by specifying and estimating bivariate capital structure models which 
consider the effect of macroeconomic and taxation variables. If such variables appear 
to be more important as determinants of corporate gearing than the taxation measures, 
then it may be implied that those variables are key causes of the breakdown effect. 
The taxation and macroeconomic hypotheses are tested to determine whether 
aggregate influences upon corporate gearing decisions are important. This may suggest 
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that optimal capital structures exist, but implies nothing about unique firm-level 
solutions. However, if the effective taxation measures prove to be key determinants of 
corporate gearing then this implies that the influence of taxation is firm-specific in 
nature, thus implying firm-level optimal solutions. If corporate-level measures are also 
found to be important influences then this more strongly suggests that optimal capital 
structure solutions exist for individual firms. 
If there is found to exist a great variety of influences upon the operational and strategic 
capital structure decisions of the firm, which derive from the taxation, macroeconomic 
and corporate environments, then this alone implies optimising behaviour. This is 
because the finance manager who adjusts the capital structure mix to a number of key 
influences through time is by definition engaging in at least weak-form optimising 
behaviour. Strong-form optimising behaviour additionally requires evidence of 
strategic capital structure decision-making behaviour, which, as discussed earlier, is 
synonymous with cointegrating capital structure relationships. 
Finally, the presence of significant two-way causal capital structure relationships, 
expected mainly in relation to the corporate environment factors, may suggest that 
whilst the corporate capital structure decision is a key part of the firm's planning 
strategy, the capital structure ratio is also monitored as a determinant of other strategic 
decisions. Indeed, it may be determined that the firm's capital structure decision is of 
marginal importance compared to other long-term strategic decisions to be made by 
the finance manager. 
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2.4 SummaEy 
The econometric methods employed in the bivariate time series analyses are briefly 
discussed in section 7.2 in relation to their application to the European corporate 
capital structure research. Unit root testing, cointegration testing and Granger causality 
testing are undertaken merely as preparatory stages towards the construction and 
estimation of bivariate autoregressive distributed lag models and error correction 
models. The methodological approach extends the testing of the central hypothesis to 
encompass not only short-run disequilibrium relationships but also those long-run 
equilibrating relationships which characterise the strategic determination of the 
European corporate capital structure. 
Section 7.3 reconsiders the theoretical and empirical underpinning of the hypotheses to 
be tested, within an inter-temporal perspective. The hypotheses are then employed as 
the basis for the specification of the bivariate econometric models to be estimated. 
General hypotheses are stated which derive from the underlying econometrics of the 
methods used, a recognition of the constraints of the data, and general financial 
economics concepts. Specific hypotheses are defined and developed from the existing 
theoretical and empirical literature as well as the developments of the European 
corporate capital structure research. Consideration is then given to the contribution of 
the collective set of hypotheses towards addressing the central hypothesis of the 
existence of firm-level optimal capital structure solutions. 
Chapter 8 presents the results of the bivariate time series analyses, comparing actual 
model coefficients and specifications with those hypothesized and anticipated. The 
models lead to a greater understanding of the operational and strategic capital 
structure policies of European firms, particularly where cointegrating relationships 
point towards full-optimising behaviour. It is expected that full-optimising capital 
structure behaviour is undertaken mainly in those larger firms which have the 
sophisticated information systems in place to facilitate such optimisation. The 
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examination of the bivariate capital structure relationships which govern the strategic 
policies of firms is then further extended to the multivariate perspective, by means of 
the Johansen multivariate EC modelling procedure. In order that the capital structure 
behaviour of smaller firms might also be examined in a comprehensive manner, the 
concept of intra-ratio targeting behaviour is introduced and tested empirically, as it 
represents a form of bounded, rather than full, optimisation. The salient results of the 
analyses are then to be summarised and brought together towards a final exarnination 
of the central hypothesis. 
390 
CHAPTER 8 
RESULTS OF THE BIVARIATE TIME SERIES ANALYSES, 
A MULTIVARIATE EXTENSION OF THE ANALYSIS, 
AND AN EXAMINATION OF BOUNDED OPTIMISATION BEHAVIOUR 
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8.1 Introduction 
The main objective of this chapter is to address the central hypothesis of the existence 
of firm-level optimal capital structure solutions. To achieve this objective, the , 
European capital structure research is extended and developed in a number of respects. 
Section 8.2 presents and discusses the results of the bivariate corporate capital 
structure time series analyses, following the detailed discussion concerning the 
methods employed and hypotheses to be tested in chapter 7. Section 8.3 extends the 
bivariate error correction modelling exercise to the multivariate perspective to enable a 
greater understanding of the interaction of the capital structure ratio with the 
environment within which it is determined. Section 8.4 describes a cointegration 
analysis to determine whether smaller European firms engage in a different form of 
capital structure setting behaviour from larger firms, referred to as intra-ratio capital 
structure targeting, which is a form of long-run bounded optimisation behaviour. 
Section 8.5 summarises the salient results of all of the time series analyses to address 
the central hypothesis and to determine the nature of the operational and strategic 
capital structure policies employed by firms to facilitate some degree of optimisation. 
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ivariate time series analyses 
8.2.1 Introduction 
The objective of this section is to describe and discuss the results of the bivariate time . 
series analyses. Firstly, the general results arising from the various analyses are 
discussed to provide a general perspective within which the more specific results are 
presented. Secondly, results which describe the relationship between the corporate 
DDE ratio and influencing factors from the taxation, macroeconomic and corporate 
environments are described. Finally, the salient results from the analyses are drawn 
together to determine how such results contribute towards addressing the central 
hypothesis of the existence of firm-level optimal capital structure solutions. The results 
should also enable the identification and consideration of the operational and strategic 
policies employed by firms to help them achieve an optimal capital structure solution, 
as well as identifying differences in the degree of optimisation across firms. 
8.2.2 General results arising from the bivariate corporate capital structure time 
series anal3: ses 
In this section, the general results arising from the unit root tests, cointegration. tests, 
Granger causality tests, ADL models and bivariate EC models are discussed in turn. 
The objective of the unit root testing was to determine the order of integration of each 
variable within the different samples which comprise the European time series data set. 
Appendix E gives the results of the deterministic trend tests, appendix F gives the 
results of the unit root tests, and tables 8.1 and 8.2 of this section summarise the 
results. 
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Ta 
Su ing-those variables integrated of the same order 
-plus-egui! j ratio for the different weii! hted and non-weii! hted 
country samples 
(figures in parentheses give the order of integration of the variable, and 'N' 
means that the variable may not be integrated) 
UK UK Netherlands Netherlands 
weighted non-weighted weighted non-weighted 
sample sample sam e s am e 
order of . 
integration of the 1(1) 
DDERATIO 
variables ASSETSchange ASSETSchange ASSETSchange ASSETSchange 
integrated of the CTAXRATIO CTAXRATIO CTRATE CTRATE 
same order as the CTRATE CTRATEchange INFLATEchange DIVCOVER 
DDERATIO DIVCOVER DIVCOVER INTCOVER INFLATEchange 
GDPchange GDPchange LRINTchange LRINTchange 
INCTAX INCTAX MRINTchange MRINTchange 
124FLATEchange INFLATEchange QRATIO QRATIO 
INTCOVER INTCOVER ROCE ROCE 
INVESTchange RTVESTchange SMIND SMIND 
LRINT LRINT SRINT SRINT 
MUNT NUUNT TAXRATIO TAXRATIO 
QRATIO QRATIO WCRATIO 
ROCE ROCE 
SNflND SNEND 
SRINT SRINT 
TAXADV TAXADV 
TAXRAnO TAXRATIO 
WCRATIO WCRATIO 
variables ASSETS(2) ASSETS(2) ASSETS(2) ASSETS(2) 
integrated of GDP (2) CTRATE (2) GDP (4) GDP (4) 
different order INVEST (2) GDP (2) GI)Pchange (3) GDPchange (3) 
from the INVEST (2) INFLATE (2) INFLATE (2) 
DDERATIO INVEST (3) INTCOVER (2) 
INVESTchange (2) INTCOVERchange(O) 
INVESTchch (0) INVEST (3) 
LRINT (2) , 
INVESTchange (2) 
MRR, Tr (2) INVESTchch (0) 
WCRATIO (2) LRINT (2) 
MRINT (2) 
order of INFLATE (3) INFLATE (3) DIVCOVER (0) GDPchch (1) 
integration of GDPchch (1) 
variables in unit WCRATIOchange(3) 
root test includi g 
a trend 
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Table 8.2 
iwing those variables integrated of the same order 
-I)Ius-eguity ratio for the different weighted and non-weii! hted 
Country samples (cont. ) 
(figures in parentheses give the order of integration of the variable, and IN' 
means that the variable may not be integrated) 
German German French French 
weighted non-weighted weighted non-weighted 
sample sample sample sample 
order of 
integration of the 1(l) 1(2) 1(2) 
DDERATIO 
variables ASSETSchange ASSETS CTAXRATIO DIVCOVER 
integrated of the DIVCOVER GNPchange CTRATEchange LRINT 
same order as INVESTchange INFLATEchange DIVCOVER NflUNT 
the DDERATIO LRINT MUNT INTCOVERchange ROCE 
NflUNTchange ROCE LRINTchange SNUND 
QRATIO NUZINTchange SRINT 
ROCEchange QRATIO TAXADV 
SNIIND ROCEchange 
SRINT SMINDchange 
WCRATIOchange SRINTchange 
TAXRATIO 
WCRATTOchange 
variables ASSETS(2) DIVCOVER (1) ASSETS(N) ASSETS(N) 
integrated of GNP (3) GNP (3) ASSETSchange (N) ASSETSchange (N) 
different order GNPchange (2) INFLATE (3) ASSETSchch (N) CTAXRATIO (1) 
from the GNPchch (0) INTCOVER (1) CTRATE (2) CTRATE (0) 
DDERATIO INFLATE (3) INVEST (3) GDP (N) GDP (N) 
INFLATEchange (2) INVESTchange (1) GDPchange (N) GDPchange (N) 
INFLATEchch (0) LRINT (1) GDPchch (N) GDPchch (N) 
INTCOVER (2) QRATIO (1) R*LATEchange (N) INFLATEchange (N) 
INVEST (3) SMIND (1) INFLATEchch (0) INFLATEchch (0) 
MRINT (2) SRINT (1) INVEST (N) INTCOVER (1) 
ROCE (2) TAXRA'110 (1) INVESTchange (N) INVEST (N) 
TAXRA1 10 ý2) WCRATIO (1) INVESTchch (0) INVESTchange (N) 
WCRATIO (2) LRINT (2) INVESTchch (0) 
MRINT (2) QRATIO (1) 
ROCE (2) TAXRATIO (1) 
SNUND (2) WCRATIO (N) 
SRINT (2) WCRATIOchange(N) 
TAXADV (2) 
TAXADVchange (0) 
WCRATIO (2) 
order of INTCOVERchange (0) INFLATE (N) INFLATE (N) 
integration of TAXRATIOchange (0) INTCOVER (N) 
variables in unit 
root test including 
a trend 
The results suggest that many of the variables are integrated of the same order as the 
capital structure ratio, and those which are integrated of a higher order tend to become 
integrated once they are expressed in relative change form. The DDE ratio is generally 
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integrated of order one, though is integrated of order two in the German and French 
non-weighted samples, perhaps because such non-weighted samples are characterised 
by short data time-spans and thus the DDE ratio may be exhibiting accelerating or even 
cycling behaviour through time. It appears that the data from the non-weighted 
samples are generally integrated of higher orders than the data from the weighted 
samples, which lends some support to the proposition that the latter samples give 
greater representation to larger, better diversified and longer established firms than the 
former samples, producing more stable accountingý ratios generally. In particular, larger 
firms are likely to make more frequent issues of debt or equity than smaller firms, thus 
enabling the DDE ratio to remain more stable through time. 
It is argued that the paucity of data time-spans impacts significantly upon the results 
such that, for the German and French samples, the short time-span analysed may 
represent merely a fluctuation in the long-run path of the DDE ratio which would 
become negligible if the longer run path could be tested. These results are consistent 
with the expectations discussed in section 7.3.2.1, resulting both from characteristics 
of the firms within the data set and from statistical phenomena related to data 
constraints. Those variables which are found to be integrated of the same order as the 
DDE ratio within each sample are then tested for the existence of a bivariate 
cointegrating relationship with the capital structure ratio. 
The objective of the cointegration testing was to identify those time series variables 
which exhibit a cointegrating or equilibrating long-run relationship with the DDE ratio. 
Appendix G presents the Mackinnon critical values employed in the cointegration 
testing, appendix H presents the deterministic trend tests of the error correction 
mechanisms of the long-run static equations, and appendix I gives the final 
cointegration test results. Table '8.3 summarises the salient results of the bivariate 
cointegration tests. 
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Table 8.3 
LuffflnDaa table exhibiting occurrences of cointegratin2 corporate capital 
sample cointegrating variable ADF test significant at lags: 
UK weighted INFLATEchange lag 
UK non-weighted INFLATEchange lag 0 
NL weighted INFLATEchange lag 0 
UK non-weighted MRINT lag 1 
UK weighted TAXRATIO lag 4* 
UK non-weighted CTRATEchange lag I 
UK weighted ROCE lag 0,1,4 *, 5 
BD weighted ROCEchange lag 0** 
UK weighted DIVCOVER lag 0,1 
BD weighted ASSETSchange lag 0** 
BD weighted WCRATIOchange lag 0** 
Durbin Watson statistic is in the grey area of the distribution. 
ADF tests include a trend in the computation, and the Durbin Watson statistic 
is in the grey area of the distribution, thus weakening the cointegration result 
Table 8.3 clearly shows that most incidences of cointegrating capital structure 
relationships occur within the weighted rather than the non-weighted samples. 
Therefore, hypothesis H3 5, which states that the weighted data samples are more likely 
to contain cointegrating relationships than the non-weighted samples, may be given 
some support by this casual observation result, although it is recognised that a formal 
statistical test of variation of the incidence of cointegration relationships between 
sample types is not undertaken in this research. The results thus highlight a behavioural 
dichotomy between the smaller and larger firms across the European countries tested, 
whereby the larger firm is more sophisticated and thus more rapidly responds to a 
capital structure ratio which is in disequilibrium with respect to its optimal long-run 
path than the smaller firm. Indeed, the smaller firm may not even realise that such a 
disequilibrium has occurred due to its relatively naive information systems, and thus a 
disequilibrium may be sustained, resulting in the absence of any significant 
COintegrating bivariate capital structure relationships with respect to key determinants. 
As smaller firms do not appear to engage in this long-run equilibrating behaviour with 
respect to key capital structure determinants, any strategic optimising behaviour must 
be based upon factors external to the taxation, macroeconomic, and corporate 
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environments of the firm. This may imply, indirectly, that smaller firms set their DDE 
ratios in relation to other stimuli, such as the capital structure norm for the industry to 
which such firms belong, the capital structure of larger firms, or some other stimulus. 
Section 8.4 develops this implication by examining the capital structure targeting 
behaviour of firms as a form of bounded-optimisation. If targeting behaviour, such as 
industry-norm targeting, is more common in smaller European firms, the probability of 
the smaller firm being in disequilibriurn through time is much higher than for the larger 
firm. Such a proposition is consistent with the cointegration testing results. 
The majority of the capital structure bivariate relationships do not exhibit cointegrating 
relationships, a result which is consistent with the expected behaviour discussed in 
section 7.3.2.3. Intuitively, the finance manager of the European firm is only capable of 
tracking a small number of key capital structure influences in the long-run, even if he 
or she incrementally corrects for a larger number of influences on a year-to-year basis. 
Therefore, the cointegrating relationships effectively set the boundaries within which 
the DDE ratio may be set. A cointegrating relationship in this context suggests that 
there is a desired long-run path which the DDE ratio should follow which is 
determined by the linear relationship between the DDE ratio and the variables which 
are cointegrated with it. Although only bivariate cointegrating relationships are 
discussed in this section, it is likely that the DDE ratio is more realistically determined 
by a multivariate linear function of the key explanatory factors. As the cointegrating 
relationship is a vector, the DDE ratio is bounded by and contributes to the linear 
bounding of the key capital structure influences. In an estimated linear regression 
model the dependent and independent variables are related by the independent variable 
coefficient and an intercept. The independent variable coefficient is important as it 
effectively determines a ratio between the two variables in a bivariate relationship when 
the intercept is insignificant.. The "'boundaries" discussed are thus ratios between the 
DDE ratio and each cointegrating factor which constrains its movement in n- 
dimensional space, where (n-1) is the number of variables which are cointegrated with 
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the DDE ratio. It is intuitive that the European firm only monitors a small set of key 
variables to establish its desired capital structure in the long-run, as to monitor a larger 
set of variables would require a far more complex trade-off of influences, many of 
which are conflicting. 
There is some evidence to support the expectation that samples with short data time- 
spans are less likely to produce cointegrating relationships. If longer data time-spans 
were available cointegrating relationships might be found. However, such a results may 
also plausibly arise from country-specific effects not identified in this research, 
producing less incidences of cointegrating relationships in certain country samples. 
This result serves to highlight limitations in the availability of data for European firms. 
Most of the variables of table 8.3 appear to be cointegrated in a Dickey-Fuller test with 
no lags, but are not cointegrated if lags are introduced. The reason for this is unclear, 
although it may be merely related to the degrees of freedom becoming significantly 
reduced as lags are introduced. Although the DF test does not account for 
autocorrelation, half of the non-lagged test results do not exhibit any autocorrelation 
anyway, at least on the basis of the DW statistic. However, some of the non-lagged 
test statistics suggest a potential autocorrelation problem, as the DW statistics are 
situated in the grey area of the distribution. It is noted though that the grey area does 
not enable any conclusion to be made regarding the presence of autocorrelation. Some 
of the lagged significant cointegration test results also exhibit inconclusive DW test 
results, and it is noted that the longer the lag length, the more probable that the DW 
test statistic appears in the grey area of the distribution. The reason why most of these 
inconclusive DW test results occur is merely the small number of degrees of freedom. 
For the German weighted sample results, the degrees of freedom are small owing to 
the paucity of the data time-span, and the longer-lagged test results suffer from 
reduced degrees of freedom merely owing to the length of the lag. When the degrees 
of freedom are small, the grey area is so wide as to capture most DW test results and 
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produce an inconclusive test result. However, perusal of the DW tests in appendix I 
reveals that even where inconclusive results occur, the computed statistic is towards 
the "acceptance" end of the grey distribution area. Thus, the small number of degrees 
of freedom render the DW test results more difficult to interpret, although it is 
probably the case that autocorrelation is not a significant problem in the majority of 
occurrences of cointegration. 
Therefore, the bivariate cointegration testing has identified those time series variables 
which exhibit a cointegrating or equilibrating relationship with the DDE ratio. 
Evidence of cointegrating capital structure relationships implies that firms within a 
sample are optimising their capital structure ratios with respect to key capital structure 
deterniinants. The results suggest the existence of a small firm / large firm behavioural 
dichotomy, such that it is mainly larger firms which undertake such optimisation with 
respect to key capital structure determinants. It is argued that smaller firms may not 
continually adjust their capital structures to changes in key determinants as their 
information systems are unable to signal that their capital structures are in 
disequilibrium. However, the paucity of sample time-spans does impact somewhat 
upon the results, highlighting the need to interpret them with some care and qualify 
them where appropriate. 
The objective of the Granger causality tests was to determine the direction of causation 
within a bivariate corporate capital structure relationship. The results of the tests are 
detailed in appendix J and are surnmarised in tables 8.4 and 8.5. Perusal of the tables 
reveals that hypothesis H36, which states that the corporate debt-equity ratio is best 
expressed as a dependent variable in any model containing significant time series 
capital structure variables, must be questioned. The reason for this is that most of the 
variables are subject to two-way causation with respect to the DDE ratio. Indeed, one- 
way causation with the DDE ratio as the dependent variable alone occurs only in the 
case of the bivariate relationship with the dividend cover variable. In the majority of 
400 
cases where only one-way causation occurs, the DDE ratio is actually best expressed 
as the independent variable. 
Table 8.4 
Summary of the Granger causality test results for the European corl2orate 
ta 
WEIGH TED SA MPLES N ON-WEIGHTED SAMPL ES 
variable UK NL BD FR general 
result 
UK NL BD FR general 
result 
general 
result 
across 
sample 
types 
ASSETS C D A ? C C B C C 
CTAXRATIO A C ? A A A 
CTRATE A B D ? A A A A 
DIVCOVER B A B B A C B ? B 
GDP/GNP C D C C D C C 
INCTAX A A A A A 
INFLA17E A B ? A A D A A 
INTCOVER A B A D A C C A 
IWEST A C ? A A A 
LRINT A D C D D A C B ? 
MRINT B D C D D A C D D D D 
QRATIO A B A C A A A A A 
ROCE A B A D A A A C D A A 
SNE[ND A B C D ? A A B A A 
SRINT D C A C C C A A A ? 
TAXADV A A A B ? A 
TAXRATIO A A A D A A C ? A 
WCRATIO A C D ? C C C 
Lru 
ICEY 
*= causation test results are listed under basic variable form where variable is 
expressed in a percentage change or further refined form. 
A= variables which exhibit two-way causation with respect to the DDE ratio. 
B= variables which "Granger-cause" the DDE ratio. 
C= variables "Granger-caused" by the DDE ratio. 
D= variables which are neither "Granger-caused" nor "Granger-cause" the DDE ratio. 
?= variables which produce mixed causation results across countries. 
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Ta 
A further summary of the results of table 8.4 
i) Variables which exhibit two-way causation with respect to the DDE ratio: 
corgýLrate variables: taxation variables: macro economic variables: 
INTCOVER CTAXRATIO CTRATE 
ROCE TAXADV INCTAX 
QRATIO TAXRATIO INFLATE 
INVEST 
SMIND 
I ii) Variables which "Granger-cause" the DDE ratio: 
ý corporate variables: 
DIVCOVER 
I iii) Variables are " Granger-caused " by the DDE ratio: 
corporate variables: macro economic variables: 
ASSETS GDP/GNP 
WCRATIO 
iv) Variables which are neither "Granger-caused" nor "Granger-cause" the DDE ratio: 
macro economic variables: 
MRINT 
I v) Variables which produce mixed causation results across countries: 
macro economic variables-, 
LRINT 
SRINT 
The majority of variables which exhibit two-way causation are either macroeconomic 
or taxation variables, with the majority of corporate variables exhibiting one-way 
causation. Two-way causation is intuitive in the case of corporate variables because it 
is clear that the DDE ratio has the power to influence such variables and also may be 
influenced by them in turn, as all are within the realms of the corporate environment 
and may be controlled by the finance manager of the individual firm. However, the 
frequent occurrence of two-way causation with respect to macroeconomic and 
taxation variables is counter intuitive due to "causation inequality". Clearly, there is no 
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theoretical support for the existence of two-way capital structure relationships with 
respect to super-exogenous variables. The concept of causation inequality, as defined 
in this research, states that causation may not flow from a localised variable to an - 
iggregate variable where the latter is determined by a vast multitude of different ;0 
influences. For example, the Granger causality tests suggest that the corporate tax rate 
is both a determinant of, and is determined by, the DDE ratio, whilst the former 
relationship is theory-consistent and intuitive, the latter relationship is extremely 
dubious because the corporate DDE ratio is likely to be only one of thousands of 
potential influences upon the level of the corporate tax rate budgeted by a particular 
government. The interest rate variables generally produce mixed causation tests results 
or suggest a lack of causal relationship at all with respect to the DDE ratio. However, 
even for the medium-term interest rate, which evidences no causal relationship with 
respect to the DDE ratio overall, there is some evidence of causal relationships in 
certain individual samples. The results for the interest rate measures serve to highlight 
the inconsistency of results for separate variables across samples. 
The apparent inconsistency of causation test results across samples weakens the 
authority of the results. It may be observed, for example, that the shorter the sample 
time-span gets, the more frequent "one-way causation" or "no causal relationship" test 
results become. Therefore, the paucity of the time series samples of this research 
probably biases the results of tests away from "two-way causation" towards "no causal 
relationship" results. If this argument is correct then it only serves to strengthen the 
overall result of the Granger causality exercise, thus supporting the occurrence of two- 
Way causation of European time series variables with respect to the DDE ratio. 
Therefore, there generally appears to exist two-way causal relationships between 
European time series variables and the corporate capital structure ratio. However, this 
result is weakened by the apparent two-way causal relationships observed between the 
DDE ratio and extremely exogenous taxation and macroeconomic variables. It is 
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argued, then, that whilst two-way causality is common within bivariate corporate 
capital structure relationships, the inconsistency of results across samples and the 
counter intuitive nature of two-way causation in capital structure relationships 
involving super-exogenous variables imply that the Granger procedure may be a fairly 
weak power test and thus the results of this section may not be given very much 
weighting in the European capital structure research. The apparent weakness of the 
test may arise, for example, from the limited number of lags employed in the test 
equations due to the constraints of the European time series data set. However, the 
results do serve to question the perception of the DDE ratio as being the dependent 
variable in any capital structure model. Furthermore, the possibility of two-way 
causation is allowed for in the bivariate and multivariate EC models, the results of 
which are presented in this chapter, to address more precisely the endo-exogenous 
division of the European time series variables. 
There are no general results of interest arising from the specification and estimation of 
the ADL models and thus the results of such models are better discussed in the 
following sections, which describe bivariate capital structure relationships with key 
taxation, macroeconomic and corporate determinants. The results of the ADL models 
are presented in the appendices. Appendix K presents the specific-form bivariate ADL 
models, appendix L briefly discusses the diagnostic statistic measures used to aid 
interpretation of the models, and appendix M gives the results of those diagnostic 
statistics for the ADL models. 
The objective of the bivariate EC analysis was to model and study the processes 
governing both the long-run and short-run capital structure policies of European firms 
simultaneously, thus enabling the relative importance of such processes to be 
determined. The results of the bivariate error correction models are presented in 
appendix N and in tables 8.6 to 8.8 of this section. Table 8.6 presents the test results 
404 
for cointegrating relationships with both the DDE ratio as dependent variable and as 
independent variable. 
Ta 
Summary table exhibiting occurrences of cointegrating corporate capital 
structure relationships 
sample dependent 
variable 
independent 
variable coefficient 
ADF test 
significant 
at lags: 
UK weighted DDERATIO INFLATEchange lag 0 
UK non-weighted DDERATIO INFLATEchange lag 0 
UK non-weighted INFLATEchange DDERATIO lag 0 
NL weighted DDERATIO INFLATEchange lag 0 
UK non-weighted DDERATIO NHUNT lag I 
UK weighted DDERATIO TAXRATIO lag 0 
UK non-weighted DDERATIO CTRATEchange lag I 
UK non-weighted CTRATEchange DDERATIO lag 0*, 1 
UK weighted DDERATIO ROCE lag 0,1,4**, 5** 
BD weighted DDERATIO ROCEchange lag 0*** 
BD weighted ROCEchange DDERATIO lag 0*** 
UK weighted DDERATIO DIVCOVER lag 0,1 
UK weighted DIVCOVER DDERATIO lag 0,1 
BD weighted DDERATIO ASSETSchange lag 0*** 
BD weighted ASSETSchange DDERATIO lag I 
BD weighted DDERATIO WCRATIOchange lag 0*** 
j 
I 
BD weighted 
I 
WCRATIOchange 
, 
DDERATIO lag 1** 
Durbin Watson statistic is rejected. 
Durbin Watson statistic is in the grey area of the distribution. 
DF/ADF tests include a trend in the computation, and the Durbin Watson 
statistic is in the grey area of the distribution. 
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Table 8.7 
els for the European data samples 
country dependent constant independent model 
sample variable variable R-squared 
(independent) coefficient 
UKW DDERATIO 0.21412 0.70630 0.22042 
(INFLATEchange) 
UKNW DDERATIO 0.13859 0.64530 0.491961 
INFLATEchange) 
UKNW INFLATEchange -0.057972 0.76238 0.491961 
(DDERATIO) 
NLW DDERATIO 0.30754 2.0868 0.440223 
(INFL TEchange) 
UKNW DDERATIO 0.050782 0.013094 0.409518 
RINT) 
UKW DDERATIO 0.16065 0.0028397 0.134816 
(TAXRATIO) 
UKNW DDERATIO 0.20138 0.55366 0.425762 
(CT TEchange) 
UKNW CTRATEchange -0.16003 0.76900 0.425762 
(DDERATIO) 
UKW DDERATIO 0.060648 0.014049 0.376678 
OCE) 
BDW DDERATIO 0.60611 0.23970 0.340274 
(ROCEchange) 
BDW ROCEchange -0.89475 1.4196 0.340274 
(DDERATIO) 
UKW DDERATIO 0.36808 -0.042004 0.235121 
(DIVCOVF, R) 
UKW DIVCOVER 3.6723 -5.5975 0.235121 
(D ERATIO) 
BDW DDERATIO 0.60062 -0.096793 0.0280993 
(ASS TSchange) 
BDW ASSETSchange 0.24449 -0.29030 0.0280993 
(DDERATIO) 
BDW DDERATIO 0.59488 0.35947 0.191196 
(WC TIOchange) I - - BDW WCRATIOchange -0.31921 0.53188 1196 0. F1 9 
1 1 (DDERATIO) 
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Table 8.8 
wwww-wý 
country 
- 
dependent constant Adependent Aindependent Aindependent ECM R2 
sample variable variable variable variable lagged 
] 
statistic/ (independent) lagged 1year lagged 1year 1 year 
(t-critical) 
UKW ADDERATIO 0.0012613 0.44556 -0-69126 0.309702 
(AINFLATEchange) (0,080) (1.123) (-2.995) (2-086) 
UKNW ADDERATIO -0.00078120 - 0.41880 - -0.70366 0.304899 
(AINFLATEchange) (-0.104) (2.020) (-2.877) (2.086) 
UKNW AINFLATEchange -0.00098014 - - 0,40567 -0.43457 0.482618 
(ADDERATIO) (1.981) (-2.002) (2.086) 
NLW ADDERATIO -0.0049003 - 2.2513 -1.1170 0.537516 
NFLATEchange) (-0.309) (1.879) (-3.383) (2.228) 
UKNW ADDERATIO -0.0065519 - 0.0055380 -0.43705 0.28601 
(AMRINT) (-1.080) (1.384) (-2.358) (2.13 1) 
UKW ADDERATIO 0.0030354 0.0033279 -0.56892 
_ 
0.317923 
(ATAXRATIO) (0.213) (1.324) 0.016) (2.074) 
UKNW ADDERATIO -0.00002797 - 0.15055 - -0.74672 0.540839 
(ACTRATEchange) (-0.005) (1.315) (4.240) (2.080) 
UKW ACTRATEchange 0.00096188 0.66186 0,80818 -0.48130 -I. G788 0.713947 
(ADDERATIO) (0.144) (3.343) (3.572) (-2.350) (-3.619) 2.1 1) 
UKW ADDERATIO 0.0025830 0.0098713 -0.71140 0.475559 ý 
(AROCE) (0.207) (2.1 1) (-3.407) (2.074) 
BDW ADDERATIO -0.040968 -0.84072 - -0.10841 -0.23819 0.841334 
(AROCEchange) (-6.122) (4.262) 0.290) (-1.528) (2.571) 
BDW AROCEchange -0.15972 -3.2231 -3.7448 -1.0975 0.830617 
(ADDERATIO) (-2.728) (-2.568) (-2.540) (4357) (2.447) 
1 
UKW ADDERATIO 0.0033290 -0.045336 -0.71437 0.363941 
(ADIVCOVER) (0.212) (-2.476) (-2.964) (2.093) 
UKW ADIVCOVER 0.046271 0.43578 -3.5892 -0.82956 0.611365 
(ADDERATIO) (0.353) (2.939) (-2.341) (4.508) (2.110) 
BDW ADDERATIO -0.028118 -0.52079 -0.052531 -0.17108 
0.78403 
(AASSETSchange) (4.113) (-2.909) (-1.806) (-1.634) (2.571) 
BDW AASSETSchange -0.10051 1.1451 - -2.6085 -2.5039 
0.903711 
- 
(ADDERATIO) (-2.597) (4.325) (-2.583) (-6.503) (2.571) 
BDW ADDERATIO -0.029614 -0.61858 0.11950 -0.080602 -0.11189 
0.90804 
_ _ 
(AWCRATIOchange) (-6.109) (4.774) (3.155) (-2.353) (-1.133) (2.776) 
BDW AWCRATIOchange 0.021240 0.63177 1.6924 -1.4774 0.830808 
(ADDERATIO) (0.953) (2.597) (2.006) (-4.235) (2.571) 
It is noted that the occurrence of a significant cointegrating relationship with the DDE 
ratio as dependent variable does not necessarily imply a significant cointegrating 
relationship with the DDE ratio as independent variable. The reason for this may 
merely lie in the weakness of the cointegration analysis method. For example, the 
critical values are simulated rather than being derived analytically. (Deadman and 
Charemza (1992), p. 13 2-13 3). Perhaps a better test of the significance of the residuals 
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from a bivariate static long-run equation is to include them in an error correction 
model, where the strength of the ECM Is gauged in relation to the other model 
components, particularly the dynamic processes. On balance, however,, it is more 
reassuring when both the error correction mechanism arising from the bivariate static 
long-run equation and the coefficient of the ECM in the EC model are found to be 
significant. 
It is noted that for the profitability static long-run equations, the profitability measure 
is expressed in its simple untransformed form for the UK weighted model whereas it is 
transformed to a relative change form if the German weighted models. This 
phenomenon warrants some explanation. The reason for the difference is that the 
untransformed profitability measure in the German weighted sample was found to be of 
a higher order of integration than the DDE ratio in the unit root testing of the previous 
chapter, thus necessitating its expression in relative change terms. The reason why the 
untransformed profitability measure was found to be of a higher order than the DDE 
ratio in the German but not the UK sample is unclear, but it may be a result of 
unexplained country-specific effects. Alterriatively, it may merely be the result of the 
relative paucity of the German data sample time-span, whereby there may be 
insufficient observations for the profitability measure to become integrated of the same 
order as the DDE ratio. Whatever the reason for this phenomenon, its occurrence 
weakens to some extent the results of the profitability models. 
Quick perusal of table 8.8 reveals that there is generally a more rapid capital structure 
response to changes in the exogenous macroeconomic and taxation variables than there 
is to the endogenously determined corporate environment variables. This result derives 
from the fact that models where endogenous variables are expressed as independents 
generally exhibit longer lag structures than models where exogenous variables are 
expressed as independents. Thus, there is some support for hypothesis H37, which 
states that the European firm responds rapidly to exogenous influence changes, 
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whereas there is a delayed response to changes in endogenous influences. The reason 
for this result may be that the firm is compelled to respond rapidly to changes in 
exogenous macroeconomic and taxation influence changes otherwise it will become 
rapidly disadvantaged with respect to its competitors by not correcting for any 
disequilibrium. However, the firm may not respond rapidly to endogenous variable 
changes because the finance manager may wait until changes in the internal accounting 
structure and environment of the firm appear to be sustained before adjusting the firm's 
capital structure. 
The lag length of the ADF test required to achieve stationarity is generally very similar 
whether the DDE ratio is expressed as the dependent or independent variable in a 
cointegrating relationship. The more exogenous the non-capital structure variable in 
each bivariate relationship, the less likely there is to be a significant cointegrating 
relationship when the exogenous variable is expressed as the dependent variable in the 
static long-run equation. This is particularly the case for the exogenous 
macroeconomic and taxation variables. Thus, hypothesis H38, which states that the 
greater the degree of exogeneity of a particular corporate capital structure influence, 
the more likely that variable is to be a determinant of, and not determined by, the DDE 
ratio, is strongly supported by the results of the "two-way" cointegration tests. Whilst 
the "degree of exogeneity" is not a statistic which may be measured on a statistical 
scale, in this context it is merely sufficient to be able to divide variables into those 
which are more exogenous and those which are less exogenous (or endogenously 
determined). Therefore, particularly with respect to macro economic factors, they are 
likely to exert a strong influence upon the DDE ratio, but it is counter intuitive to 
expect those variables to be themselves influenced by the DDE ratio. Furthermore, 
even where there is evidence of a cointegrating relationship with the exogenous 
variable expressed as the dependent variable in the DF / ADF cointegration tests, the 
estimated EC model may be seen to be relatively weak. 
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Therefore, the fact that the DDE ratio is cointegrated with a particular time series 
variable when the DDE ratio is expressed as the dependent variable does not 
necessarily imply a cointegrating relationship for the opposite direction of causation. 
Firms more rapidly adjust to a capital structure disequilibrium with respect to key 
exogenous vafiable changes, such as changes in the taxation and macroeconomic 
environments of the firm, than to endogenous corporate environment variable changes, 
possibly due to different perceptions concerning the permanency of such changes. 
Finally, the bivariate EC models clearly demonstrate that, the greater the degree of 
exogeneity of a time series variable, the more likely it is to be a determinant of, and not 
determined by, the corporate DDE ratio. 
In summary, this section has identified a number of general though important results 
arising from the bivariate time series analyses. Firstly, full optimisation behaviour, 
which involves the finance manager choosing a DDE ratio which is optimal in relation 
to key capital structure determinants in the long-run, appears to occur mainly for larger 
firms. Such behaviour is evidenced by bivariate cointegrating or equilibrating capital 
structure relationships. This implies that smaller firms must behave in a different 
manner as they do not generally engage in this bivariate equilibrating behaviour, which 
might be described as extra-ratio targeting behaviour (as finance managers appear to 
target key determinants external to the capital structure ratio). It is argued that smaller 
firms may concentrate instead upon targeting the level of their capital structure ratios 
upon the DDE ratios of larger firms, firms in their industry, or on the basis of some 
other criterion. This form of bounded optimisation, described as intra-ratio targeting, 
must therefore be examined farther, a task which is undertaken in section 8.4. Whilst 
differences in the sophistication of information systems are argued to cause such a 
behavioural dichotomy, the relative instability of time series data from the non- 
weighted (smaller firm) data sets May also form part of the cause. The corporate-level 
and capital structure variables of larger firms (which are given greater representation in 
the weighted samples) are likely to be more stable and exhibit less fluctuations than the 
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equivalent variables of smaller firms (given over-representation in the non-weighted 
samples). 
Secondly, it appears that two-way causation may be a fairly common occurrence in 
bivariate capital structure relationships. However, such causality results are 
inconsistent across samples, even suggesting two-way causation in capital structure 
relationships with taxation and macroeconomic variables, which is clearly counter 
intuitive. Thus, the Granger causality tests appear to be fairly weak in the 
detemunation of causality, possibly due to the constraints of the data set in this 
research, thus necessitating a further and more complex analysis of causality which is 
facilitated by the bivariate and multivariate EC models of this chapter. 
Thirdly, firms appear to adjust their capital structure ratios more rapidly to changes in 
dynamic exogenous variables than dynamic endogenous variables. The reason for this 
may be that finance managers believe exogenous variable changes to be more 
permanent than endogenous variable changes and they are less able to exert any 
influence over such changes, and are thus compelled to respond more rapidly to the 
former than the latter. 
Fourthly, the constraints of the European time series data set, particularly the paucity 
of the German and French data time-spans, appear to impinge somewhat upon the 
analytical results. For example, it is suggested that more incidences of cointegration 
nýight be determined if longer data time-spans were available. This result merely 
highlights the need to qualify the set of results somewhat at the interpretation stage. 
Finally, although some important results are drawn from the analyses, the most 
important results are discussed in'sections 8.2.3 to 8.2.5, which describe the bivariate 
relationship between the corporate DDE ratio and taxation, macroeconomic and 
corporate influencing variables. 
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nvironment capital structure models 
The discussion of hypotheses in chapter 7 argued that there may be a distinct tax 
advantage to corporate debt which impinges upon the capital structure decision of the , 
European firm, but that the tax advantage may be considerably less than that proposed 
by the NIM (1963) model, due to the influence of personal taxes, corporate tax 
exhaustion, the tax system in place, or the structure of tax rates. Furthermore, even 
where there remains a distinct and significant tax advantage to debt, there are likely to 
be many factors which can cause a breakdown in its relationship with actual corporate 
gearing, such as the stickiness of tax regimes, the naivety of tax advantage to debt 
measures, and the important influence of macroeconomic and corporate environment 
factors. The models estimated concentrate upon those factors which reduce the 
magnitude of any tax advantage to debt in the real world, by examining nominal and 
effective taxation measures and their relationship with the corporate DDE ratio. 
The hypotheses to be tested in the nominal taxation measure models are hypothesis 
H6, which states that the corporate debt-equity ratio increases as the tax advantage to 
debt increases, and hypothesis H8, which states that the corporate debt-equity ratio 
increases with the corporate tax rate. The nominal corporate tax rate is modelled as it 
not only represents an important aggregate taxation variable in its own right, but also 
proxies the tax advantage to debt measure. Intuitively, as the corporate tax rate 
increases, ceteris paribus, the tax advantage to debt should increase (or the tax 
disadvantage to debt should decrease). 
The ADL models estimated to examine the relationship between the computed nominal 
tax advantage to debt and the corporate DDE ratio are generally highly significant and 
exhibit positive coefficient low-lagged variables. The lag structures present merely 
Confirm the important influence of the tax advantage to debt as a stock concept rather 
than as merely a flow concept. Indeed, the stock of debt brings with it a stock of tax- 
deductions which benefit the firm in addition to the increases or decreases in that stock 
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as gearing is increased or decreased at the margin. As anticipated, there is some weak 
evidence of a scale influence on the relationship, whereby the smaller firms (over- 
represented in the non-weighted samples) exhibit more evidence of a significant 
positive relationship. Thus, a behavioural dichotomy is apparent, whereby smaller firms 
react more vigorously to changes in the nominal tax advantage to debt whereas the 
more sophisticated firms may wait until the effective tax advantage to debt changes 
before adjusting their capital structures. The models, then, generally conform to 
expectations, exhibiting positive coefficient independent variables ýnd some evidence 
of a behavioural dichotomy related to firm size. Hypothesis H6 is supported for the 
models estimated, and therefore there is some evidence that corporate gearing 
increases as the non-ýinal tax advantage to debt increases, particularly for smaller, less 
sophisticated European firms. 
The ADL models estimated to examine the relationship between the nominal 
corporate tax rate and the corporate DDE ratio are generally significant and exhibit 
positive coefficient independent variables. Such models are important as the nominal 
corporate tax rate proxies the tax advantage to debt measure. Indeed, for the Dutch 
samples, the tax advantage to debt is equal to the corporate tax rate as the Netherlands 
employs a classical tax system. It was argued in the hypothesis section that, as the 
nominal corporate tax rate represents a more direct and readily interpretable measure 
of the tax advantage to debt for firms generally, then the capital structure response 
should be more immediate than for the tax advantage to debt models. There is some 
weak evidence of this in the lag structure exhibited in the models. The Dutch models, 
however, fail the RESET test which suggests that the explanatory part of the models 
rnight be better expressed in a higher power, that is, implying a different model 
specification. Hypothesis H8 is supported and therefore there is some evidence that 
corporate gearing increases as the nominal corporate tax rate increases. 
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Therefore, by modelling two different nominal tax advantage to debt measures, it is 
clear that both larger and smaller firms react to increases in the magnitude of any tax 
advantage to debt by increasing their DDE ratios. This suggests that even if the tax 
advantage to debt is very much smaller than the MM (1963) model suggests, changes 
in that tax advantage do indeed impact upon the European corporate capital structure 
decision. However, so far this relationship has only been established as part of the 
year-to-year or operational capital structure policy of the firm. If the nominal tax 
advantage to debt, or some proxy for that measure, is to exert a significant influence 
upon the firm's strategic capital structure policy then there should be evidence of a 
bivariate cointegrating relationship between gearing and such measures. 
The results of the cointegration analysis suggest that the corporate DDE ratio is 
cointegrated with the nominal corporate tax rate (expressed in relative change form), 
but in the UK non-weighted sample only. This may signal the fact that whereas most 
European firms adjust their capital structures to changes in the nominal tax advantage 
to debt as part of an operational policy, such an ad ustment is generally not undertaken j 
as part of a strategic capital structure policy. Additionally, it may suggest that the 
corporate tax rate measure is more readily available and understood than the more 
Complex computed tax advantage to debt measure and thus the former may form a 
long-run equilibrating relationship whereas the latter may not. 
The bivariate EC models estimated to examine both the operational and strategic 
influence of the nominal corporate tax rate upon the corporate DDE ratio are exhibited 
in table 8.8 for both directions of causation. However, only the model with the DDE 
ratio as dependent variable is discussed because the model with the corporate tax rate 
measure expressed as dependent variable is counter intuitive. This is because any 
model with the tax rate measure expressed as the dependent variable is not 
underpinned by theory and is not logical due to the super-exogeneity of the tax rate 
measure with respect to the DDE ratio. It was argued in the hypothesis section of 
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chapter 7 that a long-run cointegrating relationship should be observed only for the 
smaller firm, given greater representation in the non-weighted samples. The model 
demonstrates that there is some support for this expectation and thus it may be argued 
that smaller firms are more likely to rely on the naive nominal tax measures than larger 
firms which monitor effective tax measures instead over the long-run. The reason for 
this may be that smaller firms do not have the information systems in place to enable 
them to accurately compute effective tax measures such as the effective corporate tax 
rate. The model with the DDE ratio expressed as dependent variable exhibits an 
insignificant positive coefficient dynamic independent variable, even though the error 
correction mechanism (ECM) is significantly negative. Hypothesis H8, then, is 
supported, but only to a weak extent for the dynamics of the model, even though the 
static long-run equation of table 8.7 exhibits a positive coefficient sign. Therefore, the 
long-run equilibrating relationship dominates any short-run dynamic relationship 
between the two variables, which implies that the influence of the corporate tax rate 
measure as a determinant of strategic capital structure policy is of far greater 
significance to the firm than its influence as a determinant of operational policy in the 
UK non-weighted sample. However, the model fails the RESET test, suggesting that 
the corporate tax rate variable should ideally be modelled within an alternative, 
unknown model specification. Therefore, the nominal corporate tax rate measure, 
which is a proxy for the tax advantage to debt, appears to be a significant strategic 
determinant of the DDE ratio. 
In summary, then, the nominal tax advantage to debt and the corporate tax rate proxy 
measure appear to be more appropriately considered significant determinants of the 
operational capital structure policy than the strategic policy of the European firm. 
However, there is some evidence of the corporate tax rate measure exerting an 
influence on the strategic capital 'structure policy of the firm, but only for one of the 
non-weighted samples. Firm size also appears to influence the short-run (operational) 
relationship between the DDE ratio and the corporate tax rate measure. Therefore, 
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firrn size impacts upon the operational and strategic capital structure policies of firms 
such that smaller firms appear more likely to monitor nominal "tax advantage to debt 
nieasures" than larger firms. It is argued that such firms do not have the information 
systems in place to correctly compute and monitor effective-form taxation influences, 
and thus rely more on the more readily available and understood nominal measures 
when adjusting their capital structures. Hypotheses H6 and H8 are supported, then, but 
the significant relationships determined represent, in the main, processes governing the 
operational capital structure policies of European firms. 
The taxation measures which should impact to a greater extent upon the capital 
structure policy of the firm are those measured in "effective" forms, that is, after real- 
world occurrences such as the offsetting effect of non-debt tax allowances are taken 
into account. As the effective tax advantage to debt is extremely complex to compute 
across samples, effective tax rates are instead modelled as proxy measures. The lower 
is the effective corporate tax rate to the firm, the lower will be any effective tax 
advantage to debt as factors such as tax exhaustion reduce the firm's tax bill and 
therefore crowd-out its ability to utilise the tax benefits associated with debt. The tax 
rate measures modelled are the effective corporate tax rate and the effective total tax 
rate. These measures also enable the interaction of the DDE ratio and the magnitude of 
the relative tax bill to be measured, thus enabling the importance of tax-reduction 
Policies to be gauged. 
As both measures may be considered proxies to the tax advantage to corporate debt, 
they are modelled to test hypothesis H8, which states that the corporate debt-equity 
ratio increases with the corporate tax rate. The other hypothesis to be tested, as 
discussed in the hypothesis section, is hypothesis H3 1, which states that the corporate 
debt-equity ratio increases as the ielative tax bill increases. An increase in the relative 
tax bill should encourage the firm to react by increasing gearing as part of a tax- 
reduction policy. 
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The ADL models exhibit varied levels of significance though generally exhibit positive 
coefficient signs. Therefore, there is some evidence to support hypotheses H8 and 
H3 1. Thus, a positive relationship may arise either because the measures modelled are 
proxies for the effective tax advantage to debt, and when effective tax rates increase, 
the value of debt interest tax-deductions increases, or because, when the relative tax 
bill of the firm increases, the finance manager is encouraged to increase gearing as part 
of a wider tax-reduction strategy. There is some evidence of a delayed capital structure 
response to changes in the effective taxation variables, a result which is argued to 
support the tax-reduction theory rather than the effective tax advantage to debt proxy 
theory. Therefore, as there is a delay between a relatively high tax bill and an increase 
in corporate gearing, this signals a "reactive" capital structure response. If the 
measures were better considered as tax advantage to debt proxies, a more immediate 
capital structure response would have been observed as there would be a proactive 
response to the taxation changes, such that the models would not exhibit the lag 
structures observed. As discussed in the hypothesis section, the delayed response is 
caused by firms taking time to assimilate the new information contained within the 
higher than average tax bill observation, a delay which may be compounded by the 
"lumpiness" of capital structure issues, whereby significant economies of issue costs 
cause firms to issue new claims on block rather than continuously. It is also noted that 
the relative corporate tax bill models are generally more significant than the relative 
total tax bill models, which may be due to the directness of the former compared to the 
latter, as firms can more readily observe and understand the relative corporate tax bill 
as it is merely the corporation tax bill as a proportion of profits whereas the total tax 
bill measures all of the taxation expenses that the firm owes. Furthermore, the firm may 
perceive a more direct link between a tax-reduction capital structure policy and its 
beneficial effect in the reduction of the corporation tax bill than the effect of such a 
Policy on the total tax bill. Perusal of the models across the samples also reveals quite 
clearly that the relative corporate tax bill models are more significant for the larger 
than the smaller firms. This is consistent with the argument that larger firms are more 
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sophisticated and are better able to assess the likely impact of factors such as corporate 
tax exhaustion which reduce the nominal taxation variables to arrive at the more 
realistic effective levels. However, the relative corporate tax bill model for the UK 
non-weighted sample fails the normality test, and thus further development of this 
model should involve the utilisation of a modelling technique which does not require 
the normality assumption. Therefore, there is some support for hypotheses H8 and 
H31, although it is argued that firms are acting in a manner which appears to provide 
more support for hypothesis H3 1. Firms appear to react to "higher than normal" tax 
bills by increasing gearing as part of a wider tax-reduction strategy. 
It appears, then, that the effective tax rate measures are better considered relative tax 
bill measures, as the European firm increases its gearing ratio in reaction to higher than 
normal tax bills. However, the above models only describe the influence of such 
effective taxation measures upon the operational capital structure policy of the firm. If 
such measures impact upon the strategic capital structure policy of the firm then there 
should be evidence of a cointegrating relationship between the DDE ratio and the 
effective taxation measures. Table 8.8 reveals that only the effective total tax rate (or 
total tax ratio) exhibits such a cointegrating relationship, and even then, only for the 
UK non-weighted sample. It is interesting to note that the effective corporate tax rate 
(or corporation tax ratio) does not appear to influence the strategic capital structure 
policy of the firm. One reason for this may be that a long-run tax-reduction strategy 
requires the monitoring of all incidences of taxation incurrence, and the minimisation of 
the corporation tax ratio is only part of this strategy. Therefore, the cointegrating 
relationship between the DDE ratio and the total tax ratio supports the argument that 
the level of the DDE ratio set by the finance manager is an integral part of the firm's 
wider tax-reduction strategy which is better measured by the total tax ratio than by the 
narrower corporation tax ratio. As part of its operational capital structure policy, the 
firm is more conscious of the effect of gearing on the corporation tax bill, whereas its 
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long-run strategic capital structure policy dictates the use of gearing adjustments as a 
component of a wider range of tax-minimisation policies. 
The total tax ratio (effective total tax rate) bivariate EC model is estimated to examine 
both the operational and strategic influence of the total tax ratio upon the corporate 
DDE ratio. The model supports hypothesis H31 as it exhibits a positive dynamic 
coefficient, even though the coefficient is insignificant. The reason for this may be that 
overall tax-reduction is a long-run strategic objective of the firm (exhibiting a positive 
coefficient in the static long-run equation), dominating any tax-reduction behaviour at 
the operational policy level for the sample evidencing such a cointegrating relationship. 
The fact that the significant EC model estimated is for the UK weighted sample only 
supports the argument, given in the hypothesis section, that only larger firms are likely 
to track the movement of the capital structure ratio in relation to the total tax ratio in 
the long-run, because such a tax-reduction strategy requires sophisticated information 
systems to enable the firm to choose an optimal mix of financial and investment tax 
allowances. 
Therefore, firms appear to respond to changes in the effective taxation measures in a 
manner consistent with the interpretation of those measures as tax ratio measures, such 
that as the tax ratio increases firms are encouraged to increase gearing as part of a tax- 
reduction policy. In the short-run the corporation tax ratio impacts more significantly 
upon the operational capital structure policy of the firm, exhibiting a short delay so that 
the finance manager can decide upon the magnitude of gearing response required. In 
the long-run, however, there is some evidence that the total tax ratio impacts upon the 
firm's strategic capital structure policy, as the level of gearing is set as a component of 
a wider-ranging tax-minimisation strategy. The effect of the scale of the firm is 
pronounced as the influence of the effective taxation measures is more significant to 
the operational and strategic capital structure policies of larger firms than it is for 
smaller firms. 
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In summary, the tax advantage to debt, and various proxies for that measure, are likely 
to be far smaller than the magnitude proposed in the MM (1963) paper. Country- 
specific factors such as the tax system and structure of tax rates employed reduce the 
nominal tax advantage to debt to a fraction of that proposed in the MM paper, a 
fraction which is then further reduced by the action of factors such as tax exhaustion to 
produce an effective tax advantage to debt. One of the key results of the bivariate time 
series taxation models is that the scale of the firm impacts significantly upon the 
interaction between the European corporate DDE ratio and the taxation environment. 
Indeed, both the operational and strategic capital structure policies of firms differ 
depending upon the size of the firm, due to differences in the complexity of 
information systems across firms. Smaller firms, which do not have complex 
information systems in place, are more likely to monitor nominal taxation measures, 
such as the nominal tax advantage to debt and the nominal corporate tax rate, before 
making a decision to adjust their capital structures. Larger firms, however, have in 
place the sophisticated information systems which enable them to compute and 
monitor the more realistic effective taxation measures, such as the effective total tax 
ratio and the effective corporation tax ratio, before adjusting their capital structures. 
This key result is consistent with the discussion in the hypotheses section of chapter 7. 
The second key result is that, with regard to the more realistic or accurate effective 
taxation measures, firms appear to act in a reactive rather than a proactive manner. 
This is because the estimated model lag structures suggest that there is a delayed 
capital structure response to changes in the effective taxation measures which implies 
that the finance manager does not act proactively by issuing debt immediately, as soon 
as its tax-deduction value increases, but he or she delays a gearing adjustment in 
reaction to a higher-than-normal relative tax bill whilst considering whether to make an 
adjustment to long-term funding. The third key result is that operational capital 
structure taxation policies are more common across samples than strategic capital 
structure taxation policies, probably because the information system requirements to 
Support the latter are far more demanding than those to support the former. Finally, it 
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is noted that taxation is a key influence of both the operational and strategic capital 
structure policies of European firms, and thus must make a significant contribution to 
the firm-level capital structure optimisation process. 
8.2.4 The macroeconomic environment capital structure models 
The macroeconomic environment capital structure models are estimated to enable the 
examination of the short-run and long-run processes governing the interaction between 
the corporate DDE ratio and inflation, financial market performance factors, and 
aggregate growth factors, respectively. 
The inflation ADL models estimated enable the effect of inflation upon the operational 
capital structure policy of the firm to be ascertained. Inflation is expressed as the 
relative change in the price index in the models. Most of the estimated models are 
significant and all exhibit positive independent variable coefficient signs, thus 
supporting hypothesis HIO, which states that the corporate debt-equity ratio increases 
with increases in the inflation rate. It is argued that such a positive relationship arises 
from either the interest rate effect or the non-debt tax allowance effect discussed in the 
hypothesis section. The interest rate effect, as discussed by Corcoran (1977), arises 
where an increase in inflation causes interest rates to rise, leading to higher debt 
interest tax deductions, which is likely to encourage higher gearing. The non-debt tax 
allowance effect, as discussed by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), arises where inflation 
decreases the real value of investment allowances, reducing the "crowding out" of debt 
tax deductions, and thus encouraging the finance manager to increase gearing. As these 
two explanations of the positive relationship are in no sense competing, it is likely that 
the relationship observed occurs as a result of both effects. The positive relationship 
found is arguably even stronger than that exhibited in the models given the "inflation 
bias" implicit in the DDE ratio measure which may arise because the equity component 
of the denominator of the DDE ratio is measured in market value terms, and thus it is 
expected that the coefficient of the inflation independent variables in the models is 
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negatively biased. The fact that all of the models exhibit a positive relationship 
suggests that the positive relationship is strong enough even to counteract this bias. 
However, the diagnostic tests show that the UK weighted model fails the normality 
test, although that particular model has no significant constituent variables anyway, and 
that the Dutch non-weighted model fails the RESET specification test, suggesting that 
the model might be respecified by expressing the right hand side in a different 
functional form. Therefore, inflation appears to be a strong determinant of the 
operational capital structure policy of the European firm. 
The bivariate EC models are then estimated to determine whether inflation is also a 
significant determinant of the strategic capital structure policy of the European firm. It 
appears that inflation exhibits the most common cointegrating relationship with respect 
to the DDE ratio of all the variables modelled in the bivariate time series analyses as 
this relationship appears in three of the eight samples modelled. As the static long-run 
equations of table 8.7 exhibit positive coefficient independent variables, hypothesis 
HIO is supported in the long-run as well as in the short-run and thus inflation is a very 
strong determinant of the strategic capital structure policy of the European firm. The 
EC models exhibit no lag structures for the dynamic independent variable, the pace of 
inflation, because inflation is a super-exogenous variable, as discussed in the ADL 
models. The ECM's of the models are all highly significant and dominate the model 
dynamics, implying that inflation is more important as a strategic influence of the DDE 
ratio than an operational influence in the samples evidencing cointegrating behaviour. 
However, the UK non-weighted model fails the normality and heteroscedasticity tests 
and therefore the normality requirement for the model disturbance is violated, the 
model estimators are inefficient and the standard errors of the model are biased 
(Wallace and Silver (1988), p. 262) for that sample. 
Overall, inflation impacts upon both the operational and strategic capital structure 
Policies of European firms, though the strategic influence dominates any operational 
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adjustments made in the samples which evidence cointegrating behaviour. There are a 
number of possible explanations for the positive relationship determined, although it 
appears most plausible that the relationship is caused partly by the interest rate effect 
discussed by authors such as Corcoran (1977) and partly by the non-debt tax 
allowance effect discussed by authors such as DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). 
"Expectations bets" theories, proposed by authors such as Franks and Broyles (1979) 
as an explanation for firms wanting to increase gearing during periods of higher 
inflation, cannot be argued to cause such a relationship because the European investors 
are predominantly institutions, which are unlikely to consistently lose such "bets" over 
the long-run, 
The financial market performance factors are modelled to determine the effect of the 
state of equity and debt markets upon the capital structure policy of the European firm. 
Such factors are important, it is argued, as the finance manager must consider the 
strength of demand for new debt and equity claims on the firm before ad usting the 
firds capital structure. 
The stock market index ADL models are estimated to determine the influence of stock 
market performance upon the operational capital structure policy of the firm. The 
models are generally highly significant and exhibit negative independent variable 
coefficients. Therefore, there is strong support for hypothesis H12, which states that 
the Corporate debt-equity ratio is negatively related to stock market performance. This 
result gives some support to the theories of authors such as Martin and Scott (1974), 
who suggest that managers are more likely to issue equity after periods of strong 
equity market performance. Although there is theoretically a positive relationship 
between stock market performance and the proportion of equity issued, because equity 
appears in the denominator of the DDE ratio, the stock market index exhibits a 
negative relationship with the capital structure ratio. There is some weak evidence of a 
lagged capital structure reaction to changes in stock market performance in some of 
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the samples. This is consistent with theories proposed by King (1977) and Marsh 
(1982), who argued that managers are more likely to issue equity after periods of 
sustgLtned strong equity market performance. However, a number of the models suffer 
from diagnostic test failures, although of these models, only the Dutch non-weighted 
estimated model results should be qualified, as the other models do not contain 
significant independent variable coefficients. The Dutch model fails both the ARCH 
test and the heteroscedasticity test, and thus appears to be fundamentally unsound as a 
model specification, even though it appears to be highly significant on the basis of 
other statistics. Therefore, some alternative, though unknown model specification is 
required to adequately capture the relationship between the DDE ratio and the stock 
market index measure for this particular sample. Stock market performance, then, is a 
very significant determinant of the operational capital structure policy of the European 
firm, as finance managers wait for evidence of a buoyant stock market before 
increasing the proportion of equity in the firm's capital structure. 
It is interesting to note that the stock market index is not cointegrated with the DDE 
ratio in any of the European samples analysed. Therefore, although stock market 
performance is an important determinant of operational capital structure policy, it does 
not impact upon the strategic or long-run determination of the European corporate 
capital structure. 
The interest rate ADL models are estimated to examine the influence of interest rates 
(an explicit cost of debt finance) on the operational capital structure policy of the firm. 
Approximately half of the interest rate models contain significant independent 
variables, which generally exhibit positive coefficients. Hypothesis H31 is thus 
rejected, as it states that the corporate debt-equity ratio increases as debt interest rates 
decrease, implying a negative coefticient. The positive coefficient found is strengthened 
further by the presence of the inflation bias which is likely to produce a negative bias in 
the independent variable coefficients. Thus, it is likely that the positive coefficients 
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found would be even more significant, if it were not for the inflation bias. The positive 
coefficients of the interest rate independent variables question Marsh's (1982) 
proposition that finance managers are more likely to increase debt in the firm's capital 
structure when interest rates are relatively low. Instead, it appears that managers may 
only significantly increase the supply of bonds to the market when the interest rates 
they offer on their debt claims are relatively high. This suggests that debt markets may 
be "demand-driven", such that investors appear to maintain a more powerful 
bargaining stance than debt-issuers, contradicting an implicit assumption of mahy 
capital structure theories which argue that financial markets are "supply-driven" (and 
are best examined from the corporate perspective). Additionally, it was anticipated in 
the hypothesis section that shorter-term interest rate measures should form weaker 
estimated models than longer-term measures. However, European firms appear to 
react equally significantly to changes in interest rates of any term length, and thus the 
finance manager does not necessarily appear to "match" long-term debt finance 
decisions to long-term interest rate movements, believing such rates to represent the 
long-term trend in rates with the shorter-term fluctuations smoothed out. The 
diagnostic tests confirm the models to be robust, as the only test failure is for the UK 
non-weighted short-term interest rate model, which fails the normality test. Therefore, 
contrary to expectations, the market for corporate debt appears to be "demand- 
driven", producing a positive relationship between the DDE ratio and the interest rate 
measures. There does not appear to be a more significant relationship between gearing 
and longer-term rates than shorter-term rates, at least at the level of the operational 
gearing decision, suggesting that debt markets are approximately perfect and thus the 
level of short-term interest rates implicitly conveys information about the level of 
expected medium-term and long-term interest rates. 
The only interest rate variable forming a significant cointegrating relationship with the 
DDE ratio is for the medium-term interest rate and, even then, only for the UK non- 
weighted sample. Neither the EC model nor the static long-run equation contains a 
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negative dynamic independent variable coefficient, again questioning hypothesis H13. 
Thus, the demand-driven nature of debt markets appears capable of exerting an 
important influence upon the strategic as well as the operational capital structure 
policy of the firm in certain samples. Hypothesis H37 is supported as the dynamic 
capital structure response to a change in interest rates (which are super-exogenous) is 
rapid, exhibiting no lag structure. However, the dynamic independent variable is not 
significant, whereas the ECM is, and thus the influence of interest rates on the 
operational capital structure policy of firms in the UK non-weighted sample is 
dominated by their influence on the strategic policy. The diagnostic tests reveal that the 
overall model F-ratio is marginally insignificant at the five per cent level, even though 
the ECM is significant. 
Overall, interest rates of all term-lengths impact upon the operational capital structure 
decision of the firm, whereas only medium-term rates alone impact upon the strategic 
capital structure decision in one of the samples modelled. The nature of the influence 
of interest rates contrasts markedly with the theory of authors such as Marsh (1982). 
as the market for debt appears to be essentially demand-driven. Even though corporate 
gearing is a long-term stock concept, there does not appear to be a more significant 
relationship between gearing and longer-term interest rates at the operational level, 
although such an effect may occur at the strategic level. 
Thus, the financial market performance factors, the stock market index and various 
interest rate measures, appear to significantly influence the operational capital structure 
policy of the firm. It appears that both equity and debt markets are demand-driven in 
the short-run, as finance managers may only significantly increase their equity financing 
when equity markets are buoyant and may only significantly increase their debt 
financing when debt interest ratesare relatively high. The stock market index exerts no 
influence on the strategic capital structure policy, whereas the medium-term interest 
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rate exerts a significant influence upon the strategic policy in one of the samples, again 
evidencing a demand-driven debt market orientation. 
Modelling of the aggregate growth factors, output and investment, is undertaken to 
determine the effect of the economic cycle on the operational capital structure policy 
of the European firm. In the ADL models, the aggregate investment and aggregate 
output independent variables are generally insignificant, although the majority of 
models exhibit positive coefficient signs. Therefore, there is only some very weak 
support for hypotheses H39 and H40, which state that the corporate debt-equity ratio 
increases with increases in aggregate output and aggregate investment, respectively. 
There is no evidence that investment models are more significant than the output 
models estimated, thus questioning the "recovery-phase investment concept", such that 
there is no evidence that the timing of recovery phase investments, rather than the 
position in the economic cycle as a whole, determines changes in corporate financing. 
However, there is some evidence of the lag structure anticipated, due to the lag 
between the recovery in investment or output and a corporate gearing adjustment, 
which may represent a time period during which firms are depleting internal funds 
before resorting to new external funding. The models for the UK samples, however, 
suffer from normality and heteroscedasticity test failures, and some of the other models 
also exhibit RESET test passes which are marginal, which may suggest that some 
unknown alternative model specification may be more consistent with any underlying 
relationships. Finally, there is no evidence of a cointegrating relationship between 
gearing and each aggregate variable across the samples studied, and thus no EC 
models are estimated. Therefore, aggregate output and investment are very weak 
determinants of the operational capital structure policy of the European firm, and there 
is no evidence to support the recovery-phase investment concept developed in the 
hypothesis section. 
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In summary, the macroeconomic environment capital structure models were estimated 
to examine the influence of key macroeconomic environment factors upon the 
operational and strategic capital structure policies of the European firm. Inflation is the 
most important macroeconomic influence on the firm's capital structure policy as it 
impacts upon both the operational and at times the strategic capital structure policy 
either through the interest rate effect of authors such as Corcoran (1977) or through 
the non-debt tax allowance effect of authors such as DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). 
The financial market performance factors, the stock market index and various term- 
length interest rates, also appear to significantly influence the operational corporate 
capital structure policy, whereas medium-term interest rates alone influence the 
strategic policy in one of the samples modelled. There appears to be evidence that 
finance markets are essentially demand-driven, such that finance managers may only 
significantly increase the issue of new debt and equity claims if the returns to investors 
are relatively high. Finally, aggregate investment and output exhibit little influence on 
the operational capital structure policy of the firm, although there is weak evidence of 
a positive relationship between the corporate capital structure and such measures. 
Therefore, key macroeconomic variables exert a significant influence on the 
operational and strategic capital structure policies of European firms. 
8.2.5 The corporate environment capital structure models 
Models of the relationship between the firm's capital structure ratio and the corporate 
environment of the firm are of great importance to the understanding of capital 
structure policy because such models enable the uniqueness of any optimal capital 
structure solution to be considered, as the corporate factors are firm-specific in nature 
and thus are capable of giving rise to unique firm-level optimal capital structure 
solutions. Additionally, such models examine variables which are generally endogenous 
with respect to firm capital structure policy and thus are capable of forming two-way 
causal relationships with the DDE ratio, which affords an interesting extension to the 
capital structure research. The corporate environment variables are divided into three 
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groups: those factors related to the scale of the firm, those factors related to the ability 
of the firm to support new debt, and those factors related to the returns from the firm's 
projects. 
The corporate environment factors related to the scale of the firm are firm size and 
firm growth, which form, respectively, ADL models and EC models with respect to the 
corporate DDE ratio. 
The firm size ADL models do not generally exhibit significant independent variables, 
although such variables generally exhibit positive coefficients. Thus, there is some 
weak support for hypothesis H 18, which suggests that the larger the firm is, the more 
likely it is to have higher gearing levels due to the greater opportunities for larger firms 
in debt markets (Martin and Scott (1974) and Marsh (1982)) and the reduced risk of 
such larger firms (Remmers et al (1974), Taub (1975), and Rajan and Zingales (1994). 
The negative relationship proposed by authors such as Gupta (1969) is generally not 
observed, probably because the models only examine the relationship between gearing 
and long-term funding and do not consider short-term funding. There appears to be an 
immediate response of the DDE ratio to a change in firm size, as demonstrated by the 
model lag structures, which supports the proposition that funding lags might only 
occur if growth is rapid and unexpected, whereas firm growth is generally gradual and 
anticipated. Thus, the firm size ADL models generally conform to the partial 
adjustment specifications anticipated in the hypothesis section. Overall, it is clear that 
the scale of the firm exerts only a weak influence on the operational capital structure 
Policy of the firm, such that larger firms may exhibit higher gearing ratios through time. 
The firm growth EC models, which are estimated only for the German weighted 
sample, are complicated by the ýotential for a two-way causal relationship between 
growth and gearing. The firm growth EC model with the DDE ratio as dependent 
variable contains an insignificant negative lagged independent variable and an 
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insignificant ECM. Thus, growth is not an important influence upon the strategic 
capital structure policy of the firm and there is no support for hypothesis H20. The 
propositions of authors such as Gupta (1969), Toy et al (1974), King (1977), and 
Martin and Scott (1974) are therefore given no support, questioning their arguments 
that a positive relationship should exist due to growth firms requiring the greater 
flexibility afforded by debt, their need for additional external funds, and their 
willingness to accept higher risk financing during their growth phase. The weakness of 
the overall model may merely question the concept of a pecking order for corporate 
finance, as there appears to be no strong preference for one form of external finance 
over another as the firm grows. 
The firm growth EC model with the DDE ratio expressed as the independent variable 
is far stronger, exhibiting a significant negative lagged dynamic independent variable 
and a significant ECM. The negative sign of the dynatnic independent variable 
coefficient and the static long-run equation suggests that increased debt may be 
detrimental to growth in the long-term, due, for example, to the fact that it may 
displace marginal future investment projects as it increases claims on the future income 
streams of firms. Alternatively, such a negative relationship may suggest that the more 
restrictive debt covenants associated with higher gearing might constrain the firm's 
activities, thus imposing a significant agency cost on the firm, thereby reducing its 
profitability and its growth potential. However, the static long-run equation, given in 
table 8.7, is extremely weak, questioning the overall robustness of the EC model. 
Therefore, although gearing appears to impact more significantly upon growth than the 
converse in the longer-run, both causal relationships are relatively weak. 
Overall, the firm scale factors exert a fairly weak influence upon the operational and 
strategic capital structure policies of European firms. There is some weak evidence 
that larger firms may employ relatively more debt due to the greater financing 
OPPortunities and reduced risk associated with such firms. Firms undergoing more 
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rapid growth over the long-term do not appear to exhibit a clear preference for debt 
over equity, even though debt is argued to endow higher growth firms with greater 
flexibility than equity financing (Gupta, 1974), and Toy et al (1974) and many 
subsequent authors argued that higher growth firms are more willing to accept 
relatively higher risk funding. There thus appears to be no clear pecking order of 
external finance for growth firms. Finally, there is some limited evidence that debt may 
even be detrimental to European firm growth in the longer-run due to the mandatory 
servicing costs and agency costs with which debt is associated. 
The corporate environment factors which describe the firm's ability to support new 
debt may be divided into inverse bankruptcy risk factors (interest cover and dividend 
cover) and firm liquidity. Intuitively, when interest cover, dividend cover, and liquidity 
ratios are low, the firm should be constrained in its ability to support new debt, as new 
debt may greatly increase its probability of default and thus bankruptcy. 
The inverse bankruptcy risk factors modelled are interest cover and ýdividend cover, 
which basically describe the firm's ability to cover the servicing commitments to debt 
holders and dividend quasi-commitments to equity holders, respectively. Indeed, if 
such coverage ratios are low, the finance manager should not even consider 
approaching finance markets for new external funds. Most authors, as discussed below, 
agree that bankruptcy costs potentially counterbalance any tax advantage to debt, 
although some argue, on the basis of fairly restrictive sets of assumptions, that the 
capital structure remains irrelevant even after the incorporation of such costs into a 
capital structure theoietical model. Authors have found the direct costs of bankruptcy 
to be small, but argue that the indirect costs are likely to be large, although extremely 
difficult to measure. More directly related to the modelling exercise, authors have 
found empirical evidence that bankruptcy risk is a significant determinant of corporate 
gearing. 
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The ADL inverse bankruptcy models estimated, which model the DDE ratio upon 
interest cover and dividend cover, do not generally exhibit significant independent 
variables and evidence a mix of variable coefficients. Thus, the expectation of a 
positive coefficient is not supported by the models as it is found that an improvement 
in financial safety (a reduction in bankruptcy risk) does not clearly encourage the firm 
to increase its gearing. Hypothesis HI 5, which states that the degree of bankruptcy 
risk increases as the corporate debt-equity ratio increases, is not addressed in this 
instance, as this hypothesis addresses the opposite direction of causation from that 
represented in the ADL models. However, the models do suggest that there is little 
support in the European research for the conclusions of the empirics of Stonehill. et al 
(1975), Marsh (1982), and Mackie-Mason (1990), who found that bankruptcy risk 
variables are a significant determinant of corporate gearing. Thus, whilst there is 
considerable support for the concept that bankruptcy costs may counterbalance any tax 
advantage to debt (DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), and numerous other authors), 
bankruptcy risk does not appear to impact significantly on the operational capital 
structure policy of the firm. It may be that bankruptcy risk is better considered an 
influence upon the long-tenn or strategic corporate capital structure policy, a 
conjectural statement to be tested in the EC models to follow. There is only limited 
evidence of a delay between a change in the firm's financial safety and a subsequent 
adjustment to gearing, although the lack of evidence of a positive relationship confirms 
that there is no adjustment process anyway whereby managers wait for a sustained 
improvement in financial safety before increasing gearing. RESET specification test 
failure is common across the models estimated, suggesting that the model 
specifications may be erroneous, although the precise nature of a more representative 
alternative specification is unknown. It appears, then, that financial safety is not a key 
determinant of the operational capital structure policy of the European firm. 
EC models are estimated for the dividend cover variable for the UK weighted sample 
Only, as the interest cover variable is not cointegrated with corporate gearing in any of 
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the samples examined. There is evidence of a two-way, causal cointegrating 
relationship, such that changes in financial safety influence the gearing decision, which 
further cause changes in financial safety due to changes in debt-servicing conunitments. 
The EC model with the DDE ratio expressed as the dependent variable exhibits model 
component characteristics which are counter intuitive, at least on a prima facie basis, as 
both the static long-run model independent variable and the dynamic independent 
variable of the EC model exhibit negative coefficients. Such coefficients suggest, then, 
that a firm which experiences an improvement in financial safety, is likely to reduce its 
gearing, whereas it might be expected that a firm in such a situation would, intuitively, 
be in a better position to increase its gearing. One explanation for the negative 
coefficient, which draws upon intuitive information signalling theory, may be that 
investors who observe a firm which experiences an improvement in financial safety 
may purchase the firm's equity on terms more favourable to the firm as their investment 
is considered safer. However, this explanation is less robust than the theoretical case 
supporting a positive relationship. Thus, financial safety does appear to be a significant 
determinant of the strategic capital structure policy of the firm in one of the samples, 
although the precise nature of its influence in terms of underlying theory remains 
somewhat unclear. 
The EC model with the DDE ratio expressed as independent variable enables 
hypothesis H15 to be tested. The model exhibits a negative coefficient dynamic 
independent variable and a negative static long-run equation coefficient, and thus 
hypothesis H15 is supported. Therefore, an increase in corporate gearing reduces the 
financial safety (increases the financial risk) of the firm, due to the extra servicing 
commitments associated with the debt which may reduce the probability of the firm 
being able to cover future dividend payments. This evidence lends some indirect 
Support to the propositions of the authors such as Myers (1966), Baxter (1967), 
Hirshleifer (1970), Stiglitz (1972), Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Scott (1976) and 
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DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), who argued that bankruptcy risk may counterbalance 
any tax advantage to debt. 
As anticipated in the inference arising from the ADL model results, the inverse 
bankruptcy risk variables may be more of an influence on the strategic than the 
operational capital structure policy of the European firm in certain samples, although 
this result holds only for dividend cover and not interest cover. It is intuitive that risk- 
reduction is such an important aspect of firm policy that it is identified as a strategic 
influence upon the capital structure decision. 
Overall, then, bankruptcy risk (inverse financial safety) does not appear to be a 
significant influence on the operational capital structure policy of the firm. Whereas 
bankruptcy risk may impact significantly upon the strategic capital structure policy in 
certain samples, the theoretical underpinning of that impact is uncertain. More 
intuitively, the policy of increasing firm gearing may itself raise financial risk (reduces 
financial safety) in the long-run, due to the increased commitments associated with 
servicing such debt. It might be concluded that gearing is better ýconsidered a 
determinant of bankruptcy risk rather than the converse, even though two-way 
causation might be anticipated on the basis of theory. However, apart from the 
estimation of the EC capital structure models, the European corporate capital structure 
research does not explicitly consider the direction of causation where the DDE ratio is 
expressed as the independent variable in econometric models as the research seeks 
mainly to test and model the determinants of the DDE ratio. The purpose of this focus 
is to address the central hypothesis and the numerous supporting and subsidiary 
hypotheses which derive from the mainstream literature. 
The other corporate environment' factor which describes the firm's ability to support 
new debt is firm liquidity. A firm with low liquidity, exhibiting a low working capital 
ratio, may consider it prudent not to extend its gearing any further, otherwise it may 
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experience an increased probability of default as available liquid funds may not cover 
future debt-servicing commitments. 
The liquidity ADL models generally exhibit insignificant independent variables with 
negative coefficients. This suggests that firms which experience a deterioration in 
liquidity appear to subsequently increase gearing, which is of course counter to 
accounting prudence and intuition. Hypothesis H21 is questioned, although to a weak 
extent due to the general insignificance of models, thus questioning the propositions of 
authors such as Van Home (1974) and Martin and Scott (1974), who both argued that 
the greater the firm's liquidity posture is, the greater its debt capacity will be. As 
anticipated, there do appear to exist time lags of one or two years between a liquidity 
change and a gearing adjustment, although the theoretical underpinning of this unclear 
in the absence of the expected positive relationship. However, the UK models fail the 
normality diagnostic tests, which further questions any naive relationship between 
liquidity and the operational capital structure policy of the firm. One explanation for 
the lack of any clear relationship may be that because only quoted firms are analysed in 
the research, liquidity is unlikely to be a major issue in the capital structure policy of 
such firms as they are likely to be relatively stable, well-established and liquid 
compared to the population of UK firms as a whole. 
The EC models are estimated to determine whether liquidity is better considered a 
determinant of the strategic capital structure policy rather than the operational policy, 
as well as determining whether gearing exerts a long-run impact upon liquidity. The 
liquidity EC model with the DDE ratio expressed as dependent variable, which is 
estimated for the German weighted sample alone, is a poor model, exhibiting a positive 
coefficient dynamic variable, a positive coefficient static long-run equation independent 
variable, and an insignificant ECM. Thus, although the coefficients of the static and EC 
model support hypothesis H21, the model is not robust as the ECM is not significant 
and thus evidences no significant impact of liquidity upon the strategic corporate 
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capital structure policy. It may be that gearing is better considered a strategic influence 
upon liquidity rather than the converse. 
The liquidity EC model with the DDE ratio expressed as the independent variable, 
estimated for the German weighted sample, exhibits an insignificant positive dynamic 
independent variable, a positive static long-run equation independent variable 
coefficient, and a significant ECM. This suggests that increased gearing exerts an 
advantageous effect on firm liquidity in the long-run which at first glance is counter 
intuitive. However, it may be that a relative increase in debt enables the funding of 
relatively more investment projects than before, leading to an increase in future cash 
inflows and thus increased liquidity. 
Overall, the only clear relationship between gearing and liquidity suggests that 
increased gearing improves long-run liquidity, which, although intuitive, is a somewhat 
abstract conclusion when compared to the anticipated and more direct detrimental 
impact of increased gearing on liquidity. 
To summarise, the corporate environment factors modelled which describe the firm's 
ability to support new debt are inverse financial risk measures and a corporate liquidity 
measure. It appears that inverse financial risk does not exert a significant influence 
upon the operational or strategic capital structure policy of the firm, although there is 
some evidence that increasing corporate gearing raises financial risk (reduces financial 
safety) in the long-run. Thus, gearing is probably better considered a key determinant 
of long-run financial risk than the converse. Additionally, whereas liquidity appears to 
exert little impact upon either the operational or strategic capital structure policy of the 
firm, gearing itself exerts a positive impact upon liquidity in the long-run in one of the 
samples, possibly because it enables relatively more investment projects to be funded, 
leading to increased future cash inflows and thus increased liquidity. Therefore, there is 
some evidence that gearing may exert a more important impact upon the ability of the 
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firm to support new debt than the converse, a result which questions the causal 
ofientation of analyses in the existing literature. 
The corporate environment factors related to the returns from the firm's projects are 
the profitability of the firm and a q-ratio proxy. The profitability measure is the return 
on the capital employed by the firm and the q-ratio proxy is a measure of the value of 
the firm over and above the replacement cost of its assets. 
The profitability ADL models generally exhibit positive coefficient independent 
variables, although only the minority of models are significant. Thus, hypothesis H22, 
which states that the corporate debt-equity ratio increases as firm profitability 
decreases, is questioned. This is a surprising result as the majority of theoretical studies 
and all of the empirical studies reviewed support a negative relationship. Thus, more 
profitable firms appear to be more likely to expand their debt rather than equity base 
and do not appear to be discouraged by the disciplinary role of debt, questioning the 
theoretical arguments of Toy et al (1974), Martin and Scott (1974), Drury and Bougen 
(1980), Jensen (1986), Titman and Wessels (1988), and Rajan and Zingales (1994), 
and the empirical evidence of these authors and that of Marsh (1982). However, the 
contrasting theoretical arguments given by Martin and Scott (1974) and Drury and 
Bougen (1980) suggest that the positive relationship may arise because more profitable 
firms can obtain debt at a lower price and are able to support more fixed-interest debt 
than less profitable firms. It is noted, however, that although most of the models 
suggest a positive relationship, three of the eight models exhibit negative coefficient 
independent variables and the models are generally insignificant. Thus, the models 
question, though not conclusively, a negative relationship between profitability and 
corporate gearing. There is evidence of a lag structure, as anticipated in the hypothesis 
section, although for different theoretical reasons from those suggested. Therefore, 
there is some evidence of a lag between an improvement in profitability and an increase 
in gearing, as the finance manager waits until evidence of a sustained improvement in 
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the firrn's debt capacity before the gearing adjustment is made. However, the UK non- 
weighted model fails the normality test, and the German weighted model fails the 
RESET model specification test, suggesting that an alternative estimation method is 
warranted for the former model and that the explanatory part of the latter model 
should be transformed into some unknown alternative model specification to render it 
more robust. Therefore, profitability exerts a fairly weak influence on the operational 
capital structure policy of the European firm, whereby an improvement in profitability 
increases the firm's debt capacity and encourages further gearing. 
The profitability EC models with the DDE ratio expressed as the dependent variable 
vary in their significance and the signs of model coefficients. The UK weighted sample 
model exhibits a significant ECM and dynamic variable, which may imply that it is 
more robust than the German weighted sample model, which has an insignificant ECM. 
Interestingly, although both models exhibit positive coefficients in their respective 
static long-run equations, only the UK model exhibits a positive coefficient dynamic 
independent variable. As the UK model exhibits a significant ECM, a positive long-run 
static equation independent variable which is consistent with the dynamic variable of 
the EC model, and it is estimated upon a much longer time-span data set than the 
German model, it should be given commensurately greater weighting in the inference 
arising from such models. The positive coefficients of the underlying static long-run 
equations suggest that improved profitability also encourages the firm to increase its 
gearing over the longer-term, again questioning hypothesis H22 and the associated 
theoretical and empirical literature. Although the UK model is far more significant than 
the German model, it does appear to fail the RESET test, which suggests that some 
unknown alternative specification may be preferable for this particular sample. 
Therefore, profitability appears to exert a positive influence upon corporate gearing in 
both the short-run and long-run, and thus represents an influence, although somewhat 
weak, upon both the operational and strategic capital structure policy of the European 
firm. 
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The profitability EC model with the DDE ratio expressed as independent variable, 
which is estimated for the German weighted sample alone, exhibits a significant 
negative dynamic independent variable coefficient and a significant ECM. However, 
the underlying static long-run model exhibits a positive independent variable 
coefficient, a result which is contrary to the expectations of the hypothesis section. The 
apparent conflict between the negative coefficient in the dynamics of the EC model and 
the positive long-run coefficient which underlies that model may be resolved by 
consideration of the different time frames described in the EC model. In the short-run, 
the firin may experience mainly the costs (and few of the benefits) of the new debt 
finance, thus producing a negative coefficient in the model dynamics. Over the longer- 
run, however, as the increase in gearing may facilitate a relative increase in the number 
of investment projects, such projects will begin to generate returns over and above the 
debt costs and raise profitability, thus producing a positive coefficient in the static 
long-run equation which underpins the ECM. However, it is noted that such a 
relationship is found only for one of the samples analysed. 
Overall, then, profitability appears to exert a fairly weak positive influence upon firm 
gearing in both the short-run and long-run, and thus contributes to the determination, 
to some limited extent, of the operational and strategic capital structure policy of the 
European firm. Thus, hypothesis H22 is questioned, in turn questioning the 
applicability of the underlying theory of a negative relationship proposed by Toy et al 
(1974) and subsequent authors to the European data set. Instead, it may be that more 
profitable firms can obtain debt at a lower price or exhibit a higher debt capacity than 
less profitable firms, supporting the propositions of Martin and Scott (1974) and Drury 
and Bougen (1980). The opposite direction of causation appears more robust in the 
longer-run, such that increased gearing facilitates faster growth whilst such an increase 
may reduce profitability in the short-run until the increased number of investment 
projects begin to generate returns. 
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The q-ratio proxy ADL models, only half of which are significant, generally exhibit 
negative independent variable coefficients. Thus, some support is provided for 
hypothesis H41, which states that the corporate debt-equity ratio increases as the q- 
ratio proxy decreases. The theoretical underpinning to such a relationship is essentially 
that which underpins the profitability hypothesis, H22, as it is argued in the hypothesis 
section that the q-ratio proxy may be considered another form of profitability ratio. 
Therefore, firms with higher q-ratio proxies are more profitable and thus are likely to 
exhibit higher retentions, reducing their demand for additional debt financing, and 
higher q-ratio proxy firms should find it easier to attract new equity finance than lower 
q-ratio proxy firms due to the attraction of their high value-added potential. Such a 
result thus supports the theoretical underpinning of a negative relationship by authors 
such as Toy et al (1974) through to Raj an and Zingales (1994). However, the UK non- 
weighted model fails the normality diagnostic test and the Dutch non-weighted model 
fails the RESET model specification test, which weakens the model inference to some 
extent. Therefore, the q-ratio proxy variable, which may be considered another form of 
profitability ratio, appears to be a determinant of the operational capital structure 
policy of the European firm. However, the results of EC models for the q-ratio proxy 
are not presented here, as this measure is not cointegrated with the DDE ratio in any of 
the samples and thus does not constitute a determinant of the strategic capital structure 
policy. 
Overall, in the short-run, both the profitability measures exert an influence upon the 
operational capital structure policy which is fairly weak, although the return on capital 
employed measure exerts a positive influence and the q-ratio proxy exerts a negative 
influence. Combined with the weakness of the models, then, the overall influence of 
profitability in the short-run is uncertain. An improvement in profitability may 
encourage gearing due to an improvement in the firm's debt capacity, although a more 
profitable firm may alternatively find it attractive to expand its equity base or may wish 
to avoid the disciplinary role of debt, and so on. As such relationships are seen to 
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conflict, the overall effect may be ambiguous, thus producing weak and conflicting 
models of short-run gearing determination. In the longer-run, however, gearing 
appears to exert an influence upon profitability which is stronger than the opposite 
direction of causation, such that increased gearing facilitates faster growth, although 
such a relationship is determined in only one of the samples modelled. 
In summary, the corporate environment factors appear far less important as 
determinants of corporate capital structure policy than the taxation and 
macroeconomic environment factors. The scale of the firm, whether considered in 
terms of firm size or firm growth, exerts little influence as a determinant of the level of 
gearing chosen by the firm, in terms of both operational and strategic policy. However, 
there is some limited evidence that debt may be detrimental to firm growth in the 
longer-term due to the increased mandatory servicing costs associated with increased 
gearing. The inverse financial risk variables examined do not generally appear to 
significantly influence the operational capital structure policy of the firm. However, 
inverse financial risk exerts a weak influence on the strategic capital structure policy, 
such that a firm which becomes less financially risky is likely to reduce its gearing ratio, 
although the theoretical underpinning of this is unclear. Conversely, there is some 
limited evidence that an increase in corporate gearing reduces the financial safety of the 
firm in the long-run, which is an intuitive result. The only clear relationship between 
liquidity and the corporate capital structure is that increased gearing improves long-run 
liquidity, although this result appears counter intuitive on a prima facie basis and holds 
in only one of the samples modelled. It is argued that increased gearing is generally 
used to significantly expand the number and increase the quality of investment projects, 
thus increasing future cash flows and liquidity. 
Profitability exerts only a weak influence upon capital structure policy, whereby an 
imProvement in profitability encourages the firm to increase its gearing in both the 
short-run and long-run, as more profitable firms may obtain debt at a lower price and 
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, nay exhibit a higher debt capacity than less profitable firms. Additionally, there is some 
evidence that increased gearing facilitates increased profitability in the long-run, which 
may be due to the fact that debt enables an expansion of the portfolio of the firm's 
investment projects. Finally, the q-ratio proxy, which is considered another form of 
profitability ratio, appears to be a determinant of the operational capital structure 
policy of the European firm such that firms with higher q-ratios are more profitable, 
make higher retentions, thus reducing their demand for additional debt financing, and 
also such firms should find it easier to attract new equity finance than lower q-ratio 
firms. 
Overall, then, the corporate environment factors generally exert a fairly weak influence 
upon either the operational or the strategic capital structure policies of the European 
firm. One reason for this may be that, as both the capital structure policies and the 
corporate environment factors are endogenous to the firm, the capital structure policy 
decision impacts more significantly upon the corporate factors than the converse. 
Thus, rather than there being "causal-neutrality" amongst those variables which the 
finance manager controls, there is some causal inequality such that the DDE ratio is 
better considered a determinant of, rather than being determined by, other corporate- 
level factors. This may be because the capital structure ratio is the result of cumulative 
funding decisions over the long-run, which render the DDE ratio a stock concept. 
Although many of the corporate environment factors are also stock concepts, they are 
likely to be shorter-term in nature and thus the corporate DDE ratio may essentially be 
exogenous with respect to these factors. 
Another explanation for the fact that such corporate environment factors are fairly 
weak influences on European corporate capital structure policy may be that, whereas 
fIrnis may respond fairly uniformly'in their gearing adjustments to shocks in exogenous 
variables, changes in corporate-level factors are likely to have very different effects 
uPongearing across firms within a sample. A simple example of this is that some firms 
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are likely to be risk-averse whereas others are willing to risk far higher probabilities of 
financial distress (a corporate environment factor), resulting in different attitudes to 
gearing policy. Thus, when modelling aggregated firm data, the uniqueness of the 
corporate characteristics of each firm and its capital structure response to changes in 
those characteristics is argued to produce a wide range of responses which are not 
conducive to the estimation of highly significant models at the aggregate level. 
8.2.6 Summary of the results arising from the bivariate corvorate capital 
structure time series analysis 
The bivariate corporate capital structure time series analysis produces a wealth of 
results ranging from specific hypothesis tests through to more general results 
conceming the operation of corporate capital structure policy at the operational and 
strategic level. 
The number of significant models across the samples analysed gives a rough indication 
of the relative importance of different capital structure determinants to the operational 
and strategic capital structure policies of firms, although this is not an ideal gauge. It is 
argued that if longer data time-spans were available, slightly different patterns or 
relationships might emerge because the paucity of time-spans of the European time 
series data is likely to markedly reduce the incidence of significant models across the 
samples. The very short data time-spans for the German and French samples, in 
particular, means that although results similar to those arising from the longer LJK and 
Dutch samples are anticipated, it is argued that such results are suppressed by the 
reduced probability of statistical significance. The strength of these data problem 
arguments is highlighted by the result that the UK samples generally produce models of 
greater significance than the models arising from the shorter data time-span samples. 
Thus, it may be argued that although certain capital structure determinants produce 
significant models in only a few 'of the samples, there is some justification for the 
careful generalisation of results across samples, with the relative significance of models 
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across samples remaining an indication of the relative importance of taxation, 
macroeconomic and corporate variables as determinants of capital structure policy. 
The key European capital structure relationships modelled in the bivariate time series 
analysis may be best summarised within the framework of those determinants which 
exert an influence upon the operational capital structure policy of the firm; those 
determinants which exert an influence upon the strategic capital structure policy of the 
firm; and those cases where the corporate capital structure itself exerts an influence 
upon the taxation, macroeconomic, and corporate environment factors. 
Those determinants which exert a significant influence upon the operational capital 
structure policy of the firm are predominantly taxation and macroeconomic 
environment variables. Both the nominal tax advantage to debt and the nominal 
corporate tax rate, a proxy for the tax advantage to debt, appear to exert a significant 
impact upon the corporate capital structure policy. Therefore, even if the tax 
advantage to debt across Europe is very much smaller than the MM (1963) model 
suggests, an increase in either tax measure encourages firms to increase their gearing in 
the short-run. Running parallel to the nominal tax advantage effect, European firms 
appear to react to a relatively high corporate tax bill (corporation tax ratio) by 
increasing gearing as part of a "reactive" tax-reduction policy in the short-run. Thus, 
taxation environment factors exert a very strong influence upon the operational capital 
structure policy of the European firm. 
The macroeconomic environment factors which exert a significant influence upon the 
operational capital structure policy of the firm are the rate of inflation and financial 
market performance factors. An increase in the rate of inflation encourages the finance 
manager to increase the gearing of the firm because inflation causes interest rates to 
fise, thus increasing the value of tax deductions associated with debt and making debt 
more attractive as a form of finance, and also because inflation decreases the real value 
444 
of investment allowances, reducing the "crowding out" of debt tax-deductions and thus 
encouraging increased gearing. Stock market performance, as measured by the stock 
market index, exerts a very strong influence upon corporate capital structure policy, 
such that an increase in the stock market index encourages firms to increase equity 
financing, as they are more likely to issue equity after periods of strong equity market 
performance. There is some evidence that various term-length interest rates influence 
operational corporate capital structure policy, although their effect is not quite as 
strong as that observed for the stock market index. Surprisingly, there is generally a 
positive relationship observed between gearing and interest rates, which suggests that 
debt markets are demand-driven, whereby finance managers may only significantly 
increase the supply of bonds to the market when the interest rates they offer are 
relatively high. Indeed, consideration of the nature of the operational influence of the 
stock market index reveals that this demand-driven characteristic may also apply to the 
equity market. Thus, finance managers may only significantly increase their supply of 
financial instruments to the finance market when conditions are favourable to investors. 
It is clear, then, that those factors which impact most significantly upon the operational 
capital structure policy of the firm, that is, in the short-run, are those factors which 
dirýýgtl impact upon the relative costs of financial instruments. The taxation factors are 
concerned mainly with the tax advantage to debt, which clearly impacts upon the cost 
of finance, and debt in particular, such that an increase in the tax advantage to debt 
reduces the weighted average cost of capital, rendering debt a relatively more 
attractive option than before. The incidences where inflation impacts upon gearing 
appear to be transmitted through the tax advantage to debt, as an increase in inflation 
increases the interest rate, thus increasing the tax advantage to debt, whilst the reduced 
value of non-debt tax allowances in addition enables greater debt tax allowances to be 
utilised, thus encouraging further' gearing. The financial market performance factors 
impact upon the gearing decision in a very different manner, working directly on the 
he-foree-tax direct costs of debt and equity finance. Thus, as finance managers may only 
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significantly increase or reduce gearing if interest rates are relatively high or equity 
market performance is strong, respectively, the direct before-tax costs of finance and 
the jimin of financial market trends in returns impinge greatly upon the firm's 
operational capital structure policy. Therefore, it is interesting to note that those 
factors which exert the most significant influence upon the capital structure policy of 
the European firm on a year-to-year basis are those factors over which the finance 
manager has no control, that is, such factors are external or exogenous to the firm. 
As the exogenous macroeconomic and taxation environment factors impinge most 
significantly upon the operational capital structure policy of the firm, this implies that it 
is the more endogenous factors which are likely to impinge less significantly upon that 
policy. However, some of the weaker influences are also exogenous factors and thus 
the reason why such factors exert only a weak influence must be explored. 
One of the taxation variables, the total tax ratio, exerts a fairly weak influence upon the 
operational corporate capital structure policy. An increase in the total tax ratio signals 
to the finance manager that the firm should increase its gearing as part of a reactive 
tax-reduction strategy. Additionally, both aggregate output and investment exert a 
positive though weak influence upon corporate gearing in the short-run, which 
suggests that corporate gearing may expand to fund boom period activity and may be 
reduced during recessions. These taxation and macroeconomic factors are both 
exogenous though exert little influence upon the operational capital structure policy. 
One reason for this may be that such factors, with the possible exception of the total 
tax ratio, are not direct influences on the relative costs of alternative financial 
instruments. Even the total tax ratio factor exerts an influence which is merely a 
reactive response of an indirect nature. Thus, it is argued that unless the factors 
modelled are capable of exerting an exogenous influence upon gearing which directl 
impacts upon the explicit costs of financial instruments in the short-run, then such 
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factors will not be significant determinants of operational corporate capital structure 
policy. 
The remaining factors which exert a weak influence upon the operational corporate 
capital structure policy are the endogenous corporate environment factors. Larger 
firms are more likely to exhibit higher gearing through time due to the greater 
opportunities for larger firms in debt markets and the reduced risk of such firms. 
Perhaps the most uncertain influence upon the operational capital structure policy of 
the firm is that exerted by the financial safety (inverse financial risk) factors. A finance 
manager whose firm experiences an improvement in financial safety does not appear to 
take the opportunity to increase gearing, as he or she appears equally likely to choose 
either form of new external finance. An increase in firm liquidity appears to exert a 
very weak influence upon gearing in the short-run, which is another surprising results 
as it is counter to both accounting prudence and intuition. Therefore, the ability of the 
firm to support new debt does not appear to significantly influence the operational 
capital structure policy of the firm. An explanation for this may be that, because only 
quoted firms are modelled in the European capital structure research, such firms are 
unlikely to be greatly concerned with the probability of financial distress as sample 
firms are generally characterised by high levels of reserves, diversified portfolios of 
projects, market stability, and so on. Thus, firms are unlikely to automatically adjust 
their capital structures to short-term movements in financial safety or liquidity, 
believing financial distress to be a remote possibility. The profitability measures, the 
return on capital employed and the q-ratio proxy, although weak influences upon 
operational policy, are probably the strongest influence of all the corporate 
environment factors upon corporate gearing in the short-run. Firms which experience 
an increase in profitability appear more likely to expand gearing because more 
profitable firms are able to obtain'debt at a lower price and are able to support more 
fixed-interest debt than less profitable firms. Thus, of the corporate environment 
factors modelled, the ability of the firm to support new debt in terms of financial risk 
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and liquidity exerts little influence upon the operational corporate capital structure 
policy, whereas the larger and more profitable the firm is, the greater opportunities it 
has to obtain debt financing at a favourable cost and subsequently support that debt 
out of future income streams. 
To summarise, then, those taxation and macroeconomic environment factors which 
exert a direct impact upon the relative costs of financial instruments appear to exert the 
most significant influence upon the operational capital structure policy of the firm. 
Indeed, factors which are exogenous though have a more indirect influence upon the 
costs of financial instruments appear to exert a weaker influence. The corporate 
environment factors, which are endogenous in nature, are generally fairly weak 
influences upon gearing in the short-run, mainly because the quoted firms in the 
analysis are not greatly concerned with the risk of financial distress when setting the 
level of the DDE ratio, although higher growth and more profitable firms do tend to 
exhibit higher gearing. 
Those determinants which exert an influence upon the strategic capital structure policy 
of the firm are a subset of those factors modelled in the bivariate analysis. The most 
significant influences again appear to come from the taxation and macroeconomic 
environments, although some corporate environment factors also significantly influence 
the strategic capital structure policy of the firm. 
The nominal corporate tax rate is a significant long-run influence of corporate capital 
structure policy whereby an increase in that rate causes the firm to increase gearing in 
the long-run. Additionally, the effective total tax rate (or total tax ratio) is also a 
significant long-run influence, such that a higher than normal total tax ratio encourages 
the firm to increase gearing as part of a wider tax-reduction strategy. Therefore, it is 
clear that firms increase gearing both in response to an increase in the tax advantage to 
debt (as proxied by the nominal corporate tax rate) and as a reaction to a higher than 
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normal relative tax bill. Thus, the minimisation of the weighted average cost of capital, 
by means of tax-reduction strategies, is not only an operational policy of the firm, but 
also forms a central part of its strategic policy for the setting of the capital structure 
ratio. 
Inflation is perhaps the most significant long-run influence of capital structure policy as 
a cointegrating relationship is exhibited in three of the samples modelled. Corporate 
gearing is positively related to the rate of inflation over the long-run, which confirms 
that such a relationship must be underpinned by the effect on interest rates and non- 
debt tax allowances rather than the "inflation bets" argument, discussed in the 
hypothesis section, as this latter argument may not logically persist over the long-run. 
Of the different term-length interest rate measures modelled, only the medium-term 
interest rate appears to evidence some influence upon the strategic capital structure 
policy. Therefore, this suggests that the long-term external finance decision is 
influenced more by medium-to-long-term interest rates such that the finance manager 
plans the long-run path of the gearing ratio with respect to longer-term trends in rates 
rather than the shorter-term fluctuations which characterise shorter-term rates. The 
model also confirms that debt markets are demand-driven even in the long-run, 
whereby finance managers may only significantly increase their supply of bonds to the 
market if conditions are favourable to investors. 
Finally, corporate environment factors also exert an influence upon the strategic capital 
structure policy of the firm. Financial safety, represented by dividend cover in the EC 
model, exhibits a long-run cointegrating relationship with the DDE ratio, such that a 
firm which experiences an improvement in financial safety is likely to reduce its gearing 
in the long-run. This result runs counter to intuition as it might be expected that firms 
which become less risky would be'In a better position to increase gearing. However, an 
explanation for the negative relationship may be that investors who observe a firm 
which experiences an improvement in financial safety in the long-run may purchase the 
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firm's equity on terms more favourable to the firm as their investment is considered 
safer. Therefore, it is argued that this information signalling concept underlying the 
financial safety factor relationship is understood by finance managers who take it into - 
account when setting the capital structure ratio to its strategic, long-run level. 
Additionally, there is some evidence that profitability is a positive influence upon 
gearing in the long-run, such that more profitable firms clearly maintain a greater 
capacity for debt expansion over the long-run. Indeed, whilst a short-run increase in 
profitability may encourage some expansion in gearing as part of an operational policy 
decision, surely a long-run and sustained increase in profitability will exert a more 
profound reconsideration of the gearing stance of the firm. 
It is interesting to note that the exogenous factors which impact directly upon the 
explicit costs of financial instruments are also the most significant influences of the 
strategic capital structure policy of the firm. However, the more endogenous financial 
safety and profitability factors are also key strategic determinants of corporate gearing 
and thus as well as considering the direct costs of the gearing policy of the firm, the 
finance manager also takes into account the ability of the firm to cover any increase in 
gearing. Thus, the manager considers the current probability of financial distress as 
well as the effect of longer-term profitability trends upon long-run cashflows, possibly 
using this as an indicator of future profitability. Although the quoted firms studied do 
not appear greatly concerned with financial risk on a year-to-year or operational basis 
as they are likely to be well diversified, stable, and backed by substantial reserves, in 
the longer-term, trends in risk and profitability will influence the gearing decision and 
May cause the finance manager to re-assess the firm's degree of financial risk aversion. 
Surprisingly, a number of the corporate environment factors produce models with 
insignificant ECM's,, even though they evidence cointegrating relationships with respect 
to corporate gearing. The reason for this may be that because the EC models also 
include dynamic variables, such variables dominate the ECM's in terms of significance, 
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suggesting that the real underlying bivariate model process may be essentially dynamic 
and that the error correction process is only weak. This appears to be the case for the 
firm growth and liquidity factors, and even firm profitability exhibits this phenomenon 
in one of the models estimated. 
To summarise, the exogenous taxation and macroeconomic environment factors which 
exert a direct influence upon the explicit costs of financial instruments appear to be the 
most significant influences upon the strategic corporate capital structure policy, thus 
dominating the short-run and long-run determination of the corporate capital structure. 
However, at the strategic level, finance managers also appear to take into account 
trends in the financial risk and profitability of the firm, thus continually re-assessing the 
gearing stance of the firm in terms of debt-capacity and financial risk. 
In addition to the taxation, macroeconomic and corporate environment factors exerting 
a significant influence upon the operational and strategic capital structure policies of 
European firms, the level of gearing itself also exerts an influence upon the corporate 
environment factors. Although this converse direction of causation is tested in the 
bivariate EC models across all three sets of environment factors, only the relationships 
for the corporate factors are discussed due to the concept of causal inequality, which 
essentially states that gearing is unlikely to exert any measurable influence upon 
taxation and macroeconomic factors as they are highly exogenous. Thus, gearing is 
likely to be only one of a multitude of influences upon inflation, for example, and thus 
it is unlikely to demonstrate any explanatory power as an independent variable in a 
bivariate inflation model. It is clear, however, that the gearing policy of the firm is 
capable of significantly affecting other corporate environment variables, and the 
bivariate EC models reveal that gearing indeed affects firm growth, financial safety, 
liquidity, and profitability in the lohg-run. 
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It appears that gearing exerts a detrimental influence upon firm growth in both the 
short and long-run, possibly because increased gearing may displace marginal future 
investment projects as it increases claims on the future income streams of firms. 
Alternatively, it may be that the more restrictive debt covenants associated with higher 
gearing may constrain the firm's activities, thus imposing a significant agency cost on 
the firm, thereby reducing its profitability and its growth potential. Increased gearing 
also reduces the financial safety of the firm in the short and long-run, due to the extra 
servicing commitments associated with debt, which may reduce the probability of the 
firm being able to cover future dividend payments. Such a result provides some indirect 
support for the propositions of those authors who argued that bankruptcy risk may 
counterbalance any tax advantage to debt. Although increased gearing appears to be 
detrimental to both the growth and financial safety of the firm, it appears to exert an 
advantageous influence upon firm liquidity and profitability. Increased gearing may 
enable the funding of relatively more investment projects than before, leading to an 
increase in future cash inflows and thus increased profitability in the short and long-run 
and increased liquidity in the long-run. 
In summary, then, although gearing may be detrimental to firm growth and may 
significantly increase the risk of financial distress in the long-run, it is also likely to 
facilitate greater investment in new projects leading to higher income streams, thus 
improving firm liquidity and profitability. This interesting although fairly intuitive result 
highlights the complex nexus of relationships focussing upon the capital structure ratio 
chosen by the firm. The cross-sectional models of chapter 5, which examined the short- 
run relationship between gearing and mainly corporate environment factors, debt was 
clearly shown to be characterised more by its detrimental influence on the corporate 
environment than any relationship for the converse direction of causation. This result is 
reconciled with the results of the bivariate EC models by explaining that, in the short- 
run, debt confers only detrimental effects as the firm experiences only the costs of that 
debt, whereas in the longer-run the increased number of investment projects begin to 
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break even, thus conferring benefits upon the firm in terms of increased liquidity and 
profitability. Overall, it is clear that although the finance manager may expend 
considerable resources striving for a capital structure ratio which is optimal for the 
firm, he or she must also examine the likely effects of that capital structure decision as 
a, 'knock-on" effect to the corporate environment. 
A number of important general results arise from the bivariate time series analysis 
which are briefly considered in turn. 
Full optimisation, which is consistent with the presence of cointegrating corporate 
capital structure relationships, occurs predominantly for the larger firms, given more 
correct representation in the weighted samples modelled. Such full optimisation (or 
strong-form optimisation) involves the finance manager of the firm determining the 
long-run optimal path for the DDE ratio in relation to key long-run or strategic 
determinants of that ratio. The finance manager then maintains that optimal path by 
adjusting the DDE ratio when changes occur in the strategic determinants, so that any 
disequilibrium errors from the long-run path are continually corrected for. Hence there 
must be evidence of the existence of significant error correction mechanisms (ECMs) 
within bivariate capital structure relationships for there to be full optimisation 
behaviour. Larger firms are able to engage in this form of optimisation because the 
sophisticated information collection, analysis, and actioning systems within their 
finance functions facilitate such behaviour. It is intuitive that the finance functions of 
larger firms are going to be far better resourced and far more capable of sophisticated 
OPtitnisation procedures than those within smaller firms. In the long-run, smaller firms 
cannot engage in full optimisation and thus do not target such "extra-ratio" strategic 
determinants (long-run detern-finants external to the capital structure environment). 
Instead, smaller firms are likely to engage in a form of bounded optimisation in the 
lOng-run, referred to as "intra-ratio" targeting. It is proposed, then, that the strategic 
10119-run behaviour of smaller firms involves such firms targeting the capital structure 
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ratios (hence intra-ratio targeting) of firms within their industry, larger firms, larger 
firms within their industry, or on the basis of some other criterion. This proposition is 
tested in detail in section 8.4, both to rationalise this type of smaller firm behaviour, 
explaining why such firms generally do not engage in extra-ratio targeting (consistent 
with cointegrated capital structure relationships), and to complete the smaller firm side 
of the strategic capital structure behaviour dichotomy which appears to be emerging. 
Thus, smaller firms do not continually adjust their DDE ratios towards an optimal 
long-run path because their information systems are not sufficiently complex to identify 
disequilibrium errors in relation to key long-run capital structure determinants. 
Firms may also engage in less stringent forms of optimisation which do not require 
evidence of cointegrating processes, which may be termed weak-form optimisation 
behaviour. The operational capital structure behaviour of European firms must be 
considered to determine whether this evidences such weak-form behaviour. Weak- 
form optimising behaviour, then, may be argued to occur where the individual firm 
finance manager takes into account a wide range of determinants before setting the 
level of the DDE ratio. The European bivariate ADL models reveal that the finance 
managers of both larger and smaller firms appear to set the level of the DDE ratio with 
reference to a wide range of taxation, macroeconomic and corporate environment 
factors in the short-run, with the emphasis however placed upon the taxation and 
macroeconomic environment factors. There are significant corporate environment 
influences upon the operational capital structure decision of the firm, although these 
are not as consistent in terms of significance across samples as the more exogenous 
taxation and macroeconomic factors. Thus, the finance manager adjusts the level of the 
DDE ratio in the short-run in relation to exogenous and endogenous environmental 
factors, trading off their influence upon the DDE ratio in a naive manner which may be 
described as weak-form capital structure optimisation. Additionally, the cross-sectional 
and marginal analyses of chapter 5 revealed that finance managers are also conscious 
of the effect of operational gearing decisions upon the corporate environmentý such 
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that they will set the DDE ratio such that the costs it confers upon the firm are not 
damaging to the firm's continued existence. Thus, the finance manager's actions, 
observed in the empirical models of the European capital structure research, are 
consistent with weak-form optimising behaviour in the short-run. This result is 
supported by evidence from the operational-level bivariate ADL models as well as 
evidence from the cross-sectional and marginal models examined in chapter 5. In 
summary, then, larger firms are demonstrated to engage in strong-form optimisation 
behaviour whereas larger and smaller firms alike engage in weak-form optin-dsation. 
To address the central hypothesis, however, which states that there exist firm-level 
optimal capital structures, the firm-specific nature of optimal solutions must be proven. 
At the operational capital structure policy level, the firm-specific nature of the capital 
structure optimal solution derives from the influence of the corporate environment, 
which although relatively weak, produces an optimal DDE ratio solution which is 
specific to the individual firm. This is because the ability of the firm to support 
increased gearing varies from one firm to another due to the differences in the financial 
risk, liquidity, profitability, the rate of growth, and so on, across firms. Additionally, 
individual firm finance managers realise that an increase in gearing will affect their 
firms in very different manners, depending upon the health of the firm, its growth 
prospects, and so on, again producing a DDE ratio solution which is specific to the 
individual firm. Thus, optimal capital structure solutions are likely to be firm-specific 
across the samples studied, supporting hypothesis HI in the short-run in that weak- 
form optimising behaviour is capable of producing firm-level optimal solutions. 
At the strategic level, the firm-specific nature of the capital structure solution 
Potentially derives from two processes. Firstly, although the key determinants of the 
strategic optimal capital structure solution are taxation and macroeconomic 
environment factors, which are exogenous in nature and exert a direct effect which is 
aggregate in nature, the endogenous corporate environment factors such as financial 
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safety and profitability which are capable of producing firm-specific optimal solutions 
also exert a significant influence. As firm risk and firm profitability are very much 
specific to the individual firm, the strategic capital structure solution is rendered firm- 
specific in nature. Secondly, there is an endo-exogenous interaction between variables 
such that, although the taxation and macroeconomic environment factors produce a 
long-run influence which is aggregate in nature, the fact that the precise or effective 
advantage to debt, for example, is also determined by the corporate structure of the 
firm (such as the nature of its investment projects which produce firm-specific tax 
allowances and thus "crowd-out" debt tax allowances to different extents) means that 
the resulting capital structure solution is optimal to the individual firm. Such an endo- 
exogenous interaction effect may also occur at the operational level, although smaller 
firms in particular are unlikely to fully appreciate its effect. 
The effect of the scale of the firm is seen to be significant to both the operational and 
strategic capital structure policy. The most important incidences where the scale of the 
finn impacts upon the type of capital structure decision are those within bivariate 
relationships with respect to the taxation environment of the firm. Indeed, smaller firms 
are more likely to monitor nominal taxation measures such as the nominal tax 
advantage to debt and the nominal corporate tax rate, before making a decision to 
adjust their capital structures. However, larger firms have in place the sophisticated 
information systems which enable them to compute and monitor the more realistic 
&-Lec-tive taxation measures, such as the effective total tax rate and the effective 
corporation tax rate, before adjusting their capital structures. Furthermore, this 
dichotomous influence of taxation which depends upon the scale of the firm appears to 
hold for both the operational and strategic policies of European firms. Thus, only 
larger firms exhibit a more considered understanding of the influence of the taxation 
environment upon gearing such that they can assess the influence of tax exhaustion 
upon the tax advantage to debt, for example, before arriving at an optimal capital 
structure decision. 
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In summary, the bivariate corporate capital structure time series analysis enables the 
central hypothesis to be addressed in a methodological manner as well as identifying 
numerous other key results which constitute a framework for understanding the 
decisions which make up the operational and strategic capital structure policies of 
European firms. Firstly, there is support for the central hypothesis, Hl, as both weak- 
form and strong-form optimisation procedures are identified within European firms and 
optimal results arising from both the operational and strategic capital structure policies 
of such firms are shown to be firm-specific in nature. Secondly, there exists a fairly 
distinct behavioural dichotomy between larger and smaller European firms, whereby 
larger firm finance managers engage in full optimisation behaviour to continually 
maintain the desired optimal long-run path of the DDE ratio in relation to key strategic 
determinants (extra-ratio targeting) by continually correcting for any disequilibrium 
errors from that path, whereas smaller firm finance managers engage in a form of 
bounded optimisation behaviour (intra-ratio targeting) by targeting their DDE ratios 
upon those of other firms in their industry, larger firms, and so on. The dichotomous 
behaviour is caused by differences between the larger and smaller firms in the 
sophistication of information systems present within the finance function of the firm, 
which is a crucial determinant in the extent of optimising behaviour undertaken. 
Thirdly, the modelling exercise determined that exogenous factors which impact 
directly upon the explicit costs of financial instruments are the most significant 
influences upon both the operational and strategic capital structure policies of firms. 
However, at the strategic level, the finance manager also appears to consider the 
longer-term trends in profitability and financial risk before arriving at an optimal capital 
structure solution. Therefore, although this research identifies a wide range of potential 
influences upon corporate gearing, the most important of those influences still appears 
to be the cost of the external financial instruments as determined by the taxation and 
macroeconomic environments within which the firm is placed. it is perhaps reassuring 
that the finance manager still focuses upon the explicit costs of external finance when 
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setting the optimal DDE ratio, even though both finance managers and academics have 
in recent years developed a far greater understanding of the implicit costs of finance. 
Fourthly, it is clear that the finance manager may not set the level of the DDE ratio 
with reference merely to the determinants of that ratio alone, as changes in the DDE 
ratio additionally have important implications for the environment of the firm. In the 
short-run, the static and marginal analyses revealed that an increase in gearing confers 
mainly detrimental effects upon the firm, whereas in the longer-run (examined in the 
bivariate EC models) the new investment projects financed by increased gearing should 
begin to break-even, benefiting the firm in terms of improved profitability and liquidity. 
Optimality must therefore encompass the two-way causation between gearing and the 
corporate environment, and it is clear from the bivariate models that firms do indeed 
recognise this phenomenon. 
Finally, the bivariate analysis has identified two areas which require theoretical 
development and empirical testing before the European corporate capital structure 
research is complete. Section 8.3 thus extends the bivariate analysis to a multivariate 
perspective, enabling the two-way causation phenomenon to be incorporated into a 
system of capital structure models. Section 8.4 then develops and tests the concept of 
intra-ratio targeting, to explain the long-run behaviour of smaller firms. 
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8. and estimation of Johansen procedure multivariate error 
determine the short-run and long-run processes present 
Wi__ dure relationships 
8.3.1 introduction 
The bivariate time series models identified that it is uncertain whether the firm's capital 
structure is better considered a determinant of, or is determined by, corporate 
environment variables related to it. The static models examined earlier in this research 
determined that gearing may often be characterised by its detrimental cost and risk 
effects upon the corporate environment in the short-run rather than relationships of the 
converse direction of causation. The later bivariate EC models identified that gearing 
exerts a significant influence upon corporate environment factors in the long-run, in 
addition to the converse causation. Thus, it is necessary to express variables which 
exhibit two-way causality with respect to the DDE ratio in a model form which can 
accommodate and augment the examination of such relationships. Only those variables 
which exhibit a long-run cointegrating relationship with corporate gearing are 
examined in this section, however, as the method employed is based in cointegration 
econometrics. The samples to be modelled comprise the UK weighted and non- 
weighted samples because the other samples are too short to enable a multivariate 
modelling method to be used, particularly when lag structures are introduced. 
Johansen's Maximum Likelihood procedure (1988,1989) is employed for the 
multivariate error correction modelling as it enables the number of cointegrating 
vectors to be established and estimated. The method for estimating a multivariate error 
correction model is based on the error correction representation of the VAR(p) model 
with Gaussian errors. The model given in equation 8.1 is a multivariate generalisation 
of a model with an error correction mechanism. 
459 
Axt + FlAxt -I+ 
'F2AXt-2 +Fp-IAXt-p+l + fIXt-p+ Bzt + ut 
Equation 8.1 
where: 
Xt = an rn xI vector of I(l) variables 
zt = an sxI vector of 1(0) variables 
FIX2 5***ý IFP-I! p 
H are mxm matfices of unknown parameters 
an mxs matrix 
ut P. - N(05 E) 
The Johansen maximum likelihood procedure estimates the model subject to the 
hypothesis that 11 has a reduced rank, that is, r<M. Thus, the hypothesis H(r) may 
be written as follows: 
H(r): TI = afl' Equation 8.2 
whereaand P are mxr matrices. Johansen's 1989 paper argued that this reduced 
rank condition implies that the process AXt is stationary, Xt is non-stationary, and that 
P'Xt is stationary, under certain conditions. 8'Xt are the cointegrating relations and 
the P matrix represents the cointegrating vectors which, after normalization, may be 
interpreted as long-run parameters. The a's measure the speed of adjustment of 
particular variables with respect to a disturbance in the equilibrium relation. The 
Johansen procedure, then, identifies the number of cointegrating vectors, which may be 
more than one in a multivariate model, and enables estimation of the error correction 
mechanism to be incorporated into a general ADL model in differences which is then 
reduced. 
8.3.2 The hypotheses to be tested bv the construction and estimation of the 
M rrection models 
The Johansen procedure multivarýate error correction models are not constructed and 
estimated to further test hypotheses concerning the dynamic and long-run coefficient 
Signs of variables influencing the DDE ratio, as such hypothesis testing is conducted 
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extensively in the section 8.2. The Johansen procedure models are created instead to 
examine the interaction of endogenous/exogenous groupings of variables, and the 
iniplications of this for the determination of the European DDE ratio. To facilitate this, - 
three model systems are constructed and estimated within a general-to-specific 
framework, and two new hypotheses are tested. 
Hypothesis H42 states that multivariate error correction models containing a mix of 
exogenous and endogenous variables will exhibit less explanatory power than models 
in which the variables are all of the same nature. However, it might be argued that in a 
strict statistical sense, all variables modelled using the Johansen procedure are 
endogenous in the respect that they are endogenously determined. It is therefore noted 
that, in the context of the application of the Johansen procedure to the European 
research, it is the macroeconomic and taxation environment variables which are 
referred to as "exogenous" variables and the corporate environment variables are 
referred to as "endogenous variables". The reason for this hypothesis is that in a 
"mixed" model, the exogenous variables may be able to explain a high proportion of 
the variation in the endogenous variables, but the endogenous variables, by definition, 
should explain little or none of the variation in the exogenous variables. In the context 
of the UK weighted sample models, for example, models with the inflation or taxation 
variables expressed as dependent variable should appear significantly weaker than 
models with the DDE ratio, profitability or dividend cover expressed as dependent 
variable. Weaker models may exhibit counter intuitive coefficient signs and 
ilisignificant or incorrectly signed ECM coefficients. 
Hypothesis H43 states that the DDE ratio is better expressed as a determinant of long- 
run gjTorate target ratios rather than the converse. if the hypothesis holds then 
models with the DDE ratio expressed as dependent variable should be relatively weak 
compared with models with the other corporate ratios expressed as dependent, and 
should thus exhibit counter intuitive coefficient signs or lack a significant ECM. This 
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hypothesis therefore seeks to test the proposition that gearing may exert an influence 
upon the corporate environment which is potentially of greater importance to the firm 
than the converse direction of causation. 
Three model systems are estimated to enable hypotheses H42 and H43 to be tested. 
Model system I contains all of the variables which are cointegrated with the DDE ratio 
in the UK weighted sample. Model system 2 contains only those variables which are 
deternýined within the corporate environment, that is, variables of an endogenous 
nature, again for the UK weighted sample. Model system 3 contains only exogenous 
variables (plus the DDE ratio) for the UK non-weighted sample. Thus, the models 
enable the examination of three scenarios, to determine the interaction of the DDE 
ratio with: exogenous and endogenous variables; with endogenous variables alone; and 
with exogenous variables alone. If hypothesis H42 holds then model system I should 
be a weak model, whereas model systems 2 and 3 should be stronger as they isolate 
exogenous and endogenous factors. However, model system 2 should also be more 
significant than model system 3, because it contains a set of variables which are all 
endogenously determined whereas model system 3 contains exogenous variables in 
addition to the endogenously determined DDE ratio. 
8.3.3 The method employed to produce multivariate error correction models of 
the European corporate capital structure environment 
The variables to be tested for the presence of cointegrating vectors are entered into the 
time series statistics package, MICROFIT Version 3.0 (1993). Only those variables 
which are cointegrated with the DDE ratio measure are modelled, The variables form a 
'vector autoregressive (VAR) representation in which they are not divided into 
dependent or independent variables. 
The order of the VAR is two, as most of the significant relationships within the data 
should occur within two years. This is because there may be a lagged reaction to 
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corporate measures which are based upon annual accounting data, because two years 
is generally sufficient to take account of residual autocorrelation, and because a VAR 
inodel of order greater than two might reduce the degrees of freedom available to such 
an extent as to render the models invalid. Indeed, Charemza and Deadman (1992) 
argue that the lag length of the VAR corresponds to the length of adjustment to a 
deviation from a long-run path and that it is usually assumed that these corrections 
occur after a relatively short period of time. 
Firstly, the maximum likelihood ratio test statistics are computed to determine the 
number of cointegrating vectors, using Johansen's (1989) maximal eigenvalue test and 
trace statistic test. The null hypothesis for both tests is that r, the number of 
cointegrating vectors, is zero. Each statistic is compared to its respective critical value 
at the 5 per cent level, and if the statistic is greater than the critical value then the null 
hypothesis of no cointegrating vectors is rejected. If the first null hypothesis is rejected 
then the second null hypothesis tested is that the number of cointegrating vectors is 
one, that is, r--1. The tests are conducted in a sequential manner until the number of 
cointegrating vectors is determined. 
Secondly, once the number of cointegrating vectors present within the VAR model is 
determined, the cointegrating vector coefficients are computed, based on the 
assumption that there are r cointegrating vectors present. Thus, the coefficients are 
determined by the number of cointegrating vectors found. The coefficients are 
presented in both pure vector form and are also standardised upon the DDE ratio 
variable. The standardised variable coefficients should be very similar to a static long- 
run representation of an ADL model of order two, which provides a means of checking 
the cointegrating vector coefficients. 
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Thirdly, an adjustment matrix is also computed, the components of which provide 
some measure of the speed of adjustment of particular variables with respect to a 
disturbance in the equilibrium relation. 
Fourthly, the residuals of the VAR model are saved for inclusion in the multivariate 
error correction models within each model system. A series of models, expressing each 
variable as the dependent in turn, is constructed and estimated, to contain each 
variable, differenced and lagged zero and one years, a constant, and the residuals from 
the Johansen NIL procedure lagged two years. The differenced variables enable the 
short-run or dynamic processes to be represented, whereas the long-run EC process is 
measured by the residuals from the Johansen procedure. The ECM is lagged two years 
to produce a model consistent with the dynamic components, and, additionally, the 
VAR model from which the ECM is estimated., is of order two years. This produces a 
set of general-form multivariate EC models. 
Finally, the general-form models must be reduced sequentially on the basis of the t-test, 
in a manner similar to the general-to-specific modelling approach used in the bivariate 
EC modelling. Models are reduced to the point where either or all of the remaining 
variables are significant, or where further reduction would involve elimination of the 
error correction mechanism. The constant is left in the model throughout the process, 
as models perform better with than without it, and its inclusion enables the coefficient 
of determination to be used as an easily interpretable measure of the goodness of fit of 
each model. The final reduced-form model is then tested for robustness using the 
diagnostic tests described in appendix L. 
8. he Johansen procedure multivariate error correction models 
The detailed results of the three model systems are tabulated in appendices 0, P and Q, 
and only the results of model system 2 are discussed in detail for reasons explained 
below. 
464 
Model system 1, which expresses the relationships between the DDE ratio, exogenous 
variables (inflation and the total tax ratio) and endogenous variables (dividend cover 
and the profitability ratio) is presented in table 7 of appendix 0. The model system is 
extremely weak as the ECM's are generally not significantly negative and the 
coefficient signs exhibited are not consistent with the results of the bivariate models 
examined in section 8.2. ECM's must exhibit significant negative coefficients for there 
to exist an error correcting process, as positive coefficient mechanisms exacerbate any 
disequilibrium errors from the long-run path of the DDE ratio. It is unsurprising that 
the exogenous variable models are weak as the more endogenous corporate 
enviromnent and capital structure variables are unlikely to exert any measurable 
influence upon them at all. 
Even at this stage in the results, hypothesis H42 may be given some limited support 
because model system 1, which contains a mix of endogenous and exogenous 
components, is extremely weak. However support for the hypothesis is not conclusive 
until the results of model systems 2 and 3 are examined, because for stronger support it 
is essential to determine whether model systems which isolate endogenous and 
exogenous variables are indeed more significant than model system 1. Therefore, 
model system I appears to be a weak system because of the endo-exogenous, mix of 
variables which comprise it, mainly because only half of the non-DDE ratio variables 
are capable of producing a two-way causal cointegrating relationship with the DDE 
ratio. 
Hypothesis H43 is given some support by the results of model system 1, as the model 
with the DDE ratio expressed as dependent variable produces an incorrect positive 
ECK whereas the dividend cover and profitability models exhibit significant negative 
ECMs- This suggests that if thecorporate environment could be isolated, the DDE 
ratio might be better considered an influence of other corporate variables rather than 
the converse. A more precise examination of the models which comprise model system 
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I is not presented in this section as the model system as a whole is not robust and thus 
a detailed consideration of model coefficients would produce few results of interest. 
The purpose of examining the results of model system 2 is: to determine whether the 
isolation of endogenously-determined variables produces a more significant model 
system than model system 1, thus further testing hypothesis H42; to determine whether 
hypothesis H43 is supported and thus whether the DDE ratio is better expressed as a 
determinant of long-run corporate target ratios rather than the converse; and finally, to 
determine whether the endogenously determined model system 2 is more significant 
than the predominantly exogenously determined model system 3 to follow. As model 
system is expected to be a far more significant model system than systems I and 3, 
the results of the model and the tests leading to its estimation are presented below in 
some detail. This also enables the Johansen procedure to be discussed in a structured 
manner to demonstrate how a multivariate model system is computed. 
Model system 2, then, is a system of endogenous variable models alone as the 
exogenous factors, the inflation and taxation measures, have been removed. Tables 8.9 
and 8.10 give the results of the maximum likelihood tests to determine the number of 
cointegrating vectors, showing the maximal eigenvalue and trace statistic tests, 
respectively. Table 8.9 illustrates that the first null hypothesis that there are no 
Cointegrating vectors within the variable group is rejected as the maximal eigýenvalue 
statistic of 24.3112 is greater than the critical value (at the five per cent level) of 
22.0020. However, the null hypothesis that there is less than or equal to one 
cointegrating vector may not be rejected as the maximal eigenvalue statistic of 11 . 6843 
is less than the critical value of 15.6720. Therefore, table 8.9 reveals that there is only 
one cointegrating vector linking the reduced group of variables. 
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Table 8.9 
Johansen Maximum Likelihood Procedure (non-trended case) 
t based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the stochastic matrix 
List ! nding order: 
. 
68578 . 
42673 . 
093235 -. 0000 - 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% Critical Value 90% Critical Value 
- 1=0 r=1 24.3112 22.0020 
- 19.7660 
r<= I r=2 11.6843 15.6720 13.7520 
r<-- 2 r=3 2.0553 9.2430 7.5250 
In table 8.10, the first null hypothesis that there are no cointegrating vectors within the 
variable group is rejected as the trace statistic of 38.0509 exceeds the five per cent 
critical value of 34.9100. However, the second null hypothesis that there is less than or 
equal to one cointegrating vector may not be rejected as the trace statistic of 13.7397 
is less than the critical value of 19.9640. Therefore, table 8.10 confirms that there is 
only one cointegrating vector linking this reduced group of endogenous variables. 
Table 8.10 
Johansen Maximum Likelihood Procedure (non-trended case) 
cointe2ration LR test based on trace of the stochastic matrix 
List of ei genvalues in descending order: 
. 68578 . 42673 . 093235 -. 0000 
1 
Null 
. 
Alternative Statistic 95% Critical Value 90% Critical Value 
r=0 r>= 1 38.0509 34.9100 32.0030 
r<= I r>= 2 13.7397 19.9640 17.8520 
r<= 2 r=3 2.0553 9.2430 7.5250 
Table 8.11 presents the computed cointegrating vector coefficients in standardised and 
unstandardised form, where standardisation merely involves dividing all of the 
coefficients by minus the coefficient of the DDE ratio in this case. 
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Table 8.11 
Estimated cointegrated vectors in Johansen estimation 
-kets) 
Table 8.12 presents the estimated Johansen procedure coefficients, with the DDE ratio 
expressed as dependent variable, as well as the estimated coefficients of a static long- 
run representation of an ADL(2) model. It is noted that the magnitudes of the 
coefficients are somewhat different and that for the profitability ratio measure the 
coefficient sign differs between estimation procedures. The coefficient signs are 
generally consistent with the coefficients of the separate bivariate static long-run 
equations of table 8.7, the only exception being the profitability ratio, ROCE, which 
exhibits a negative cointegrating vector coefficient in the Johansen procedure model 
but exhibits a positive coefficient in the static long-run equation. Multicollinearity 
between the independent variables may cause the sign change in the multivariate 
perspective, as profitability and dividend cover are likely to be highly cointegrated. The 
adjustment matrix is given in appendix P. 
Table 8.12 
Long-run coefficient estimates of the Johansen procedure compared with a static 
long-run model of an ADL(2) representation of the same model 
variable Johansen procedure 
estimated long-run 
coefflicients 
coefficients of a static 
long-run representation 
of an ADL(2) model 
DDERATIO (dependent) (dependent) 
DIVCOVER -0.17822 -0.0298 
ROCE -0.13741 +0.01114 Fconstant +0.86959 +0.1791 
The residuals from the multivariate cointegrating vector are saved and are included, 
lagged two years, in each general-form error correction model. These models are then 
reduced sequentially using the t-test to give the model system 2 reduced-form models, 
given in ta e 8.13. 
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Table 8.13 
mmwý 
I)ependent ADDERATIO ADIVCOVER AROCE 
variable 
Constant -0.013453 0.069578 -0.25413 
(-0.679) (0.760) (-0.489) 
ADDERATIO - - 
ADDERATIO-1 -0.30268 -2.8001 - 
(-1.362) (-2.500) 
ADIVCOVER -0.032224 -3.2133 
(-0.734) (-2.835) 
ADIVCOVER-1 - 
AROCE -0.10837 - 
(-2.914) 
AROCE-1 -0.56341 
(-3.075) 
ECM-2 -0.12052 -3.3636 -13.956 [t 
(-0.645) (4.900) (-2.880) 
The DDE ratio model is clearly a weak model, exhibiting no significant model 
components. Additionally, the diagnostic tests of appendix P reveal that the model has 
an extremely low coefficient of determination and the model is not significant on the 
basis of the F-test statistic. The dividend cover dynamic coefficient is insignificant 
although it is consistent with the bivariate EC model examined in section 8.2, as the 
negative coefficient suggests that investors who observe a firm which experiences an 
improvement in financial safety may purchase the firm's equity on terms more 
favourable to the firm as their investment is considered safer. However, although the 
model is extremely weak, it does appear to be correctly specified, as the ECM exhibits 
the correct negative coefficient sign and the model does not fail specification tests. 
The model with dividend cover as the dependent variable is a far stronger model as it 
exhibits significant dynamic variable components and a significant ECM- The negative 
coefficient of the DDE ratio dynamic variable is consistent with the bivariate EC model 
for this direction of causation, and intuitively confirms that as the firm's gearing 
increases, its financial safety is reduced. Thus, hypothesis H15, which states that the 
degree of bankruptcy risk (inverse financial safety) increases as the corporate debt- 
equity ratio increases, is supported. The negative coefficient of the profitability 
dynamic variable suggests that as profitability increases, the firm is less able to cover 
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its payments of dividends, which appears counter intuitive, or at least very difficult to 
explain, However, it is not the objective of this research to explain interactions 
between non-capital structure variables and thus it is sufficient to note that the 
coefficient is significant. 
The model with the profitability ratio as the dependent variable is also a strong model 
as it exhibits significant dynamic variable components and a significant ECM. There 
appears to be no significant dynarnic relationship between the DDE ratio and 
profitability. However, the significant ECM suggests that a relationship between 
gearing and profitability is indeed observed in the long-run. The negative coefficient of 
the dividend cover dynamic variable suggests that as financial safety improves, the 
profitability of the firm may be reduced. This may be because a firm with very high 
earnings experiences eroded profitability through time unless it invests more of its 
surpluses in new investment projects. However, the diagnostic tests reveal that residual 
autocorrelation may be a problem in the model. 
Therefore, the profitability and dividend cover models of model system 2 are clearly far 
stronger than the DDE ratio model, both in terms of dynamic variable significance and 
the significance of ECM's. It is also clearly demonstrated that the corporate 
environment variables are not significant determinants of the DDE ratio either 
dynamically or in the long-run, whereas the DDE ratio is indeed a significant 
determinant of the corporate environment variables, particularly in the long-run. 
Hypothesis H43, which states that the DDE ratio is better expressed as a determinant 
of long-run corporate target ratios than the converse, is therefore given some support 
in the Johansen modelling analysis. 
Additionally, the model system provides further support for hypothesis H42, which 
states that multivariate error correction models containing a mix of exogenous and 
endogenous variables will exhibit less explanatory power than models in which 
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variables are all of the same nature. Thus, because endogenously-determined variables 
are isolated in model system 2, the resulting model system exhibits more correctly 
specified models which generally exhibit highly significant dynamic variables and 
significant negative ECM's. 
Model system 3 contrasts with model system 2 in that it contains only variables which 
are highly exogenous in nature, for the UK non-weighted sample. The results are 
presented in appendix Q only as they add little to the multivariate investigation. The 
reason for this is that two cointegrating vectors are found to be present and thus each 
model system 3 component model must contain two ECM's. The models are not 
discussed as the interpretation of more than one cointegrating vector is not yet 
established in the econometric literature, at least at the time of writing. Additionally, 
models estimated upon different samples may not be compared, particularly where they 
contain different variables and different EC specifications, and thus model system 3 
does not enable further testing of hypothesis H42. 
8.3.5 Summarv 
In this section, the recently developed and somewhat sophisticated Johansen procedure 
was employed to construct and estimate multivariate error correction models to 
examine the two-way causality present between the DDE ratio and factors exhibiting a 
long-run relationship with it. There is fairly strong support for hypothesis H42 which 
states that multivariate error correction models containing a mix of exogenous and 
endogenous variables will exhibit less explanatory power than models in which the 
variables are all of the same nature. This is due to the presence of causal inequalities 
amongst those factors related to the DDE ratio, such that, whereas variables which are 
more endogenous in nature may be determined by variables which are more exogenous 
in nature, the opposite cannot hold. There is also some support for hypothesis H43, 
which states that the DDE ratio is better expressed as a determinant of long-run 
corporate target ratios rather than the converse. Thus, in the long-run, corporate 
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environment variable models with the DDE ratio expressed as an independent variable 
perform consistently better than would be the case with the DDE ratio expressed as the 
dependent variable. Firms are likely, then, to maintain target corporate environment 
variables as well as targeting the DDE ratio in the long-run, such that they may 
maintain a target for profitability, financial risk, liquidity, growth, and so on. 
Model systems for the UK samples only were constructed and estimated because the 
Johansen procedure may not be undertaken with respect to shorter time-span data 
samples. The results may be generalised across samples, it is argued, because they are 
consistent with the results of the other (bivariate) analyses of this European research 
which support the two-way causation result. Similar results would therefore be 
expected if longer data time-spans were available for the other samples. The Johansen 
procedure results thus may be viewed not only as an extension to the capital structure 
research, but also as a synthesis of causal uncertainty results arising from the whole 
body of the research. 
The implications of the results arising from the Johansen procedure models for the 
European corporate capital structure research are that, although the finance manager 
may expend considerable resources setting the capital structure ratio to its optimal 
level, as embodied by the firm's operational and strategic capital structure policies, he 
or she must also be mindful of the long-run influence of gearing, in turn, upon the 
9QMO-r, ate environment of the firm. Indeed, in some respects, the direction of causation 
where the capital structure ratio is considered a determinant of, rather than being 
determined by, corporate environment factors, may be of equal importance to the 
finance manager. Thus, the finance manager sets the optimal level of the DDE ratio 
based mainly upon taxation factors, macroeconomic factors, and the endo-exogenous 
interaction effect discussed in section 8.2, whilst at the same time examining the likely 
effect of his or her decision upon the corporate environment, particularly in the 
long- 
run. Essentially, then, corporate capital structure policy becomes not only a matter of 
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optir, aising the DDE ratio with respect to its key determinants, but also optimising it 
with respect to its "knock-on" effects upon the firm. This result is further rationalised 
when it is realised that capital structure policy is only one of the key policies 
implemented by firms, and furthermore, the DDE ratio target is only one of a group of 
corporate environment targets which the finance manager is likely to set, monitor, and 
strive to achieve. 
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8.4Acointegration analysis to determine the existence of intra-ratio targeting 
behaviour within smaller European quoted firms 
8 4.1 Introduction 
It has been demonstrated in the corporate capital structure research, up to this 
juncture, that the finance manager of the firm must engage in targeting behaviour to 
some extent if he or she wishes to optimise the firm's capital structure. Therefore, 
targeting behaviour is entirely consistent with optimising behaviour. However, such an 
assertion must be qualified. "Full-optimisation" behaviour requires a type of capital 
structure behaviour which is distinct from "bounded-optimisation" behaviour. Full- 
optimisation behaviour requires the finance manager to monitor and fully understand 
the effect of the salient determinants of the capital structure, such that, given those 
determinants, he or she may determine the optimal capital structure for the firm. As the 
determinants are external to the capital structure measure targeted, which is generally 
expressed as a ratio, this form of fall-optimisation is termed "extra-ratio" targeting, 
However, extra-ratio targeting behaviour may only occur where sophisticated 
information systems are in place within the finance function of the firm, so that all of 
the salient data necessary to a full-optin-dsation solution may be collected, transformed 
into information, analysed, and then acted upon. The results of the bivariate time series 
models revealed that extra-ratio targeting behaviour is evidenced predominantly in 
larger firms across the samples studied. Where the sophisticated information systems 
necessary to support extra-ratio targeting (full-optimisation) are not present within the 
firm's finance function, due to the scale of the firm, the cost, and so on, finance 
managers may instead engage in "intra-ratio" targeting (bounded-optimisation). Intra- 
ratio targeting behaviour involves the finance manager targeting the capital structure 
ratio of the firm upon the norm for the industry to which the firm belongs, upon the 
capital structure ratio of some larger firm(s), or on the basis of some other targeting 
criterion. It is a form of bounded-optimisation because the finance manager is 
OPtimising within the bounds imposed by the constraints of the firm's information 
systems. It is still a form of optimising behaviour because the finance manager 
is 
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in, plicitly benefiting from targeting the capital structure ratio of a firm or group of 
firrns which it perceives itself to be similar to, or has aspirations to be similar to. An 
example of this is where the finance manager targets the capital structure ratio norm 
for the industry to which it belongs. It is anticipated that intra-ratio target behaviour 
should be predominantly observed within smaller rather than larger firms in the analysis 
conducted in this section. If this expectation holds then it rationalises the lack of extra- 
ratio targeting behaviour exhibited by smaller firms in the bivariate models discussed in 
section 8.2. Whilst such intra-ratio targeting is not ideal for the individual firm, it may 
approximate its unique optimal capital structure ratio because the industry norin 
implicitly takes into account salient capital structure determinants such as the degree of 
business risk. Another example of intra-ratio targeting behaviour is where the finance 
manager targets the capital structure ratio of a larger, more successful firm, particularly 
a firm within the industry to which that firm belongs. The smaller firm thus benefits 
from the full-optimisation / extra-ratio targeting behaviour of the larger firm by 
targeting a capital structure which approximates to its own optimal ratio. 
Therefore, the level of sophistication of the firm's information systems may logically 
influence the type of targeting behaviour which the finance manager of the firm 
engages in, and thus may ultimately influence the degree to which the capital structure 
is optimised. The individual firm finance manager trades-off the benefits of achieving 
full-optimisation against the cost of the sophisticated information systems required to 
achieve this aim. 
Intra-ratio targeting is generally framed in the literature such that the finance manager 
of the firm targets the firm's capital structure ratio upon the norm (or average) of the 
industry to which that firm belongs. Before analysing the occurrence of intra-ratio 
targeting behaviour, it is necessary to place this new concept within the context of the 
previous studies of capital structure targeting. There are numerous theories explaining 
WhY firms might endeavour to target their capital structures on the norm (or average) 
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of the industry to which they belong. Scott and Martin (1975) argued that the finance 
manager of the firm lacks a valuation formula to determine the best capital structure 
for his/her individual firm, relying instead on analysis and judgement. They suggested 
that judgement may be improved by examining the funding mixes of other firms in the 
same industry. Indeed, Drury and Bougen (1980) noted that any deviation from 
industry norms is viewed by both lenders and investors with some suspicion, further 
encouraging strong industry convergence. Scott (1972), however, rationalised 
targeting behaviour by arguing that firms choose capital structures which are consistent 
with their particular business risk. As firms within the same industry should have a 
similar degree of business risk, a range of leverage ratios will exist which firms will 
seek to locate within. Remmers et al (1974) argued that firms in the same industry face 
the same environmental and economic conditions, thus producing a clustering of 
capital structure ratios. 
Therefore, the theory suggests that if firms target their capital structures upon the 
norm for their industry then optimal firm-level capital structures may exist. The reason 
that firms target in this way is because finance managers often look for guidance from 
sinAar firms on financial structure decisions, as they recognise that similar firms will be 
exposed to similar environmental factors, especially business risk, and they realise that 
significant departures from published industry norms will be viewed with 'some 
suspicion. 
Evidence supporting the occurrence of industry norm capital structure targeting 
behaviour consists predominantly of simple analysis of variance tests which seek to test 
the hypothesis that debt-equity ratios (or other capital structure variants) vary more 
between industries than they do within industries. Schwartz and Aronson (1967) 
studied the common stock equity tatios for four US industry classes for the years 1928 
and 1961 and found significant differences in the equity ratios between industries 
compared to differences within them. Lev (1969) conducted a regression analysis of 
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245 US firms from 18 industries over the period 1947-66 and found that firms in 
general adjusted their financial ratios to industry-wide averages in a partial adjustment 
manner. Scott (1972) conducted an analysis of variance test of capital structure 
measures in 12 US industries containing 77 firms over the period 1959-68, and found 
significant differences in capital structures between industries in each of the ten years 
studied. Scott and Martin (1975) employed a Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance by 
ranks test to determine whether or not there existed a significant industry effect within 
the equity-to-total-asset ratios of 277 US firms from 12 industries over the period 
1967-72, and found industry class to be a significant determinant of financial structure. 
Briscoe and Hawke (1976) conducted an analysis of variance of 120 UK firms for the 
periods 1965-69 and 1970-74 and found evidence of significant industry differences in 
gearing. Ang (1976) constructed and estimated a range of models of corporate 
leverage and found the best performing models to be consistent with targeting 
behaviour, whereby firms move in a partial adjustment process towards the target, they 
merely drift around their own concept of a target, or they target their capital structure 
on the historical average of their industry, Marsh (1982) conducted a logit analysis of 
748 debt and equity issues made by UK companies over the period 1959-70, assuming 
that a company's choice of debt or equity was a function of the difference between 
current and target debt ratios, and that the target ratio was observed only through its 
deterniinants such as size, risk, and asset composition. As he found these determinants 
to be significant, he concluded that firms did choose to issue either debt or equity as 
though they strived towards target long-term debt ratios. Cordes and Sheffiin (1983) 
used the UK Treasury Corporate Tax Model to examine data associated with 1978 
corporate returns and found that the marginal incentives to use debt varied significantly 
across industries, thus implying that there may be an optimal capital structure 
associated with each separate industry. Finally, Titman and Wessels (1988) estimated a 
factor analytic model of the corporate capital structure choice, using data from 469 US 
firms over the period 1974-82, and found that industry-type appeared to influence the 
corporate capital structure chosen by the firm. Therefore, there is considerable 
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evidence to support the concept that firms target their capital structures with respect to 
the norms of their particular industry. 
There is some evidence questioning the occurrence of industry norm capital structure 
targeting behaviour. Remmers et al (1974) conducted a one-way analysis of variance 
of the debt-to-total-assets ratio for manufacturing industries in five countries, and 
found that industry norm was a significant determinant of corporate debt ratios in 
France and Japan, but not in the Netherlands, Norway and the US. They concluded 
from this that the industry influence on the capital structure is very weak, possibly 
because "industry" is not a good proxy for business risk. Stonehill et al (1975), in their 
survey of 87 firms from France, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway and the US, over the 
period 1972-73, found that firms did not perceive the industry norm to be an important 
debt ratio detenninant in any of these countries. Drury and Bougen (1980) analysed 
700 UK firms in 45 industries over the period 1968-77, constructing gearing 
distributions for each industry. They found no evidence of the clustering of firms 
within each distribution around a norm and thus concluded that if an industry optimal 
capital structure does exist then it must be spread over a very wide range. Sekely and 
Collins (1988) conducted a Kruskal-Wallis test upon a sample of 677 firms from 9 
industries in 23 countries for the period 1979-80. They found that the differences in 
median rank between industries were not significant even at the 10 per cent level, and 
argued that the industry effect may be insignificant owing to a reduction in the 
distinction between industries through time, a significant increase in the use of debt 
across the sample, and the highly imperfect and incomplete markets that exist outside 
the US. However, their study did examine multinational corporations, which would be 
expected to complicate the results, rendering minimal any industry effect. Therefore, 
evidence questioning the existence of firm target capital structure ratios is far weaker 
than the evidence lending support to their existence. Even though authors such as 
Stonehill et al (1975) found that finance managers do not perceive capital structure 
targeting to be an important influence upon the capital structure decision, it may be 
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that such managers are subconsciously practising such behaviour or possibly that they 
would not admit to "following the leader" behaviour as such an admission might be 
embarrassing. 
On balance, evidence arising from the existing literature appears to support the 
proposition that individual firms target their capital structures on the norm for the 
industry to which they belong. This behaviour may result from the fact that firms 
within an industry are subject to similar business risk, tax incentives, or other factors. 
Furthermore, there is some evidence that firms are in a state of partial adjustment 
towards a capital structure target at a given moment in time, suggesting a continual 
state of disequilibrium. 
8.4.2 H3: potheses to be tested 
It is seen that there is considerable evidence in the existing literature supporting the 
occurrence of capital structure targeting behaviour based upon the capital structure 
ratio norm for the industry to which a particular firm belongs. However, this section 
examines intra-ratio targeting behaviour from an entirely new perspective. In a paper 
not directly related to capital structure theory, Marsh and Merton (1987) argue that 
US firms maintain a dividend-price ratio towards which they continually adjust, and 
that such behaviour implies that prices and dividends are cointegrateýd. This reasoning 
may be applied to capital structure theory to enable the targeting hypothesis to be 
tested within a time series perspective. Thus, if firms engage in intra-ratio capital 
structure targeting behaviour, it might be reasonably expected that the constituents of 
the capital structure measure are cointegrated, as firms continually adjust the 
proportions of different financial instruments towards their desired long-term capital 
structure path. 
The adjustment of the constituents of the capital structure ratio to maintain a desired 
lOng-run path is distinct from the adjustment of the capital structure ratio as a whole 
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measure towards a desired long-run path in relation to key long-run influencing 
factors. As already discussed, the former adjustment process is termed intra-ratio 
targeting whereas the latter is termed extra-ratio targeting. In the case of intra-ratio 
targeting, debt and equity are targeted in relation to each other and if such targeting 
occurs then the level of debt will track the level of equity, and vice versa, so that it 
appears that the amounts of the two financial instruments are drifting through time 
together, producing a cointegrating relationship. Therefore, cointegration analysis is 
employed to determine whether European firms adjust their DDE ratios as if 
continually tracking a desired capital structure mix. The hypothesis employed to test 
this, hypothesis H44, states that European quoted firms target capital structure ratios. 
However, hypothesis H44 may only be addressed after a number of supporting 
hypotheses, hypotheses H45 to H48, are tested. The supporting hypotheses relate to 
the type of capital structure accounting ratio targeted and the size of the firm. 
The supporting hypotheses related to the type of capital structure accounting ratio 
targeted are hypotheses H45 to H47. It is anticipated that the DDE ratio (the debt-to- 
debt-plus-equity ratio) is the most important targeted capital structure ratio that is 
continually adjusted by European firms because it not only expresses the proportion of 
long-term external finance represented by long-term debt, but also expresses this 
measure on a scale of zero to unity, thus making it a readily interpretable measure. 
Hypothesis H45, then, states that the DDE ratio is a capital structure ratio targeted by 
European quoted firms. Commonly cited alternatives to the DDE ratio measure are the 
debt-to-equity ratio (DE ratio) and the debt-to-total-assets ratio (DTA ratio). The DE 
ratio is not such as useful a measure as the DDE ratio, because it is not bounded 
by 
unity, although it still expresses long-term debt as a proportion of equity and 
in this 
sense is a pure capital structure measure. Hypothesis H46 states that the DE ratio 
is a 
capital structure ratio targeted by'European quoted firms. The DTA ratio 
is also not 
bounded by unity, and additionally, is a debt-to-firm- size measure which 
is less directly 
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interpretable than a pure capital structure measure. Hypothesis H47 states that the 
DTA ratio is a capital structure ratio targeted by European quoted firms. 
It was determined in the bivariate models that larger firms are more likely to set the 
level of the capital structure ratio in response to key capital structure determinants, 
producing cointegrating relationships which may be described as extra-ratio targeting. 
Smaller firms may target their capital structure ratios either upon the norm for their 
industry or upon the ratios of larger, more sophisticated firms. As industries are often 
dorninated by one or two large market leaders, industry-targeting may equate to large 
firm-targeting in many cases. As the smaller firms are tracking a desired capital 
structure ratio which is externally given, they are merely adjusting the proportions of 
debt and equity in their capital structures to the desired capital structure ratio. In this 
sense, smaller firms are far more likely to engage in intra-ratio targeting than larger 
finns, and consequently should exhibit capital structure constituent interrelationships 
which are cointegrated. Thus, hypothesis H48 states that the capital structure 
constituents of smaller firms are more likely to be cointegrated than the capital 
structure constituents of larger firms. 
Therefore, the capital structure targeting behaviour hypotheses, H45 to H48, are 
tested, as a means of testing the overall hypothesis, H44, which states that European 
quoted firms target capital structure accounting ratios. 
The data set analysed is data set 3, the European time series data set. Three time series 
variables are employed in the testing of this section: the total loan capital of the firm 
(labelled LRLOANS), the historical market value of equity (labelled HMVEQUITY), 
the sum of these variables (labelled LNPLUSEQ), and the total assets employed by the 
firm (which is labelled ASSETS). ' 
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aller European cluoted rirms 
The basis for the testing is that if a capital structure measure is targeted by European 
firms then the numerator and denominator of that measure will be cointegrated. Thus, 
if the DDE ratio is targeted, total loan capital (LRLOANS) will be cointegrated with 
the sum of total loan capital and the historical market value of equity (LNPLUSEQ). If 
the DE ratio is targeted, total loan capital will be cointegrated with the historical 
market value of equity (RMVEQUITY). Finally, if the DTA ratio is targeted, total 
loan capital will be cointegrated with the total assets employed by the firm (ASSETS). 
The tests employed to determine whether European firms target various capital 
structure measures in an intra-ratio manner is the Engle and Granger (1987) approach 
to cointegration analysis, applied in a slightly different manner in the construction of 
the bivariate EC models. Firstly, the order of integration of the four capital structure 
constituent variables is determined using the Dickey Fuller (1979) unit root test, 
hereafter known as the DF test. Secondly,, those variables which are integrated of the 
same order as total loan capital are tested using the DF or Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF) (1981) tests to determine whether they are cointegrated with that variable. 
Thus, measures which are cointegrated with total loan capital form the constituents of 
targeted capital structure measures. 
Before the unit root tests are undertaken, all of the constituent variables are tested for 
the presence of a deterministic trend. The null hypothesis is that there is no 
deterministic trend, and each variable is tested by means of an F-test of the estimated 
equation 8.3. with a critical value of 10.61 for 25 observations at the one per cent level 
(Dickey and Fuller (198 1), p. 1063, table 6). If the F-ratio, is greater than the DF critical 
value then the null hypothesis of no deterministic trend is rejected, and thus a 
deterministic trend is present. I 
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Ayt =a+ bT + cyt-, + Ct Equation 8.3 
Where: 
T= a time trend 
Once the deterministic trend test is computed for each of the constituent variables, the 
DF test is computed, as given in equation 8.4. The null hypothesis is that each capital 
structure constituent is non-stationary. Each variable is sequentially tested and 
differenced until the order of integration is determined, that is, until the null hypothesis 
is rejected and the variable is found to be stationary. 
Ayt : --:: 6*y, +6t Equation 8.4 
Critical values for the DF test are computed from Mackinnon (1991) response surface 
values. The null hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected if the DF statistic is lower 
than the Mackinnon critical value for the relevant number of observations. If the DF 
statistic is higher than the Mackinnon critical value, then, the null hypothesis may not 
be rejected, and the variable must be integrated of some higher order. In cases where a 
deterministic trend is present within the variable, the DF unit root test is estimated with 
a trend in the right hand side of the test equation, as given in equation 8.5. 
Ayt = ýt + (x. T+6. yt-, + ct Equation 8.5 
The Durbin Watson (DW) test for autocorrelation is computed at each stage of the 
sequential DF testing. The null hypothesis is that there is no residual autocorrelation) 
and this hypothesis is rejected if the DW statistic is less than the lower bound DW 
critical value, accepted if the statistic is greater than the upper bound, and an 
inconclusive result is produced if the statistic lies between the bounds. To strengthen 
the result of the DF test, the null hypothesis must not be rejected, that is, insignificant 
autocorrelation supports a stationa'rity result. 
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only those constituent variables integrated of the same order as the total loan capital 
variable are tested in the second stage of the procedure to determine whether they are 
cointegrated with it. Before the DF and ADF tests are undertaken, the residuals from a 
static long-run regression equation of the total loan capital variable upon the 
constituent to be examined are tested for the presence of a deterministic trend. 
Equation 8.6 is regressed for the residuals of each static long-run regression. The null 
hypothesis of no deterministic trend within the residuals is rejected if the F-ratio arising 
from the estimated regression of equation 8.6 exceeds the DF critical F value of 10.61 
for 25 observations at the one per cent level. 
AECMt =a+ bT + cECMt-I + Ft Equation 8.6 
Where: 
ECM= the error correction mechanism 
The second stage of the Engle and Granger cointegration testing procedure is then 
undertaken. Firstly, the cointegrating vector is estimated by regressing the total loan 
capital variable upon each of the other constituent variables in turn, as given in 
equation 8.7. 
Yt ----: It + 
Pýxt + vt Equation 8.7 
The estimated residuals are then tested for stationarity by means of the DF and ADF 
tests of equations 8.8 and 8.9. 
AA vt = 8. V^t-l + ýt Equation 8.8 
AA+ Ik vt = 6. v^t-l =, 
6i 
. Avt-i 
+ ýt Equation 8.9 
The ADF tests, which allow for autocorrelation, introduce as many lags as each sample 
requires. The null hypothesis that the residuals (error correction mechanisms) are non- 
stationary is rejected if the DF or ADF statistic is lower than the Mackinnon critical 
value for the relevant number of observations. Where ECM's are non-stationary the 
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relationship from which they are estimated is not a cointegrating relationship. In this 
context, a non-stationary ECM signals that the capital structure measure tested is not a 
targeted measure. Where a deterministic trend is found to be present within the ECM, 
the DF and ADF tests of equations 8.10 and 8.11 are estimated, including a trend. 
Av"t = cc. T+6. v^t +ýt Equation 8.10 
k 
Avt = oc. T+6. V^t + yj, =, 
6, 
. Avt-, 
+ ýt Equation 8.11 
Again, the DW test is computed, for each DF/ADF test computed. Acceptance of the 
null hypothesis of no residual autocorrelation is again the result required to lend 
support to a re . ection of the null hypothesis of non-stationarity. Therefore, the method Ij 
employed to determine whether European firms target capital structure measures 
through time is that of unit root testing and then cointegration testing, in addition to 
the respective deterministic trend and DW tests. Where the total loan capital measure 
is found to be integrated of the same order as, and is cointegrated with, another capital 
structure constituent, then it is argued that a capital structure measure with total loan 
capital as numerator and the cointegrated variable as denominator is indeed a measure 
targeted by European firms. 
8.4.4 Results of the testing for the existence of intra-ratio targeting behaviour 
The majority of the statistical test results are presented in appendix F, although the 
salient results are surnmarised in tables 8.14 and 8.15 below. Table I of appendix R 
shows that, excepting the total loan capital variable for the UK weighted sample, none 
of the other capital structure consistent variables contain a significant deterministic 
trend at the I per cent level. The DF unit root tests for this particular variable thus 
include a trend in the right hand side of the DF test equation for the UK weighted 
samPle, as given in equation 8.5. ' 
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Table 8.14 
. Zmý ults of the unit root tests computed for the can: ital structure 
t the I per cent level, showing the order of integration 
variable weighted/ 
non-weighted 
UK Netherlands Gennany France 
LRLOANS weighted 0 2 2 2 
HMVEQUITY weighted I I I I 
LRLOANS+ 
HMVEQUITY 
weighted 1 1 2 2 
ASSETS weighted 2 2 2 N 
LRLOANS non-weighted 1 1 1 2 
HMVEQUITY non-weighted I 1 1 2 
LRLOANS+ 
WAVEQUITY 
non-weighted 1 1 1 2 
ASSETS non-weighted 2 2 2 N 
Figures in bold give the order of integration of those variables which may be tested for the 
existence of a cointegrating relationship with the total loan capital in the second stage of the 
cointegration testing procedure. These capital structure constituent variables are integrated 
of the same order as the total loan ýapital variable. 
N= variable which is not capable 6f becoming integrated. 
The results of the DF unit root tests are given in tables 2 to 5 of the appendix, and are 
summarised in table 8.14. The table shows that many of the capital structure 
constituent variables are integrated of the same order as the total loan capital variable 
i within each sample and thus may 'be tested for the existence of a cointegrating 
relationship with that variable. None'. of the capital structure variables are integrated of 
the same order as the total loan capital constituent variable for the UK weighted 
sample because it is integrated of order zero. An interesting result is that in the 
majority of samples, the total assets employed (ASSETS) variable is either integrated 
of a Iýigher order than the total loan capital variable, or is not integrated at all. As a 
result of this, total assets employed is not tested for the possibility of a cointegrating 
relationship with total loan capital in the majority of samples. This suggests that the 
majority of European firms do not target the DTA ratio (debt-to-total-assets ratio), 
Possibly due to the shortcomings of this ratio such that it is not a pure capital structure 
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measure and is not bounded by unity, rendering it less readily interpretable than other 
capital structure measures. Even at this early stage in the analysis, therefore, hypothesis 
H47 is questioned. 
Table 6 of the appendix reveals that the residuals of the static long-run regressions of 
total loan capital on each capital structure constituent variable do not contain 
significant deterministic trends in any of the European samples tested. Thus, a trend 
need not be included in any of the cointegration test equations. The DF/ADF 
cointegration test results are given in tables 7 to 13 of the appendix and are 
surnmarised in table 8.15. 
Table 8.15 
Summary of cointegration testing of the total loan capital variable upon each of 
the capital structure constituent variables at the 10 per cent significance level 
vaflable weighted/ UK Netherlands Gerniany France 
non- 
weighted 
HMVEQUITY WEIGHTED NT NT NT NT 
LRLOANS+ WEIGHTED NT NT cointegrated cointegrated 
RMVEQUITY lag 0,1 *, 2 lag 0 
ASSETS WEIGHTED NT NR NR NT 
HMVEQUITY NON- cointegrated cointegrated NR NR 
WEIGHTED lags 0,2 lag3* 
LRLOANS+ NON- cointegrated cointegrated NR NR 
HMVEQUITY WEIGHTED lags 0,2 lag 3* 
AS: S: ETS 
L 
NON- NT NT NT NT 
WEIGHTED 
*= the Durbin Watson test is inconclusive for this lag length within tile IMADI' test. 
NT = the capital structure constituent variable is not tested for the existence of a 
cointegrating relationship with the total loan capital variable, as either it is 
integrated of a different order than this variable or is not integrated at all. 
NR = the null hypothesis of no cointegration is not rejected. 
The table shows that there are relatively few occurrences of cointegrated capital 
structure relationships. However, some capital structure constituents show more 
evidence of a cointegrating relationship with the total loan capital measure than others. 
Of the six incidences of cointegrating capital structure constituents (targeted capital 
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structure measures), four relate to the targeting of the DDE ratio and two relate to the 
targeting of the DE ratio. Therefore, there is some evidence to support hypotheses 
H45 and H46, although such evidence is weak as capital structure targeting behaviour 
is not universal across samples. The DTA ratio does not exhibit cointegrated 
constituent variables for any of the European data samples, and it is thus inferred that 
such a measure is not widely employed by finance managers as a capital structure 
target, refuting hypothesis H47. 
Table 8.15 reveals quite clearly that the effect of the scale of the firm appears to be 
important to the targeting behaviour of the finance manager. There is some evidence of 
a targeting behaviour dichotomy between larger and smaller firms, whereby larger 
firms are more likely to engage in extra-ratio targeting (full-optimisation) and smaller 
firms are more likely to engage in intra-ratio targeting (bounded-optimisation). 
Therefore hypothesis H48 is supported. 
Once it is determined that intra-ratio targeting is behaviour associated mainly with 
smaller European quoted firms, it is the lower half of table 8.15 which becomes of 
greater interest, as this shows the cointegration test results for the non-weighted 
European samples. Additionally, once the less popular DTA ratio measure is eliminated 
as a targeted measure, it is clearly observed that the DE ratio and the DDE ratio are 
important capital structure target measures. One reason why cointegrating 
relationships for these measures are not universal across samples may be merely that 
statistically significant cointegration test results require a greater number of 
observations than is available within the shorter time-span samples. 
Before the salient results are brought together, the limitations of the analysis 
undertaken are briefly discussed. ' Firstly, residual autocorrelation appears to be a 
problem in a number of the cointegration tests, although the use of the Durbin Watson 
test in this analysis may be problematic anyway as the cointegration test equation 
488 
contains a lagged dependent variable. Secondly, it may be argued that the time series 
data time-spans are too short to produce strong evidence of intra-ratio targeting 
behaviour. However, although data availability limits the strength of the results,, the 
analysis may be considered an extremely useful illustrative exercise. 
on balance, once the effect of the scale of the firm is taken into account, hypotheses 
H45 and H46 are given greater support, particularly once the effect of short time-spans 
on the cointegration. test results is understood. As anticipated, the less popular DTA 
ratio measure is not found to be targeted at all for the countries analysed, and thus 
hypothesis H47 is fim-Ay rejected. The effect of the scale of the firm is clearly observed, 
supporting hypothesis H48. Therefore, there is some evidence that European quoted 
firms, particularly smaller firms, target capital structure accounting ratios, thus 
supporting hypothesis H44, although firms appear to be very specific with respect to 
the precise measure they target. 
8.4.5 Summary 
Thus, the concept of intra-ratio targeting behaviour, developed in this section, involves 
the targeting of the constituents of the capital structure ratio with reference to the ratio 
of another firm or group of firms. Some evidence is found to support the hypothesis 
that European quoted firms target capital structure ratios in an intra-ratio targeting 
manner. Consistent with the theory developed, evidence reveals that smaller quoted 
firms are more likely to engage in intra-ratio targeting behaviour than larger quoted 
firms as they do not have in place the sophisticated information systems necessary to 
facilitate extra-ratio targeting. Additionally, there is evidence that finance managers 
only target very specific capital structure ratio measures such as the DDE ratio and the 
DE ratio, and that measures such as the DTA ratio are not targeted, probably because 
they are not so readily interpretable. Whilst intra-ratio targeting appears to be a fairly 
naive form of corporate behaviour, it is useful as a form of bounded-optimisation 
whereby the finance manager may approximate the firm's optimal capital structure 
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ratio, given the firm's business risk and other prevailing market conditions. Therefore, 
there exists a behavioural dichotomy with respect to corporate capital structure policy 
which is supported both by the results of the bivariate and multivariate time series . 
models pnd by the results from the analysis of this section. There is evidence, then, that 
predorainantly larger firms engage in full-optimisation in the long-run (extra-ratio 
targeting) whereas predominantly smaller firms engage in bounded-optimisation (intra- 
ratio targeting) in the long-run. 
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.5 
SummaEy of results arising from the corporate capital str2cture ti e 
seEiLes analyses 
it is clearly demonstrated that the capital structure policies undertaken by European 
firms are complex. Perhaps the most pronounced result arising from the time series 
capital structure research is the dichotomous nature of capital structure policy 
behaviour, such that smaller firms and larger firms appear to engage in different capital 
structure behaviour due to differences in the sophistication of their respective finance 
functions. There are likely to be differences in the sophistication of the information 
collection, analysis, and actioning systems within the finance function between larger 
and smaller firms which determine the extent to which the individual firm is able to 
engage in optimising capital structure setting behaviour. It is essential to present a 
synthesis of the results arising from the time series research to explain the nature of the 
capital structure behavioural dichotomy which emerges. 
Smaller European firms operate both operational and strategic capital structure 
policies. In the short-run, the firm operates an operational capital structure policy 
which determines the setting of the DDE ratio on a month-to-month or even year-to- 
year basis. The most important influences upon the operational capital structure policy 
of the smaller firm are those factors which impact directly upon the explicit relative 
costs of financial instruments. The finance manager monitors changes in nominal 
taxation measures such as the nominal tax advantage to debt and the nominal corporate 
tax rate, and reacts to increases in these variables by increasing the firm's DDE ratio. 
There also appears to be a reaction to an increase in the effective corporate tax and 
effective total tax rates, which may alternatively be described as a reactive response to 
an increase in the relative tax bill, whereby managers raise the DDE ratio as part of a 
tax-reduction strategy. However, there is more evidence of a reaction to changes in the 
effective taxation variables in larger firms because the effective taxation measures 
proxy the effective tax advantage to debt more closely than the naive nominal 
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measures, and it is argued that the larger, more sophisticated firm finance managers 
appreciate this distinction more than smaller, naive firm finance managers. 
Macroeconomic environment factors also impact directly upon the relative costs of 
financial instruments and thus exert a strong exogenous influence upon the operational 
capital structure policy of the smaller firm. An increase in the rate of inflation 
encourages the finance manager to increase the DDE ratio as the inflation rate increase 
is likely to have a positive influence upon the tax advantage to debt by raising interest 
rates and reducing the value of non-debt tax allowances which may crowd out debt tax 
allowances. Additionally, the performance of financial markets significantly affects the 
operational capital structure decision of the smaller firm as the manager may only 
significantly increase issues of debt or equity claims if interest rates are relatively high 
or equity markets are buoyant, respectively. The timing of capital structure decisions 
may also be influenced by the performance of financial markets in the short-run, due to 
the investor, rather than the corporate, orientation of such markets. Therefore, those 
factors which exert the most important influence upon the operational capital structure 
decision of the smaller firm are factors which impact directly upon the explicit relative 
costs of financial instruments, whereby macroeconomic environment factors determine 
the before-tax cost of finance and taxation factors determine the after-tax cost. 
Taxation and macroeconomic factors which do not impact directly upon the exp icit 
costs of finance exert little influence upon the operational capital structure policy of the 
smaller firm as their influence upon gearing is too remote. It is noted that the finance 
manager monitors closely exogenous influences upon the DDE ratio whereas 
endogenous influences, determined within the firm, exert only a weak influence. There 
is some evidence that relatively larger and more profitable firms are more willing to 
maintain higher gearing, althoughfinancial risk is not an important influence, probably 
because the quoted firms in the European research are not greatly concerned with the 
Possibility of financial distress as they are likely to be characterised by diversified 
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markets, large reserves, and so on. It may be the case that increases in firm size and 
profitability impinge weakly upon policy because only longer-run increases in both 
va6ables will cause an improvement in the finance managers' perception of the firm's 
debt capacity. Therefore, potential influences of the operational capital structure policy 
of the firm will not be significant unless they are capable of exerting an exogenous 
influence upon gearing through their direct impact upon the explicit costs of financial 
instruments. 
A further influence upon the operational capital structure policy of the smaller firm is 
that of endo-exogenous interaction. This describes the impact of exogenous factors, in 
conjunction with endogenous factors, upon the corporate capital structure policy. For 
example, managers may observe an increase in the corporate tax rate, which exerts an 
influence upon gearing policy at the aggregate level. However, once the current tax- 
allowances of the firm (which depend in part upon the nature of each individual firm's 
investment projects) are taken into account, managers' gearing reactions are likely to 
vary significantly across firms, producing an influence upon gearing. policy at the 
individual firm level. However, the complexity of this interaction may mean that only 
the finance managers of larger, more sophisticated firms may correctly understand and 
take account of this effect. This may mean that the endo-exogenous effect is weaker 
for smaller European firms. 
There are also influences upon the operational capital structure policy of the smaller 
firm which work in the converse direction of causation. The cross-sectional bivariate 
regression analyses determined that the DDE ratio is perhaps better considered as an 
exogenous variable with respect to corporate environment factors. Therefore, the 
finance manager must take into consideration the potential influence of the DDE ratio 
4R-On the corporate environment before he or she can make a gearing decision which 
may be considered optimal for the firm. As the European capital structure research 
strongly confirms the presence of two-way causal capital structure relationships across 
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the samples, such potential effects are likely to be understood by even the most naive 
finns and thus both relationships in a two-way causal relationship must form inputs 
into the operational capital structure policy of the smaller firm. 
Overall, then, those exogenous factors which impact upon the explicit costs of finance 
continually influence the smaller firm finance manager's operational capital structure 
policy. As such factors are ex, ogenous and are relatively easily understood in terms of 
the appropriate gearing response, corporate DDE ratios are adjusted fairly rapidly to 
factor changes. Whilst the exogenous factors dominate the operational policy, the 
finance manager may also monitor the year-to-year profitability and scale of the firm, 
though may not react to changes in these variables unless it is perceived that they 
represent more permanent shifts and are not merely transitory. Endo-exogenous 
interaction effects may exert an influence upon operational capital structure policy, 
although this influence is likely to be weak due to the difficulties in correctly gauging 
an appropriate gearing response. Finally, at each juncture of the operational policy 
process, the manager will roughly gauge the likely impact of gearing adjustments upon 
the health of the firm as a whole. Thus, the dominating influence of exogenous factors 
(which determine the explicit costs of finance) and the more implicit recognition of the 
converse effect of gearing upon the corporate environment together form the salient 
processes governing the operational capital structure policy of the firm. 
In the longer-run, smaller firm finance managers are demonstrated to operate a type of 
strategic capital structure policy behaviour referred to as intra-ratio targeting, whereby 
the manager targets the capital structure ratio of the firm upon the norm for the 
industry to which the firm belongs, upon the capital structure ratio of some larger 
firm(s), or on the basis of some other targeting criterion. Such behaviour is a form of 
bounded-optimisation because the finance manager is optimising within the bounds 
imposed by the constraints of the firm's information systems and is emulating the 
capital structure ratio of a firm or group of firms which it perceives itself to be similar 
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to, or has aspirations to be similar to. Thus, the firm is benefiting from copying the 
capital structure ratio of other firms which approximate its degree of business risk or 
copying the ratio of a larger, more successful firm, for example. The smaller firm 
finance manager, then, may be approximating the capital structure ratio which is 
optimal for his or her firm. 
Overall, then, the operational capital structure policy of the smaller firm is similar to 
that for the larger firm. However, smaller firm finance managers may react more 
significantly to changes in nominal taxation variables than larger firm managers might. 
The operational policy is driven mainly by those exogenous factors which determine 
the explicit costs of financial instruments, although it is also determined by an 
awareness of the influence of gearing upon the health of the firm. The endo-exogenous 
interaction effect is not as strong in smaller firms as it is likely to be in larger firms, as 
to understand its full influence demands more sophisticated information systems to be 
present within the finance function of the firm. The relationship between the 
operational and strategic policy behaviour of the smaller firm may be explained in an 
intuitive manner. It is argued that the finance manager of the smaller firm essentially 
emulates other firms' capital structure ratios in the long-run, based upon one of the 
criteria discussed above, thus producing the long-term path of the DDE ratio. 
However, from year to year there may be fluctuations around this path due to the 
operational policy gearing adjustments, which arise mainly from changes in factors 
which determine the explicit costs of finance. Thus, the capital structure ratio of the 
smaller firm is determined in the long-run by emulating behaviour referred to as intra- 
ratio targeting, although in the short-run there may be fluctuations around this longer- 
term path due mainly to movements in those exogenous factors which determine the 
explicit costs of finance. 
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Larger European firms operate both operational and strategic capital structure policies, 
though the nature of the strategic policy of the larger firm, in particular, is radically 
different from that of the smaller firm. The year-to-year, or operational, capital 
structure policy of the larger firm is identical to that of the smaller firm, discussed 
above, except for two important differences. Firstly, larger firms appear more likely to 
react to changes in measures of the effective tax advantage to debt than smaller firms, 
realising that the effective taxation measures are more important to capital structure 
policy decisions than nominal taxation measures. As larger firms have in place the 
sophisticated information systems which enable the firm to gauge the extent of the 
effective tax advantage to debt, taking into account factors such as tax exhaustion, 
their reaction to changes in the taxation environment are likely to be more considered 
and appropriate. Secondly, larger firms are more sophisticated and can thus understand 
and more accurately take account of endo-exogenous interaction effects. Thus, 
changes in the taxation environment, for example, do not only exert an influence in 
aggregate, but also exert an influence upon each individual firm. A change in the 
aggregate tax advantage to debt leads to differential effects across firms because such 
firms will be tax-exhausted to different extents, and thus less tax-exhausted firms may 
make a more significant gearing adjustment than more tax exhausted firms. This is due 
to the fact that non-debt tax allowances may crowd out to some extent the tax 
allowances associated with new debt, thus rendering the tax advantage to new debt 
contingent upon the structure and operations of the firm which give rise to the amount 
of non-debt allowances, such as the nature of the firm's investment projects. Thus, the 
operational capital structure policy of the larger firms will still be dominated by those 
exogenous factors which determine the explicit costs of finance, although the converse 
effect of gearing upon the corporate environment and endo-exogenous interaction 
effects will also influence the determination of that policy. 
In the longer-run, larger firm finance managers engage in a form of strategic capital 
structure behaviour referred to as extra-ratio targeting, whereby the manager targets 
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the long-run path of the capital structure ratio in relation to its key long-run taxation, 
rnacroeconomic and corporate determinants. As observed for the operational capital 
structure policy of the European firm, the dominant determinants of the strategic 
capital structure policy decision are those exogenous factors which impact upon the 
explicit costs of finance. Additionally, however, corporate environment factors which 
exert a weak influence upon the operational corporate capital structure policy may 
exert a more significant influence upon the strategic capital structure policy. An 
increase in financial safety appears to lead to a reduction in gearing in the long-run, as 
this "good news" information signalling effect leads to an increase in investor demand 
for the firm's equity. An increase in profitability over the long-run causes an increase in 
gearing, probably because finance managers may wait until the improvement in the 
fortunes of the firm appear to be sustained before significantly increasing the debt risk 
stance of the firm. Endo-exogenous interaction effects also impinge significantly upon 
the strategic capital structure policy of the larger firm in a manner similar to that 
discussed at the operational level. Therefore, in the longer-run, the finance manager 
not only examines those exogenous factors which determine the explicit costs of 
finance, but also considers the ability of the firm generally to cover its debt servicing 
commitments. 
Once the strategic capital structure ratio is determined, the finance manager of the 
larger firm then considers the likely influence of that ratio upon the corporate 
environment. Such a consideration of the converse direction of causation is essential as 
a long-run optimal solution placed within a nexus of two-way causal capital structure 
relationships must logically optimise with respect to each causal direction. In the 
longer-run, an adjustment to corporate gearing appears to exert a significant influence 
upon firm liquidity, profitability, growth, and financial safety. An increase in gearing 
exerts a detrimental effect upon firm growth and financial safety. The former effect 
may arise from increased gearing displacing marginal investment projects, or may arise 
due to the increasing restrictiveness of debt covenants constraining activities which 
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, night lead to faster growth. The latter effect may arise from increased gearing 
reducing the financial safety of the firm, due to the increased servicing commitments 
associated with debt which must be covered by future income streams. An increase in 
gearing may also exert a beneficial effect upon firm liquidity and profitability, as 
gearing may facilitate the expansion of the firm's investment project portfolio, leading 
to an increase in future income streams. Whilst the detrimental and beneficial effects of 
gearing upon the corporate environment may at first glance appear inconsistent, it is 
recognised that the capital structure policy of the firm involves the trading-off of all of 
these influences, in addition to the myriad of influences upon gearing itself, to arrive at 
an optimal solution. It is intuitive that, whereas the shorter-term impact of debt may be 
detrimental to the firm as debt mainly confers costs upon the firm in the short-run (a 
proposition which is supported by the results of the short-term models of chapter 5), 
the benefits may only be identified in the longer-run (as demonstrated in the bivariate 
EC models discussed above). Thus, the "knock-on" effects of gearing are an important 
determinant of the long-run strategy of capital structure policy of the larger European 
firm. 
The multivariate EC models provide a further perspective on the capital structure 
policy behaviour of larger European firms, although the perspective may also logically 
apply to smaller firms even though they were not modelled in this manner due to data 
constraints. There is some evidence that the DDE ratio exerts an influence upon the 
corporate environment which is potentially qf greater significance than the converse 
direction, although the results which underpin this proposition arise from the analysis 
of only one of the samples in the European data set. Clearly, the firm is not driven by 
the sole objective of optimising the long-run external financing decision, and it is likely 
that senior managers from other functions of the firm maintain objectives which are of 
greater importance to the continued success of the firm. Whilst the ultimate owners of 
the firm, its shareholders, are constantly concerned that the finance manager maximises 
the value of the firm by minimising the weighted average costs of the capital 
it 
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ernploys, a more prominent shareholder concern would be the overall profitability of 
the firm. Thus, the firm's target profitability ratio may represent a more prominent firm 
target than its capital structure ratio target, even though the two are intrinsically bound 
together and related. Another prominent target of the firm is that of risk minimisation, 
whether business risk, financial risk, or other forms of risk, as all firms seek to 
maximise returns whilst minimising the risks associated with those returns. However, 
rather than proposing a likely hierarchy of targets / objectives for the European firm in 
this research to enable the placing of the capital structure ratio target within that 
hierarchy, it is merely noted that the capital structure ratio is only one gf A range of 
targets, though is likely to remain an extremely important concern to the overall 
corporate strategy of the firm. 
Overall, then, the operational capital structure policy of the larger firm is very similar 
to that of the smaller firm, except for the fact that taxation measures and endo- 
exogenous interaction effects will exert a greater influence. The key distinction 
between smaller and larger firm capital structure policy behaviour is at the strategic 
level, as larger firms engage in a form of full-optimisation involving the targeting of the 
long-run path of the capital structure ratio in relation to its key extra-ratio 
determinants, whereas smaller firms engage merely in a form of bounded-optimisation. 
However, in addition to extra-ratio targeting behaviour, there are also long-run endo- 
exogenous interaction effects, whereby aggregate changes in taxation and 
macroeconomic environment factors produce individual firm-level effects. Once the 
strategic capital structure ratio is determined in relation to its key long-run 
determinants, the finance manager then considers the likely influence of the ratio upon 
the Corporate environment, before arriving at a final capital structure solution which is 
optimal in the long-run. Therefore, the finance manager of the larger firm determines 
the optimal long-run capital structure solution which dictates the long-run desired path 
of the capital structure ratio, around which there will be short-run fluctuations due to 
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operational policy gearing adjustments, which arise mainly from changes in factors 
which determine the explicit costs of finance. 
The synthesis of results described above gives rise to a theoretical model of the 
operational and strategic capital structure policy behaviour of the European quoted 
firni which is supported by empirical evidence arising from the application of a wide 
range of econometric and statistical techniques. The overall corporate capital structure 
model highlights the importance of a behavioural dichotomy based upon the scale of 
the firm. However, the most important development of this research is that the 
complete corporate capital structure model may be employed to address the central 
hypothesis of European research, which states that there exist firm-level optimal capital 
structures. However, there are four criteria to be met before the existence of firm-level 
optimal solutions may be supported with any degree of confidence. 
Firstly, for there to exist firm-level optimal capital structure solutions, firm behaviour 
must evidence at least weak-form optimising behaviour. A weak-form optimal capital 
structure solution may be argued to occur where the firm finance manager takes into 
account a wide range of factors before setting the level of the capital structure. In the 
European research, weak-form optimising behaviour is consistent with the operational 
capital structure behaviour evidenced by larger and smaller firms alike. Although the 
key influences upon operational capital structure policy are those factors which 
determine the explicit costs of finance, in addition a more extensive group of variables 
is demonstrated to exert a weaker influence. Indeed, the multivariate logistic regression 
marginal models identified that firms' gearing decisions are influenced by a very wide 
range of mainly corporate environment variables, even though their influence is weak. 
Other influences upon the operational capital structure policy include endo-exogenous 
interaction effects, which describe the combined effect of - related factors upon 
cOrporate gearing. Additionally, the finance manager is demonstrated to examine the 
influence of gearing upon the corporate environment in the cross-sectional models of 
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chapter 5, which confirms that finance managers must take into account the two-way 
causal nature of the corporate gearing decision in relation to the corporate 
environment. Therefore, it is demonstrated that the operational capital structure policy 
decision made by the firm is influenced by: the explicit costs of finance, arising from 
the taxation and macroeconomic environments; a weaker influence from endogenous 
corporate environment variables, particularly those describing the firm's ability to 
support debt; complex endo-exogenous interaction effects; and the two-way causal 
nature of the gearing decision in relation to the corporate environment. As there is 
evidence of significant gearing adjustments to this diverse and complex range of 
influences; evidence that the finance manager takes into account the influence of 
gearing upon the corporate environment; and evidence that such behaviour holds for 
both larger and smaller firms though to slightly different extents in some cases, the 
existence of weak-form optimisation behaviour is firmly supported. 
Although evidence of weak-form optimisation enables the first criterion to be met, a 
more robust support for the first optimality criterion would be provided if there were 
also evidence of strong-form optimising behaviour. A strong-form optimal capital 
structure solution may be argued to occur where the individual firm finance manager 
determines the desired long-run path of the DDE ratio in relation to key long-run 
determinants of that ratio. Smaller firms engage predominantly in intra-ratio, targeting 
in the long-run. Although evidence of intra-ratio targeting behaviour is provided by the 
presence of cointegrating processes, thus evidencing long-run disequilibrium- 
correction behaviour in relation to the firm's target ratio, this form of behaviour is still 
relatively naive as it is a form of bounded-optimisation behaviour. The underlying 
bounded nature of the optimisation and the fact that the manager does not make full 
use of information describing the key -long-run determinants of the capital structure 
ratio must mean that intra-ratto I targeting may not be described as strong-form 
OPtimisation. However, it is a stronger-form of optimising behaviour than the 
operational capital structure setting behaviour observed for the short-run as 
it 
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evidences error-correction behaviour and therefore must be described as a form of 
strategic behaviour which is classified somewhere between weak-form and strong-form 
optimisation. Larger firms engage in extra-ratio targeting in the long-run, whereby the 
finance manager does indeed target the long-run path of the capital structure ratio in 
relation to its key determinants. As such targeting is evidenced by the error-correction 
behaviour of the finance manager and the target ratio is based upon key taxation, 
macroeconomic and corporate environment determinants, then this fulfils the 
requirements for strong-form optimisation. Furthermore, as the finance manager also 
examines the likely converse influence of the DDE ratio upon the corporate 
environment before arriving at a final long-run solution which is considered optimal, 
this surely augments the strong-form optirnising nature of the strategic capital structure 
behaviour of larger firms. 
Therefore, there is strong evidence to support the first criterion towards the existence 
of firm-level optimal capital structure solutions, as there is evidence, at the very least, 
of weak-form optimising behaviour across all firms. Additionally, smaller firms engage 
in behaviour approaching strong-form optimisation in the long-run whilst larger firms 
do indeed engage in full-optimisation or strong-form optimising behaviour in the long- 
run. 
Secondly, for there to exist firm-level optimal capital structure solutions, it must be 
demonstrated that optimising behaviour is capable of occurring for the individual firm, 
and not merely for the market as a whole. As operational capital structure policy is 
determined to a weak extent by corporate environment factors, to a somewhat stronger 
extent by endo-exogenous interaction effects, and is also determined by taking into 
consideration the potential converse influence of the DDE ratio upon the corporate 
environment, firm-level solutions should arise from such a policy. The reason for this is 
that the corporate environment is interrelated with the capital structure decision 
by 
means of both direct and indirect relationships, forcing the solution of the individual 
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firm to reflect the influence not only of aggregate, exogenous factors but also the 
influence of the corporate environment of the firm. The longer-rUn or strategic capital 
structure policy is somewhat more complex to consider in terms of the second 
criterion. The strategic policy of the larger firm is determined in relation to key 
corporate environment factors, endo-exogenous interaction effects, and the two-way 
causal nature of the DDE ratio with respect to corporate environment factors, all of 
which are capable of producing a firm-level optimal solution. However, the strategic 
behaviour of the smaller firm may, by definition, produce a capital structure solution 
which is identical to that of the firm(s) which it seeks to emulate by means of intra- 
ratio targeting, and thus a solution may result which is common to a number of firms 
of like nature (such as those firms within the same industry). This does not mean that, 
overall, smaller firm capital structure solutions are not firm-specific, however, because 
it is demonstrated that the operational capital structure policy is likely to produce 
fluctuations around the long-run capital structure path, thus rendering each firm's 
solution unique. Furthermore, the interaction of the operational and strategic capital 
structure policies of larger firms merely serves to strengthen the firm-level nature of 
their capital structure solutions, as either policy is capable of producing a firm-specific 
solution. There is strong evidence to support the firm-level nature of optimal capital 
structure solutions, then, as both larger and smaller firm capital structure policies are 
capable of producing firm-level solutions, therefore lending support to the second 
Optimality criterion. 
Thirdly, for there to exist firm-level optimal capital structure solutions, any variation in 
the extent of capital structure optinýiisation across firms must be explained in terms of 
the tangible characteristics of those firms. The characteristic of the firm which 
determines the extent to which the firm may engage in full optimisation, and which is 
capable of explaining the behavioural dichotomy that exists between smaller and larger 
firms, is the complexity of the information gathering, monitoring, analysis, and 
utilisation systems present within the finance function of the firm. Whilst the research 
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has not tested directly whether significant differences occur in the complexity of 
information systems between smaller and larger firms, it is argued that all of the 
processes by which the finance manager is seen to determine the corporate capital 
structure ratio may be explained in terms of information system differentials. The 
information systems proposition relies merely upon the logical statement that larger 
firms have in place more complex information systems, facilitated by large, expert 
teams, whereas smaller firms' information systems are much less sophisticated. Clearly, 
it would be difficult to dispute such a statement even though it is not explicitly tested 
in this research. Therefore, the analysis of capital structure behaviour across European 
firms strongly supports the probability of a behavioural. dichotomy based upon 
differentials in information system complexity. The complexity of information systems, 
then, is clearly capable of explaining the observed variation in the extent of 
optimisation across European firms, thus supporting the third criterion towards firm- 
level optimal capital structure solutions. 
Fourthly, for there to exist firm-level optimal capital structure solutions, all of the 
environments within which the firm is placed must be demonstrated to contribute 
towards any optimal solution found to exist, otherwise the solution is optimal only 
with respect to an artificial subset of the real-world environment. Taxation and 
macroeconomic environment factors are demonstrated to contribute most significantly 
towards an optimal solution, both at the operational and strategic policy level, as they 
determine the explicit costs of external finance. Hypotheses H2 and H3, which state 
that taxation and macroeconomic factors, respectively, significantly influence the 
corporate capital structure, are therefore firmly supported. As discussed above, 
however, the corporate environment exerts an influence which is generally weaker and 
more indirect, resulting from two-way causal interrelationships with the capital 
structure ratio and endo-exogenbus interaction effects. Thus, although corporate 
environment factors exert a weaker and perhaps more complex influence than the more 
exogenous factors examined, the impact of ; corporate environment factors is still a 
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significant influence upon the corporate capital structure, supporting hypothesis H4. 
Hypotheses H2 to H4, which are termed the. supporting hypotheses in chapter 4, must 
be addressed before finally addressing the central hypothesis, HI. As there is strong 
support for each of these supporting hypotheses, which further derives from the 
empirical testing of numerous subsidiaty hypotheses, the resulting optimising capital 
structure behaviour of the firm does indeed appear to be conducted with reference to 
the taxation, macroeconomic and corporate environments within which the firm is 
placed, and thus resulting solutions are optimal in relation to the whole environment. 
Therefore, hypothesis HI is supported, and resulting optimal solutions arise ftom a 
theoretically-underpinned empirical analysis which is as comprehensive as data 
limitations allow, thus supporting the fourth criterion. 
In summary, the central hypothesis, Hl, is strongly supported, and thus there exist 
firm-level optimal capital structures within European quoted firms. Capital structure 
solutions are, in the least, weak-form-optimal, although are demonstrated to be strong- 
form-optimal for larger firms in the long-run. The varied and complex influence of the 
corporate environment ensures that solutions are firm-specific, and are not merely 
optimal at the aggregate-level. Variations in the extent of optimising behaviour, 
exhibited in particular between smaller and larger firms, may be explained by 
differences in the complexity of information systems across firms. Finally, all of the 
environments within which the firm is placed (the taxation, macroeconomic and 
corporate environments) significantly contribute towards the determination of the 
ultimate capital structure solutions of individual European quoted firms. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
'06 
9.1 Conclusion 
The main objective of this research was to test the central hypothesis that there exist 
firm-level optimal capital structure solutions for European firms. In a general sense, the 
question of optimality is addressed with reference to the taxation, macroeconomic and 
corporate environments within which the firm is placed. More specifically, the extent 
of optimality of observed corporate capital structure solutions is determined by 
examination of the processes governing the interaction between the corporate capital 
structure and those environments, which in turn describe the operational and strategic 
capital structure policies of European firms. An additional objective was to identify and 
explain the nature of the most important determinants of the capital structure solution. 
A further objective was to determine whether the hypotheses arising from the 
mainstream corporate finance literature, which exhibits a strong Anglo-American bias, 
may be supported for firms from a far wider and more diverse range of countries 
across Europe. 
The existing theoretical and empirical literature reveal that taxation exerts a significant 
influence upon the corporate capital structure due to the distinct tax advantage 
associated with corporate debt, the presence of which, Modigliani and Nfiller (1963) 
argued, leads to firm-level optimal capital structure solutions. However, as there is 
little empirical evidence in the literature that various tax advantage to debt measures 
exhibit a relationship with observed gearing, it was argued that influences such as the 
type of tax system, the structure of tax rates, corporate tax exhaustion, and other 
factors, reduce the tax advantage from that proposed by Modigliani and Miller. 
Furthermore, even if there remains a significant tax advantage to debt, it may not 
exhibit a clear relationship with corporate gearing because macroeconomic and 
corporate environment factors may counterbalance the tax advantage in the real world. 
Of the other environments withinwhich the firm is placed, the literature suggests that 
the macroeconomic environment exerts a more significant influence than the corporate 
environment because the macrocconomy essentially defines the parameters within 
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which all operations of the individual firm occur. The significant macroeconomic 
determinants of corporate gearing identified in the literature are those factors which 
essentially describe the direct costs of external financial instruments, such as inflation, . 
and stock and bond market performance variables. The corporate environment factors 
which exhibit a strong theoretical and empirical relationship with corporate gearing 
are: bankruptcy and earnings risk; the agency costs and benefits of debt and equity 
instruments; financial instrument transactions costs; firm size and growth; firm 
profitability and asset tangibility; investment, production, and marketing factors; and 
the gearing norm for the industry to which the firm belongs. It was postulated that the 
finance manager monitors changes in the taxation, macroeconomic, and corporate 
environments within which the firm is placed and makes adjustments to the firm's 
capital structure based upon a priority order of influences. The priority influences are 
those which exert a direct impact upon the costs of external financial instruments, 
whereas the influences of less priority to the finance manager are those which exert an 
impact which is less readily ascertainable and direct. As the corporate finance 
manager's priority order of capital structure influences may vary across firms with 
differing objective functions, as many of the capital structure influences identified in the 
literature are firm-specific in nature, and as the literature generally supports the 
proposition of the presence of a distinct tax advantage to debt at the firm-level, then 
the literature supports the existence of firm-level optimal capital structure solutions. 
The central objective of the European research, which was to test the central 
hypothesis that there exist firm-level optimal capital structure solutions for European 
firms, forms hypothesis HI. Hypotheses H2 to H4 form the supporting hypotheses, to 
determine whether the taxation, macroeconomic, and corporate environments 
significantly influence the corporate capital structure solution of the firm. Numerous 
subsidiary hypotheses were developed, arising from the existing literature and new 
developments in the theoretical and empirical research, to enable testing of the 
supporting hypotheses, and ultimately the central hypothesis. 
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Analyses of a purely descriptive or statistical nature identified patterns and 
relationships within the European data sets which, when considered together, produce 
a perspective on the environment of the corporate capital structure decision as a 
precursor to formal modelling. Such analyses are conducted at the cross-section and 
on an inter-temporal basis. Analysis of variance tests revealed that the country, tax 
system, and industry within which the firm is placed exert a significant impact upon the 
corporate capital structure ratio, thus supporting the later modelling of firms on a 
country-specific basis to account for differences between respective macroeconomies 
and tax system characteristics. Two results at the cross-section have implications for 
the optimality hypothesis: the Miller (1977) capital structure irrelevance model is 
questioned by means of a distributional analysis of capital structure ratios for each 
country; and tax exhaustion is a very significant phenomenon across Europe, as at least 
30 per cent of firms are completely tax-exhausted and many others are partially tax- 
exhausted. Whilst the distributional analysis does not prove the existence of firm-level 
optimal capital structure solutions, it does question the existence of aggregate optimal 
solutions. The tax exhaustion phenomenon does, however, have implications for 
optimality in that the degree of tax exhaustion observed results directly from the level 
of non-debt tax shields which will vary across firms, producing different effective tax 
advantage to debt values for each firm and thus firm-level optimal capital structure 
solutions. Therefore, the cross-sectional descriptive results suggest that country- 
specific capital structure modelling is the logical basis for development of the 
European research, and that, even at an early stage in the European research, firm-level 
optimal capital structure solutions appeared probable. 
Inter-temporal descriptive analyses revealed important trends within external finance 
markets and sought to explain these trends in relation to macroeconomic and taxation 
events and movements. Debt-finahcing appears to be experiencing a long-term decline 
in relation to equity-financing across Europe, caused by the switch from classical 
towards imputation tax systems, convergence of capital structure ratios due to tax 
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competition within Europe, a dramatic reduction in corporate tax rates, and political 
efforts to encourage a greater use of equity-financing and wider share ownership 
amongst investors. Although there was clearly a significant tax advantage to debt over 
most of the research study period, in the last few years reductions in corporate tax 
rates have reduced that advantage towards zero in some countries. However, in the 
last few years, debt financing has experienced a resurgence in demand due to various 
macroeconomic shocks such as the stock market crash of 1987 and German re- 
unification in 1989. The corporate DDE ratio exhibits prima-facie evidence of a 
positive relationship with the corporate tax rate, the tax advantage to debt measure, 
stock market buoyancy, long-term interest rates, and aggregate investment, although 
there appears only weak evidence of a positive relationship with inflation and no 
evidence of a direct relationship with GDP. Therefore, both taxation and 
macroeconomic environment factors are seen to exhibit significant influences upon 
corporate gearing in Europe. However, as such prima facie evidence based upon data 
plots was unlikely to adequately capture the dynamic processes present within bivariate 
capital structure relationships or the underlying long-run equilibrium relationships 
which may be present once the short-run fluctuations are removed, it was ascertained 
that more formal econometric analysis was required. Therefore, the inter-temporal 
descriptive results identified the need for more formal econometric modelling of the 
interaction between the corporate capital structure decision and the taxation and 
macroeconomic environments, as well as revealing that, in more recent years, debt and 
equity have become less distinguished by their inherent tax effects, implying that 
macroeconomic and corporate environment factors are likely to become more 
significant determinants of European corporate gearing with the next decade. 
Econometric modelling was undertaken to establish more precisely the nature of 
relationships between the corporate capital structure ratio and factors related to it. 
HYPotheses arising from the existing literature may be tested by examining the 
significance of individual estimated relationships between the corporate DDE ratio and 
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quantifiable factors from the taxation, macroeconomic and corporate environments 
within which the firm is placed. The main benefit of econometric modelling as opposed 
to less formal statistical analyses is that relationships which are not readily observable, 
such as error correction processes, may be determined and quantified, in addition to 
modelling the more readily observable relationships. A wide range of econometric 
modelling techniques are employed to analyse the European data sets. To study the 
processes governing the short-term, or operational, capital structure policy of the 
European firm: bivariate cross-sectional regressions identify relationships across firms 
fforn a static perspective; multivariate logistic regressions identify the influences of the 
capital structure decision at the margin; and autoregressive distributed lag models 
identify bivariate dynamic relationships. As all of these methods examine capital 
structure policy in the short-term, they essentially constitute disequilibrium models. To 
study the processes governing the longer-term, or strategic, capital structure policy of 
the European firm: bivariate error correction models identify dynamic and equilibrium 
relationships; the Johansen procedure analysis identifies multivariate error correction 
relationships; and intra-ratio targeting cointegration analysis determines whether firms 
engage in a form of bounded capital structure optimisation. As these latter methods 
examine capital structure policy in the long-run, identifying separate long-run error 
correction processes and dynamic processes, they constitute equilibrium models. 
Whilst the main objective of the econometric modelling is to identify significant 
determinants of corporate capital structure policy and the precise nature of their 
influence, the bivariate regression and error correction models additionally enable the 
converse direction of causation to be examined. Therefore, the econometric 
techniques, considered together, yield models of the processes governing capital 
structure determination over average, marginal, short-run, and long-run time-frames, 
as well as identifying which relationships form disequilibrium models (operational 
Policy models) and which form equilibrium models (strategic policy models). Rather 
than distinguish separate results arising from each of the modelling techniques, the 
overall European corporate capital structure model is briefly described below. 
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The European corporate capital structure model is essentially a synthesis of hypothesis 
test results, the results of the descriptive analyses, and the policy processes identified in 
the econometric modelling techniques. The model describes a capital structure policy . 
behaviour dichotomy between larger and smaller European firms due to differences in 
the sophistication of information systems within their respective finance functions. The 
overall model is perhaps best described by examining the operational and strategic 
capital structure policies of smaller firms and larger firms in turn. 
Smaller European firms engage in capital structure setting behaviour which supports 
the operation of distinct operational and strategic capital structure policies. In the long- 
run, the manager targets the capital structure ratio of the firm upon the norm for the 
industry to which the firm belongs, upon the capital structure ratio of some larger 
firm(s), or on the basis of some other targeting criterion in a manner referred to as 
intra-ratio targeting. This targeting behaviour represents a form of bounded- 
optimisation as the finance manager is approximating the firm's optimal capital 
structure ratio by copying the ratio of firms which it is similar to, or aspires to be 
similar to, within the boundaries imposed by the information constraints of the firm. 
Such constraints are caused by the limitations of the smaller firm's information 
collection, analysis and actioning systems, which are far less developed, resourced, and 
sophisticated than the information systems present within the finance function of the 
larger firm. There are departures from the long-run path produced by this intra-ratio 
targeting behaviour due to operational policy gearing adjustments. The operational or 
short-run capital structure policy of the firm gives rise to adjustments in the capital 
structure ratio due mainly to the dominating influence of those exogenous factors 
which determine the explicit costs of finance and to the more implicit recognition of 
the converse effect of gearing upon the corporate environment. Weaker influences 
upon the operational capital structure policy result from a reaction to significant 
changes in the scale of the firm, or from endo-exogenous interaction effects such as the 
influence of non-debt tax shields upon the value of any tax advantage to debt. 
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Therefore, the capital structure ratio of the smaller European firm is determined in the 
long-run by emulating behaviour referred to as intra-ratio targeting, although in the 
short-run there may be fluctuations around this longer-term path due to the 
determinants of operational policy and, in particular, movements in those exogenous 
factors which determine the explicit costs of finance. 
Larger European firms operate operational and strategic capital structure policies, 
although the nature of the strategic policy of such firms, in particular, is radically 
different from that of smaller firms. At the strategic policy level, larger firms engage in 
a form of full-optimisation behaviour such that the finance manager targets the long- 
run path of the capital structure ratio in relation to its key extra-ratio determinants. The 
dominant determinants are those exogenous factors which impact upon the explicit 
costs of finance, although corporate environment factors such as financial risk and 
profitability also exert some influence. Additionally, endo-exogenous interaction 
effects impact upon the long-run optimal capital structure ratio, whereby changes in 
taxation and macroeconomic environment variables produce individual firm-level 
effects. One further influence upon the strategic capital structure policy of the firm is 
the finance manager's consideration of the likely influence of the capital structure ratio 
upon the corporate environment, particularly the liquidity, profitability, growth, and 
financial safety of the firm. Therefore, the strategic capital structure policy of the larger 
firm, which determines the optimal long-run path of the capital structure ratio, is far 
more complex than the bounded-optimisation policy of the smaller firm. Fluctuations 
around the long-run desired path of the capital structure ratio arise due to operational 
Policy gearing adjustments. Such adjustments are identical to those undertaken by 
smaller firms, except: effective taxation measures should exert a greater influence, as 
such measures are more clearly more important to the capital structure decisions of 
larger, more sophisticated firms than nominal taxation measures; and endo-exogenous 
interaction effects will be stronger as larger firms understand and make adjustment for 
such complex effects in a more optimal manner than smaller firms. Therefore, the 
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finance manager of the larger firm determines the optimal long-run capital structure 
solution which dictates the long-run desired path of the capital structure ratio, around 
which there will be short-run fluctuations due to operational policy gearing 
adjustments. 
The most significant determinants of the capital structure policy of the European firm 
are found to be those factors which impact directly upon the explicit costs of finance. 
Financial market performance factors determine the before-tax cost of debt and equity 
finance, as well as affecting the timing of issues. As finance markets are demonstrated 
to be demand-driven in nature, the finance manager may only significantly increase 
debt or equity financing if interest rates are relatively high or equity markets are 
buoyant, respectively. Taxation and inflation factors then determine the after-tax 
relative costs of financial instruments. An increase in the tax advantage to debt (or 
corporate tax rate) reduces the weighted average cost of capital to the firm, rendering 
debt a more attractive financial instrument than before. An increase in the rate of 
inflation impacts upon the after-tax cost of debt because it causes an increase in 
interest rates, thus directly increasing the tax advantage to debt, whilst at the some 
time reducing the value of non-debt tax allowances, enabling greater debt tax 
allowances to be utilised. Thus, increases in the tax advantage to debt and the rate of 
inflation both encourage greater use of corporate debt. It is an unsurprising result that, 
even though capital structure research in the last few decades has become 
characterised by models of ever-increasing complexity, often concentrating upon 
examination of the more indirect and less tangible determinants of corporate gearing, 
the European research suggests that the key determinants of gearing still remain those 
factors which impact upon the more explicit, tangible after-tax weighted average costs 
of capital. This result is consistent with the mainstream capital structure literature 
reviewed in this research, especially the Modigliani and Miller (1963) model, which 
also identified the explicit after-tax costs of finance as key determ inants of corporate 
gearing. 
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The corporate capital structure ratio itself exerts an important influence upon the 
corporate environment of the firm in a manner which extends far beyond its impact 
upon the financial risk of the firm, discussed by authors such as DeAngelo, and Masulis 
(1980). It is clear that the influence of corporate gearing upon the corporate 
environment forms a key element in the capital structure optimisation process because 
the final capital structure solution is placed within a nexus of two-way causal capital 
structure relationships and thus must optimise with respect to each causal direction. 
The corporate capital structure policy is only one of the key policies implemented by 
the firm, and moreover, the DDE ratio is only one of a group of corporate environment 
targets which the finance manager is likely to set, monitor, and strive to achieve. It is 
intuitive that the capital structure target ratio may be of subordinate importance when 
considered in relation to targets for the profitability and overall risk of the firm, as the 
latter targets are of greater importance to the continued success of the European firm. 
The central hypothesis, HI, was developed by examining four criteria essential to the 
existence of firm-level optimal capital structure solutions. The first criterion, which 
states that there should be evidence of at least weak-form optimising behaviour, is 
strongly supported. Operational capital structure policy processes, which constitute 
weak-form optimising behaviour, are determined for all firms in the European research. 
Furthennore, smaller firms are seen to engage in intra-ratio targeting behaviour in the 
long-run, which is a form of bounded-optimisation approaching strong-form 
OPtinlisation, whilst larger firms engage in full-optirnisation or strong-form 
OPtimisation in the long-run, as evidenced by their extra-ratio targeting and other long- 
run behaviour of an optimýising nature. The second criterion, which states that 
OPtitnising behaviour must be capable of occurring for the individual firm, and not 
merely for the market as a whole, is also supported, as firm-level optimal capital 
structure solutions arise due to the influence of endo-exogenous interaction effects and 
the two-way causal nature of the DDE ratio with respect to corporate environment 
factors. Such influences produce solutions which are firm-specific in nature as a result 
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essentially of the uniqueness of each individual firm's corporate structure. The third 
criterion, which states that any variation in the extent of capital structure optimisation 
across firms must be explained in terms of the tangible characteristics of those firms, is 
supported. The characteristic of the firm which determines the extent to which the firm 
tnay engage in full optimisation, and which is capable of explaining the behavioural 
dichotomy that exists between smaller and larger firms, is the complexity of 
information gathering, monitoring, analysis and utilisation systems present within the 
finance function of the firm. The fourth criterion, which states that all of the 
environments within which the firm is placed must be demonstrated to contribute 
towards any optimal solution found to exist, is supported. The explicit costs of finance, 
discussed above, which consist of taxation and macroeconomic environment factors, 
are seen to be the most significant determinants of both the operational and strategic 
capital structure policies of European firms. Additionally, although the influence of the 
corporate environment is often weaker and less direct, its impact is still pivotal to any 
capital structure solution due to its two-way causal interrelationship with the capital 
structure ratio and endo-exogenous interaction effects. As taxation, macroeconomic 
and corporate environment factors are all significant determinants of corporate 
gearing, the respective supporting hypotheses, H2 to H4, are given strong support, in 
tum supporting the fourth optimality criterion. Overall, then, the theoretical and 
empirical analyses of the European research provide very strong support for hypothesis 
HI, and thus there exist firm-level optimal capital structures within European firms. 
Before summarising the main contributions of the European research to the corporate 
capital structure research area, it is essential to briefly identify and discuss its 
limitations. The limitations of the European research are associated predominantly with 
data availability constraints, as discussed throughout the empirics of this report. Firstly, 
the coverage of the European data varies in its scope and quality across the data sets 
analysed. However, it is argued that as the existing theoretical and empirical capital 
structure literature exhibits a narrow Anglo-American bias, any research undertaken 
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for firms from a much wider range of countries must be considered a significant 
development, even if the results of such research require careful qualification. 
Secondly, smaller cross-sectional or shorter inter-temporal data sets may give rise to 
econometric models which are insignificant merely as a result of the quality of the data 
sets analysed. The empirical research, however, takes this shortcoming into account by 
examining the coefficients and structures of models which are both significant and 
insignificant at the interpretation stage, although whilst still giving greater weight to 
the significant models. Thirdly, the time series data set is characterised by time-span 
paucity limitations, although it is argued that the resulting models remain robust as 
each time series observation for each variable is computed by aggregating data from a 
very large cross-sectional sample. Finally, it is recognised that only a subset of the 
initial European countries chosen are analysed in the time-series models constructed 
and estimated, which may be argued to reduce the extent to which the time series 
results may be generalised. However, the countries studied in the time series analyses 
are the only countries for which sufficient time-span data sets were available, and 
furthermore, the subset of countries analysed contain the majority of quoted firms 
within Europe. Overall, then, although there are a number of limitations identified in 
the European research which are the direct result of data availability constraints, 
empirical results are carefully qualified throughout the research such that the 
limitations do not significantly weaken them. Moreover, as individual hypotheses are 
tested by means of a number of different statistical and econometric techniques, as 
such techniques produce results of remarkable consistency, and as the resulting overall 
synthesis model is both coherent and logical, the empirical research is arguably robust. 
The main contributions of the European research to the corporate capital structure 
area may be surnmarised into five areas. Firstly, the complete European corporate 
capital structure model represents a coherent synthesis of interaction between the 
capital structure decision of the firm and each of the environments within which the 
firm is positioned. Whilst many authors within the mainstream finance literature, 
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pafticularly in recent years, have sought to concentrate upon the influence of very 
specific individual capital structure determinants, the European research brings 
together the influence of taxation, macroeconomic and corporate factors into a 
comprehensive model of corporate capital structure determination. Although the model 
component parts are underpinned by mainstream finance theory, the contribution of the 
European research is to test individual capital structure determination hypotheses 
which anse, model the processes by which such determinants influence gearing, and 
then bring together individual processes to examine the capital structure policy 
decisions of the firm. 
Secondly, the model contributes a European perspective to the ongoing capital 
structure relevancy debate. Clearly, the model supports the proposition of firm-level 
optimal capital structure solutions, and thus supports the conclusion that the individual 
firm's capital structure decision is indeed relevant. The European research therefore 
supports the propositions of Modigliani and Nfiller (1963) and questions the relevance 
of the Nfiller (1977) model to European capital structure determination. However, 
rather than being positioned firmly at the MM (1963) end of the bi-polar capital 
structure debate, the European model suggests that although there may be a distinct 
tax advantage to debt, it may be much smaller than that proposed by Modigliani and 
Miller due to the effect of European tax systems and structures of tax rates, 
widespread and significant corporate tax exhaustion, and other factors which may 
counterbalance the tax advantage to debt. In this respect, the model may be positioned 
in the same school of thought as authors such as DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), who 
exarnine the effect of factors which may counterbalance any tax advantage to debt. 
Thirdly, there are four important new results which arise from the European research. 
The first of these is that the model extends the Anglo-American biased capital structure 
research area to a European perspective, thus legitimising many broad generalisations 
drawn from US or UK experience which have been applied to Europe whilst 
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questioning other generalisations. The second result is that the research extends the 
examination of capital structure determination to encompass average, marginal, 
dynamic, and long-run time-frames, and identifies by means of modem econometric 
techniques which processes describe equilibrium relationships and which describe 
disequilibrium relationships. In so doing, capital structure determination becomes the 
sum consequence of distinct operational and strategic policies undertaken by the 
finance manager rather than merely assuming that such determination results merely 
ftom a year-to-year, or operational, policy alone. The third result is that the research 
identifies a clear capital structure behavioural dichotomy, determined on the basis of a 
number of different analytical techniques, which is based upon the scale of the firm. 
The scale effect is logically explained by differentials in the sophistication of finance 
function information systems between larger and smaller firms. The fourth result is that 
the corporate capital structure ratio target of the firm is merely one of a series of 
targets present within the corporate strategy of the firm, a result which is demonstrably 
supported by the Johansen procedure multivariate error correction modelling analysis. 
Whilst this result is perhaps not surprising or ground-breaking, the manner in which it 
was identified in the empirics appears to be. 
Fourthly, the European research methodology represents the application of modem 
econometric techniques which have not previously been applied to the area of capital 
structure determination, at least not in the structured manner presented in this report. 
The application of cointegration analysis, in particular, enables the identification of 
equilibrium and disequilibrium relationships, a development which impacts significantly 
upon the modern capital structure debate. 
Finally, the European research reveals that the tax advantage to corporate debt has 
been significantly eroded in many European countries in the last few decades due 
mainly to the movement towards imputation tax systems and the dramatic reduction in 
corporate tax rates. Logically, macroeconomic and corporate environment factors are 
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likely to become more important determinants of corporate gearing as the influence of 
taxation diminishes. Additionally, with the increasing sophistication of financial 
rnarkets, the more indirect determinants of corporate gearing such as agency costs and . 
information signalling effects are also likely to become relatively more important. 
However, as weak and strong-form optimisation both involve complex trade-offs of 
influences from the entire set of environments within which the individual firm if 
placed, capital structure determination is likely to remain the result of corporate 
optirnisation behaviour, even if the influence of taxation effects is greatly diminished or 
even eliminated - 
In summary, then, European firm finance managers engage in operational and strategic 
policy behaviour which produces firm-specific optimal capital structure solutions. 
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9.2 Recommendations for further research 
Although the research undertaken is a comprehensive study of European corporate 
capital structure determination, a number of areas may be identified for further 
research, to build upon the results and theoretical framework described in this report. 
The potential areas for further research consist of new techniques that may be 
employed to extend the European corporate capital structure research or existing 
techniques which may be applied to new data sets. 
A useful extension of the European corporate capital structure research might be 
undertaken by means of survey-based or case-study-based analyses. A survey-based 
analysis might be performed to ascertain how the theoretical model developed in the 
research of this report compares with the actual corporate capital structure policies of 
European firms. However, it is noted that most finance managers would argue that 
they have complex capital structure strategies in place, even if this were not the case, 
because to admit otherwise would project a poor image of their firms and their own 
activity in particular. As a result of this, such a survey would thus have to be extremely 
carefully worded and interpreted. An important issue to be explored in such a survey 
might be to determine whether there are indeed significant differences in the 
sophistication of information systems of smaller and larger firms, as this concept is 
pivotal to the European research model. 
Another potential extension of the research would be to conduct case studies of capital 
structure policy behaviour for a small sample of quoted firms in each European 
country. Finance managers could then be questioned directly about their capital 
structure policies, and the key determinants and processes which influence those 
Policies. Again, finance managers might be unwilling to disclose details of their true 
Capital structure policies as they may not wish to be perceived naive in their 
approaches, or they may be unwilling to disclose key financial information as such 
itiformation is necessarily of a very sensitive nature. Therefore, although other 
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techniques may be employed to extend the European corporate capital structure 
research, even preliminary consideration of the feasibility of such extensions highlights 
potential difficulties which are related mainly to the willingness of finance managers to 
divulge sensitive financial policy information. 
Another technique which might be applied to European capital structure data is a the 
simultaneous equation modelling approach, to investigate further the corporate 
environment within which the capital structure is determined. Such an approach may 
enable complex causal relationships, which include the processes which determine the 
capital structure ratio, to be examined from a number of different perspectives, 
allowing a more detailed consideration of the relationship between the highly inter- 
related accounting ratios which define the corporate environment. 
The European corporate capital structure research has demonstrated the application of 
numerous econometric techniques, ranging from long-established conventional 
methods through to very modem techniques which are still in their infancy. These 
techniques have enabled average, marginal, dynamic and long-run perspectives to be 
established with respect to European corporate capital structure behaviour, and have 
additionally enabled consideration of the large/small firm policy dichotomy. It is thus 
argued that the econometric techniques employed constitute a framework for analysis 
which may be applied to the study of corporate capital structure policies in any 
country. Two potential extensions may be identified here. Firstly, the framework might 
be employed to study the capital structure behaviour of firms in the non-European 
major industrialised countries of the world. Secondly, the framework might be 
employed to study capital structure behaviour in the newly-emerging finance markets 
of the world. It would indeed be a worthwhile exercise to determine whether the 
capital structure behaviour identified within European quoted firms also holds for firms 
in non-European countries, whether industrialised or newly-industrialising. 
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Therefore, the corporate capital structure research may be extended by undertaking 
survey or case study approaches, to enable the capital structure practices of the 
theoretical model of this research to be compared with the perceptions of finance 
managers as to capital structure practices in the real world. Simultaneous equation 
modelling might additionally be applied to European corporate capital structure data 
sets to enable a greater understanding of the complex corporate environment inter- 
relationships within which the corporate capital structure decision is positioned. 
If alternatively, the research is extended by employing a similar econometric I 
framework to study the corporate capital structure behaviour of other industrialised 
and newly-industrialising countries, then it may be determined whether the theoretical 
capital structure behaviour proposed is a world-wide or merely a European-wide 
phenomenon. 
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APPENDICES 
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APPENDýIXA.: 
DEFINITION OF THE VARIABLES USED IN THE MARGINAL CAPITAL 
STRUCTURE ANALYSIS 
The variables to be used in the analyses of chapters 4 and 5 are defined below. All of 
the variables are ratios, constructed either within the Datastream financial database or 
within the SPSS statistical package. Where possible, further definitions are given of 
those component accounts items which form a particular ratio, although limitations of 
space mean that an exhaustive definition of each component item is not possible. Each 
variable is defined both in words, and as an expression, where appropriate. The 
variable label is that which is actually employed in the computer analysis, and is thus a 
shortened version of the variable name. The Datastream codes for the separate 
accounts items which make up the variables are given to aid any follow-on work 
deriving from this research. 
The debt-to-debt-plus-eguily-ratio 
This variable will be described only briefly as it has been discussed in some detail in 
chapter 3. This ratio is the main measure of the stock of funds raised by the firm to 
date, in order to finance its investments. The ratio is thus defined as- 
debt-to-debt-plus-equity-ratio = total loan capital 
total loan capital + the market issue value of equity 
Where 
debt-to-debt-plus-equity ratio variable label = DDERATIO 
total loan capital Datastrearn code = 321 
market issue value of equity code = MV 
The depreciation ratio 
The depreciation ratio is defined as provisions for amounts written off, and 
depreciation of fixed assets and assets leased-in as a proportion of total net fixed 
assets. The latter variable is comprised of the net total of land and buildings, plant and 
machinery, construction in progress and any other fixed assets. The ratio is thus 
defined as: 
depreciation ratio = 
Where 
depreciation 
total net fixed assets 
depreciation ratio variable label = DEPRATIO 
depreciation Datastrearn code = 136 
total net fixed assets Datastream code = 339 
A, 2 
pividend cover 
The dividend cover ratio is defined as adjusted net earnings per share divided by 
dividends per share. The net earnings per share measure is the adjusted earned-for- 
ordinary profit divided by the year end number of shares. The dividends per share 
measure relates to the net dividend per share, adjusted for subsequent scrip and rights 
issues. The ratio is thus defined as: 
dividend cover = adjusted net earnings per share 
------------------------------- 
dividends per share 
Where: 
dividend cover variable label = DIVCOVER 
adjusted net earnings per share Datastrearn code = 211 
dividends per share Datastream code = 190 
The depreciation-adjusted tax ratio 
The depreciation-adjusted tax ratio is defined as the amount of corporation tax charged 
on the profit for the current period divided by adjusted pre-tax profit (including 
associates) plus depreciation. The pre-tax profit, (including associates) measure is 
adjusted for exceptional/extraordinary items, non-operating provisions and exchange 
profits/losses. The ratio is thus defined as: 
depreciation- adjusted tax ratio = corporation tax 
adjusted pre-tax profit + depreciation 
Where: 
depreciation-adjusted tax ratio variable label = DTAXRAT 
corporation tax Datastrearn code = 160 
adjusted pre-tax profit (including associates) Datastream code = 157 
depreciation Datastrearn code = 136 
The fixed-assets ratio 
The fixed asset ratio is defined as total net fixed assets as a proportion of total assets 
employed. The former has already been defined but the latter measure, total assets 
employed, shows the sum of all assets less all current liabilities. 
The ratio is thus defined as: 
fixed asset ratio = total net fixed assets 
total assets employed 
Where 
fixed asset ratio variable label = FARATIO 
total net fixed assets Datastream code = 339 
total assets employed Datastream code = 391 
A3 
interest cover 
Interest cover is defined as total non-operating income plus adjusted operating profit, 
all divided by total interest charges. Total non-operating income includes dividend 
income, interest received, rents, grants, and any other non-operating income. Adjusted 
operating profit is the net profit derived from normal activities of the company, after 
depreciation and operating provisions. Total interest charges includes interest on bank, 
convertible and other loans, bonds and debentures, leasing finance and hire purchase 
minus interest capitalised. The ratio is thus defined as: 
interest cover = total non-operating income + adjusted operating profit 
total interest charges 
Where: 
interest cover variable label = INTCOVER 
total non-operating income Datastrearn code = 144 
adjusted operating profit Datastrearn code = 137 
total interest charges Datastrearn code = 153 
The liouid assets ratio 
The liquid assets ratio is defined as total cash and equivalent items divided by the sum 
of total creditors and equivalent, provisions due in less than one year, and borrowings 
repayable within one year. Total cash and equivalent includes cash, bank balances, 
short-term loans and deposits and investments shown under current assets. Total 
creditors and equivalent includes the amount payable after one year relating to the 
normal trading activities of the firm. Provisions due in less than one year includes the 
current portion of longer-term provisions. Borrowings repayable within one year 
includes bank overdrafts, loans and other short-term borrowings. The ratio is thus 
defined as: 
liquid assets ratio = total cash and equivalent 
------------------------------------------------------------------- 
total creditors and equivalent + provisions due in less than one year 
+ borrowings repayable within one year 
Where: 
liquid assets ratio variable label = LARATIO 
total cash and equivalent Datastream code = 375 
total creditors and equivalent Datastream code = 385 
provisions due in less than one year Datastream code = 380 
borrowings repayable within one year Datastream code = 309 
AA 
The net rorit maEgin 
Net profit margin is defined as after-tax profit divided by total sales. Adjusted after-tax 
profit gives the after-tax profit, adjusted for items which do not relate to the normal 
trading activities of the company, net of adjusted tax. Total sales is the amount of sales 
of goods and services to third parties, relating to the normal activities of the company. 
The ratio is thus defined as: 
net profit margin = adjusted after-tax profit X 100 
total sales 
Where: 
net profit margin variable label = NPNLARGIN 
adjusted after-tax profit Datastream code = 175 
total sales Datastream code = 104 
The pgjout ratio 
Payout ratio is defined as dividends per share divided by adjusted net earnings per 
share. It is effectively the inverse of dividend cover. The ratio is thus defined as: 
payout ratio = dividends per share 
adjusted net earnings per share 
Where 
payout ratio variable label = PAYRATIO 
dividends per share Datastream code - 190 
adjusted net earnings per share Datastream code = 211 
The guick assets ratio 
Quick asset ratio is defined as total current assets less total stock and work in 
progress, all divided by total current liabilities. Total current assets includes stock, 
work in progress, debtors, cash and equivalent, and any other current assets and 
accounts receivable after one year. Total stock and work in progress includes all 
stocks, raw materials, plus work in progress, less advances on work in progress. Total 
current liabilities includes current provisions, creditors, borrowings repayable within 
one year and any other current liabilities. 
The ratio is thus defined as: 
quick assets ratio = total current assets - total stock and work in progress 
total current liabilities 
Where: 
quick assets ratio variable label = QARATIO 
total current assets Datastream code = 376 
total stock and work in progress Datastream code = 364 
total current liabilities Datastream code = 389 
The retentions ratio 
The retentions ratio is defined as published retentions divided by adjusted after-tax 
profit. Published retentions consist of after-tax profit, after deducting dividends and 
adding post-tax extraordinary items. Adjusted after-tax profit consists of after-tax 
profit, adjusted for items which do not relate to the normal trading activities of the 
company, net of adjusted tax. The ratio is thus defined as: 
retentions ratio = published retentions 
adjusted after-tax profit 
Where: 
retentions ratio variable label = RETRATIO 
published retentions Datastrearn code = 196 
adjusted after-tax profit Datastrearn code = 175 
The return on capital employed 
Return on capital employed is defined as profit before interest and taxation divided by 
capital employed multiplied by 100. The ratio is thus defined as: 
return on capital employed = profit before interest and taxation X 100 
---------------------------------- 
capital employed 
Where: 
retentions ratio (Datastream code 707) variable label = ROCE 
The short-run-to-Iong-run-debt ratio 
The short-run to long-run debt ratio is defined as borrowings repayable within one year 
divided by total loan capital. The borrowings measure is defined earlier in this section. 
Total capital relates to all loans repayable in more than one year. 
The ratio is thus defined as: 
short-run-to-long-run-debt ratio = borrowings repayable within one year 
total loan capital 
Where: 
short-run-to-long-run-debt ratio variable label =SRLRDEBT 
borrowings repayable within one year Datastrearn code = 309 
total loan capital Datastream code =321 
A6 
The stock ratio 
Stock ratio (days) is defined as total stock and work in progress divided by total sales, 
91 multiplied by 365 days. The ratio is thus defined as: 
stock ratio = total stock and work in progress X 365 days 
total sales 
Where 
stock ratio variable label = STKRATIO 
total stock and work in progress Datastream code = 364 
total sales Datastream code - 104 
The tax-to-pre-tax-prorit ratio 
The tax to pre-tax profit ratio is defined as the adjusted total tax charge divided by 
adjusted pre-tax profit (excluding associates). The adjusted total tax charge is the total 
amount of tax charged against the profits for the year. The adjusted pre-tax profit 
(excluding associates) includes the pre-tax profit, adjusted fo r 
exceptional/extraordinary items, non-operating provisions and exchange profits/losses. 
The ratio is thus defined as: 
tax to pre-tax profit ratio = adjusted total tax charge 
adjusted pre-tax profit 
Where: 
tax to pre-tax profit ratio variable label = TAXONPTP 
adjusted total tax charge Datastream code ý 172 
adjusted pre-tax profit Datastream code = 155 
The tax ratio 
The tax ratio is defined as the adjusted total tax charge divided by the sum of adjusted 
pre-tax profit (excluding associates) and associates pre-tax profits. The total tax 
charge and pre-tax profit (excluding associates) have already been defined in this 
section. The associates pre-tax profits gives the portion of pre-tax profits/losses of 
associates and other companies under the equity method. The ratio is thus defined as: 
tax ratio = adjusted total tax charge 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
adjusted pre-tax profit (excluding associates) + associates pre-tax profits 
Where: 
tax ratio (Datastrearn code 76 1) variable label = TAXRATIO 
V 
The workin capital ratio 
The working capital ratio is defined as total current assets divided by total current 
liabilities. Total current assets includes stock, work in progress, debtors, cash and 
equivalent and any other current assets. Total current liabilities includes current 
provisions, creditors, borrowings repayable within one year and any other current 
liabilities. The ratio is thus defined as: 
working capital ratio = total current assets 
total current liabilities 
Where: 
working capital ratio variable label = WCRATIO 
total current assets Datastream code = 376 
total current liabilities Datastrearn code = 389 
The net current assets ratio 
The net current assets ratio is defined as total current assets less total current liabilities 
all divided by total assets employed. The ratio is thus defined as: 
net current assets ratio = total current assets - total current liabilities 
total assets employed 
Where 
net current assets ratio variable label = WORKCAP 
total current assets Datastrearn code = 376 
total current liabilities Datastream code 389 
total assets employed Datastream code 391 
AS 
APPENDIX B: 
FOR THE EUROPEAN MULTIVARIATE LOGISTIC 
RE'ýGRESSION MODELS 
Table I 
aid tests for the German multivariate logistic regression model 
vadable variable 
coefficient 
standard 
error 
Wald 
statistic 
degrees of 
freedom 
significance 
level 
DDERATIO 2.2673 3.0374 0.5572 1 0.4554 
DEpRATIO 5.1406 6.0140 0.7306 1 0.3927 
FARATIO 7.9344 4.5093 3.0960 1 0.0785 
INTCOVER 0.1166 0.1059 1.2130 1 0.2707 
LARATIO -1.6010 1.0339 2.3980 1 0.1215 
pAYRATIO 5.9406 3.1747 3.5014 1 0.0613 
RETRATIO 2.2368 2.1467 1.0857 1 0.2974 
ROCE -0.724 0.0697 1.0781 1 0.2991 
SRLRDEBT 0.6912 0.4736 2.1303 1 0.1444 
TAXRATIO -0.0643 0.0527 1.4885 1 0.2225 
WORKCAP 1 6.1240 1 3.5079 1 3.0476 11 1 0.0809 
Constant 1 -6.5088 1 4.4349 1 2.1540 11 1 0.1422 
Table 2 
Wald tests for the Belgian multivariate logistic regression model 
v"ble variable 
coefficient 
standard 
error 
Wald 
statistic 
degrees of 
freedom 
significance 
level 
DDERATIO 47.3864 66.9509 0.5009 1 0.4791 
DEPRATIO 128.0793 169.4711 0.5712 1 0.4498 
FARATIO -53.1262 56.1620 0.8948 1 - 
0.3442 
- Constant i 4.5120 38.6053---- t- 0.0137 1 t 0.9070 
Table 3 
Wald tests for the Danish multivariate lo2istic re2ression model 
variable variable 
coefficient 
standard 
error 
Wald 
statistic 
degrees of 
freedom 
significance 
level 
DDERATIO 46.1710 45.0296 1.0513 1 0.3052 
RETRATIO -1.5504 1.8353 0.7137 1 0.3982 
TAXONPTP 8.5713 6.6230 1.6749 1 0.1956 
Constant -9.2518 8.2089 1.2702 1 11 0.2597 
Table 3 
opanish multivariate, logistic regression model 
E 
ariable variable 
coefficient 
standard 
error 
Wald 
statistic 
degrees of 
freedom 
significance 
level 
AYRATIO 9.0410 18.6912 0.2340 1 0.6286 
F 
I tant Ons -6.0846 13.8649 0.1926 1 
0.6608 
AD 
Table 4 
rench multivariate logistic repression model 
variable variable 
coefficient 
standard 
error 
Wald 
statistic 
degrees of 
freedom 
signiflcance 
level 
nivcoVER 1( -0.0326 0.1245 0.0684 1 0.7937 
T DTAXRAT X 1.0860 2.8278 0.1475 1 0.7009 
INTCOVER 
r 
-0.0855 0.1787 0.2292 1 0.6321 
CE RO -0.0394 0.0516 0.5821 1 0.4455 
SRLRDEBT 0.5843 0.3355 3.0336 1 0.0816 
TAXONPTP 8.2934 5.0942 2.6504 1 0.1035 
TAXRATIO -0.1808 0.1028 3.0926 1 0.0786 
WcRAITIO 3.4593 1.9746 3.0692 1 0.0798 
W(ORKCAP -0.0599 1.6938 0.0013 1 0.9718 
Co St: 
mt 
-2.5635 2.1908 1 1.3692 1 0.2419 
Table 5 
Wald tests for the Irish multivariate logýistic regression model 
variable vaiiable 
coefficient 
standard 
error 
Wald 
statistic 
degrees of 
freedom 
significance 
level 
DEPRATIO -73.4627 136.3096 0.2905 1 0.5899 
WORKCAP 14.4330 27.3784 0.2779 1 0.5981 
Constant 3.1805 4.7307 0.4520 1 0.5014 
Table 6 
Wald tests for the Italian multivariate logistic regression model 
variable variable 
coefficient 
standard 
error 
Wald 
statistic 
degrees of 
freedom 
significance 
level 
DDERATIO 3.1951 6.0107 0.2826 1 0.5950 
FARATIO 3.8637 5.6718 0.4640 1 0.4957 
INTCOVER -0.1830 0.2191 0.6973 1 0.4037 
LARATIO -6.6559 4.3982 2.2901 1 0.1302 
RETRATIO 5.4240 3.4130 2.5256 1 0.1120 
ROCE -0.7218 0.5478 1.7362 1 0.1876 
WORKCAP 30.4430 21.4935 2.0061 1 0.156 
Constant 7.1441 7.2911 0.9601 1 0.3272 
Table 7 
Wald tests for the Dutch multivariate logistic regression model 
variable variable 
coefficient 
standard 
error 
Wald 
statistic 
degrees of 
freedom 
significance 
level 
LARATIO -5.6261 3.7827 2.2121 
1 0.1369 
PAYRATio -14.3521 9.2159 2.4253 
1 0.1194 
OARATIO 2.3006 3.8362 0.3596 1 0.5487 
RETRATio 6.5788 4.4165 2.2189 1 0.1363 
SRLRDEBT -0,1957 0.2719 0.5183 
1 0.4716 
TAXRATIO 7.3378 7.6065 0.9306 1 0.3347 
WORKCAP 1 -4.4116 1 3.7079 1 1.4156 
1 0.2341 
Cýonstant 1 0.2677 1 4.2235 1 0,0040 1 0.9495 
AIO 
Table 8 
lutch multivariate logistic repression model 
variable variable 
coefficient 
standard 
error 
Wald 
statistic 
degrees of 
freedom 
significance 
level 
LARATIO ? T I r( 10 -5.6261 3.7827 2.2121 1 0.1369 
I pAYRATIO AYR A T kTIO -14.3521 9.2159 2.4253 1 0.1194 
QARATIO 2.300 3.8362 0.3596 1 0.5487 
FRETRATIO 
6.5788 4.4165 2.2189 1 0.1363 
DE SRLR SRLRDEBT D -0.1957 0.2719 0.5183 1 0.4716 
T AXRAT AXRATIO 7.3378 7.6065 0.9306 1 0.3347 
W WORKC CCAP ORKCAP 1 -4.4116 1 3.7079 1.4156 11 1 0.2341 
Constant Constant 0.2677 4.2235 0.0040 0.9495 
Table 9 
Wald tests for the Swiss multivariate logistic regression model 
vaiiable variable 
coefficient 
standard 
error 
Wald 
statistic 
degrees of 
freedom 
significance 
level 
DDERATIO -15.1993 9.9822 2.3184 1 0.1278 
DIVCOVER 1.3503 1.2953 1.0867 1 0.2972 
FARATIO 6.4877 6.0598 1.1462 1 0.2843 
INTCOVER -0.3998 0.4222 0.8967 1 0.3437 
NPMARGIN -0.6846 0.5938 1.3291 1 0.2490 
Constant 4.8346 3.9764 1.4782 1 0.2240 
Table 10 
Wald tests for the UK multivariate logistic repression model 
variable variable 
coefficient 
standard 
error 
Wald 
statistic 
degrees of 
freedom 
significance 
level 
DDERATIO -3.3989 1.8026 15552 1 0.0594 
DEPRATIO -6.3344 4.4027 2,0701 1 0.1502 
DIVCOVER -0.3115 0.2955 1,1118 1 0.2917 
DTAXRAT -4.2166 2.9073 2.1035 1 0.1470 
FARATIO 1.9885 1.0771 3.4085 1 0.0649 
INTCOVER -0.0146 0.0132 L2163 1 0.2701 
LARATIO 0.7449 0.7662 0.9452 1 0.3309 
PAYRATIO -1.7817 1.6309 1.1935 1 0.2746 
QARATIO -2.0027 1.6817 1.4182 1 0.2337 
ROCE -0.0125 0.0265 0,2229 1 0.6369 
SRLRDEBT -0.0028 0.0298 0.0089 1 0.9249 
STKRATIO -0.0223 0.0119 3.5157 1 0.0608 
WCRATIO 2.4235 1.3150 3.3966 1 0.0653 
Constant 1.9810 2.1714 0.8323 1 0.3616 
All 
APPLNDIX C: 
HE VARIABLES MODELLED IN THE TIME SERIES 
ANALYSES 
The variables listed below represent only the "base" variables from which all other 
variables used in the time-series analyses are computed. Most of the accounting ratio 
variables are defined in appendix A and thus their definitions are not repeated here. In 
the analyses, then, variables containing the word "change" are merely percentage 
changes in the variables to which they relate. Variables containing the letters "chch" 
are merely percentage changes in the percentage change variables to which they relate. 
n the UK samples 
ASSETS (Datastream. code 391) is defined as total assets employed. 
CTAXRATIO (Datastream code 160 divided by Datastream code 157) and represents 
the corporation tax paid by the firm in the period as a proportion of adjusted pre-tax 
profit. 
CTRATE (Datastream code 202) is defined as the average tax rate applicable to the 
period. 
DDERATIO See appendix A. 
DIVCOVER See appendix A. 
GDP (Datastream code UKGDPAVEG) is defined as the average estimate of GDP. 
INCTAX is defined as the basic rate of income tax applying to the period. 
INFLATE (Datastream code UKRP .... F) 
is defined as the retail price index, all items. 
INTCOVER See appendix A. 
INVEST (Datastrearn code UKGDFCFOA) is defined as gross domestic fixed capital 
formation. 
LMT (Datastrearn code UK20YEAR) is defined as the gross redemption yield on 20 
year gilts. 
MRINT (Datastrearn code LDNCD2Y) is defined as the Sterling certificate of deposit 
two year rate. 
QRATIO is defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm to the replacement 
cost of its assets. It is defined below in terms of the Datastrearn items which form it. 
QRA TIO = 
HMV + 389 + 321 
391+389+[(328-336). 
INFLA TE t 
INFLATEt-4 
Where: 
HMV = the historical market value of equity 389 = total current liabilities 
321 = total loan capital 391 = total assets employed by the firm 
328 --= gross plant and machinery 336 = plant and machinery 
depreciation 
INFLATE = the inflation index as defined above 
A12 
, Dn 
, CE See appendix A. 
SMIND (Datastream code UKFTALL. ) is defined as the Financial Times All Share 
index at period end. 
SRINT (Datastream code UKTRSBL%) is defined as the three month Treasury bill 
rate at period end. 
TAXADV is defined as DSCT - INCTAX 
I- INCTAX 
and is referred to as the tax advantage to debt. 
TAXRATIO See appendix A. 
WCRATIO See appendix A. 
A13 
in the Netherlands samples 
ASSETS (Datastrearn code 391) is defined as total assets employed. 
CTRATE (Datastrearn code 202) is defined as the average tax rate applicable to the 
Period. 
DDERATIO See appendix A. 
DIVCOVER See appendix A. 
GDP (Datastrearn code NLGDPDCN) is defined as the gross domestic product in 
constant prices. 
NFLATE (Datastrearn code NLCP .... 
F) is defined as the consumer price index. 
INTCOVER See appendix A. 
iNVEST (Datastrearn code NLINDINVA) is defined as industry gross fixed capital 
investment. 
LMT (Datastrearn code NLLONG.. ) is defined as the interest rate on long term 
government loans (Staatsleningen). 
MRINT (Datastrearn code NUT05L. ) is defined as the interest rate on goverment 
loans of three to five years. 
QRATIO is defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm to the replacement 
cost of its assets (and is computed using the expression given in the UK definitions). 
ROCE See appendix A. 
SMIND (Datastrearn code NLCBSGEN) is defined as the CBS all share general stock 
price index. 
SRINT (Datastrearn code NLTRSBL%) is defined as the yield on Treasury paper with 
remaining maturity of three months. 
TAXRATIO See appendix A. 
WCRATIO See appendix A. 
14 
Yiiab1es used in the German samples 
ASSETS (Datastream code 391) is defined as total assets employed. 
DDERATIO See appendix A. 
iDIVCOVER See appendix A. 
GNP (Datastrearn code BDGNP ... B) is defined as the gross national product. 
INFLATE (Datastrearn code BDCP .... F) is 
defined as the cost of living price index. 
INTCOVER See appendix A. 
INVEST (Datastream code BDINVMACD) is defined as investment in machinery and 
equipment in constant, seasonally adjusted prices. 
LRINT (Datastrearn code BDOCLNGO/o) is defined as the period average yield on 
long term government bonds. 
MMT (Datastream code BDMEDYLD) is defined as the yield on secondary market 
public bonds three to seven years. 
QRATIO is defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm to the replacement 
cost of its assets. It is defined below in terms of the Datastream items which form it. 
QRA TIO = 
HAIIV + 389 + 321 
391+ 389 + [699. 
TE t 
INFLATEt-4 
Where: 
FMV = the historical market value of equity 389 = total current liabilities 
321 total loan capital 391 = total assets employed by the firm 
699 net plant and machinery 
INFLATE = the inflation index as defined above 
ROCE See appendix A. 
SMIND (Datastream code BDSBRPRC) is defined as the Commerzbank Share Price 
Index at period end. 
SRINT (Datastream code BDTRSBL%) is the three month Treasury bill rate at period 
end. 
TAXRATIO See appendix A. 
WCRATIO See appendix A. 
A15 
tagh ý 
ASSETS (Datastream code 39 1) is defined as total assets employed. 
CTAXRATIO (Datastream code 160 divided by DatAstream code 157) and represents 
the corporation tax paid by the firm in the period as a proportion of adjusted pre-tax 
profit. 
CTRATE (Datastrearn code 202) is defined as the average tax rate applicable to the 
period. 
DDERATIO See appendix A. 
DIVCOVER See appendix A. 
GDP (Datastrearn code FRGDP ... D) 
is defined as the gross domestic product (product 
interior brut, marchand). 
IMPUTE is defined as the imputation rate applicable to the period. 
INFLATE (Datastrearn code FRCP .... F) is defined as the consumer price index. 
INTCOVER See appendix A. 
INVEST (Datastrearn code FROCGDFXD) is defined as gross domestic fixed 
investment. 
LRINT (Datastream code FRLNGYLD) is defined as the yield on central government 
bonds of over seven years life on the secondary market. 
MRINT (Datastrearn code FRSHORT3) is defined as the yield on public sector bonds 
of three to five years. 
QRATIO is defined as the ratio of the market value of the firm to the replacement 
cost of its assets (and is computed using the expression given in the UK definitions). 
ROCE See appendix A. 
SMIND (Datastrearn code FROCSPRQ is defined as industrial share prices (INSEE). 
SRINT (Datastream code FRTRSBL%) is defined as the auction average three month 
Treasury bill discount rate. 
TAXADV is defined as CTRATE - IWUTE 
I- IWUTE 
and represents the tax advantage to debt (alternative model). 
TAXRATIO is defined as TOTAL TAX CHARGE - ADJUSTED 
------------------------------------ 
PRE-TAX PROFITS 
(EXCLUDING ASSOCIATES, ADJUSTED) 
WCRATIO See appendix A. 
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APPENDIX D: 
LES USED IN THE UNIT ROOT TESTING 
Table I 
tion critical value table at the 1 ger cent level 
no_gons§tantl L___ 
A 
floo 
= -2.5658ýA= -1.960,, #2= -10.04 
T -2.5658 -1.960/T -10.041T 
2 Mackinnon 
distribution 
5 if -0.3920 -0.4016 -3.3594 
6 of -0.3267 -0.2789 -3.1714 
7 it -0.2800 -0.2049 -3.0507 
8 of -0.2450 -0.1569 -2.9677 
9 if -0.2178 -0.1240 -2.9076 
10 of -0.1960 -0.1004 -2.8622 
11 of -0.1782 -0.0830 -2.8270 
12 to -0.1633 -0.0697 -2.7988 
13 if -0.1508 -0.0594 -2.7760 
14 if -0.1400 -0.0512 -2.7570 
15 it -0.1307 -0.0446 -2.7411 
16 of -0.1225 -0.0392 -2.7275 
17 if -0.1153 -0.0347 -2.7158 
18 of -0.1089 -0.0310 -2.7057 
19 if -0.1032 -0.0278 -2.6968 
20 of -0.0980 -0.0251 -2.6869 
21 of -0.0933 -0.0228 -2.6819 
22 it -0.0891 -0.0207 -2.6756 
23 If -0.0852 -0.0190 -2.6700 
24 ff -0.0817 -0.0174 -2.6649 
25 it _ -0.0784 -0.0161 -2.6603 
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Table 2 
tion critical value table at the I per cent level 
Llt-jj. wiLth trendl 
A 
Poo 
=: -3.96385A -8.3531,, 82 --47.44 
T -3.9638 -8.353 /T -47.44 /T2 
Mackinnon 
distribution 
5 of -1.6706 -1.8976 -7.5320 
6 if -1.3922_ -1.3178 -6.6738 
7 It -1.1933 -0.9682 -6.1253 
8 it -1.0441 -0.7413 -5.7492 
9 of -0.9281 -0.5857 -5.4776 
10 to -0.8353 -0.4744 -5.2735 
11 it -0.7594 -0.3921 -5.1153 
12 it -0.6961 -0.3294 -4.9893 
13 -0.6425 -0.2807 -4.8870 
14 -0.5966 -0.2420 -4.8024 
15 -0.5569 -0.2108 -4.7315 
16 -0.5221_ -0.1853 -4.6712 
17 -0.4914 -0.1642 -4.6194 
18 -0.4641 -0.1464 - . 5743 
19 it -0.4396 -0.13 14 -4.5348 
20 if -0.4177 -0.1186 -4.5001 
21 it -0.3978 -0.1076 -4.4692 
22 -0.3797 -0.0980 -4.4415 
23 -0.3632 -0.0897 -4.4167 
24 -0.3480 -0.0824 -4.3942 
25 -0.3341 -0.0759 -4.3738 
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, kPPENDIX E: 
PRESENCE OF A DETERMINISTIC TREND WITHIN, 
THE EUROPEAN TIME SERIES VARIABLES 
Table 1 
resence of a deterministic trend within the UK weighted 
es 
variable degrees of freedom F-statistic accept/reject 
-TSS-ETS 2,22 2.0343 accept 
ASSETSchange 2,21 7.7688 accept 
CTAXRATIO 2,22 5.3955 accept 
CTRATE 2,22 2.3275 accept 
DDERATIO 2,22 4.2437 accept 
DIVCOVER 2,19 4.497 accept 
GDP 2,21 1.2197 accept 
GDPchange 2,20 5.3224 accept 
INCTAX 2,22 4.7704 accept 
INFLATE 2,21 11.194 reject 
INFLATEchange 2,20 3.4339 accept 
INTCOVER 2,22 5.8376 accept 
INVEST 2,21 2.1151 accept 
RSWESTchange 2,20 4.4418 accept 
LRINT 2,21 3.2936 accept 
MRINT 2,15 3.9764 accept 
QRATIO 2,22 3.8354 accept 
ROCE 2,22 2.6789 accept 
SNffND 2,20 3.3915 accept 
SRINT 2,21 4.9822 accept 
TAXADV 2,22 2.3319 accept 
TAXRATIO 2,22 3.0618 accept 
WCRATIO 2,22 1.2709 accept 
19 
Table 2 
iresence of a deterministic trend within the UK non-weighted 
les 
vanable degrees of freedom F-statistic accept/reject 
--ýS-SETS 2,22 2.0343 accept 
ASSETSchange 2,21 7.7688 accept 
CTAXRATIO 2,22 3.4852 accept 
CTRATE 2,22 2.1659 accept 
CTRATEchange 2,21 3.2181 accept 
DDERATIO 2,22 4.1099 accept 
DIVCOVER 2,19 6.2161 accept 
GDP 2,21 1.2197 accept 
GDPchange 2,20 5.3224 accept 
INCTAX 2,22 4.7704 accept 
INFLATE 2,21 11.194 reject 
MLATEchange 2,20 3.4339 accept 
INTCOVER 2,22 7.2072 accept 
INVEST 2,21 2.1151 accept 
INVESTchange 2,20 4.4418 accept 
LRINT 2,21 3.2936 accept 
MRINT 2,15 3.9764 accept 
-QRATIO 2,22 3.1044 accept 
ROCE 2,22 2.9889 accept 
SMIND 2,20 3.3915 accept 
SRINT 2,21 4.9822 accept 
TAXADV 2,22 2.3359 accept 
TAXRATIO 2,22 1.9128 accept 
WCRATIO 2,22 6.3402 accept 
A, 20 
Table 3 
iresence of a deterministic trend within the Netherlands 
ta variables 
variable degrees of freedom F-statistic accept/reject 
ASSETS 2,11 1.375 accept 
ASSETSchange 2,10 5.6067 accept 
CTRATE 2,11 3.8146 accept 
DDERATIO 2,11 2.6074 accept 
DJVCOVER 2,11 12.784 reject 
GDP 2,10 3.4678 accept 
2,9 3.3791 accept 
GDPchch 3,11 12.922 reject 
INFLATE 2,11 2.5829 accept 
INFLATEchange 2,10 0.64828 accept 
INTCOVER 2,11 5.5331 accept 
INVEST 2,9 2.399 accept 
INVESTchange 2,8 0.2386 accept 
INVESTchch 2,7 5.1258 accept 
LRINT 2,11 1.3285 accept 
LRINTchange 2,10 2.1248 accept 
MRINT 2,11 1.2282 accept 
MRINTchange 2,10 2.1663 accept 
QRATIO 2,11 5.5437 accept 
ROCE 2,11 7.5795 accept 
SMIND 2,11 3.8263 accept 
SRINT 2,9 1.069 accept 
TAXRATIO 2,11 4.1885 accept 
WCRATIO 2,11 3.6166 accept 
WCRATIOchange 2,10 11.309 reject 
WCRATIOchch 2,9 4.4605 
. 6. 
accept 
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Table 4 
iresence of a deterministic trend within the Netherlands non- 
ta variables 
variable degrees of freedom F-statistic accept/reject 
-ýS-SETS 2,11 1.375 accept 
ASSETSchange 2,10 5.6067 accept 
CTRATE 2,11 3.5724 accept 
DDERATIO 2,11 1.7489 accept 
DIVCOVER 2,11 9.7063 accept 
GDP 2,10 3.4678 accept 
GDPchange 2,9 3.3791 accept 
GDPchch 3,11 12.922 reject 
INFLATE 2,11 2.5829 accept 
INFLATEchange 2,10 0.64828 accept 
INTCOVER 2,11 0.91635 accept 
INTCOVERchange 2,10 5.0269 accept 
INVEST 2,9 2.399 accept 
INVESTchange 2,8 1.7235 accept 
R4WSTchch 2,7 5.1258 accept 
LRINT 2,11 1.3285 accept 
LRINTchange 2,10 2.1248 accept 
MRINT 2,11 1.2282 accept 
MRINTchange 2,10 1.5564 accept 
QRATIO 2,11 4.1892 accept 
ROCE 2,11 3.8404 accept 
SNUND 2,11 3.8263 accept 
. SRINT 2,9 1.069 accept 
TAXRATIO 2,11 7.0484 
-- 
accept 
WCRATIO 
. 
1 
2,11 2.5667- 
l 
accept 
A22 
Table 5 
iresence of a deterministic trend within the German 
sample data variables 
variable degrees of freedom F-statistic accept/reject 
TS-SETS 2,8 2.1826 accept 
2,7 4.1457 accept 
DDERATIO 2,8 6.491 acce Pt 
DIVCOVER 2,8 2.8485 acce t 
GNP 2,8 7.2415 a ccept 
GNPchange 2,7 2.3153 accept 
GNPchch 2,6 4.7176 accept 
INFLATE 2,8 0.53825 accept 
INFLATEchange 2,7 6.215 accept 
INFLATEchch 2,6 4.8328 accept 
INTCOVER 2,8 3.6769 acce 
INTCOVERchange 2,7 35.061 reject 
INVEST 2,8 4.4913 accept 
INVESTchange 2,7 4.8491 accept 
LRINT 2,8 3.4121 accept 
MRINT 2,8 3.0024 accept 
MRINTchange 2,7 1.6458 accýLt 
QRATIO 2,8 2.6656 accept 
ROCE 2,8 3.8799 accept 
ROCEchange 2,7 7.8923 accept 
SNffND 2,8 2.6359 accept 
SRINT 2,8 7.1631 accept 
TAXRATIO 2,8 5.1673 accept 
TAXRATIOchange 2,7 15.776 reject 
WCRATIO 2,8 1.9576 accept 
WCRATIOchange 2,7 4.6537 accept 
A23 
Table 6 
ýýhe-test for the gresence of a deterministic trend within the German 
non-weighted sample data variables 
variable degrees of freedom F-statistic accept/reject 
ASSETS 2,8 2.1826 accept 
DDERATIO 2,8 2.9742 accept 
DIVCOVER 2,8 5.794 accept 
GNP 2,8 7.2415 accept 
GNPchange 2,7 2.3153 accept 
INFLATE 2,8 0.53825 accept 
INFLATEchange 2,7 6.215 accept 
INTCOVER 2,8 1.3159 accept 
INVEST 2,8 4.4913 accept 
INVESTchange 2,7 4.8491 accept 
LRINT 2,8 3.4121 acce t 
MRINT 2)8 3.0024 accept 
QRATIO 2,8 2.2376 accept 
ROCE 2,8 1.7586 accept 
SMIND 2,8 2.6359 accept 
SRINT 2,8 7.1631 accept 
TAXRATIO 2,8 2.1703 accept 
WCRATIO 2,8 1 2.2899 accept 
A24 
Table 7 
! resence of a deterministic trend within the French weijzhted 
es 
variable degrees of freedom F-statistic accept/reject 
ASSETS 2,6 7.3275 accept 
ASSETScýý.. 2,5 2.2754 accept 
ASSETSchch 2,4 5.8154 accept 
CTAXRATIO 2,6 2.7162 accept 
CTRATE 2,6 3.2669 accept 
CTRATEchange 2,5 ___. 4.1404 accept 
DDERATIO 2,6 2.4817 accept 
DIVCOVER 2,6 7.2729 accept 
GDP 2,6 1.193 accept 
GDPchange 2,5 1.5094 accept 
GDPchch 2,4 2.8192 accept 
INFLATE 2,6 18.112 reject 
INFLATEchange 2,5 4.2234 accept 
INFLATEchch 2,4 4.0521 accept 
INTCOVER 2,6 12.003 reject 
INTCOVERchange 2,5 6.7197 accept 
INVEST 2,6 0.73487 accept 
INVESTchange 2,5 5.0329 accept 
INVESTchch 2,4 6.3174 accept 
LRINT 2,6 2.7219 accept 
LRINTchange 2,5 5.2026 accept 
MRINT 2,6 2.4799 accept 
MRINTchange 2,5 4.9015 accept 
QRATIO 2,6 2.766 accept 
ROCE 2,6 3.2169 accept 
ROCEchange 2,5 3.089 accept 
SMIND 2,6 2.2303 accept 
SMINDchange 2,5 8.4561 accept 
SRIW 2,6 3.2687 accept 
SRINTchange 2,5 3.7269 accept 
TAXADV 2,6 3.2669 accept 
TAXADVchange 2,5 4.0027 accept 
TAXRATIO 2,6 4.5604 accept 
WCRATIO 2,6 2.5548 accept 
WCRATIOchange 1 2,5 3.142 accept 
A25 
Table, 8 
! resence of a deterministic trend within the French non- 
ta variables 
variable degrees of freedom F-statistic accept/reject 
ASSETS 2,6 7.3275 accept 
ASSETSchange 2,4 5.8154 accept 
CTAXRATIO 2,6 4.8464 accept 
CTRATE 2,6 8.7244 accept 
DDERATIO 2,6 2.5152 accept 
-ý-JVCOVER 2,6 1.249 accept 
GDP 2,6 1.1961 accept 
GDpchange 2,5 1.5059 accept 
GDPchch 2,4 2.8192 accept 
INFLATE 2,6 18.112 reject 
INFLATEchange 2,5 4.2234 accept 
INFLATEchch 2,4 4.0521 accept 
INTCOVER 2,6 4.1171 accept 
INVEST 2,6 0.73487 accept 
INVESTchange 2,5 5.0329 accept 
INVESTchch 2,4 6.3174 accept 
LRINT 2,6 2.7219 accept 
MRINT 2,6 2.4799 accept 
QRATIO 2,6 5.8199 accept 
ROCE 2,6 2.0435 accept 
SMIND 2,6 2.2303 accept 
SRINT 2,6 3.2687 accept 
TAXADV 2,6 8.7244 accept 
TAXRATIO 2,6 6.7634 accept 
WCRATIO 2,6 1.4988 accept 
WCRATIOchange 2,5 1.7107 accept 
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APPENDIX F-. 
tjNIT ROOT TESTING UPON THE EUROPEAN TIME SERIES VARIABLES 
T a! Ll -el u UK weighted sample, showing critical Dickey Fuller 
st nstant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
Dickey 
Fuller 
stat. 
Mack. 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
ASSETS 1.19 1.288 1.454 1,25 R 0.8185 -2.6603 A 
AASSETS 1.67 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -2.382 -2.6649 A 
AAASSETS 1.65 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -6.045 -2.6700 R 
ASSETSchange 2.27/1.73 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -2.471 -2.6649 A 
AASSETSchange 2.17/1.83 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -7.998 -2.6700 R 
CTAXRATIO 2.72 1.288 1.454 1,25 1 -0.8682 -2.6603 A 
ACTAXRATIO 2.13/1.87 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -7.106 -2.6649 R 
CTRATE 1.30 1.288 1.454 1,25 1 -0.9839 -2.6603 A 
ACTRATE 1.51 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -2.869 -2.6649 R 
DDERATIO 2.23/1.77 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -0.7065 -2.6603 A 
ADDERATIO 2.01/1.99 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -5.569 -2.6649 R 
DIVCOVER 1.40 1.239 1.429 1,22 1 -0.7347 -2.6756 A 
ADIVCOVER 2.00 1.221 1.420 1,21 A -4.194 -2.6819 R 
GDP 1.19 1.273 1.446 1,24 R 3.631 -2.6649 A 
AGDP 2.00 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -2.308 -2.6700 A 
AAGDP 2.09/1.91 1.239 1.429 1,22 A -5.531 -2.6756 R 
GDPehange 2.04/1.96 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -2.5 -2.6700 A 
AGDPchange 2.15/1.85 1.239 1.429 1,22 A -5.818 -2.6756 R 
INCTAX 2.41 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -1.801 -2.6603 A 
AINCTAX 1.99 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -5.241 -2.6649 R 
INFLATEchange 1.91 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -0.9444 -2.6700 A 
AINFLATEchange 1.98 1.239 1.429 1,22 A -4.533 -2.6756 R 
INTCOVER 1.94 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -2.036 -2.6603 A 
AMCOVER 2.08/1.92 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -5.458 -2.6649 R 
INVEST 0.706 1.273 1.446 1,24 R 2,647 -2.6649 A 
AINVEST 1.40 1.257 1.437 1123 1 -1.751 -2.6700 A 
. 
AAINVEST 1.65 1.239 1.429 1,22 A -3.542 -2.6756 R 
INVESTchange 1.82 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -1.274 -2.6700 A 
AINVESTchange 1.99 1.239 1.429 1,22 A -4.625 -2.6756 R 
LRINT 1.44 1.273 1.446 1,24 1 -0.09284 -2.6649 A 
ALRINT 1.86 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -3.726 -2.6700 R 
MRINT 1.87 1.158 1.391 1,18 A -0.7221 -2.7057 A 
AMRINT 1.811 1.133 1.381 1,17 A -3.747 -2.7158 R 
QRATIO 1.39 1.288 1.454 1,25 1 0.02011 -2.6603 A 
AQRATIO 1.61 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -3.338 -2.6649 R 
. 
ROCE 2.25/1.75 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -0.3583 -2.6603 A 
AROCE 1.94 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -5.648 -2.6649 R 
SMIND 2.75 1.257 1.437 1,23 R 3.103 -2.6700 A 
ASMIND 1.91 1.239 1.429 1,22 A -3.982 -2.6756 R 
SRINT 2.36/1.64 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -0.748 -2.6649 A 
ASRINT 2.06/1.94 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -5.883 -2.6700 R 
TAXADV 1.66 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -0.9096 -2.6603 A 
ATAXADV 1.77 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -4.093 -2.6649 R 
TAXRATjo 2.27/1.73 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -0.7267 -2.6603 A 
ATAXRATIO 2.03/1.97 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -5.502 -2.6649 
R 
WCRATio 1.73 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -1.131 -2.6603 1A 
AWCRATIO 1.82 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -4.012 1 -2.6649 
R 
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Table 2 
u UK weighted sample, showing critical Dickey Fuller 
d) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
i degrees 
of 
Creedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I----inconc. 
Dickey 
Fuller 
stat. 
Mack. 
critical 
Irderence 
A=accept 
R=reject 
LATE 0.984 1.101 1.656 3,24 R -2.852 -4.3942 A 
AINFLATE 1.55 1.078 1.660 3,23 1 -2.248 -4.4167 A 
AAINFLATE 1.92 1.053 1.664 3,22 A -3.093 -4.4415 _A 
AAAINFLATE 2.15/1.85 1.026 1.669 3,21 A -5.941 -4.4692 R 
A28 
Table 3 
Unit root tests for the UK non-weighted sample, showing critical Dickey Fuller 
onstant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
Dickey 
Fuller 
stat. 
Mack. 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I 
ASSETS 1.19 1.288 1.454 1,25 1 0.8185 -2.6603 A 
WSETS 1.67 1273 1.446 1,24 A -2.382 -2.6649 A 
AWSETS 1.65 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -6.045 -2.6700 R 
ASSETSchange 2.27/1.73 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -2.471 -2.6649 A 
WSETSchange 2.17/1.83 1,257 1.437 1,23 A -7.998 -2.6700 R 
CTAXRATIO 2.15 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -1.21 -2.6603 A 
ACTAXRATIO 1.72 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -5.132 -2.6649 R 
CTRATE 0.822 1.288 1.454 1,25 R -0.8028 -2.6603 A 
ACTRATE 1.35 1.273 1.446 1,24 R -2.482 -2.6649 A 
AACTRATE 1.89 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -4.279 -2.6700 R 
CTRATEchange 1.32 1.273 1.446 1,24 1 -2.493 -2.6649 A 
ACTRATEchange 1.85 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -4.173 -2.6700 R 
DDERATIO 1.90 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -0.5912 -2.6603 A 
ADDERATIO 1.98 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -4.704 -2.6649 R 
DIVCOVER 1.99 1.239 1.429 1,22 A -0.2784 -2.6756 A 
ADIVCOVER 1.93 1.221 1.420 1,21 A -4.732 -2.6819 R 
GDP L 19 1.273 1.446 1,24 R 3.631 -2.6649 A 
AGDP 2.00 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -2.308 -2.6700 A 
AAGDP 2.09/1.91 1.239 1.429 1,22 A -5.531 -2.6756 R 
GDPchange 2.04/1.96 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -2.5 -2.6700 A 
AGDPchange 2.15/1.85 1.239 1.429 1,22 A -5.8181 -2.6756 R 
INCTAX 2.41/1.59 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -1.801 -2.6603 A 
AINCTAX 1.99 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -5.241 -2.6649 R 
INFLATEchange 1.91 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -0.9444 -2.6700 A 
AWLATEchange 1.98 1.239 1.429 1,22 A -4.533 -2.6756 R 
INTCOVER 2.37 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -1.561 -2.6603 A 
AMCOVER 2.27/1.73 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -6.694 -2.6649 R 
INVEST 0.706 1.273 1.446 1,24 R 2.647 -2.6649 A 
AINVEST 1.40 1.257 1.437 1,23 1 -1.751 -2.6700 A 
AAINVEST 1.65 1.239 1.429 1,22 A -3.542 -2.6756 R 
INVESTchange 1.82 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -1.274 -2.6700 A 
AINVESTchange 1.99 1.239 1.429 1,22 A -4.625 -2.6756 R 
LRINT 1.44 1.273 1.446 1,24 1 -0.09284 -2.6649 A 
ALRINT 1.86 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -3.726 -2.6700 R 
MRINT 1.87 1.158 1.391 1,18 A -0.7221 -2.7057 A 
AMRINT 1.811 1.133 1.381 1,17 A -3.747 -2.7158 R 
QRATIO 2.60/1.40 1.288 1.454 1,25 1 -0.4717 -2.6603 A 
AQRATIO 1.95 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -6.714 -2.6649 R 
. 
ROCE 1.79 1.288 1.454 1,25 A 0.1014 -2.6603 A 
AROCE 1.87 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -4.292 -2.6649 R 
SMIND 2.75/1.25 1.257 1.437 1,23 R 3.103 -2.6700 A 
ASMIND 1.91 1.239 1.429 1,22 A -3.982 -2.6756 R 
SRINT 2.36/1.64 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -0.748 -2.6649 A 
ASRINT 2.06/1.94 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -5.883 -2.6700 R 
TAXADv 1.27 1.288 1.454 1,25 R -0.4662 -2.6603 A 
ATAXADV 1.78 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -3.366 -2.6649 R 
TAXRATIo 2.13 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -0.6109 -2.6603 A 
ATAXRATIO 1.90 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -5.175 -2.6649 R 
WCRATIO 2.96/1.04 1.288 1.454 1,25 R -0.4531 -2.6603 A 
AWCRATIO 1.87 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -8.163 -2.6649 
R 
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Tab, le4 
U- e UK non-weighted sample, showing critical Dickey Fulle 
d) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc, 
Dickey 
Fuller 
stat. 
Mack. 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
FLATE 0.984 1.101 1.656 3,24 R -2.852 -4.3942 A 
AINFLATE 1.55 1.078 1.660 3,23 1 -2.248 -4.4167 A 
_wmý AMNFLATE 1.92 1.053 1.664 3,22 A -3.903 -4.4415 A 
AAAINFLATE 2.15/1.85 1.026 1.669 3,21 A -5.941 4.4692 R 
A30 
Table 5 
he Netherlands weighted sample, showing critical Dickey 
hout constant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
Dickey 
Fuller 
stat. 
Mack. 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
ASSETS 1.83 1.045 1.350 1,14 A 1.63 -2.7570 A 
AASSETS 1.74 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -2.638 -2.7760 1 
AAASSETS 2.07/1.93 0.971 1.331 1,12 A -4.188 -2.7988 R 
ASSETSchange 1.62 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -2.748 -2.7760 A 
AASSET'Schange 2.02/1.98 0.971 1.331 1,12 A 4.726 -2.7988 R 
CTRATE 2.28/1.72 1.045 1.350 1,14 A -1.718 -2.7570 A 
ACTRATE, 2.01/1.99 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -3.292 -2.7760 R 
DDERATIO 2.52/1.48 1.045 1.350 1,14 A -0.6462 -2.7570 A 
ADDERATIO 2.11/1.89 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -4.562 -2.7760 R 
GDP 0.821 1.010 1.340 1,13 R 4.35 -2.7760 A 
AGDP 1.19 0.971 1.331 1,12 1 -0.9631 -2.7988 A 
AAGDP 1.55 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -2.224 -2.8270 A 
AAAGDP 1.83 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -2.628 -2.8622 A 
AAAAGDP 2.10/1.90 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -3.847 -2.9076 R 
GDPchange 1.18 0.971 1.331 1,12 1 -1.11 -2.7988 A 
AGDPchange 1.59 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -2.273 -2.8270 A 
AAGDPchange 1.86 0.879 1.320 IJO A -2.708 -2.8622 A 
MAGDPchange 2.11/1.89 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -3.871 -2.9076 R 
INFLATE 0.423 1.045 1.350 1,14 R 4.741 -2.7570 A 
AINFLATE 1.28 1.010 1.340 1,13 1 -0.5234 -2.7760 A 
AAINFLATE 1.93 0.971 1.331 1,12 A -2.974 -2.7988 R 
INFLATEchange 1.26 1.010 1.340 1,13 1 -0.78 -2.7760 A 
AINFLATEchange 1.83 0.971 1.331 1,12 A -2.973 -2.7988 R 
INTCOVER 1.49 1.045 1.350 1,14 A -0.8564 -2.7570 A 
AINTCOVER 1.18 1.010 1.340 1,13 1 -3.897 -2.7760 R 
INVEST 1.21 0.971 1.331 1,12 1 3.857 -2.7988 A 
AINVEST 1.63 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -0.9125 -2.8270 A 
AAINVEST 1.85 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -2.746 -2.8622 1 
AAAINVEST 2.10/1.90 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -3.629 -2.9076 R 
INVESTchange 1.47 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -1.225 -2.8270 A 
AMESTchange 1.76 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -2.52 -2.8622 A 
AfflNVESTchange 1.98 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -3.21 -2.9076 R 
INVESTchch 2.00 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -3.196 -2.8622 R 
LRINT 1.12 1.045 1.350 1,14 1 -0.1257 -2.7570 A 
ALRINT 1.75 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -2.344 -2.7760 A 
AALRINT 2.03/1.97 0.971 1.331 1,12 A -3.489 -2.7988 R 
LRINTchange 1.73 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -2.28 -2.7760 A 
ALRINTehange 2.00 0.971 1.331 1,12 A -3.389 -2.7988 R 
MRINT 1.15 1,045 1.350 1,14 1 -0.1138 -2.7570 A 
AMRINT 1.75 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -2.355 -2.7760 A 
AAMRINT 2.04/1.96 0.971 1.331 1,12 A -3.534 -2.7988 R 
-EnLhanr ,e 
1.75 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -2.298 -2.7760 A 
AMRNTchange 2.02/1.98 0.971 1.331 1,12 A -3.493 -2.7988 R 
QRATIO 2.76/1.24 1.045 1.350 1,14 1 -0.494 -2.7570 A 
AQRATIO 2.00 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -5.288 -2.7760 R WE- 
2.04/1.96 1.045 1.350 1,14 A -1.197 -2.7570 A 
AROCE 
- 
1.57 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -4.078 -2.7760 R TMINýD 2.35/1.65 1.045 1.350 1,14 A 1.143 -2.7570 A 
MND 
-ýýh 
2.00 1.010 1,340 1,13 A -3.496 -2.7760 R 
SRINT -- 2.21/1.79 0.971 1.331 1,12 A -0.4438 -2.7988 A 
ASRINT 1.34 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -4.193 -2.8270 
R 
TAXRATIO 2.57/1.43 1.045 1.350 1,14 A -0.7705 -2.7570 
A 
ATAXRATIO _ 2.26/1.74 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -5.225 -2.7760 
R 
WCRATIO 1.57 1.045 1.350 1,14 A -2.241 -2.7570 A 
AWCRATIO 2.14 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -2.25 -2.77.6 A 
. 
ýLWC ýýJo ý ý6ý/154 ý2.4 =0=. 971 1.331 1,12 A -5.659 
1 -2.7988 R 
A31 
Table 6 
Z-ý he Netherlands weip-hted sample, showinp_ critical Dickey 
th trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
Wý- variable DW stat lower 
DW 
critical 
upper upper 
DW DW 
cli Ical critical t 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
Dickey 
Fuller 
stat. 
Mack. 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
DIVCOVER IVCC 1.40 0.767 1 . 779 3,14 1 4.833 -4.8024 R 
PC C GDPChCh 1.87 0.595 1.928 3,11 1 -5.061 -5.1153 A 
GDPC DPchch AG 2.25/1.75 0.525 2.016 3,10 1 -7.828 -5.2735 R 
F 
WCRA WCRATIOchan e 2.37/1.63 0.715 1.816 3,13 1 -4.732 -4.887 A 
AWCR AWCRATIOchan e 2.37/1.63 0.658 1.864 3,12 1 -4.527 -4.9893 A 
AAWC AAWCRATIOchange 1 2.23/1.77 0.595 1 1.928 3,11 11 -4.655 -5.1153 A 
AMW, AAAWCRATIOchange 1 2.50/1.50 0.525 1 2.016 3,10 1 -5.482 5.2735 R 
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Table 7 
Z-ý 
; he Netherlands non-weighted sample, showing critical Dickpj hout constant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
Dickey 
Fuller 
stat. 
Mack 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
SETS 1.83 1.045 1.350 1,14 A 1.63 -2.7570 A 
WSETS 1.74 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -2.638 -2.7760 A 
AWSETS 2.07/1.93 0.971 1.331 1,12 A -4,188 -2.7988 R 
ASSETSchange 1.62 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -2.748 -2.7760 A 
AASSETSchange 2.02/1.98 0.971 1.331 1,12 A -4.726 -2.7988 R 
CTRATE 2.15/1.85 1.045 1.350 1,14 A -1.861 -2.7570 A 
ACTRATE 2.03/1.97 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -3.039 -2.7760 R 
DDERATIO 2.00 1.045 1.350 1,14 A -1.062 -2.7570 A 
ADDERATIO 1.73 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -3.368 -2.7760 R 
DIVCOVER 2.39/1.61 1.045 1.350 1,14 A -1.265 -2.7570 A 
ADIVCOVER 1.94 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -7.129 -2.7760 R 
GDP 0.821 1.010 1.340 1,13 R 4.35 -2.7760 A 
AGDP 1.19 0.971 1.331 1,12 1 -0.9631 -2.7988 A 
AAGDP 1.55 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -2.224 -2.8270 A 
AAAGDP 1.83 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -2.628 -2.8622 A 
AAAAGDP 2.10/1.90 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -3.847 -2.9076 R 
GDPchange 1.18 0.971 1.331 1,12 1 -1.11 -2.7988 A 
AGDPchange 1.59 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -2.273 -2.8270 A 
AAGDPchange 1.86 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -2.708 -2.8622 A 
AAAGDPchange 2.11/1.89 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -3.871 -2.9076 R 
INFLATE 0.423 1.045 1.350 1,14 R 4.741 -2.7570 A 
AINFLATE 1.28 1.010 1.340 1,13 1 -0.5234 -2.7760 A 
AAINFLATE 1.93 0.971 1.331 1,12 A -2.974 -2.7988 R 
INFLATEchange 1.26 1.010 1.340 1,13 1 -0.78 -2.7760 A 
AINFLATEchange 1.83 0.971 1.331 1,12 A -2.973 -2.7988 R 
INTCOVER 1.52 1.045 1.350 1,14 A 0.005194 -2.7570 A 
AINTCOVER 2.02/1.98 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -2.772 -2.7760 A 
AAINTCOVER 2.09/1.91 0.971 1.331 1,12 A -5.443 -2.7988 R 
INTCOVERchange 2.08/1.92 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -3.064 -2.7760 R 
INVEST 1.21 0.971 1.331 1,12 1 3.857 -2.7988 A 
AINVEST 1.63 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -0.9125 -2.8270 A 
AAINVEST 1.85 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -2.746 -2.8622 1 
AAAINVEST 2.10/1-90 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -3.629 -2.9076 R 
INVESIc 6=ge 1.47 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -1.225 -2.8270 A 
AINVESTchange 1.76 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -2.52 -2.8622 A 
AAINVESTchange 1.98 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -3.211 -2.9076 R 
INVESTchch 2.00 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -3.196 -2.8622 R 
LRINT 1.12 1.045 1,350 1,14 1 -0.1257 -2.7570 A 
ALRINT 1.75 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -2.344 -2.7760 A 
AALPJNT 2.03/1.97 0.971 1.331 1,12 A -3.489 -2.7988 R 
LRINTchange 1.73 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -2.28 -2.7760 A 
ALRINTchange 2.00 0.971 1.331 1,12 A -3.389 -2.7988 R 
NTR-INT 1.15 1.045 1.350 1,14 1 -0.1138 -2.7570 A 
AMRINT 1.75 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -2.355 -2.7760 A 
AAMRINT 2.04/1.96 0.971 1.331 1,12 A -3.534 -2.7988 R 
MRINTchange 1.90 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -0.7801 -2.7760 A 
AMRINTchange 2.01/1.99 0.971 1.331 1,12 A -3.288 -2.7988 R 
QRATIO 2.80/1.20 1.045 1.350 1,14 1 0.3826 -2.7570 A 
-AQRATIO 
2.19/1.81 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -5.089 -2.7760 R 
2.33/1.67 1.045 1.350 1,14 A -0.06885 -2.7570 A 
AROCE 1.86 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -5.042 -2.7760 R 
SMIND 2.35/1.65 1.045 1.350 1,14 A 1.143 -2.7570 A 
ASMIND 2.00 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -3.496 -2.7760 R 
SRINT 2.21/1.79 0.971 1.331 1,12 1A -0.4438 -2.7988 A 
ASRINT 1.34 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -4.193 -2.821" R 
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Table 7 
he Netherlands non-weighted sample, showing critical Dickel 
hout constant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics (cont. ) 
variable DW stat lower 
DW 
critical 
upper DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
l=inconc. 
Dickey 
Fuller 
stat. 
Mack 
critical 
Inference- 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I 
2.57/1.43 1.045 1.350 1,14 A -0.7215 -2.7570 A 
ATAXRATIO 2.22/1.78 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -5.321 -2.7760 R 
1.94 1.045 1.350 1,14 A 0.1294 -2.7570 A 
AWCRATIO 1.96 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -3.358 -2.7760 R 
Table 8 
Unit root tests for the Netherlands non-weighted sample, showing critical Dickey 
Fuller statistics (with trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW staL lower upper degrees DW test Dickey Mack Inference 
DW DW of A=accept Fuller critical A=accept 
critical critical freedom R=reject stat. R=reject 
I=inconc. 
GDPchch 1.87 0.595 1.928 3,11 1 
-- -5.061 - -5.1153 
A 
AGDPchch 2.25/1.75 0.525 2.016 1 -7.828 -5.2735 
A, 34 
Table 9 
ýhe German weighted sample, showing critical Dickey Fulle 
onstant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I---inconc. 
Dickey 
Fuller 
stat. 
Mack. 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
ASSETS 2.02 0.927 1.324 1,11 A 1.799 -2.8270 A 
AASSETS 1.77 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -2.133 -2.8622 A 
AWSETS 2.29/1.71 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -3.815 -2.9076 R 
ASSETSchange 1.82 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -2.195 -2.8622 A 
&ASSETSchange 2.34/1.66 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -3.781 -2.9076 R 
DDERATIO 3.05/0.95 0.927 1.324 1,11 R -2.12 -2.8270 A 
ADDERATIO 1.31 0.879 1.320 1,10 1 -3.309 -2.8622 R 
DIVCOVER 2.23/1.77 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -0.2947 -2.8270 A 
ADIVCOVER 0.969 0.879 1.320 1,10 1 -3.534 -2.8622 R 
GNP 1.05 0.927 1.324 1,11 1 10.13 -2.8270 A 
AGNP 1.42 0.879 1.320 1,10 A 0.01631 -2.8622 A 
AAGNP 1.57 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -2.125 -2.9076 A 
MAGNP 1.64 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -2.974 -2.9677 R 
GNPchange 1.55 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -0.2575 -2.8622 A 
AGNPchange 1.62 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -2.572 -2.9076 A 
AAGNPchange 1.79 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -3.644 -2.9677 R 
GNPchch 1.88 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -3.565 -2.9076 R 
DIFLATE 0.552 0.927 1.324 1,11 R 5.289 -2.8270 A 
AINFLATE 1.16 0.879 1.320 1,10 1 -0.7471 -2.8622 A 
ANNFLATE 2.14/1.86 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -2.275 -2.9076 A 
AANNFLATE 2.20/1.80 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -4.109 -2.9677 R 
WIATEchange 1.13 0.879 1.320 1,10 1 -1.266 -2.8622 A 
AINFLAT&hange 2.20/1.80 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -2.44 -2.9076 A 
AAINFLATEchange 2.22/1.78 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -4.054 -2.9677 R 
INFLATEchch 2.08/1.92 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -3.349 -2.9076 R 
INTCOVER 1.29 0.927 1.324 1,11 1 -0.3031 -2.8270 A 
AINTCOVER 1.76 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -1.986 -2.8622 A 
AAINTCOVER 2.59 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -5.736 -2.9076 R 
INVEST 1.39 0.927 1.324 1,11 A 2.03 -2.8270 A 
AfNVEST 1.37 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -1.75 -2.8622 A 
AAINVEST 1.15 0.824 1.320 1,9 1 -2.73 -2.9076 A 
AAAINVEST 0.889 0.763 1.332 1,8 1 -4.576 -2.9677 R 
INVESTchange 1.51 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -1.929 -2.8622 A 
AINVESTchange 1.17 0.824 1.320 1,9 1 -4.157 -2.9076 R 
LRINT 1.48 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -1.045 -2.8270 A 
ALRINT 1.53 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -3.098 -2.8622 R 
MRINT 1.12 0.927 1.324 1,11 1 -1.068 -2.8270 A 
AMRINT 1.27 0.879 1.320 1,10 1 -2.412 -2.8622 A 
AAMRINT 0.898 0.824 1.320 1,9 1 -3.765 -2.9076 R 
MRINTc iange 1.29 0.879 1.320 1,10 1 -1.997 -2.8622 A 
AMRINTchange 1.08 0.824 1.320 1,9 1 -3.103 -2.9076 R 
QRATIO 2.14/1.86 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -0.9487 -2.8270 A 
AQRATIO 1.85 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -2.996 -2.8622 R 
1.02 0.927 1.324 1,11 1 -0.9138 -2.8270 A 
1.20 0.879 1.320 1,10 1 -1.622 -2.8622 A 
AAROCE 1.84 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -3.851 -2.9076_ R 
ROCEchange 1.17 0.879 1.320 1,10 1 -1.246 -2.8622 A 
AROCEchange 1.50 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -4.185 -2.9076 R 
SMIND 2.27/1.73 0.927 1.324 1,11 A 0.08977 -2.8270 A 
ASMIND 2.10/1.90 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -3.419 -2.8622 R 
SRINT 1.22 0.927 1.324 1,11 1 -0.1963 -2,8270 A 
ASRINT 2.17/1.83 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -2.916 -2.8622 R 
TAXRATIO 1.41 0.927 . 
1 1.324 1,11 A -1.848 -2.8270 A 
ATAXR-kT--Io /1.55 2.45 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -1.715 -2.8622 A 
AATAXRATIO _ 2.28/1.72 0.824 1.320 1,9 A 1 -6.977 -2.9076 R 
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Table 9 
he German weighted sample, showing critical Dicke3L Fulle 
onstant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics (conQ 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
Dickey 
Fuller 
stat. 
Mack. 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I 
WCRATIO 1.67 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -0.3287 -2.8270 A 
, &WCRATIO 
1.62 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -2.532 -2.8622 A 
AAWCRATIO 1.87 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -3.711 -2.9076 R 
WCRATIOchange 1.56 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -2.5 -2.8622 A 
I AWCRATIOchange 1.77 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -3.783 1 -2.9076 1R 
Table 10 
Unit root tests for the German weighted sample, showing critical Dickey Fulle 
statistics (with trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat. lower upper degrees DW test Dickey Mack Inference 
DW DW of A=accept Fuller critical A=accept t 
critical critical freedom R=reject stat. R=reject t 
I--mconc. 
INTCOVERchange 2.92/1.08 0.525 2.016 3,10 1 -8.04 -5.2735 R 
TAXRATIOchange 2.54/1.46 0.525 2.016 3,10 1 -5.616 -5.2735 R 
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Table II 
he German non-weighted sample, showing critical Dickey 
hout constant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
Dickey 
Fuller 
stat. 
Mack. 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
ASSETS 2.02/1.98 0.927 1.324 1,11 A 1.799 -2.8270 A 
WSETS 1.77 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -2.133 -2.8622 A 
AAASSETS 2.29/1.71 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -3.815 -2.9076 R 
DDERATIO 1.36 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -1.49 -2.8270 A 
ADDERATIO 1.77 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -1.924 -2.8622 A 
AADDERATIO 2.00 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -3.724 -2.9076 R 
DIVCOVER 2.64/1.36 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -0.7931 -2.8270 A 
ADJVCOVER 1.39 0.879 1.320 1,10 A 4.631 -2.8622 R 
GNP 1.05 0.927 1.324 1,11 1 10.13 -2.8270 A 
AGNP 1.42 0.879 1.320 1,10 A 0.01631 -2.8622 A 
AAGNP 1.57 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -2.125 -2.9076 A 
AAAGNP 1.64 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -2.974 -2.9677 R 
GNPchange 1.55 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -0.2575 -2.8622 A 
AGNPchange 1.62 0.824 1.320 L9 A -2.572 -2.9076 A 
AAGNPchange 1.79 0.763 1.322 1,8 A -3.644 -2.9677 R 
INFLATE 0.552 0.927 1.324 1,11 R 5.289 -2.8270 A 
AINFLATE 1.16 0.879 1.320 1,10 1 -0.7471 -2.8622 A 
AAINFLATE 2.14/1.86 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -2.275 -2.9076 A 
FLATE 2.20/1.80 0.763 1.332 1,8 A 4.109 -2.9677 R 
INFLATEchange 1.13 0.879 1.320 1,10 1 -1.266 -2.8622 A 
AINFLATEchange 2.20/1.80 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -2.44 -2.9076 A 
AAINFLATEchange 2.22/1.78 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -4.054 -2,9677 R 
INTCOVER 1.88 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -0.8023 -2.8270 A 
AINTCOVER 1.55 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -3.76 -2.8622 R 
INVEST 1.39 0.927 1.324 1,11 A 2.03 -2.8270 A 
AINVEST 1.37 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -1.75 -2.8622 A 
AAINVEST 1.15 0.824 1.320 1,9 1 -2.73 -2.9076 A 
AAAINVEST 0.889 0.763 1.332 1,8 1 -4.576 -2.9677 R 
INVESTchange 1.51 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -1.929 -2.8622 A 
AINVESTchange 1.17 0.824 1.320 1,9 1 -4.157 -2.9076 R 
LRINT 1.48 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -1.045 -2.8270 A 
ALRINT 1.53 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -3.098 -2.8622 R 
MRINT 1.12 0.927 1.324 1,11 1 -1.068 -2.8270 A 
AMRINT 1.27 0.879 1.320 1,10 1 -2.412 -2.8622 A 
AAMRINT 0.898 0.824 1.320 1,9 1 -3.765 -2.9076 R 
QRATIO 1.98 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -0.1058 -2.8270 A 
AQRATIO 1.90 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -2.975 -2.8622 R 
ROCE 1.35 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -0.4173 -2.8270 A 
AROCE 1.18 0.879 1.320 1,10 1 -2.103 -2.8622 A 
AAROCE 1.95 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -3,516 -2.9076 R 
SMIND 2.27/1.73 0.927 1.324' 1,11 A 0.08977 -2.8270 A 
ASMIND 2.10/1.90 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -3.419 -2.8622 R 
SRINT 1.22 0.927 1.324 1,11 1 -0.1963 -2.8270 A 
ASRINT 2.17/1.83 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -2.916 -2.8622 R 
TAXRATJO 2.35/1.65 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -0.743 -2.8270 A 
ATAXRATio 1.56 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -3.631 1 -2.8622 R 
WCRATIO 2.04/1.96 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -0.2626 -2.8270 A 
AWCRATIO 1.85 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -3.169 -2.8622 R 
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Table 12 
he French weighted sample, showing critical Dickey Fuller 
onstant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
'variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
ciitical 
upper DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
l=inconc. 
Dickey 
Fuller 
stat. 
Mack 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
ASSETS 1.22 0.824 1.320 1,9 1 4.997 -2.9076 A 
AASSETS 1.83 0.763 1.332 1,8 A 0.5694 -2.9677 A 
AWSETS 1.49 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -1.813 -3.0507 A 
ASSETSchange 1.84 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -0.7944 -2.9677 A 
AASSETSchange 1.89 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -2.67 -3.0507 A 
ASSETSchch 1.35 0.700 1.356 1,7 1 -2.321 -3.0507 A 
CTAXRATIO 2.47/1.53 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -0.8041 -2-9076 A 
ACTAXRATIO 0.893 0.763 1.332 1,8 1 -3.098 -2.9677 R 
CTRATE 1.94 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -1.16 -2.9076 A 
ACTRATE. 1.92 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -2.383 -2.9677 A 
AACTRATE 2.30/1.70 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -3.966 -3-0507 R 
CTRATEchange 1.89 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -2.192 -2.9677 A 
ACTRATEchange 2.26/1.74 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -3.876 -3.0507 R 
DDERATIO 2.34/1.66 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -0.2524 -2.9076 A 
ADDERATIO 1.99 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -3.292 -2.9677 R 
DIVCOVER 1.72 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -2.487 -2.9076 A 
ADIVCOVER 2.55/1.45 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -3.469 -2.9677 R 
GDP 0.918 0.824 1.320 1,9 1 4.682 -2.9076 A 
AGDP 1.52 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -0.6508 -2.9677 A 
AAGDP 1.80 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -2.043 -3.0507 A 
GDPchange 1.53 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -0.6622 -2.9677 A 
AGDPchange 1.83 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -2.061 -3.0507 A 
GDPchch 1.78 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -2.474 -3.0507 A 
INFLATEchange 2.22/1.78 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -2.507 -2.9677 A 
AINFLATEchange 2.04/1.96 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -2.289 -3.0507 A 
INFLATEchch 1.61 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -3.136 -3.0507 R 
INTCOVERchange 1.50 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -2.46 -2.9677 A 
AINTCOVERchange 2.13/1.87 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -3.77 -3.0507 R 
INVEST 0.672 0.824 1,320 1,9 R 1.839 
_-2.9076 
A 
AINVEST 0.876 0.763 1.332 1,8 1 -0.9624 -2.9677 A 
AAINVEST 1.62 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -1.968 -3.0507 A 
UNESTchange 0.876 0.763 1.332 1,8 1 -0.9925 -2.9677 A 
AINVESTchange 1.70 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -2.191 -3.0507 A 
DATSTchch 1.66 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -3.853 -3.0507 R. 
LRINT 2.16/1.84 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -2.115 -2.9076 A 
ALRINT 2.18/1.82 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -2.282 -2.9677 A 
AALRINT 2.37/1.63 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -4.597 -3.0507 R. 
LRINTchange 2.05/1.95 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -2.469 -2.9677 A 
ALRINTchange 2.46/1.54 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -4.771 -3.0507 R 
MRINT 2.16/1.84 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -1.517 -2.9076 A 
AMRINT 2.05/1.95 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -2.521 -2.9677 A 
AAMRINT 2.44/1.56 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -4.578 -3.0507 R 
MRINTchange 1.99 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -2.892 -2.9677 A id- AMRINTchange 2.48/1.52 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -4.715 -3.0507 R 
2.63/1.37 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -0.9675 -2.9076 A 
RATIO 1.98 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -3.312 -2.9677 R 
-ROCE 
1.91 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -1.434 -2.9076 A 
-AROCE 
1.98 0,763 1.332 1,8 A -2.248 -2.9677 A 
AAROCE 1.46 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -3.984 -3.0507 
R 
ROCEchan e 1.90 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -2.124 -2.9677 
A 
110 Cý: Eýchhan,, E 1.71 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -3.844 -3.0507 
R 
_- SMIND 2.34/1.66 0.824 1.320 1,9 A 1.149 -2.9076 A 
-ýSMIND 
2.07/1.93 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -2.6_09 -2.9677 A 
AASMIND 2.67/1.33 I 0.700 1.356 1,7 1 -5.04 -3.0507 
R 
SMINDchan e 
j230/1.70 
0.763 1.332 1,8 A -2.274 9677 
A 
ASMINDchange 2.51/1.49 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -4.838 -3.0507 
R 
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Table 12 
he French weighted sample, showing critical Dickey Fuller 
onstant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics (cont. ) 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
Dickey 
Fuller 
stat. 
Mack. 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
SRINT 1.39 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -0.8089 -2.9076 A 
ASRINT 1.99 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -1.942 -2.9677 A 
AASRINT 2.19/1.81 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -3.93 -3.0507 R 
SRINTchange 1.98 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -2.171 -2.9677 A 
ASRINTchange 2.19/1.81 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -4.223 -3.0507 R 
TAXADV 1.58 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -0.8835 -2.9076 A 
ATAXADV 1.92 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -2.383 -2.9677 A 
AATAXADV 2.30/1.70 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -3.966 -3.0507 R 
TAXADVchange 2.05/1.95 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -3.033 -2.9677 R 
TAXRATIO 2.64/1.36 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -0.7761 -2.9076 A 
ATAXRATIO 1.44 0.763 1.332 1,8 -4.667 -2.9677 R 
WCRATIO 2.06/1.94 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -1.53 -2.9076 A 
AWCRATIO 2.01/1.99 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -2.22 -2.9677 A 
AAWCRATIO 2.04/1.96 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -4.204 -3.0507 R 
WCRATIOchange 1.99 0.763 1.332 1,8 A 
1 
-2.137 -2.9677 A 
AWCRATIOchange 2.01/1.99 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -4.151 -3.0507 R 
Table 13 
Unit root tests for the French weighted sample, showing critical Dickel Fuller 
statistics (with trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat. lower upper degrees DW test Dickey Mack Inference 
DW DW of A=accept Fuller critical A=accept 
critical critical freedom R=reject stat. R=reject 
1--mconc. 
INFLATE 2.42/1.58 0.455 2.128 3,9 1 -4.621 -5.4776 1 A 
JINTCOVER 2.07/1.93 1 0.455 2.128 3,9 1 -4.585 -5.4776 1 
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Ta 
Unit root tests for the French non-weighted sample, showing critical Dickey 
Fuller statistics (without constant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
Dickey 
Fuller 
stat. 
Mack. 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
ASSETS 1.22 0.824 1.320 1,9 1 4.997 -2.9076 A 
AASSETS 1.83 0.763 1.332 1,8 A 0.5694 -2.9677 A 
AWSETS 1.49 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -1.813 -3.050 7 A 
ASSETSchange 1.84 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -0.7944 -2.9677 A 
AASSETSchange 1.89 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -2.67 -3.0507 A 
CTAXRATIO 2.95/1.05 0.824 1.320 1,9 1 -0.9099 -2.9076 A 
ACTAXRATIO 2.03/1.97 0.763 1.322 1,8 A -5.659 -2.9677 R 
CTRATE 
- 
2.34/1.66 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -3.17 -2.9076 R 
DDERATIO 
- 
2.11/1.89 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -1.147 -2.9076 A 
ADDERATIO .. 1.93 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -2.646 -2.9677 A 
AADDERATIO 2.70/1.30 0.700 1.356 1,7 1 -4.337 -3.0507 R 
DIVCOVER 1.28 0.824 1.320 1,9 1 -1.452 -2.9076' A 
ADIVCOVER 1.99 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -1.58 -2.9677 A 
AADIVCOVER 1.44 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -3.266 -3.0507 R 
GDP 0.918 0.824 1.320 1,9 1 4.682 -2.9076 
- A 
AGDP 1.52 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -0.6508 -2.9677 A 
AAGDP 1.80 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -2.043 -3.0507 A 
GDPchange 1.55 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -0.6635 -2.9677 A 
AGDPchange 1.83 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -2.073 -3.0507 A 
GDPchch 1.78 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -2.474 -3.0507 A 
INFLATEchange 2.22/1.78 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -2.507 -2.9677 A 
AINFLATEchange 2.04/1.96 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -2.289 -3.0507 A 
INFLATEchch 1.61 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -3.136 -3.0507 R 
INTCOVER 2.33/1.67 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -1.142 -2.9076 A 
. 
&NTCOVER 1.66 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -3.474 -2.9677 R 
INVEST 0.672 0.824 1.320 1,9 R 1.839 -2.9076 A 
AINVEST 0.876 0.763 1.332 1,8 1 -0.9624 -2.9677 A 
AAINVEST 1.62 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -1.968 -3.0507 A 
INVESTchange 0.876 0.763 1.332 1,8 1 -0.9925 -2.9677 A 
AINVESTchange 1.70 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -2.191 -3.0507 A 
INVESTchch 1.66 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -3.853 -3.0507 R 
LRINT 2.16/1.84 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -2.115 -2.9076 A 
ALRINT 2.18/1.82 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -2.282 -2.9677 A 
AALRINT 2.37/1.63 0.700 1.356 1,7 A 4.597 -3.0507 R 
MRINT 2.16/1.84 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -1.517 -2.9076 A 
AMRINT 2.05/1.95 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -2.521 -2.9677 A 
AAMRINT 2.44/1.56 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -4.578 -3.0507 R 
QRATIO 3.07/0.93 0.824 1.320 1,9 1 -0.08405 -2.9076 A 
AQRATIO 2.56/1.44 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -4.95 -2.9677 R 
ROCE 2.35/1.65 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -1.07 -2.9076 A 
. 
AROCE 1.48 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -2.91 -2.9677 A 
AAROCE 0.806 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -5.087 -3.0507 R 
SMIND 2.34/1.66 0.824 1.320 1,9 A 1.149 -2.9076 A 
ASMIND 2.07/1.93 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -2.609 -2.9677 A 
AASMIND 2.67/1.33 0.700 1.356 1,7 1 -5.04 -3.0507 R 
SRINT 1.39 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -0.8089 -2.9076 A 
ASRINT 1.99 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -1.942 -2.9677 A 
AASRINT 2.19/1.81 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -3.93 -3.0507 R 
TAXADV 1.59 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -2.322 -2.9076 A 
ATAXADV 2.46/1.54 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -1.587 -2.9677 A 
AATAXADV 1.79 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -5.571 -3.0507 R 
AXRATIO 2.53/1.47 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -0.8903 -2.9076 A 
ATAXRATIO 1.91 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -5.34 -2.9677 R 
WCRATIO 1.58 0.824 1,320 1,9 A 0.08651 -2.9076_ A 
AWCRATIO 1.64 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -2.165 -2.9677 A 
AAWCRATIO 1.68 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -2.454 -3.0507 A 
WCRATIOchange 1.64 0.763 1.332 
- 
1,8 A -2.164 -2.967 A 
. 
AWCRATIOchange 
NWAM 
1.667 0.700 1 356 1,7 A -2.444 -3.0507 A 
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Ta b_l-e 15 
Unit root tests-for the French non-weighted sample, showing critical Dickev 
Fu- trend) and Durbin Watson statistics (cont. ) 
variable DW stat. lower upper degrees DW test Dickey Mack. Inferejice 
DW DW of A=accept Fuller critical A=accept 
critical critical freedom R=reject stat. R=reject 
I 
I=inconc. 
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APPENDIX G:, 
BLES USED IN THE COINTEGRATION TESTING 
Table I 
Mackinnon distribution critical value table at the 10 per cent level 
(N=2. no trend) 
A 
pw 
= -3.04625A= -4.069,, 82= -5.73 
T -3.0462 -4.069 /T -5.73 /T2 
Mackinnon 
distribution 
5 -0.8138 -0.2292 -4.0892 
6 -0.6782 -0.1592 -3.8836 
7 -0.5813 -0.1169 -3.7444 
8 -0.5086 -0.0895 -3.6443 
9 -0.4521 -0.0707 -3.5690 
10 -0.4069 -0.0573 -3.5104 
11 -0.3699 -0.0474 -3.4635 
12 -0.3391 -0.0398 -3.4251 
13 -0.3130 -0.0339 -3.3931 
14 -0.2906 -0.0292 -3.3660 
15 -0.2713 -0.0255 -3.3430 
16 -0.2543 -0.0224 -3.3229 
17 -0.2394 -0.0198 -3.3054 
18 -0.2261 -0.0177 -3.2900 
19 -0.2142 -0.0159 -3.2763 
20 -0.2035 -0.0143 -3.2640 
21 -0.1938 -0.0130 -3.2530 
22 if -0.1850 -0.0118 -3.2430 
23 if -0.1769 -0.0108 -3.2339 
24 if -0.1695 -0.0099 -3.2256 
25 11 -0.1628 -0.0092 -3.2182 
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Table 2 
Mackinnon distribution critical value table at the 10 per cent level 
fffLnEiEmm 
A 
floo 
= -3.4959, A= - 1.960,, 82= -10.04 
T -3.4959 -7.203 /T -4.01 /T2 
Mackinnon 
distribution 
5 -1.4406 -0.1604 -5.0969 
6 -1.2005 -0.1114 -4.8078 
7 -1.0290 -0.0818 -4.6067 
8 -0.9004 -0.0627 -4.4590 
9 -0.8003 -0.0495 -4.3457 
10 -0.7203 -0.0401 -4.2563 
11 -0.6548 -0.0331 -4.1838 
12 -0.6003 -0.0278 -4.1240 
13 -0.5541 -0.0237 -4.0737 
14 -0.5145 -0.0205 -4.0309 
15 -0.4802 -0.0178 -3.9939 
16 -0.4502 -0.0157 -3.9618 
17 -0.4237 -0.0139 -3.9335 
18 -0.4002 -0.0124 -3.9085 
19 -0.3791 -0.0111 -3.8861 
20 -0.3602 -0.0100 -3.8661 
21 -0.3430 -0.0091 -3.8480 
22 -0.3274 -0.0083 -3.8316 
23 -0.3132 -0.0076 -3.8167 
24 -0.3001 -0.0070 -3.8030 
25 -0.2881 -0.0064 -3.7904 
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APPENDIX H: 
F-TESTS FOR THE PRESENCE OF A DETERMINISTIC TREND WITHIN 
THE ERROR CORRECTION MECHANISM OF A BIVARIATE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DDERATIO AND EACH VARIABLE 
Table I 
The F-test for the presence of a deterministic trend within the UK weil! . hted 
sawle error correction mechanisms 
error correction 
mechanism 
degrees of freedom F-statistic accept/reject 
ASSETSchange 2,21 5.051 accept 
CTAXRATIO 2,22 4.2172 accept 
CTRATE 2,22 3.9977 accept 
. DIVCOVER 2,19 6.2987 accept 
GDPchange 2,20 4.1639 accept 
INCTAX 2,22 4.283 accept 
INFLATEchange 2,20 6.0726 accept 
INTCOVER 2,22 4.3303 accept 
WWSTchange 2,20 4.1441 accept 
LRINT 2,21 3.6035 accept 
MRINT 2,15 3.1894 accept 
QRATIO 2,22 3.1537 accept 
ROCE 2,22 5.2713 accept 
SNUND 2,20 3.8201 accept 
SRINT 2,21 4.1964 accept 
TAXADV 2,22 3.9871 accept 
TAXRATIO 2,22 4.5239 accept 
WCRATIO 2,22 4.5717 accept 
A44 
Table 2 
. Mý- The F-test for the presence of a deterministic trend within the UK non-weijzhted 
sample error correction mechanisms 
error correction 
mechanism 
degrees of freedom F-statistic accept/reject 
ASSETSchange 2,21 4.3048 accept 
CTAXRATIO 2,22 4.1298 accept 
CTRATEchange 2,21 6.6183 acce 
DIVCOVER 2,19 3.9745 accept 
GDPchange 2,20 4.08 accept 
INCTAX 2,22 3.9377 accept 
INFLATEchange 2,20 8.0612 accept 
INTCOVER 2,22 4.4086 accept 
INVESTchange 2,20 3.0443 accept 
LRINT 2,21 2.601 accept 
MRINT 2,15 3.9666 accept 
QRATIO 2,22 3.8702 accept 
ROCE 2,22 3.9845 accept 
SNUND 2,20 2.7295 accept 
SRINT 2,21 3.6742 accept 
TAXADV 2,22 3.7893 accept 
TAXR-ATIO 2,22 3.398 accept 
WCRATIO 2,22 4.3286 accept 
Table 3 
The F-test for the presence of a deterministic trend within the Netherlands 
weighted sample error correction mechanisms 
error correction 
mechanism 
degrees of freedom F-statistic accept/reject 
ASSETSchange 2JO 4.0275 accept 
CTRATE 2,11 2.3091 accept 
GDPchch 2,8 2.5919 accept 
INFLATEchange 2,10 6.8975 accept 
INTCOVER 2,11 2.5143 accept 
LRINTchange 2,10 2.5973 accept 
MRINTchange 2,10 2.7274 accept 
2,11 3.6608 accept 
ROCE 2,11 2.5252 accept 
SMIND 2,11 2.3698 accept 
SRINT 2,9 3.7555 accept 
TAXRATIO 2,11 2.4412 1 accept 
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Table 4 
The F-test for the presence of a deterministic trend within the Netherlands non- 
weighted sample error correction mechanisms 
error correction 
mechanism 
degrees of freedom F-statistic accept/reject 
TSSETSchange 2,10 1.7627 accept 
CTRATE 2,11 1.3043 accept 
DJVCOVER 2,11 1.8162 accept 
GDPchch 2,8 5.0828 accept 
INFLATEchange 2,10 2.7552 accept 
LRINTchange 2,10 1.9687 accept 
MRINTchange 2,10 2.2933 accept 
__QRATIO 
2,11 2.9944 accept 
ROCE 2,11 1.5052 accept 
SMIND 2,11 2.0457 accept 
SRINT 2,9 3.2126 accept 
TAXRATIO 2,11 2.4308 accept 
WCRATIO 2,11 2.135 accept 
Table 5 
The F-test for the presence of a deterministic trend within the German weighted 
sample error correction mechanisms 
error correction 
mechanism 
degrees of freedom F-statistic accept/reject 
ASSETSchange 2,7 13-355 reject 
DIVCOVER 2,8 4.3223 accept 
WWSTchange 2ý7 3.4215 accept 
LRINT 2,8 9.689 accept 
MRINTchange 2,7 1.9474 accept 
QRATIO 2,8 2.2439 accept 
2,7 16.943 reject 
SMIND : 2,8 3,5243 accept 
S RINT 
L 
2,8 2.9592 accept 
RL : 10: 4 WCRATIOchange 2,7 --- 7-1 - 11.832 reject 
Table 6, 
The F-test for the presence of a deterministic trend within the German non- 
MiAted sample error correction mechanisms 
error correction 
-___. Techanism 
degrees of freedom F-statistic accept/reject 
ASSETS 2,8 2.2147 accept 
GNPchanLye 2,7 2.5455 accept 
INFLATEchange 
ý"- 
2,7 2.5524 accept 
MRINT 
F 
2,8 1.7135 accept 
2,8 4.147 accept 
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Table 7 
The F-test for the presence of a deterministic trend within the French weilzhted 
sample error correction mechanisms 
error correction 
mechanism 
degrees of freedom F-statistic accept/reject 
CTAXRATIO 2,6 3.4752 accept 
CTRATEchange 2,5 2.9079 accept 
DIVCOVER 2,6 2.5538 accept 
INTCOVERchange 2,5 2.7094 accept 
LRINTchange 2,5 2.5444 accept 
MRINTchange 2,5 2.6861 accept 
QRATIO 2,6 2.4425 accept 
ROCEchange 2,5 3.0128 accept 
SMINDchange 2,5 3.4794 accept 
SRINTchange 2,5 2.6668 accept 
TAXRATIO 2,6 3.0424 accept 
WCRATIOchange 1 2,5 3.3218 accept 
Table 8 
The F-test for the presence of a deterministic trend within the French non- 
wei2hted sample error correction mechanisms 
error correction 
mechanism 
degrees of freedom F-statistic accept/reject 
DIVCOVER 2,6 2.4892 accept 
LRINT 2,6 1.7033 accept 
MRINT 2,6 1.1995 accept 
ROCE 2,6 2.0515 accept 
SMIND 2,6 2.835 accept 
SRINT 2,6 2.2785 accept 
TAXADV 2,6 3.1944 accept 
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APPENDIX 1: 
TESTING FOR THE EXISTENCE OF COINTEGRATION WITHIN 
BIVARIATE EUROPEAN CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
RELATIONSHIPS 
Table I 
Cointegration tests for the UK weighted sample, showing Dickey Fuller and 
Augmented Dickey Fuller statistics at different lag lengths 
(without constant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
DF/ADF 
stat. 
Mack. 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
ASSETSchangelagO 2.08/1.92 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -3.219 -3.2256 A 
ASSETSchangelagl 1.98 1.168 1.543 2,23 A -2.29 -3.2339 A 
ASSETSchangelag2 2.02/1.98 1.053 1.664 3,22 A -2.031 -3.2430 A 
ASSETSchangelag3 2.08/1.92 0.927 1.812 4,21 A -2.602 -3,2530 A 
ASSETSchangelag4 1.63 0.792 1.991 5,20 1 -2.392 -3.2640 A 
ASSETSchangelag5 2.18/1.81 0.649 2.206 6,19 1 -2.056 -3.2763 A 
CTAXRATIOlagO 1.85 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -2.762 -3.2182 A 
CTAXRATIOlagl 1.96 1.188 1.546 2,24 A -2.492 -3.2256 A 
CTAXRATIOlag2 1.97 1.078 1.660 3,23 A -2.169 -3.2339 A 
CTAXRATIOlag3 2.03/1.97 0.958 1.797 4,22 A -2.434 -3.2430 A 
CTAXRATIOlag4 1.95 0.829 1.964 5,21 1 -2.447 -3.2530 A 
CTAXRATIOlag5 1.72 0.692 2.162 6,20 1 -2.044 -3.2640 A 
CTRATEIagO 1.98 1.288 1.454 1125 A -2.912 -3.2182 A 
CTRATElagl 1.99 1.188 1.546 2,24 A -2.478 -3.2256 A 
CTRATE1ag2 2.02/1.98 1.078 1.660 3,23 A -2.16 -3.2339 A 
CTRATElag3 2.14/1.86 0.958 1.797 4,22 A -2.608 -3.2430 A 
CTRATElag4 2.09/1.91 0.829 1.964 5,21 1 -2.706 -3.2530 A 
CTRATE1ag5 1.65 0.692 2.162 6,20 1 -2.494 -3.2640 A 
DIVCOVERIagO 1.73 1.239 1.429 1,22 A -3.285 -3.2430 R 
DIVCOVERIagl 1.88 1.125 1.538 2,21 A -3.302 -3.2530 R 
DIVCOVERIag2 1.98 0.998 1.676 3,20 A -2.471 -3.2640 A 
DIVCOVERIag3 1.85 0.859 1.848 4,19 A -2.389 -3.2763 A 
DIVCOVER]ag4 1.93 0.710 2.060 5,18 1 -2.213 -3.2900 A 
DIVCOVERIag5 1.89 0.554 2.318 6,17 1 -1.829 -3.3054 A 
GDPchangelagO 1.91 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -2.839 -3.2339 A 
GDPchangelagl 1.95 1.147 1.541 2,22 A -2.432 -3.2430 A 
GDPchangelag2 1.96 1.026 1.669 3,21 A -2.087 -3.2530 A 
GDPchangelag3 1.89 0.894 1.828 4,20 A -2.449 -3.2640 A 
GDPchangelag4 2.01/1.99 0.752 2.023 5,19 1 -1.884 -3.2763 A 
GDPchangelag5 1.97 0.603 2.257 6,18 1 -2.05 -3.2900 A 
INCTAMagO 1.84 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -2.738 -3.2182 A 
INCTAMagl 1.95 1.188 1,546 2,24 A -2.466 -3.2256 A 
INCTAYJap-2 1.96 1.078 1.660 3,23 A -2.118 -3.2339 A 
INCTAYdag3 2.02/1.98 0.958 1.797 4,22 A -2.385 -3.2430 A 
INCTAMag4 1.94 0.829 1.964 5,21 1 -2.343 -3.2530 A 
INCTAMag5 1.71 0.692 2.162 6,20 1 -1.927 -3.2640 A 
INFLATEchangelagO 1.98 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -3.649 -3.2339 R 
INFLATEchangelagi 1.99 1.147 1.541 2,22 A -2.793 -3.2430 A 
INFLATEchangelag2 1.99 1.026 1.669 3,21 A -2.171 -3.2530 A 
INFLATEchangelag3 2.00 0.894 1.828 4,20 A -2.11 -3.2640 A 
INFLATEchangelag4 1.91 0.752 2.023 5,19 1 -1.753 -3.2763 A 
INFLATEchangelaO 1.69 0.603 2.257 6,18 1 -2.017 -3.2900 A 
INTCOVERIagO 1.70 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -2.689 -3.2182 A 
INTCOVER]agl 1.97 1.188 1.546 2,24 A -2.578 -3.2256 A 
INTCOVER]ag2 1.97 1.078 1.660 3,23 A -2.299 -3.2339 A 
INTCOVERIag3 1.97 0.958 1.797 4,22 A -2.42 -3.2430 A 
INTCOVERjag4 1.89 0.829 1.964 5,21 1 1 -2.244 -3.2530 A 
INTCOVERIag5 1.66 0.692 2.162 6,20 1 -1.979 -3.2640 A 
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Table I 
for the UK weighted sample, showing Dickey Fuller and 
Fuller statistics at different lag lengths 
(without constant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics (cont. ) 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
1--Inconc. 
DF/ADF 
stat. 
Mack. 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
INVESTchangelagO 1.98 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -2.997 -3.2339 A FN-VESTchangelagl 1.97 1.147 1.541 2,22 A -2.368 -3.2430 A 
INVESTchangelag2 2.00 1.026 1.669 3,21 A -2.064 -3.2530 A 
INVESTchangelag3 2.08/1.92 0.894 1.828 4,20 A -2.482 -3.2640 A 
INVESTchan lag4 1.68 0.752 2.023 5,19 1 -2.233 -3.2763 A 
INVESTchangelag5 1.86 0.603 2.257 6,18 1 -2.145 -3.2900 A 
LRINTIagO 1.96 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -2.801 -3.2256 A 
LRINTIagl 1.97 1.168 2.543 2,23 A -2.327 -3.2339 A 
LRINTIag2 1.95 1.053 1.664 3,22 A -1.839 -3.2430 A 
LRINTIag3 2.02/1.98 0.927 1.812 4,21 A -2.062 -3.2530 A 
LRINTIag4 1.99 0.792 1.991 5,20 1 -1.807 -3.2640 A 
LRINTIag5 1.87 0.752 2.023 6,19 1 -1.887 -3.2763 A 
MRINTIagO 1.93 1.158 1.391 1,18 A -2.673 -3.2900 A 
MRINTIagl 1.95 1.015 1.536 2,17 17 A -2.406 -3.3054 A 
MRINTIag2 1.96 0.857 1.728 1 16 3,16 A -2.113 -3.3229 A 
MRINTIag3 1.93 0.685 1.977 
1 
4,15 j15 A -2.409 -3.3430 A 
MRINTIag4 1.67 0.505 2.296 ,I 14 1 -2.29 -3.3660 A 
MRINTIag5 1.87 0.328 2.692 6,13 1 -0.9632 -3.3931 A 
QRATIOlagO 1.99 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -2.544 -3.2182 A 
QRATIOlagl 2.00 1.188 1.546 2,24 A -2.167 -3.2256 A 
QRAT101ag2 2.04/1.96 1.078 1.660 3,23 A -1.967 -3.2339 A 
QRATIOlag3 2.05/1.95 0.958 1.797 1 4,22 A -2.348 -3.2430 A 
QRATIO1ag4 2.01/1.99 0.829 1.964 5,21 A -2.12 -3.2530 A 
QRATIOlag5 1.76 0.692 2.162 6,20 1 -1.943 -3.2640 A 
ROCEIagO 1.65 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -3.367 -3.2182 R 
ROCElagl 1.88 1.189 1.546 2,24 A -3.552 -3.2256 R 
ROCE1ag2 1.89 1.078 1.660 3,23 A -2.707 -3.2339 A 
ROCE1ag3 2.15/1.85 0.958 1.797 4,22 A -3.114 -3.2430 A 
ROCE1ag4 2.18/1.82 0.829 1.964 5,21 1 -3.771 -3.2530 R 
ROCE1ag5 1.86 0.692 2.162 6,20 1 -3.396 -3.2640 R 
SMINDIagO 1.93 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -2.86 -3.2339 A 
SMINDIagl 1.97 1.147 1.541 2,22 A -2.454 -3.2430 A 
SMINDIag2 2.00 1.026 1.669 3,21 A -2.137 -3.2530 A 
SMINDIag3 2.08/1.92 0.894 1.828 4,20 A -2.631 -3.2640 A 
SMINDIag4 1.77 0.752 2.023 5,19 1 -2.312 -3.2763 A 
SMINDIag5 1.92 0.603 2.257 6,18 1 -2.146 -3.2900 A 
SRINTIagO 1.90 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -2.902 -3.2256 A 
SRINTIagi 1.96 1.168 1.543 2,23 A -2.587 -3.2339 A 
SRINTIag2 1.92 1.053 1.664 3,22 A -1.882 -3.2430 A 
SRINTIag3 2.00 0.927 1.812 4,21 A -2.067 -3.2530 A 
SRINTIag4 1.99 0.792 1.991 5,20 1 -1.998 -3.2640 A 
SRINTIag5 1.68 0.752 2.023 6,19 1 -1.846 -3.2763 A 
TAXADVIagO 2.02/1.98 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -2.814 -3.2182 A 
TAXADVIagl 1.98 1.188 1.546 2,24 A -2.232 -3.2256 - 
A 
TAXADvjag2 2.01/1.99 1.078 1.660 3,23 A -1.933 -3.2339 1A 
TAXADVIag3 2.10/1.90 0.958 1.797 4,22 A -2.297 -3.2430 A 
TAXADVIag4 2.03/1.97 0.829 1.964 5,21 A -2.293 -3.2530 A 
TAXADVIag5 1.62 0.692 2.162 6,20 A -2.033 -3.2640 A 
TAXRATIOlagO 1.86 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -3.132 -3.2182 A 
TAXRATIOlagl 1.97 1.186 1,546 1 2,24 A -2.955 -3.2256 A 
TAXRATjO1ag2 1.95 1.078 1.660 3,23 A -2.39 -3.2339 A 
TAXRATIOlag3 17/183 0.958 1,797 4,22 A -2.924 -3.2430 A 
TAXRATIOlag4 2.19/lu8i 0,829 1.964 
L 
5,21 1 3.359 -3.2530 R 
TAXRATIOlag5 1.71 0.692 1 2.162 6,20 
11 -3.126 -3.2640 A 
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Table I 
for the UK weighted sample, showing Dickey Fuller and 
Fuller statistics at different lag le! lgths 
(without constant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics (cont. ) 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
DF/ADF 
stat. 
Mack 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
WCRATIOlagO 1.82 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -3.074 -3.2182 A 
WCRATIOlagl 1.95 1.188 1.546 2,24 A -2.908 -3.2256 A 
WCRATIOlag2 1.96 1.078 1.660 3,23 A -2.479 -3.2339 A 
WCRATIOlag3 2.10/1.90 0.958 1.797 4,22 A -2.819 -3.2430 A 
I WCRATIOlag4 2.10/1.90 0.829 1 1.964 1 5ý21 1 -3.178 1 -3.250 1A 
r -WCRATIOlag5 1 1.58 0.692 1 2.162 1 6,20 11 1- . 81 
1 -3.2640 1A 
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Table 2 
Cointei! ration tests for the UK non-weighted sample, showing Dickey Fuller and 
Augmented Dickey Fuller statistics at different lag lengths 
(without constant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
DF/ADF 
stat. 
Mack 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
ASSETSchangetagO 2.05/1.95 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -2.549 -3.2256 A 
ASSETSchangelagl 1.99 1.168 1.543 2,23 A -2.005 -3.2339 A 
ASSETSchangelag2 2.00 1.053 1.664 3,22 A -1.824 -3.2430 A 
ASSETSchan lag3 1.94 0.927 1.812 4,21 A -1.821 -3.2530 A 
ASSETSchangelag4 1.42 0.792 1.991 5,20 1 -1.336 -3.2640 A 
ASSETSchangelag5 1.95 0.649 2.206 6,19 1 -2.039 -3.2763 A 
CTAXRATIOlagO 1.66 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -2.033 -3.2182 A 
CTAXRATIOlagl 1.94 1.188 1.546 2,24 A -2.098 -3.2256 A 
CTAXRATIOlag2 1.92 1.078 1.660 3,23 A -1.679 -3.2339 A 
CTAXRATIOlag3 1.95 0.958 1.797 4,22 A -1.43 -3.2430 A 
CTAXRATIOlag4 1.85 0.829 1.964 5,21 1 -1.34 -3.2530 A 
CTAXRATIOlag5 1.72 0.692 2.162 6,20 1 -1.176 -3.2640 A 
CTRATEchangelagO 1.31 1.273 1.446 1,24 1 -2.824 -3.2256 A 
CTRATEchangelag 1 1.69 1.168 1.543 2,23 A -3.489 -3.2339 R 
CTRATEchangelag2 1.98 1.053 1.664 3,22 A -2.071 -3.2430 A 
CTRATEchangelag3 1.95 0.927 1.812 4,21 A -1.479 -3.2530 A 
CTRATEchangelag4 1.42 0.792 1.991 5,20 1 -1.366 -3.2640 A 
CTRATEchangelag5 2.17/1.83 0.649 2.206 6,19 1 -0.8897 -3.2763 A 
DIVCOVERIagO 1.76 1.239 1.429 1,22 A -2.67 -3.2430 A 
DIVCOVERIagl 1.97 1.125 1.538 2,21 A -2.412 -3.2530 A 
DIVCOVER]ag2 1.76 0.998 1.676 3,20 A -2.238 -3.2640 A 
DIVCOVERIag3 1.85 0.859 1.8484 4,19 A -3.258 -3.2763 A 
DIVCOVERIag4 2.03/1.97 0.710 2.060 5218 1 -1.881 -3.2900 A 
DIVCOVERIag5 1.94 0.554 2.318 6,17 1 -1.461 -3.3054 A 
GDPchangelagO 1.86 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -1.965 -3.2339 A 
GDPchangelagl 1.91 1.147 1.541 2,22 A -1.815 -3.2430 A 
GDPchangelag2 1.94 1.026 1.669 3,21 A -1.365 -3.2530 A 
GDPchangelag3 1.61 0.894 1.828 4,20 A -1.436 -3.2640 A 
GDPchangelag4 2.19/1.81 0.752 2.023 5,19 _ 1 -1.068 -3.2763 A 
GDPchangelag5 1.77 0.603 2.257 6,18 1 -1.669 -3.2900 A 
INCTAMagO 1.61 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -2.47 -3.2182 A 
INCTAMagl 1.95 1.188 1.546 2,24 A -2.632 -3.2256 A 
INCTA)Uag2 1.93 1.078 1.660 3,23 A -2.076 -3.2339 A 
INCTAMag3 1.99 0.958 1.797 4,22 A -2.058 -3.2430 A 
INCTAMag4 1.80 0.829 1.964 5,21 1 -2.102 -3.2530 A 
INCTAMag5 1.83 0.692 2.162 6,20 1 -1.736 -3.2640 A 
INFLATEchangelagO 1.98 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -3.982 -3.2339 R 
INFLATEchangelagi 1.99 1.147 1.541 2,22 A -3.142 -3.2430 A 
_INFLATEchangelag2 
1.98 1.026 1.669 3,21 A -2.583 -3.2530 A 
INFLATEchangelag3 1.98 0.894 1.828 4,20 A -1.819 -3.2640 A 
INFLATEchangelag4 1.77 0.752 2.023 5,19 1 -1.523 -3.2763 A 
INFLATEchangelag5 1.44 0.603 2.257 6,18 1 -2.479 -3.2900 A 
INTCOVERIagO 1.81 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -2.376 -3.2182 A 
INTCOVERIagl 1.90 1.188 1,546 2,24 A -2.255 -3.2256 A 
INTCOVERIag2 1.91 1.078 1.660 3,23 A -1.681 -3.2339 A 
INTCOVERIag3 1.89 0.958 1.797 4,22 A -1.707 -3.2430 A 
INTCOVERIag4 1.87 0.829 1.964 5,21 1 -1.542 -3.2530 A 
INTCOVERIag5 1.67 0.692 2.162 6,20 1 -1.292 -3.2640 A 
INVESTchangelagO 1.84 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -2.277 -3.2339 A 
INVESTchangelagl 1.95 1.147 1.541 2,22 A -2.162 -3.2430 A 
INVESTchangelag2 1.97 1.026 1.669 3,21 A -1.974 -3.2530 A 
INVESTchangelag3 1.93 0.894 1.828 4,20 A -1.741 -3.2640 A 
INVESTchangelag4 1 1.49 0.752 2.023 5,19 1 1 -1.484 -3.2763 A 
INVESTchangelag5 1 1.49 0.603 2.257 6,18 1 1 -1.958 -3.2900 A 
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Table 2 
Cointegration tests for the UK non-weighted sample, showing Dickey Fuller and 
Augmented Dickey Fuller statistics at different lag lengths 
(without constant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics (cont. ) 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
DF/ADF 
stat. 
Mack 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
LRINTIagO 1.86 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -2.127 -3.2256 A 
LRINTIagl 1.93 1.169 1.543 2,23 A -2.073 -3.2339 A 
LRINTIag2 1.99 1.053 1.664 3,22 A -1.765 -3.2430 A 
LRINTIag3 1.96 0.927 1.812 4,21 A -1.574 -3.2530 A 
LRINTIag4 1.93 0.792 1.991 5,20 1 -1.305 -3.2640 A 
LRINTIag5 1.73 0.649 2.206 6,19 1 -1.391 -3.2763 A 
MRINTIagO 1.70 1.158 1.391 1,18 A -2.979 -3.2900 A 
MRINTIagl 1.87 1.015 1.536 2,17 A -3.663 -3.3054 R 
MRINTIag2 1.93 0.857 1.728 3,16 A -2.306 -3.3229 A 
MRINTIag3 1.84 0.685 1.977 4,15 1 -1.986 -3.3430 A 
MRINTIag4 1.26 0.505 2.296 5,14 1 -2.415 -3.3660 A 
MRINTIag5 1.94 0.328 2.692 6,13 1 -1.186 -3.3931 A 
QRATIOlagO 1.66 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -2.503 -3.2182 A 
QRATIOlagl 2.02/1.98 1.188 1.546 2,24 A -2.659 -3.2256 A 
QRATIOlag2 1.97 1.078 1.660 3,23 A -2.313 -3.2339 A 
QRATIOlag3 1.98 0.958 1.797 4,22 A -2.163 -3.2430 A 
QRATIO1ag4 1.92 0.829 1.964 5,21 1 -1.82 -3.2530 A 
QRATIOlag5 1.69 0.692 2.162 6,20 1 -1.621 -3.2640 A 
ROCElagO 1.66 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -2.072 -3.2182 A 
ROCElagl 1.95 1.188 1.546 2,24 A -2.149 -3.2256 A 
ROCE1ag2 1.93 1.078 1.660 3,23 A -1.725 -3.2339 A 
ROCE1ag3 1.96 0.958 1.797 4,22 A -1.533 -3.2430 A 
ROCE1ag4 1.85 0.829 1.964 5,21 1 -1.446 -3.2530 A 
ROCE1ag5 1.72 0.692 2.162 6,20 A -1.292 -3.2640 A 
SMINDIagO 1.72 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -2.45 -3.2339 A 
SMINDIagl 1.99 1.147 1.541 2,22 A -2.511 -3.2430 A 
SMINDIag2 2.05/1.95 1.026 1.669 3,21 A -2.328 -3.2530 A 
SMINDIag3 2.03/1.97 0.894 1.828 4,20 A -2.495 -3.2640 A 
SMINMO 1.60 0.752 2.023 5,19 1 -2.299 -3.2763 A 
SMINDIag5 1.46 0.603 2.257 6,18 1 -2.332 -3.2900 A 
SRINTIagO 1.72 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -2.161 -3.2256 A 
SRINTIagl 1.93 1.168 1.543 2,23 A -2.19 -3.2339 A 
SRINTIag2 1.95 1.053 1.664 3,22 A -1.591 -3.2430 A 
SRINTIag3 1.96 0.927 1.812 4,21 A -1.502 -3.2530 A 
SRINTIag4 1.91 0.792 1.991 5,20 1 -1.429 -3.2640 A 
SRINTIag5 1.56 0.649 2.206 6,19 1 -1.289 -3.2763 A 
TAXADVIagO 1.82 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -2.017 -3.2182 A 
TAXADVIagl 1.94 1.188 1.546 2,24 A -1.904 -3.2256 A 
TAXADVIag2 1.93 1.078 1.660 3,23 A -1.739 -3.2339 A 
TAXADVIag3 1.92 0.958 1.797 4,22 A -1.437 -3.2430 A 
TAXADVIag4 1.93 0.829 1.964 5,21 1 -1.331 -3.2530 A 
TAxADVIag5 1.45 0.692 2.162 6,20 1 -1.217 -3.2640 A 
TAXRATIO1agO 1.73 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -2.443 -3.2182 A 
TAXRATIOla 1 2.00 1.188 1.546 2,24 A -2.466 -3.2256 A 
TAXRATIOlag2 1.98 1.078 1.660 3,23 A -2.125 -3.2339 A 
TAXRATjO1ag3 2.00 0.958 1.797 4,11 A -2.042 -3.2430 A 
TAXRATIOlag4 1.95 0.829 1.964 5,21 1 -1.911 -3.2530 A 
TAXRATIOlag5 1.66 0.692 2.162 6,20 1 -1.791 -3.2640 A 
WCRATIOla 1.82 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -1.963 -3.2182 A 
WCRATIOlagl 1.92 1.188 1.546 2,24 A -1.779 -3.2256 A 
WCRATIOlag2 1.91 1.078 1.660 3,23 A -1.416 -3.2339 A 
WCRATIOlag3 1.92 0.958 1.797 4,22 A -1.224 -3.2430 A 
WCRAT11011aý4 1.85 0.829 1.964 5,21 1 -1.239 -3.2530 A iýT Nag5 
1.64 0.692 2.162 6,20 1 1 -0.9387 -3.2640 A 
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Table 3 
Cointegration tests for the Netherlands weighted sample, showing Dickev Fuller 
and Aupmented Dickel Fuller statistics at different la2 lengths 
(without constant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
DF/ADF 
stat. 
Mack 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
ASSETSchangelagO 1.99 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -2.838 -3.3931 A 
ASSETSchangelagl 1.69 0.812 1.579 2,12 A -1.568 -3.4251 A 
ASSETSchangelag2 2.02/1.98 0.595 1.928 3,11 A -1.827 -3.4635 A 
ASSETSchangelag3 1.95 0.376 2.414 4,10 1 -2.35 -3.5104 A 
CTRATEIagO 1.94 1.045 1.350 1,14 A -2.311 -3.3660 A 
CTRATElagl 1.91 0.861 1.562 2,13 A -1.97 -3.3931 A 
CTRATE1ag2 1.69 0.658 1.862 3,12 1 -1.296 -3.4251 A 
CTRATE1ag3 1.82 0.444 2.283 4,11 1 -2.408 -3.4635 A 
INFLATEchangelagO 1.86 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -4.053 -3.391 R 
INFLATEchangelagl 1.71 0.812 1.579 2,12 A -3.346 -3.4251 A 
INFLATEchangelag2 2.01/1.99 0.595 1.928 3,11 A -2.067 -3.4635 A 
INFLATEchangelag3 1.98 0.376 2.414 4,10 1 -2.12 -3.5104 A 
INTCOVERIagO 2.00 1.045 1.350 1,14 A -2.269 -3.3660 A 
INTCOVERtagl 1.96 0.861 1.562 2,13 A -2.026 -3.3931 A 
M'COVERIag2 1.55 0.658 1.864 3,12 1 -1.248 -3.4251 A 
INTCOVERIag3 1.83 0.444 2.283 4,11 1 -2.482 -3.4635 A 
LRINTchangelagO 1.79 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -2.327 -3.3931 A 
LRINTchangelagl 1.61 0.812 1.579 2,12 A -2.007 -3.4251 A 
LRINTchangelag2 2.11/1.89 0.595 1.928 3,11 1 -1.604 -3.4635 A 
LRINTchangelag3 1.96 0.376 2.414 4,10 1 -2.122 -3.5104 A 
MRINTehangelagO 1.83 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -2.384 -3.3961 A 
MRINTchanizelagl 1.66 0.812 1.579 2,12 A -1.963 -3.4251 A 
MRINTchangelag2 2.09/1.91 0.595 1.928 3,11 1 -1.604 -3.4635 A 
MRINTchangelag3 1.96 0.376 2.414 4,10 1 -2.132 -3.5104 A 
QRATIOlagO 2.17/1.83 1.045 1.350 1,14 A -2.165 -3.3660 A 
QRATIOI&gl 1.97 0.861 1.562 2,13 A -1.562 -3.3931 A 
QRATIO1ag2 1.88 0.658 1.864 3,12 A -1.676 -3.4251 A 
QRATIOlag3 2.22/1.78 0.444 2.283 4,11 1 -2.378 -3.4635 A 
ROCEIagO 1.92 1.045 1.350 1,14 A -2.427 -3.3660 A 
ROCElagl 1.93 0.861 1.562 2,13 A -2.217 -3.3931 A 
ROCE1ag2 1.64 0.658 1.864 3,12 1 -1.31 -3.4251 A 
ROCE1ag3 1.76 0.444 2.283 4,11 1 -2.198 -3.4635 A 
SMINDIagO 1.94 1.045 1.350 1,14 A -2.144 -3.3660 A 
SMINDIagl 1.84 0.861 1.562 2,13 A -1.669 -3.3931 A 
SMINDIag2 1.59 0.658 1.864 3,12 1 -1.065 -3.4251 A 
SMINDIag3 1.67 0.444 2.283 4,11 1 -2.048 -3.4635 A 
SRINTIagO 1.84 0.971 1.331 1,12 A -2.755 -3.4251 A 
SRINTIagi 1.85 0.758 1.604 2,11 A -2.789 -3.4635 A 
SRINTIag2 1.83 0.525 2.016 3,10 1 -1.522 -3.5104 A 
TAXRATIOlagO 1.82 1.045 1.350 1,14 A -2.399 -3.3660 A 
TAXRATIOlagl 1.88 0.861 1.562 2,13 A -2.478 -3.3931 A 
I TAXRATjO1ag2 1.57 0.658 1 1.864 3,12 1 1 -1.506 1 -3.4251 1A 
I TAXRATIOlag3 1.96 0444 1 2.283 4,11 1 1 -2.258 1 -3.4635 
1A 
Table 4 
Cointegration tests for the Netherlands wei2hted sample, showing Dickel Fuller 
and Augmented Dickey Fuller statistics at different lag lengths (with trend) 
and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat. lower upper degrees DW test DF/ADF Mack Inference 
DW DW of A=accept stat. critical A=accept 
critical critical freedom R=reject R=reject 
I=inconc. 
GDPchchlago 1.86 0.595 1.928 3,11 -2.27 -3.4635 A L 
G- DPchch71ag1 1.84 0.376 2.414 1 -2.388 -3.5104 A 
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Table 5 
Cointegration tests for the Netherlands non-weighted sample, showing Dickey 
Fuller and -Augmented 
Dickey Fuller statistics at different lag lengths 
(without constant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
1---inconc. 
DF/ADF 
stat. 
MaCL 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
SchangelagO ASSET 1.51 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -1.097 -3.3931 A _ ASSETSchangelagi 2.27/1.73 0.812 1.579 2,12 A -1.777 -3.4251 A 
ASSETSchangelag2 2.14 0.595 1.928 3,11 1 -1.844 -3.4635 A 
ASSETSchangelag3 1.36 0.376 2.414 4,10 A -1.946 -3.5104 A 
CTRATEIagO 1.67 1.045 1.350 1,14 A -1.743 -3.3660 A 
CTF-ATElagl 1.62 0.861 1.562 2,13 A -1.903 -3.3931 A 
CTRATE1ag2 2.25/1.75 0.658 1.864 3,12 1 -2.336 -3.4251 A 
CTRATE1ag3 2.13/1.87 0.444 2.283 4,11 1 -2.018 -3.4635 A 
DIVCOVERIagO 1.77 1.045 1.350 1,14 "'A -1.267 -3.3660 A 
DIVCOVERiagl 1.63 0.861 1.562 2,13 A -1.146 -3.3931 A 
DIVCOVERIag2 1.98 0.658 1.864 3,12 A -1.439 -3.4251 A 
DIVCOVERIag3 1.94 0.444 2.283 4,11 1 -1.328 -3.4635 A 
INFLATEchangelagO 1.66 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -1.551 -3.3931 A 
INFLATEchangelagl 1.88 0.812 1.579 2,12 A -1.881 -3.4251 A 
INFLATEchangelag2 1.90 0.595 1.928 3,11 1 -1.068 -3.4635 A 
INFLATEchangelag3 1.96 0.376 2.414 4,10 1 -1.44 -3.5104 A 
LRINTchangelagO 1.45 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -1.09 -3.3931 A 
LRINTchanLelagi 2.22/1.78 0.812 1.579 2,12 A -1.767 -3.4251 A 
LRINTchangelag2 2.05/1.95 0.595 1.928 3,11 A -1.718 -3.4635 A 
LRINTchangelag3 1.38 0.376 2.414 4,10 1 -1.84 -3.5104 A 
MRINTchangelagO 1.93 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -1.407 -3.3931 A 
MRINTchangelagi 2.18/1.82 0.812 1.579 2,12 A -1.829 -3.4251 A 
MRINTchangelag2 2.10/1.90 0.595 1.928 3,11 1 -1.912 -3.4635 A 
MRINTchangelag3 1.28 0.376 2.414 4,10 1 -1.972 -3.5104 A 
QRATIOlagO 1.80 1.045 1.350 1,14 A' -2.639 -3.3660 A 
QRATIOlagl 1.71 0.861 1.562 2,13 A -2.741 -3.3931 A 
QRATIO1ag2 2.30/1.70 0.658 1.864 3,12 1 -2.37 -3.4251 A 
QRATIO1ag3 1.64 0.444 2.283 4,11 1 -3.36 -3.4635 A 
ROCEIagO 1.66 1.045 1.350 1,14 A -1.772 -3.3660 A 
ROCElagl 1.66 0.861 1.562 2,13 A -1.8 -3.3931 A 
ROCE1ag2 1.85 0,658 1.864 3,12 1 -1.678 -3.4251 A 
ROCE1ag3 2.12/1.88 0.444 2.283 4,11 1 -2.032 -3.4635 A 
SMINDIagO 1.73 1.045 1.350 1,14 A -2.218 -3.3660 A 
SMINDIagi 1.36 0.861 1.562 2,13 1 -2.564 -3.3931 A 
SMINDIag2 1.48 0.658 1.864 3,12 1 -2.758 -3.4251 A 
SMINDIag3 1.61 0.444 2.283 4,11 1 -1.025 -3.4635 A 
SRINTIagO 1.98 0.971 1.331 1,12 A -1.34 -3.4251 A 
SRINTIagi 1.50 0.758 1.604 2,11 1 -0.7668 -3.4635 A 
SRINTIag2 2.03/1.97 0.525 2.016 3,10 1 -1.144 -3.5104 A 
TAXRATIolagO 1.96 1.045 1.350 1,14 A -1.786 -3.3660 A 
TAXRATioiagi 1.92 0.861 1.562 2,13 A -1.53 -3.3931 A 
TAXRATjO1ag2 2.06/1.94 0.658 1.864 3,12 A -1.731 -3.4251 ' 
A 
TAXP, ATIOlag3 1.98 0.444 2.283 4,11 1 -1.355 -3.463 5 A 
WCRATIO1agO 1.76 1.045 1.350 1,14 A -1.154 -3.3660 A 
WCRATIOlagl 1.73 0.861 1.562 2,13 A -1.124 -3.3931 A 
_. 
ýýCRATIOIag2 2.19/1.81 0.658 1.864 3,12 1 1 -1.508 -3.4251 A 
U WCPATIOlag3 2.06/1.94 0.444 1 2.283 4,11 1 
1 -1.359 -3.4635 A 
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Table 6 
Cointep-ration tests for the Netherlands non-weighted sample, showing Dickey 
Fuller and Augmented Dickey Fuller statistics at different lag lenpths (with 
trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat. lower upper degrees DW test DF/ADF Mack Inference 
DW DW of A=accept stat. critical A=accept 
I 
critical critical freedom R=reject R=reject 
1----inconc. 
GDPchchlagO 1.95 0.595 1.928 3,11 A -3.139 -3.4635 A 
GD GDPchchlagl : 1.75 0.376 2.414 4,10 1 1 -1.465 -3.5104 A 
Table 7 
Cointegration tests for the German weighted sample, showing Dickey Fuller and 
Au2mented Dickey Fuller statistics at different la2 len2ths 
(without constant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
DF/ADF 
stat. 
Mack 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
DIVCOVERIagO 2.16/1.84 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -1.58 -3.4635 A 
DIVCOVERIagl 1.13 0.697 1.641 2,10 1 -2.13 -3.5104 A 
DIVCOVERIag2 2.67/1.33 0.455 2.128 3,9 1 -0.01851 -3.5690 A' 
INVESTchangelagO 1.75 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -0.7097 -3.5104 A 
INVESTchangelagl 1.66 0.629 1.699 2,9 1 -0.5265 -3.5690 A 
LRINTIagO 2.14/1.86 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -0.9484 -3.4635 A 
LRINTIagl 1.11 0.697 1.641 2,10 1 -1.152 -3.5104 A 
LRINTIag2 1.85 0.455 2.128 3,9 1 -0.5105 -3.5690 A 
MRINTchangelagO 1.38 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -1.148 -3.5104 
MRINTchanizelagl 1.99 0.629 1.699 2,9 A -0.9501 -3.5690 A 
QRATIOlagO 2.40/1.60 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -2.258 -3.4635 A 
QP, ATIOlagl 1.21 0.697 1.641 2,10 1 -3.142 -3.5104 A 
QRATIOlag2 2.63/1.37 0.455 2.128 3,9 1 -1.151 -3.5690 A 
SMINDIagO 1.66 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -1.825 -3.4635 A 
SMINDIagl 1.26 0.697 1.641 2,10 1 -2.379 -3,5104 A 
SMINDIag2 1.51 0.455 2.128 3,9 1 -0.07367 -3.5690 A 
SRINTIagO 1.96 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -2.203 -3.4635 A 
SRINTIagl 1.44 1 0.697 1.641 2,10 
1 -2.252 -3.5104 A 
SRINTIag2 2.50/1.50 1 0.455 2.128 3,9 1 -0.2483 -3.5690 A 
Table 8 
Cointegyration tests for the German weighted sample, showing Dickey Fuller and 
Augmented Dickel Fuller statistics at different lag lengths (with trend) 
and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat. lower upper degrees DW test DF/ADF Mack. Inference 
DW DW of A=accept stat. critical A=accept 
critical critical freedom R=reject R=reject 
I=inconc. 
ASSETSchange 1agO 2.28/1.72 0.525 2.016 3,10 1 -4.697 -4.2563 R L 
RO( ROCEchange 1agO 1.71 0.5 25 2.016 3JO 1 -5.3=47 
=. 2563 R 
WC] W wcl CRATIOchange la 1.59 0.525 2.016 3,10 1 -4.579 1 -4.2563 R 
4; 
Table 9 
Cointegration tests for the German non-weighted sample, showing Dickey Fuller 
and Auj! mented Dickey Fuller statistics at different lag lengths 
(without constant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
DF/ADF 
stat. 
Mack. 
critical 
Inference 
t t A=accept 
R=reject 
ASSETSIagO 1.39 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -1.978 -3.4635 A 
ASSETSIagl 1.78 0.697 1.641 2,10 A -2.52 -3.5104 A 
ASSETSIag2 1.84 0.455 2.128 3,9 1 -1.591 -3.5690 A 
GNPchangelagO 1.90 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -2.343 -3.5104 A 
GNPchangelagl 2.22/1.78 0.629 1.699 2,9 A -2.264 -3.5690 A 
INFLATEchangelagO 1.66 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -2.036 -3.5104 A 
INFLATEchangelagl 1.89 0.629 1.699 2,9 A -1.908 -3.5690 A 
MRINTIagO 1.51 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -1.81 -2.4635 A 
MRINTIagl 1.80 0.697 1.641 2,10 A -2.537 -3.5104 A 
MRINTIag2 1.68 0.455 2.128 3,9 1 -1.342 -3.5690 A 
ROCEIagO 1.59 0.927 1.324 Lil A -1.667 -3.4635 A 
ROCElagl 1.87 0.697 1.641 2,10 A -0.8917 -3.5104 A 
ROCE1ag2 1.73 0.455 2.128 3,9 1 -0.7376 1 -3.5690 1A 
Table 10 
Cointegration tests for the French weighted sample, showing Dickey Fuller and 
Augmented Dicke3: Fuller statistics at different lag lengths 
(without constant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
DF/ADF 
stat. 
Mack. 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
CTAXRATIOlagO 1.87 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -2.886 -3.5690 A 
CTAXP, ATIOlagl 1.51 0.559 1.777 2,8 1 -1.356 -3.6443 A 
CTRATEchangelagO 1.85 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -1.705 -3.6443 A 
DIVCOVERIagO 1.87 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -1.885 -3.5690 A 
DIVCOVER]agl 2.03/1.97 0.559 1.777 2,8 1 -1.403 -3.6443 A 
INTCOVERchangelagO 1.90 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -1.628 -3.6443 A 
LRINTchangelagO 1.83 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -1.614 -3.6443 A 
MRINTchangelagO 1.85 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -1.632 -3.6443 A 
_QRATIOlagO 
1.86 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -1.844 -3.5690 A 
QRATIOlagl 2.04/1.96 0.559 1.777 2,8 A -1.417 -3.6443 A 
ROCEchangelagO 1.92 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -1.653 -3.6443 A 
SMINDchangelagO 1.08 0.763 1.332 1,8 1 -1.719 -3.6443 A 
SRINTdhangelago 1.91 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -1.804 -3.6443 A 
TAXRATJOIagO 1.83 0.824_ 1 1.320 1 1,9 1A 1 -2.256 -3.5690 A 
TAXRATIO1agl 1.68 0,559 1.777 2,8 1 -1.318 -3.6443 A 
WCRATIOchangelagO 1.78 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -1.572 -3.6443 A 
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Table 11 
Cointegration tests for the French non-weighted sample, showing Dickey Fuller 
and Augmented Dickey Fuller statistics at different lal! lengths 
Lwithout constant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
DRADF 
stat. 
Mack. 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
IVCOVERIagO 1.99 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -2.354 -3.5690 A 
DIVCOVERIagl 1.98 0.559 1.777 2,8 A -2.399 -3.6443 A 
LRINTIagO 1.50 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -1.552 -3.5690 A 
LRINTIagl 1.59 0.559 1.777 2,8 1 -2.066 -3.6443 A 
MRINTIagO 1.32 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -1.589 -3.5690 
MRINTIagl 1.98 0.559 1.777 2,8 A -3.145 -3.6443 A 
ROCEIagO 1.97 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -2.056 -3.5690 A 
ROCElagl 2.13/1.87 0.559 1.777 2,8 A -1.808 -3.6443 A 
SMINDIagO 1.91 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -2.072 -3.5690 A 
SMINDlagl 1.70 0.559 1.777 2,8 1 -1.743 -3.6443 A 
SRINTIagO 1.68 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -1.84 -3.5690 A 
SRINTIagl 1.47 0.559 1.777 2,8 1 -2.091 -3.6443 A 
TAXADVIagO 1.58 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -1.911 -3.5690 
TAXADVIagl 1.86 0.559 1.777 8 A -2.067 -3.6443 A 
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APPENDIX J: 
GRANGER CAUSALITY TESTING OF EUROPEAN BIVARIATE 
CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE RELATIONSHIPS 
Table I 
Granger causality testing of the UK weighted variables with respect to the 
bivariate regression relationship with the corporate capital structure ratio 
dependent independent 
2 R T h k T-h 
2 R T-h R2 
- 2 
k, (r-h) 
drs 
F 
crit. 
does 
indep. 
Granger 
k 2 I-R 
k I-R cause 
depend? 
DDERATIO ASSETSchange 0.291144 23 5 2 9 0.410724 3.696516 2,18 3.55 YES 
ASSETSchange DDERATIO 0.162129 23 5 2 9 0.193501 1.741509 2,18 3.55 NO 
DDERATIO CTAXRATIO 0.419167 24 5 2 9.5 0.7.21665 6.855818 2,19 3.52 YES 
CTAXRATIO DDERATIO 0.327005 24 5 2 9.5 0.485895 4.616003 2,19 3.52 YES 
DDERATIO CTRATE 0.384436 24 5 2 9.5 0.624526 5.932997 2,19 3.52 YES 
CTRATE DDERATIO 0.790415 24 5 2 9.5 3.771334 35.827673 2,19 3.52 YES 
DDERATIO DIVCOVER 0.261251 21 5 2 8 0.353640 2.82912 2,16 3.63 NO 
DIVCOVER DDERATIO 0.557896 21 5 2 8 1.261911 10.095288 2,16 3.63 1 YES 
DDERATIO GDPchange 0.315594 23 5 2 9 0.461121 4.150089 2,18 3.55 YES 
GDPchange DDERATIO 0.209317 22 5 2 8.5 0.264729 2.250197 2,17 3.59 NO 
DDERATIO INCTAX 0.369235 24 5 2 9.5 0.585376 5.561072 2,19 3.52 YES 
INCTAX DDERATIO 0.852022 24 5 2 9.5 5.757761 54.698730 2,19 1 3.52 YES 
DDERATIO INFLATEchange 0.305604 23 5 2 9 0.440100 3.9609 2,18 3.55 YES 
INFLATEchange DDERATIO 0.59637 22 5 2 8.5 1.477516 12.558886 2,17 3.59 YES 
DDERATIO INTCOVER 0.273914 24 5 2 9.5 0.377247 3.583847 2,19 3.52 YES 
INTCOVER DDERATIO 0.275999 24 5 2 9.5 0.381214 3.621533 2,19 3.52 YES 
DDERATIO INVESTchange 0.373868 23 5 2 9 0.597107 5.373963 2,18 3.55 YES 
INVESTchange DDERATIO 0.431376 22 5 2 8.5 0.758631 6.448364 2,17 3.59 YES 
DDERATIO LRINT 0.340955 24 5 2 9.5 0.517347 4.914797 2,19 3.52 YES 
LRINT DDERATIO 0.733302 23 5 2 19 2.7495 60 24.74604 2,18 3.55 YES 
DDERATIO MRINT 0.274319 17 5 2 6 0.378016 2.268096 2,12 3.89 NO 
MRINT DDERATIO 0.572249 17 5 2 6 1.337809 8.026854 2,12 3.89 YES 
DDERATIO QRATIO 0.348424 24 5 2 9.5 0.534740 5.080034 2,19 3.52 YES 
QRATIO DDERATIO 0.549226 24 5 2 9.5 1.218407 11.574862 2,19 3.52 YES 
DDERATIO ROCE 0.400665 24 15 2 1 9.5 0.668516 6.350902 2,19 3.52 YES 
ROCE DDERATIO 0.527036 24 5 2 9.5 1.114326 10.586097 2,19 3.52 YES 
DDERATIO SMIND 0.34552 23 5 2 9 0.527931 4.751379 2,18 3.55 YES 
SMIND DDERATIO' 0.963969 22 5 2 8.5 26.753879 227.407972 2,17 3.59 YES 
DDERATIO SRINT 0.253211 24 5 2 9.5 0.339066 3.221127 2,19 3.52 NO 
SRINT DDERATIO 0.175029 23 15 2 19 0.212164 1.909476 
2,18 3.55 NO 
DDERATIO TAXADV 0.440336 24 15 2 9.5 0.786786 7.474467 2,19 3.52 YE 
TAXADV DDERATIO 0.585611 24 5 2 9.5 1.413191 13.425315 2,19 3.52 YES 
DDERATIO TAXRATIO 0.274441 24 5 2 9.5 0.378248 3.593356 2,19 3.52 YES 
TAXRATJO DDERATIO 0.742072 24 5 2 9.5 2.877051 27.331985 2,19 3.52 YES 
DDERATIO WCRATIO 0.325434 24 5 2 9.5 0.482435 4.583133 2,19 1 3.52 YES 
WCRATIO DDERATIO 0.832103 1 24 . 5 2 9.5 1 4.956033 1 47.082314 2,19 1 3.52 1 YES 
A58 
Table 2 
Granizer causalitv testing of the UK non-weighted variables with respect to the 
bivariate regression relationship with the coroorate capital structure ratio 
dependent independent R2 T h k T-h R2 T-h , R2 
k, (r-h) 
dfs 
F 
crit. 
does 
indep. 
Granger 
k 2 I-R 
k I- R' cause 
depend? 
DDERATIO ASSETSchange 0.504369 23 51 2 9 1.017630 9.15867 2,18 3.55 YES 
ASSETSchange DDERATIO 0.0627715 23 5 2 9 0.066976 0.602784 2,18 3.55 NO 
DDERATIO CTAXRATIO 0.503134 24 5 2 9.5 1.012615 9.619843 2,19 3.52 YES 
CTAXRATIO DDERATIO 0.644123 24 5 2 9.5 1.809960 17.19462 - 2,19 3.52 YES 
DDERATIO CTRATEchange 0.734431 23 5 2 9 2.765500 24.8895 2,18 3.55 YES 
CTRATEchange DDERATIO 0.637129 23 5 2 9 1.755800 15.8022 2,18 3.55 YES 
DDERATIO DIVCOVER 0.493251 21 5 2 8 0.973364 7.786912 2,16 3.63 YES 
DIVCOVER DDERATIO 0.525002 21 5 2 8 1.105272 8.842176 2,16 3.63 YES 
DDERATIO GDPchange 0.560968 23 5 2 9 1, Z77738. 11.499642 2,18 3.55 YES - 
GDPchange DDERATIO 0.253944 22 5 2 8.5 0.340382 2.893247 2,17 3.59 - NO 
DDERATIO INCTAX 0.658701 24 5 2 9.5 1.929982 18.334829 2,19 3.52 YES 
INCTAX DDERATIO 0.88531 24 5 2 9.5 7.719156 73.331982 2,19 3.52 YES 
DDERATIO INFLATEchange 0.563143 23 1 5 21 9 1.289079 11.601711 2,18 3.55 YES 
- 
INFLATEchange DDERATIO 0.698059 22 5 2 8.5 2.311905 19.651193 2,17 3.59 YES 
DDERATIO INTCOVER 0.46972 24 5 2 9.5 0.885796 8.415062 2,19 3.52 YES 
INTCOVER DDERATIO 0.252055 24 5 2 9.5 0.336997 3.201472 , 2,19 3.52 NO 
DDERATIO INVESTchange 0.572505 23 5 2 9 1.339209 12.052881 2,18 3.55 YES 
INVESTchange DDERATIO 0.417589 22 5 2 1 8.5 0.717001 6.094509 2,17 1 3.59 YES 
DDERATIO LRINT 0.548398 24 5 2 9.5 1.214339 11.536221 2,19 3.52 YES 
LRINT DDERATIO 0.733829 23 5 2 9 2.756983 24.812847 2,18 3.52 YES 
DDERATIO MRINT 0.60651 17 5_ 2 6 1.541361 9.248166 2,12 3.89 YES 
MRINT DDERATIO 0.648423 17 5 2 6 1.844327 11.065962 2,12 3.89 YES 
DDERATIO QRATIO 0.477715 24 5 2 9.5 0.914663 8.689303 2,19 3.52 YES 
QRATIO DDERATIO 0.662223 24 5 2 9.5 1.960533 18.625065 2,19 3.52 YES 
DDERATIO ROCE 0.483258 24 5 2 9.5 0.935202 8.884419 2,19 3.52 YES 
ROCE DDERATIO 0.488657 24 5 2 9.5 0.955634 9.078523 2,19 3.52 YES 
DDERATIO SMIND 0.557818 23 15 12 9 1.261512 11.353608 2,18 1 3.55 YES 
SMIND DDERATIO 0.9581 22 5 2 8.5 1 22.866348 194.363958 2,17 3.59 YES 
DDERATIO SRINT 0.493557 24 5 2 9.5 0.974556 9.258282 2,19 3.52 YES 
SRINT DDERATIO 0.19248 18 5 2 6.5 0.238359 1.549334 2,13 3.81 NO 
DDERATIO TAXADV 0.795509 24 5 2 9.5 3.890191 36.956815 2,19 3.52 YES 
TAXADV DDERATIO 0.84514 24 15 12 9.5 5.457445 51.845728 2,19 3.52 YES 
DDERATIO TAXRATIO 0.510464 24 15 2 1 9.5 1.042751 9.906135 2,19 3.52 YES 
TAXRATIO DDERATIO 0.823687 2 9.5 4.671732 44.381454. 2,19 3.52 YES 
DDERATIO WCRATIO 0.469085 2 9.5 0.883541 8.393640 
_22,19 
3.52 YES 
WCRATIO DDERATIO 0.154951 2 9.5 0.183363 1 1.741949 
t 
2,19 3.52 1 NO 
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Table 3 
Granger causali! y testing of the Netherlands weighted variables with respect to 
the bivariate regression relationship with the corporate capital structure ratio 
dependent independent 
2 R T h k T-h 
2 R T-h R2 
k, (r-h) 
drs 
F 
crit. 
, 
does 
indep. 
Granger 
k 
2 
I-R 
k I-R2 cause 
depend? 
DDERATIO ASSETSchange 0.205483 12 5 2 3.5 1 0.258626 0.905191 2,7 4.74 NO 
ASSETSchange DDERATIO 0.455653 12 5 2 3.5 0.837063 2.929721 2,7 4.74 NO 
DDERATIO CTRATE 0.279031 13 
- 
5 2 4 0.387022 1.548088 2,8 4.46 NO 
CTRATE DDERATIO 0.871126 13 5 2 4 6.759517 27.038068 2,8 4.46 YES 
DDERATIO GDPchch 0.323712 11 5 21 3 0.478660 1.435980 2,6 5.14 NO 
GDPchch DDERATIO 0.316662 10 5 2 2.5 0.463405 1.158512 2,5 5.79 NO 
DDERATIO INFLATEchange 0.361197 12 5 2 3.5 0.565428 1.978998 2,7 4.74 NO 
INFLATEchange DDERATIO 0.798956 12 5 2 3.5 3.974036 13.909126 2,7 4.74 YES 
DDERATIO INTCOVER 0.327763 13 5 2 
_4 
0.487571 0.951490 2,8 4.46 NO 
INTCOVER DDERATIO 0.743096 13 5 2 14 2.892505 11.57002 2,8 4.46 YES 
DDERATIO LRINTchange 0.45359 12 5 2 3.5 0.830128 2.905448 2,7 4.74 NO 
LRINTchange DDERATIO 0.571596 12 5 2 3.5 1.334245 4.669858 2,7 4.74 NO 
DDERATIO MRINTchange 0.46611 12_ 5 2 3.5 0.873045 3.055658 2,7 4.74 NO 
MRINTchange DDERATIO 0.521868 12 5 2 3.5 1.091473 3.820156 2,7 4.74 NO 
DDERATIO QRATIO 0.644546 13 5 2 14 1.813304 7.253214 2,8 4.46 YES 
QRATIO DDERATIO 0.404987 13 5 2 4 0.680636 2.722542 2,8 4.46 NO 
DDERATIO ROCE 0.281984 13 5 2 4 0.392727 1.570908 2,8 4.46 NO 
ROCE DDERATIO 0.822376 13 5 2 4 4.629870 18.51948 2,8 4.46 YES 
DDERATIO SMIND 0.203726 13 5 2 4 0.255849 1.023396 2,8 4.46 NO 
SMIND DDERATIO 0.821907 13 5 2 14 4.615044 18.460176 2,8 4.46 YES 
DDERATIO SRINT 0.598148 12 5 2 1 3.5 1.488478 5.209673 2,7 4.74 YES 
SRINT DDERATIO 0.494541 11 5 2 3 0.978400 2.9352 2,6 5.14 1 NO 
DDERATIO TAXRATIO 0.574502 13 5 2 4 1.350187 5.400748 2,8 4.46 1 YES 
TAXRATIO DDERATIO 0.659662 _ 1 13 
j 
5 2 4 1.938255 7.75302 2,8 4.46 1 YES 
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Table 4 
Granger causality testing of the Netherlands non-weighted variables with reslRect 
to the bivariate regression relationship with the corporate capital structure ratio 
dependent Independent 
2 R T h k T-h R2 
2 T-h 
.R 
k, (r-h) 
drs 
F 
crit. 
does 
inaep. 
Granger 
k 2 I-R 
k I- R2 cause 
depend? 
DDERATIO ASSETSchange 0.805623 12 5 2 3.5 4.144642 14.506247 2,7 4.74 YES 
ASSETSchange DDERATIO 0.157085 12 5 2 3.5 0.186359 0.652257 2,7 4.74 NO 
DDERATIO CTRATE 0.739038 13 5 2 4 2.831976 11.327904 2,8 5.32 YES 
CTRATE DDERATIO 0.877283 13 5 2 4 7.148830 28.59532 2,8 5.32 YES 
DDERATIO DIVCOVER 0.732431 13 5 2 4 2.737354 10.949416 2,8 4.46 YES 
DIVCOVER DDERATIO 0.204459 13 5 2 4 0.257006 1.028024 2,8 4.46 NO 
DDERATIO INFLATEchange 0.7906 12 5 2 3.5 3.775549 13.214422 2,7 4.74 1 YES 
INFLATEchange DDERATIO 0.762883 12 5 2 3.5 3.217327 11.260645 2,7 4.74 1 YES 
DDERATIO GDPchch 0.77889 11 5 2 3 3.522636 
. 
10.567907 2,6 5.14 YES 
GDPchch DDERATIO 0.371536 10 5 2 2.5 0.591181 1.477953 2,5 5.79 NO 
DDERATIO LRINTchange 0.787414 12 5 2 3.5 3.703979 12.963927 2,7 4.74 YES 
LRINTchange DDERATIO 0.362057 12 5 2 3.5 0.567538 1.986383 2,7 4.74 NO 
DDERATIO MRINTchange 0.758805 12 5 2 3.5 3.146023 11.01151 2,7 4.74 YES 
MRINTchange DDERATIO 0.57127 12 5 2 3.5 1.332470 4.663645 2,7 4.74 NO 
DDERATIO QRATIO 0.748114 13 1 2 4 2.970050 11.880200 2,8 4.46 YES 
QRATIO DDERATIO 0.682386 13 5 2 4 2.148758 8.593903 2,8 4.46 YES 
DDERATIO ROCE 0.715154 13 5 2 4 2.510669 12.042676 2,8 5.32 YES 
ROCE DDERATIO 0.770183 13 5 2 4 3.351288 13.405152 2,8 5.32 YES 
DDERATIO SMIND 0.75088 13 5 2 4 3.014130 12.05652 2,8 5.32 YES 
SMIND DDERATIO 0.828173 13 5 2 4 4.819807 19.279228 2,8 5.32 YES 
DDERATIO SRINT 0.89843 12 5 2 3.5 8.845427 30.958995 2,7 4.74 YES 
SRINT DDERATIO 0.636129 11 5 2 3 1.748227 5.244681 2,6 5.14 YES 
DDERATIO TAXRATIO 0.74471 13 5 2 4 2.917114 11.668456 2,8 5.32 YES 
TAXRATIO DDERATIO 0.277105 13 5 2 4 0.383327 1.533308 
1 
5.32 NO 
DDERATIO WCRATIO 1 0.847581 13 5 2 4 1 5.560861 22.243444 2,8 5.32 YES 
WCRATIO DDERATIO 1 0.343223 1 13 5 2 4 1 0.522587 2.090348 2,8 5.32 NO 
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Table 5 
Granger causality testing of the German weighted variables with respect to the 
bivariate regression relationship with the corporate capital structure ratio 
dependent independent R2 T h k T-h 
2 R T-h R2 
k, (T-h) 
dCs 
F 
crit. 
does 
Indep. 
Granger 
k 2 I-R 
k 1-R cause 
depend? 
DDERATIO ASSETSchange 0.941601 9 5 2 2 16.123581 32.24716 2,4 6.94 YES 
ASSETSchange DDERATIO 0.801005 9 5 2 2 4.025252 8.050504 2,4 6.94 YES 
DDERATIO DIVCOVER 0.980312 10 5 2 2.5 49.792361 124.480903 2,5 5.79 YES 
DIVCOVER DDERATIO 0.884713 10 5 2 2.5 7.674005 19.185013 2,5 5.79 YES 
DDERATIO INTCOVERchange 0.945241 9 5 2 2 17.261838 34.523676 2,4 6.94 YES 
INTCOVERchange DDERATIO 0.812304 9 5 2 2 4.327764 8.655528 2,4 6.94 YES 
DDERATIO INVESTchange 0.904834 9 5 2 2 9.507955 19.01591 2,4 6.94 YES 
INVESTchange DDERATIO 0.71921 9 5 2 2 2.561380 5.12276 2,4 6.94 NO 
DDERATIO LRINT 0.934774 10 5 2 2.5 1 14.331310 - 
35.828275 2,5 5.79 YES 
LRINT DDERATIO 0.49672 10 5 2 2.5 0.986966 2.467415 2,5 5.79 NO 
DDERATIO MRINTchange 0.893553 9 5 2 2 8.394346 16.788692 2,4 6.94 YES 
MRINTchange DDERATIO 0.640546 9 5 2 2 1.781997 3.563994 2,4 6.94 NO 
DDERATIO QRATIO 0.932017 10 5 2 2.5 13.709560 34.273900 2,5 1 5.79 YES 
QRATIO DDERATIO 0.819412 10 5 2 2.5 4.537466 11.343666 2,5 5.79 YES 
DDERATIO ROCEchange 0.957173 9 5 2 2 22.349756 44.699512 2,4 6.94 YES 
ROCEchange DDERATIO 0.803781 9 5 2 2 4.096346 8.192692 2,4 6.94 YES 
DDERATIO SMIND 0.937877 10 5 2 2.5 15.097098 37.742745 2,5 5.79 YES 
SMIND DDERATIO 0.613953 10 5 2 2.5 1.590358 3.975895 2,5 1 5.79 NO 
DDERATIO SRINT 0.939562 10 5 2 2.5 15.545882 38.864705 2,5 5.79 YES 
SRINT DDERATIO 0.764894 10 5 12 2.5 3.253373 8.133433 2,5 5.79 YES 
DDERATIO TAXRATIOchange 0.962044 9 5 12 2 25.346296 50.692592 2,4 6.94 YES 
TAXRATIOchang DDERATIO 0.805413 9 5 2 2 4.139090 8.27818 2,4 6.94 YES 
DDERATIO WCRATIOchange 0.936649 9 5 2 2 14.785070 29.57014 2,4 6.94 1 YES 
WCRATIOchange DDERATIO 0.440819 9 5 2 2 0.788330 1.57666 2,4 6.94 1 NO 
Table 6 
Granger causality testing of the German non-wei2hted variables with respect to 
the bivariate rellression relationshil2 with the corporate capital structure ratio 
dependent independent 2 R T h k T-h R' 
2 
kCr-h) 
drs 
F 
crit. 
does 
indep. 
Granger 
cause 
k 2 I-R 
2 
depend9 
DDERATIO ASSETS 0.626319 10 51 2 2.5 1.676079 1 4.190198 2,5 5.79 NO 
ASSETS DDERATIO 0.761648 10 5 12 2.5 3.195476 7.98869 2,5 5.79 YES 
DDERATIO GNPchange 0.398976 9 5 2 2 0.663827 1.327654 2,4 6.94 NO 
GNPchanize 
ý 
DDERATIO 0.507663 9 5 2 2 1.031129 2.062258 2,4 6.94 NO 
DDOE TIO INFLATEchange 0.713298 9 5 2 2 2.487942 4.975884 2,4 6.94 NO 
INFLATEchange DDERATIO 0.755678 9 5 2 21 3.092960 6.185919 2,4 6.94 NO 
DDERATIO MRINT 0.677783 10 5 2 2.5 2.103499 5.258748 2,5 5.79 NO 
MRINT DDERATIO 0.625213 10 5 2 2.5 1.668182 4.170455 2,5 5.79 NO 
DDERATIO ROCE 0.711914 10 5 2 2.5 2.471186 6.177965 215 5.79 YES 
ROCE DDERATIO 0,656989 10 5 21 2.5 1.915358 1 4.788395 275 5.79 NO 
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Table 7 
Granger causality testing of the French weighted variables with respect to the 
bivariate regression relationship with the corporate capital structure ratio 
dependent independent 
2 R T h k T-h 
2 R T-h 
* 
R2 
2 
k, (T-h) 
dVs 
F 
crit. 
does 
indep. 
Granger 
k 2 I-R 
k I-R cause 
depend? 
DDERATIO CTAXRATIO 0.538229 9 3 1 61 1.165562 6.993372 1,6 5.99 YES 
CTAXRATIO DDERATIO 0.0441829 9 3 1 6 0.046225 0.27735 1,6 5.99 NO 
DDERATIO CTRATEchange 0.272073 8 3 1 5 0.373764 1.86882 1,5 6.61 NO 
CTRATEchange DDERATIO 0.014381 8 3 1 5 0.014591 0.072955 1,5 6.61 NO 
DDERATIO DIVCOVER 0.21246 9 3 1 6 0.269777 1.618662 1,6 5.99 NO 
DIVCOVER DDERATIO 0.564275 9 3 11 6 1.295026 7.770156 1,6 5.99 YES 
DDERATIO INTCOVERchange 0.152673 8 3 1 5 0.180182 0.90091 1,5 6.61 NO 
INTCOVERchange DDERATIO 0.052712 8 3 1 5 0.055645 0.278225 1,5 6.61 NO 
DDERATIO LRINTchange 0.410654 8 3 1 5 -0,696796 3.48398 1,5 1 6.61 NO 
LRINTchanLe- DDERATIO 0.340931 8 3 1 5 0.517292 2.58646 1,5 6.61 NO 
DDERATIO MRINTchange 0.484258 8 3 1 5 0.938954 4.69477 1,5 6.61 NO 
MRINTchange DDERATIO 0.30686 8 3 1 5 0.442710 2.21355 1 1,5 6.61 NO 
DDERATIO QRATIO 0.307313 9 3 1 6 0.443653 2.661921 1,6 5.99 NO 
QRATIO DDERATIO 0.68851 9 3 1 6 2.210376 13.262256 1,6 5.99 YES 
DDERATIO ROCEchange 0.228026 8 3 1 5 0.295380 1.4769 1,5 6.61 NO 
ROCEchange DDERATIO 0.0063254 8 3 1 5 0.006366 0.03183 1,5 6.61 NO 
DDERATIO SMINDchange 0.152708 8 3 1 5 0.180231 0.901155 1,5 6.61 NO 
SMINDchange DDERATIO 0.053223 8 3 1 5 0.056215 0.281075 1,5 6.61 NO 
DDERATIO SRINTchange 0.718751 8 3 1 5 2.555568 12.77784 1,5 6.61 YES 
SRINTchange DDERATIO 0.107623 8 3 1 5 0.120603 0.603015 1,5 6.61 NO 
DDERATIO TAXRATIQ 0.308407 9 3 1 6 0.445937 2.675622 1,6 5.99 NO 
TAXRATIO DDERATIO 0.0723262 9 1 6 0.077965 0.46779 1,6 5.99 NO 
DDERATIO WCRATIOchange 0.317364 8 3 11 15 
0.464907 2.324535 115 6.61 
1N 
WCRATIOchange DDERAnO 1 0.225287 8 3 11 15 0.290801 1 1.454005 1,5 1 6.61 NO 
Table 8 
Granger causalill testing of the French non-weighted variables with respect to 
the bivariate regression relationship with the corporate capital structure ratio 
dependent independent 2 R h k T-h 
2 R T-h R 
k, (r-h) 
dfs 
F 
crit. 
does 
indep. 
Granger 
T 
k 2 I-R 
k cause 
depend? 
DDERATIO DIVCOVER 0.446026 9 3 1 6 0.805139 4.830834 1,6 5.99 NO 
DIVCOVER DDERATIO 0.761306 9 3 1 6 3.189464 19.136784 1,6 5.99 YES 
DDERATIO LRINT 0.407608 9 3 1 6 0.688071 4.128426 1,6 5.99 NO 
LRINT DDERATIO 0.679434 9 3 1 6 2.119482 12.716892 1,6 5.99 YES 
DDERATIO MRINT 0.423635 9 3 1 6 0.735017 4.410102 1,6 5.99 NO 
MRINT DDERATIO 0,494921 9 3 1 6 0.979889 5.879334 1,6 5.99 NO 
DDERATIO ROCE 0.410026 9 3 1 6 0.694990 4.16994 1,6 5.99 NO 
ROCE DDERATIO 0.226489 9 3 1 6 0.292806 1.756836 1,6 5.99 NO 
DDERATIO SMIND 0.442079 - 9 3 1 6 0.792368 4.754208 1,6 5.99 NO 
SMIND DDERATIO 0.898138 9 3 1 6 8.817204 52.903224 1,6 5.99 YES 
DDERATIO SRINT 0.554595 9 3 1 6 1.245148 7.470888 1,6 5.99 YES 
SRINT DDERATIO 0.540896 9 3 6 1.178156 7.068936 1,6 5.99 YES 
DDERATIO TAXADV 0.479684 9 3 1 6 0.92 1909 5.531454 1,6 5.99 1 NO 
ITAXADV DDERATIO 0.940236 9 3 1 6 15.732481 94.394886 1,6 5.99 YES 
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APPENDIX K: 
AUTOREGRESSIVE DISTRILBUTED LAG MODELS OF THE DDE RATIO 
AND THE EUROPEAN TIME SERIES VARIABLES 
Note: 
1) Figures in parentheses are computed t-values which measure the distance in terms of 
standard errors that the variable coefficient is away from zero. 
2) Figures in bold give those variable coefficients which are significant in a two-tail test 
at the 5 per cent level, along with the t-value relating to each coefficient. 
Table I 
Autoregressive distributed lap, models of the DDE ratio and the tax advantaim to 
debt, TAXADV 
country, constant DDERATIO DDERATIO independent independent Independent R2 sample variable variable variable variable variable 
statistic/ 
and lagged 1year lagged 2 years lagged 1year lagged 2 years (t-critical) 
variable 
type 
UKW 0.18446 0.38146 0.40028 -0.47624 0.52944 
(3.732) (2.318) (2.804) (-3.341) (2.086) 
UKNW 0.10646 0.46978 0.61064 -0.63880 0.782604 
(4.457) (3.767) (4.829) (-5.544) (2.086) 
NLW - - - - - 
NLNW - - - - - - 
BDW - - - - - - 
BDNW - - - - - - 
FRW - - - - - - 
FRNW 0-34904 - - 1.5563 -1.4988 - 0.597133 
(11.070) (2.903) (-2-615) (2.447) 
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Table 2 
Autoreivessive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio and the corporate tax 
rate, CTRATE 
country, constant DDERATIO DDERATIO independent independent independent R2 Swuple variable variable variable variable variable 
and laggedl year lagged 2 years lagged 1year lagged 2 years 
statistic/ 
variable 
-! 
IP- 
(t-critical) 
- 
UKW 0.37044 0.0095055 -0.011318 0.515856 
(4.554) (4.476) (4.281) (2.080) 
UKNW 0.20552 0.56932 0.48682 0.803982 
change - - 
(39.55) (6.650) (5.813) (2.086) 
NLW 0.098850 0.0066209 0.253769 
(0.744) (2.103) (2.160) 
NLNW -0.32431 0.015007 0.774041 
(-3.414) (6.673) (2.160) 
BDW 
BDNW - - - 
FRW 0.21708 0.41538 -0.21709 0.272073 
change (1.426) (1.03 (-0.907) (2.571) 
FRNW - 
Table 3 
Autoregressive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio and the corporate tax 
ratio, CTAXRATIO 
country, constant DDERATIO DDERATIO independent independent independent R2 
sample variable variable variable variable variable 
statistic/ 
and lagged 1year lagged 2 years lagged 1year lagged 2 years (t-critical) 
variable 
type 
UKW -0.0090998 0.51594 0.66092 0.401422 
(-0.116) (3.107) (2.352) (2.074) 
UKNW -0.011895 0.73873 0.26679 
0.492058 
(-0.202) (4.599) (1.485) (2.074) 
NLW - - - - - - - 
NLNW - - - - - - - 
BDW - - - - - - - 
BDNW - - - - - - - 
FRW 0.45329 - - - -0.31662 - 
0.53389 
f14 '166) (-2.832) (2.365) 
FRNW - - 
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Table 4 
Autoregressive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio and the total tax ratio, 
TAXRATIO 
country, constant DDERATIO DDERATIO independent independent independent R2 sarnple variable variable variable variable variable 
and laggedl year lagged 2 years lagged 1year lagged 2 years 
statistic/ 
variable 
type 
(t-critical) 
UKW 0.083963 0.41652 0.0019649 0.310906 
(1.315) (2.204) (1.384) (2.074) 
UKNW 0.090130 0.39228 0.0057305 - -0.0049950 0.645468 
(2.034) (2.209) (3.233) (-3.105) (2.086) 
NLW 0.010678 0.87446 0.061642 -0.043656 0.572928 
(0.097) (3.312) (2.740) (-2 09) (2.262) 
NLNW 0.082425 0.77406 -0.036960 - 0.734641 
(1.280) (4.731) (-0.988) (2.201) 
BDW 
BDNW - - - 
FRW 0.43198 -0.13093 0.233563 
(11.602) (-1.461) (2.365) 
FRNW 
Table 5 
Autoregressive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio and the inflation index, 
INFLATE 
country, constant DDERATIO DDERATIO independent independent independent R2 
sarnple variable variable variable variable variable 
statistic/ 
and lagged 1year lagged 2 years lagged 1year lagged 2 years (t-critical) 
variable 
type 
UKW 
ru 
0.13652 0.40853 0.29033 0.263474 
ge C (2.433) (1.874) (0.886) (2.080) 
. 
! 
UKNW 0.13859 0.64530 0.491961 
change (9.205) (4.616) (2.074) 
NLW 0.30754 - 2.0868 
0.440223 
change (11.985) (3.072) (2.179) 
NLNW 0.074064 0.56097 1.6659 0.804568 
Et! pje (1.658) (3.180) (2.294) (2.201) 
_ - 
BDW - - 
BDNW 0.26494 1.0348 0.439223 
change (22-308) (2.342) (2.365) 
FRW 
FRNW 
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Table 6 
Autoregressive, distributed lag models of the DDE ratio and the stock market 
index, SMIND 
country, constant DDERATIO DDERATIO independent independent independent 2 
sample variable variable variable variable variable R 
and lagged 1year lagged 2 years lagged 1year lagged 2 years 
statistic/ 
variable 
(t-critical. ) 
ATe 
_ 
UKW 0.18527 0.40974 -0.00047734 0.00055085 0.571958 
(3.6 ) (2.629) (-3.835) (3.716) (2.101) 
UKNW '0.10976 0.53464 -0.00025686 0.00027527 0.719224 
(3.046) (3.655) (4.088) (3.718) (2.101) 
NLW 0.13105 0.74033 -0.0026420 0.0025462 0.879313 
(1.578) (4.439) (-7.188) (5.733) (2.228) 
NLNW 0.50088 - -0.0015569 - 0.888543 
1 (23.867) (-10.180) (2.160) 
BDW -0.0081374 0.88437 0.000023934 0.922214 
(-0.084) (7.87) (1.462) (2.365) 
BDNW - - - - - 
FRW 0.14846 0.68854 -0.17780 - 0.805167 
change (2.132) (3.712) (4-349) (2.447) 
FRNW 0.36140 -0.00029822 0.132777 
(7.452) (-1.035) (2.365) 
Table 7 
AutoregresSive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio and the short-term 
interest rate variable, SRINT 
country, constant DDERATIO DDERATIO independent independent independent R2 
santple variable variable variable variable variable statistic/ 
and lagged 1year lagged 2 years lagged 1year lagged 2 years (t-critical) 
variable 
type 
UKW 
rU 
0.091609 0.46471 0.0056653 0.290622 
(1.302) (2.586) (1.145) (2.080) 
- UKNW 0.033802 0.66941 0.0030692 - - 0.472993 
(0.776) (4.243) (1.180) (2.080) 
NLW 0.20289 - 0.022781 - 
0.516207 
(3.923) (3.426) (2.201) 
NLNW -0.042086 0.63442 - - 0.019507 - 
0.895492 
(-1.094) (5.643) (4.304) (2.228) 
BDW 0.24805 0.57423 -0.013426 0.0085923 - 
0.974184 
(5.005) (8.335) (4.107) (2.537) (2.447) 
BDNW - - 
FRW 0.38518 0.28659 - 0.594665 
chan e (31.033) (2.967) 
(2.447) 
FRNW 0.20909 0.0095249 
1 0.218027 
(2.893) (1.293) (2.447) 
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Table 8 
Autoregressive distributed Igg models of the DDE ratio and the medium-term 
interest rate variable, MRINT 
country, 
smple 
constant DDERATIO 
variable 
DDERATIO 
variable 
independent 
variable 
Independent 
variable 
independent 
variable 
-2 R 
and 
variable 
lagged 1year lagged 2 years lagged 1year lagged 2 years 
statistic/ 
(t-critical) 
UKW 0.22725 0.39891 
-0.0071901 0.196912 
(2.256) (1.683) (-0.935) (2.145) 
UKNW 0.021386 0.58520 0.0047855 - 0.743085 
(0.748) (4.558) (1.510) (2.120) 
NLW 0.35847 - - 0.28175 0.349524 
change (21.568) (2.431) (2.201) 
NLNW -0.064995 0.93624 - - 0.56130 0.734226 
change 1 (-0.628) (5.045) (1.192) (2.228) 
_ BDW 0.14365 - 0.70027 - -0.038166 0.906784 
change (2.036) (6.198) (-0.790) (2.365) 
BDNW 0.057395 0.57550 - - 0.0088842 - 0.793252 
(1.247) (4-304) (1.718) (2.306) 
FRW 0.45846 -1.1800 1.0438 - 0.61748 0.47688 0.990149 
change (9.037) (8.502) (13.052) (8.754) (4.303) 
FRNW -0.017569 - -1.2633 0.016636 0.053566 0.944239 
(-0.351) (-5.697) (3.126) (5.911) (2.776) 
Table 9 
Autoregressive distributed In models of the DDE ratio and the Ion%! -term 
interest rate variable, LRIENT 
country, constant DDERATIO DDERATIO independent Independent independent R2 sample variable variable variable variable variable 
statistic/ and lagged 1year lagged 2 years lagged 1year lagged 2 years (t-critical) 
variable 
UKW 0.14307 0.38001 0.020230 -0.017512 0.45111 
(1.618) (2.109) (2.445) (-2.367) (2,093) 
UKNW 0.026107 0.65232 0.022106 -0.018359 0.737768 
(0.809) (4.316) (4.735) (-3.795) (2.086) 
NLW 0.16471 0.54013 0.23478 0.430783 
_Eýýe _ 
(1,915) (2.417) (1.923) (2.201) 
NLNW 0.024675 0.87834 0.17447 0.773763 
chan e (0.530) (6.103) (1.746) (2,201) 
BDW 0.17799 0.75400 -0.0091536 0.928664 
- 
(2.806) (9.408) (-1.721) (2365) 
BDNW - - - - - - - 
FRW 0.32596 -0.80670 1.0794 0.10462 0.65407 0.34309 
0.999947 
Chan e (36.519) (-23.671) (60.473) (16.004) (82.611) (36.675) (12.706) 
FRNW 0.25051 0.0047297 0.0886204 
(3.701) (0.764) (2,447) 
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Ta 
ributed In models of the DDE ratio and aggregate 
investment, INVEST 
country, constant DDERATIO DDERATIO independent independent independent R2 
sample variable variable variable variable variable 
and lagged 1year lagged 2 years lagged 1year lagged 2 years 
statistic/ 
(t-clitical) 
variable 
Ar 
- - 
UKW 0.12245 0.40973 0.38068 0.363959 
Sýane (2.324) (2.056) (2.080) 
_ 
UKNW 0.052178 0.61974 0.19557 0.535472 
chan e (1.639) (1.997) (2.080) 
NL LW 
r 
NLNW - - - - 
BDW 0.084729 - 0.78296 0.13744 0.918446 
change (1.478) (8.818) (1.309) (2.365) 
BDNW 
FRW 
FRNW 
Table 11 
Autoregressive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio and aggregate output, 
GDP (GNP) 
country, constant DDERATIO DDERATIO independent independent independent R2 
sarriple variable variable variable variable variable statistic/ 
and lagged 1year lagged 2 years lagged 1year lagged 2 years (t-critical) 
variable 
type 
UKW 0.099518 0.56843 0.99085 0.31376d6 
E 
chang (1.667) (2.975) (1.543) 2.080 2.080 
UKNW 0.014326 0.84256 0.74145 ) . 54761 0.54761 
change (0-384) (5.041) (2.158) (2.080) 
NLW 0.35942 - -0.026312 
0.17869 
chch (17.992) (-1.47 ) 
(2.228) 
NLNW 0.077534 0.67471 -0.020345 
0.809121 
chch (1.851) (4.959) (-1.792) 
(2.262) 
BDW - - - - 
BDNW 0.066622 0.64553 0.56485 0.606033 
ELan f e (0.802) (3.114) (1.163) 
(2.3 6 5) 
- _ , 
FRW - 
FRNw 
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Table 12 
Autoreggressive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio and the interest cover 
ratio, INTCOVIER 
country, constant DDERATIO DDERATIO independent independent independent R2 sample variable variable variable variable variable 
and laggedl year lagged 2 years lagged 1year lagged 2 years 
statistic/ 
(t-critical) 
variable 
te yjL __ . 
UKW 0.080476 0.56291 0.0033041 0.405713 
(1.516) (3.367) (2.394) (2.074) 
UKNW 0.097053 0.75370 -0.18728 -0.00046366 - 0.482045 
(1-924) (3.131) (-0.844 (-0.769) (2-086) 
NLW 0.12243 0.42946 0.013495 0.263948 
(0.920) (1.688) (0.949) (2.228) 
NLNW 
BDW 
BDNW - - - - 
FRW 0.19056 0.48388 -0.13204 0.230676 
change (1.025) (-0.721) (2.776) 
FRNW - 
Table 13 
Autoregressive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio and dividend cover, 
DIVCOVIER 
country, constant DDERATIO DDERATIO independent independent independent R2 
sunple variable variable variable variable variable statistic/ 
and lagged 1year lagged 2 years lagged 1year lagged 2 years (t-critical) 
variable 
__ 
type 
UKW 0.36808 -0.042004 
0.235121 
(9.615) (-2.541) (2.080) 
UKNW 0.024085 0.60113 0.016285 0.485153 
(0.525) (3.140) (1.040) (2.086) 
NLW - - - - 
NLNW -0.16722 0.77492 - 
0.076961 0.724454 
(-0.780) (4.486) (1.007) (2.228) 
- 
BDW 0.041327 0.75494 0.028057 0.971995 
(1.167) (15-033) (4.287) (2.365) 
BDNW - - - 
FRW 0-39232 - -0.0011963 
0.00079234 
(6.924) (-0.080) (2.306) 
FRNW 
_ 
0.26637 0.53313 -0.031904) 
0.500002 
(2.113) (2.397) (-1.057) (2.447) 
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Table 14 
Autoregressive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio and the firm size 
measure, ASSETS 
country, constant DDERATIO DDERATIO independent independent independent R2 sample variable variable variable variable variable 
and lagged Iyear lagged 2 years lagged 1year lagged 2 years 
statistic/ 
variable 
! IE 
(t-critical) 
- 
UKW 0.15869 0.51437 -0-18845 0.288192 
Chan e I I (2.650) (2.22) (-1.257) (2.86) 
UK N W K I 
r 
0.063420 0.62523 0.086714 - 0.49026 
chan e (1.994) (3.883) (1.455) (2.074) 
LW N 0.36194 - - 0.15546 - 0.0790612 
change (16.894) (1.105) (2.179) 
NLNW 0.063334 1.0110 -0.28942 - - 0.13042 0.767107 
change (1.271) (3.174) (0.887) (0.772) (2.306) 
BDW -0.0062336 0.94772 - 0.14651 - 0.24406 0.938446 
change (-0.090) (8.363) (2.548) (3. W (2.571) 
BDNW 0.059799 0.54581 0.000025467 -0.000019118 0.812559 
- 
(0.607) (3.442) (3.951) (-2.594) (2.447) 
FRW 
FRNW 
Table 15 
Autoregressive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio and the liguidill ratio, 
WCRATIO. 
country, constant DDERATIO DDERATIO independent independent independent R2 
sample variable variable variable variable variable 
statistic/ 
and lagged 1year lagged 2 years lagged 1year lagged 2 years (t-critical) 
variable 
type 
UKW 0.087742 0.44234 0.053119 0.311323 
(1.411) (2.411) (1.389) (2.074) 
UKNW 0.26035 0.64572 -0.12026 0.530741 
(2.562) (4.278) (-2.049) (2.074) 
NLW - - - - 
NLNW 0.94420 0.67051 - - -0.56781 
0.834649 
(3.001) (4.83 (-2.891) (2.228) 
BDW 0.14250 - 0.70269 0.071199 
0.908646 
ýýe (2.129) (6.578) (0.883) (2.365) 
. 
BDNW - - - - 
FRW 0.15085 0.57893 -0.26194 0.317364 
-Sh! 2gee 
(0.933) (1.38 (-1.100) (2.571) 
__ 
FRNW - 
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Table 16 
Autoregressive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio and the proritability 
ratio, ROCE 
country, constant DDERATIO DDERATIO independent independent independent R2 sample variable variable variable variable variable 
and lagged Iyear lagged 2 years lagged 1year lagged 2 years 
statistic/ 
variable 
(t-critical) 
--! 
ILe 
UKW 0.013472 0.31811 0.011595 0.487242 
(0.229) (1.936) (3.184) (2.074) 
UKNW 0.0084539 0.68716 0.0026549 - 0.460014 
(0.123) (4.270) (0.876) (2.074) 
NLW 0.16565 0.37448 - - 0.0040061 0.241171 
(1.456) (1.419) (0.757) (2.228) 
NLNW 0.10852 0.73138 - -0.0022170 - - 0.723803 
(1.016) (3.486) (-0.712) (2.201) 
BDW 0.15942 0.67598 - - 0.096814 0.948438 
change (3.179) (8.300) (3.057) (2.447) 
BDNW 0-31775 - 0.53362 -0.013930 - - 0.736683 
(6.570) (4.256) (-3-380) (2.365) 
FRW 0.070401 0.79890 - - -0.23869 0.434602 
chan e (0.376) (1.622) (-1.466) 2.776) 
FRNW 0.22393 0.0058319 
L 
0.0 0.098376 
(1.976) (0.934) 2 2.306) 
Table 17 
Autoregressive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio and the 0-proxy ratio, 
ORATIO 
country, constant DDERATIO DDERATIO independent independent independent R2 
sample variable variable variable variable variable 
statistic/ 
and lagged 1year lagged 2 years lagged lyear lagged 2 years (t-critical) 
variable 
type 
UKW 0.094098 0.57945 -0.30183 0.33180 0.566175 
(1.215) (3.820) (-3.699) (3.553) (2.080) 
UKNW 0.10903 0.79351 -0.25940 -0.015666 - - 0.480863 
(1.711) (3.496) (-1.081) (-0.738) (2.086) 
NLW 0.25488 - - 0.15869 0.0489726 
(1.732) (0.753) (2.201) 
NLNW 0.72517 - -0.46688 - 
0.88961 
(17.305) (-10.235) (2.160) 
BDW 0.073101 0.55563 0.18455 - 0.954545 
(1.737) (5.998) (2.938) (2.365) 
BDNW - - 
FRW 0.34362 0.72767 -0.29794 
0.479872 
(2.64ý) (2.1 9) (-1.826) (2.571) 
FRNW - 
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APPENDIX L: 
A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE DIAGNOSTIC STATISTICS COMPUTED 
FOR THE TIME SERIES MODELS 
The t-test (or Student-t ratio) is employed to determine whether certain individual 
regressors are significant components of a regression model. The t-test statistic is 
defined by equation 1: 
0_ 
_ Equation I 
se(b) se(b) 
Where: 
t =the t-statistic 
b= the regression coefficient estimate of the individual Xýariable to be tested 
se(b)= the standard errors associated with the regression coefficient estimate 
The null hypothesis of the t-test is that the regressor is zero. This hypothesis is rejected 
if the t-statistic exceeds the t-distribution critical value. Therefore,, if the null 
hypothesis is rejected then the regressor tested is significant. 
The R-squared statistic is calculated as a "goodness of fit" measure of the whole 
model, and is defined by equation 2: 
T ^2 
_I: 
t=l 
Ut 
Equation 2 
T-2 Illy; 
Where: 
2 
the coefficient of detem-lination 
T 
1ý2 = 
the sum of squared errors t= t 
the total sum of squares 
In an intuitive sense, the R2 measure represents the proportion of the dependent 
variable explained by the regressors in the regression equation. The statistic has a value 
of unity in the case of a perfect model and zero where the model explains none of the 
variation in the dependent variable. The "better" models are models with higher 
R2 
statistics, although it must be noted that adding extra variables will not cause the 
R2 
statistic of a model to decrease, and may cause it to increase, even in the case where 
the new variables are nonsensical. 
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The F-statistic enables testing of the proportion of variation in the dependent variables 
explained by the regression, and is defined by equation 3: 
(k 1) 
Equation 3 
(I-R 2) / (T- k) 
Where: 
F= the F-statistic 
R2= the coefficient of determination 
the number of regressors 
the number of observations 
The null hypothesis is that the vector of regression coefficients is equal to zero. This 
hypothesis is rejected if the F-statistic exceeds the F distribution critical value for k-1 
and T-k degrees of freedom. In this research the probability value of F is also 
presented, representing the probability that the regression explains none of the 
variation in the dependent variable. Therefore, significant models may be considered 
those models for which the probability of the null hypothesis being accepted is close to 
zero. The significance level chosen in this capital structure study is the 5 per cent level, 
or 0.05. 
The LM test for autocorrelated residuals is the Lagrange Multiplier test for residual 
autocorrelation. The test regresses the residuals of the model to be tested upon the 
regressors of that model and the lagged residuals. The null hypothesis is that no 
autocorrelation is present within the model, that is, that the errors are essentially a 
white-noise process, and this hypothesis is tested by conducting an F-test upon the 
coefficients of the lagged residuals (which are the error autocorrelation coefficients). If 
the F statistic exceeds the F critical value then the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation 
is rejected and the model thus contains significantly autocorrelated residuals. 
The autoregressive conditional heteroseedasticily test (hereafter referred to as the 
ARCH test). It basically determines whether the (conditional) variance of the error 
term depends on the past history of the errors. The ARCH test involves the regression 
of the residuals upon lagged residual values and a constant. The null hypothesis is that 
the variance of the error term is not dependent on the past history of the errors, and 
this hypothesis is tested by conducting an F-test upon the coefficients of the lagged 
residuals. If the statistic exceeds the F critical value then the null hypothesis of no 
ARCH process is rejected. 
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The Chi-sguared test for normality involves computation of the Jarque and Bera 
(1980) statistic. This statistic basically tests whether skewness and excess kurtosis are 
jointly zero, and it is calculated by using equation 4: 
Chi-squared (2) = 
(T - k) (SK2 + 
'EK2) 
Equation 4 
64 
Where: 
IT ý3 -iT - C21.5 SK = T-1 `t T-1 
I 
t=lxt 
) skewness 
EK yT x4T 2)2 -3=excesskurtosis 
-T-IA.. 
Jt=i 
-t 
T-1 
lt=l jýt 
- 
The null hypothesis in this test is that the residuals of the regression model are 
normally distributed. The test statistic is compared to a crifical value from a Chi- 
squared distribution, and if the statistic exceeds the critical value then the null 
hypothesis is rejected and the model residuals come from a non-normal distribution. 
The F-test for heteroseedasticity basically tests for unequal error variance between 
observations, and in this case, through time. The test involves the regression of the 
squared residuals from the model in question upon the regressor variables of that 
model and the squared variables. The null hypothesis of the test is that the errors are 
unconditionally homoscedastic. The null hypothesis is rejected if the F statistic exceeds 
the F critical value in a test of the joint significance of the coefficients of this secondary 
regression. Thus, a rejection of the null hypothesis highlights the problem of unequal 
error variance in the model. 
The regression specification (RESET)- test, developed by Ramsey (1969), determines 
whether some alternative specification form might be more appropriate. The test 
basically adds powers of linear combinations of the independent variables by 
construction as shown in equation 5. 
yt = X; A Equation 5 
The null hypothesis is that the model is correctly specified. This null is tested against 
the alternative hypothesis that powers of the dependent variable have been omitted in 
the model. The null hypothesis is rejected if the F statistic computed exceeds the F 
critical value, and this result highlights the fact that the model should be re-specified 
and re-estimated. 
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APPENDIX M: 
DIAGNOSTIC TESTS FOR THE AUTOREGRESSIVE DISTRIBUTED LAG 
MODELS OF THE DDE RATIO AND THE EUROPEAN TIME SERIES 
VARIABLES 
Note: 
1) Figures in parentheses are computed probabilities that the null hypothesis of the test 
is rejected. For the model F-ratio, a rejection signals a significant model, whereas for 
the other tests a model rejection signals a statistical problem with the model. 
2) Figures in bold reveal cases where the null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 per cent 
level or less. 
3) The critical value for the normality Chi-squared tests for two degrees of freedom at 
the 5 per cent level is 5.991. 
Table 1 
Diagnostic tests for the autoregressive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio 
and the tax advantaize to debt, TAXADV 
Statistic\ UKW UKNW NLW NLNW BDW BDNW FRW FRNW 
Model 
Model F-ratio 7.5009 23.999 - - - - - 4.4466 
0.001 fn difinn', (0-0654) 
Autocorrelation 0.79355 2.9487 - - - - - 0.0002422 
F-test (0.4674) (0.0780) (0.9882) 
ARCH 0.0098001 0.037653 - - - - - 0.87979 
F-test (0.9222) (0.8483) (0.4014) 
Nommlity 0.72521 0.1042 - - - - - 0.55315 
Chi-squared 
Heteroscedasticity 0.5928 0.11268 - - - - - - 
F-test (0.7311) (0.9932) 
RESET 0.72703 0.0045056 - - - 2.3143 
F-test 
. 
(0.4045) 
. 
(0.9472) (0.1887 
Table 2 
Diagnostic tests for the autoregressive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio 
and the corporate tax rate, CTRATE 
Statistic\ UKW UKNW NLW NLNW BDW BDN`W FRW FRNW 
Model 
Model F-ratio 11.188 41.016 4.4209 44.533 - - 0.93441 
(0.0005) (0.0000) (0.0556) (0.0000) (0.4521) 
Autocorrelation 0.60028 1.4489 1.1664 3.286 - - 0.036335 
F-test (0.5587) (0.2609) (0.3472) (0.0761) (0.8581) 
ARCH 0.09035 0.20787 0.54632 1.3663 - - 0.34067 
F-test (0.7670) (0.6539) (0.4753) (0.2672) (0.6004) 
Normality 0.52807 0.9643 0.76424 0.82004 - - 0.041824 
_Chi-squared Heteroscedasticity 0.57087 1.2639 0.87533 0.97127 - - - 
F-test (0.6876) (0.3273) (0.4464) (0.4116) 
RESET 0.16559 2.0832 10.647 14.284 - - 0.030767 
F-test (0.6884) 
. 
(0.1652) ý0.0068) 
. 
(0.0026) (0.8693) 
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Table 3 
Diagnostic tests for the autoregressive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio 
and the corporate tax ratio, CTAXRATIO 
Statistic\ UKW UKNW NLW NLNW BDW BDNW FRW FRNW 
Model 
Model F-ratio 7.3769 10.656 - - - - 8.0179 
(0.0006) (0.0253) 
Autocorrelation 0.49536 0.29495 - - - - 1.0962 
F-test (0.6166) (0.7478) (0.3354) 
ARCH 0.0041496 0.05066 - - - - 0.011091 - 
F-test (0.9493) (0.8242) (0.9202) 
Normality 2.4606 19.834 - - - - 0.83362 - 
Chi-squared 
Heteroscedasticity 1.2967 0.66413 - - - - 0.32398 - 
F-test (0.3107) (0.6255) (0.7406) 
RESET 0.096719 0.16154 - - - - 1.3455 - 
F-test 
__(0.7589) . 
(0.6918) 
1 
(0.2901) 
Table 4 
Diagnostic tests for the autoregressive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio 
and the total tax ratio, TAXRATIO 
Statistic\ UKW UKNW NLW NLNW BDW BDNW FRW FRNW 
Model 
Model F-ratio, 4.963 12.137 4.0246 15.227 - - 2.1332 - 
(0.0001) (0.0453) (0.0007) 0.1875 
Autocorrelation 0.181 0.45206 0.081309 0.15342 - - 0.73032 - 
F-test (0.8358) (0.6433) (0.7828) (0.7035) (0.4256) 
ARCH 0.4562 0.015104 0.30234 1.1131 - - 0.63003 - 
F-test (0.5071) (0.9036) (0.5995) (0.3189) (0.4633) 
Norntality 4.1245 0.15374 1.7067 0.72396 - - 0.37561 - 
Chi-squared 
Heteroscedasticity 0.80032 1.2804 0.13435 0.75842 - - 0.82876 - 
F-test (0.5415) (0.3314) (0.9763) (0.5882) (0.4999) 
RESET 0.44807 0.36967 0.55458 3.2578 - - 0.11973 - 
F-test 
. 
(0.5105) 
. 
(0.5504) 
. 
(0.4778) 
. 
(0.1012) (0.74112 
Table 5 
Diagnostic tests for the autoregressive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio 
and the inflation index, INFLATE 
Statistic\ UKW UKNW NLW NLNW BDW BDNW FRW FRNW 
Model 
Model F-ratio, 3.7561 21.304 9.4371 22.643 - 5.4827 
(0.0403) (0.0001) (0.0097) 1) (0.0517) 
Autocorrelation 0.66552 0.34346 0.9367 0.047568 - 0.055166 
F-test (0.5256) (0.7134) (0.4238) (0.8317) 
ARCH 0.31439 0.60543 0.2096 0.57949 - 0.017796 
F-test (0.5816) (0.4456) (0.6569) (0.4660) (0.8991) 
Normality 6.5454 2.2564 0.84172 1.7781 - 1.0554 
Chi-squared 
Heteroscedasticity 0.20236 1.0552 1.2846 1.2485 - 1.0551 
F-test (0.9334) (0.3677) (0.3230) (0.3841) (0.42 
RESET 0.11285 1.3852 0.86172 6.1626 - 0,48772 
F-test (0.7404) 
- 
(0.2524) 
_ 
(0.3732) 
_ 
(0.0324) 
- 
(0.5111) 
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Table 6 
Diagnostic tests for the autorepressive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio 
and the stock market index, SMIND 
Statistic\ UKW UKNW NLW NLNW BDW BDNW FRW FRNW 
Model 
Model F-ratio 8.0173 15.369 24.286 103.64 41.495 - 12.398 1.0717 
(0.0013) (0.0000) (0.0001) 
, 
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0074) (0.3350) 
Autocorrelation 0.4733 0.81415 0.30717 1.3359 1.6646 - 0.062885 0.064283 
F-test (0.6314) (0.4605) (0.5929) (0.3024) (0.2445) (0.8120) (0.8083) 
ARCH 0.025115 0.92045 0.24963 6.1918 0.16807 - 0.032932 2.2043 
F-test (0.8761) (0.3516) (0,6308) (0.0301) (0.6988) (0.8648) (0.1978) 
Normality 0.022835 3.5353 0.050187 1.5517 0.24665 - 0.5221 0.48978 
Chi-squ 
Heteroscedasticity 0.28011 1.4936 0.44266 4.364 0.17246 - - 0.85262 
F-test (0.9346) (0.2668) (0.8181) (0.0434) (0.9342) (0.4916) 
RESET 0.055343 0.93631 0.85567 2.6022 6.8871 - 4.9324 8.1325 
F-test (0.8168) (0.3468) 
. 
(0.3791) 
. 
(0.1327) 
. 
(0.0394) (0.0770) 
. (0.0291) 
Table 7 
Dia2nostic tests for the autore2ressive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio 
and the short-term interest rate, SRINT 
Statistic\ UKW UKNIW NLW NLNW BDW BDNW FRW FRNW 
Model 
Model F-ratio 4.3017 9.4238 11.737 42.843 75.47 - 8.8026 1.6729 
(0.0012) (0.0057) (0.0000) 
Autocorrelation 0.10972 0.48065 0.49616 0.065321 0.026225 - 0.11277 0.31331 
F-test (0.8967) (0.6257) (0.4973) (0.8040) (0.8777) (0.7506) (0.5998) 
ARCH 0.32987 0.061761 0.45192 0.48962 1,426 - 0.43308 0.89232 
F-test (0.5725) (0.8064) (0.5183) (0.5039) (0.2984) (0.5464) (0.3983) 
Normality 4.3755 36.207 1.3483 0.34114 0.37852 - 0.85304 0.94727 
Chi-squared 
Heteroscedasticity 0.49348 0.40388 0.97103 0.22663 - - 0.52903 0.041403 
F-test (0.7407) (0.8031) (0.4192) (0.9123) (0.6356) (0.9600) 
RESET 0.0022939 0.35495 3.0532 2.5347 0.86883 - 0.78316 0.5114 
F-test (0.9623) (0.5580) (0.1112) 
. 
(0.1458) 
. 
(0.3941) (0.4167) (0.5065) 
Table 8 
Diagnostic tests for the autoregressive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio 
and the medium-term interest rate, MRIENT 
Statistic\ tisl S UKW UKNW NLW NLNW BDW BDN`W FRW FRNW 
Model 
F 
t Fý-ratio ModeI 1.7164 23.139 5.9107 13.813 34.047 15.347 50.256 22.578 
(0.2154) (0.0000) (0.0333) (0.0013) 0.0002 I'll n", 11" 
Autocorrelation 0.47468 0.14238 0.49482 0.1386 0.085751 0.089301 - 1.5568 
F-test (0.6333) (0.8685) (0.4978) (0.7183) (0.7795) (0.7737) (0.3006) 
ARCH 5.13e-005 0.0020513 0.16732 0.002064 0.020384 1.1859 - 0.069799 
F-test (0.9944) (0.9645) (0.6921) (0.9649) (0.8920) (0.3180) (0.8164) 
Normality 0.49102 1.3351 1.032 0.31769 0.76833 0.20364 0.27037 0.42321 
Chi-squared 
Heteroscedasticity 1.9318 1.4686 0.16021 0.36487 0.87689 0.2619 
F-test (0.1893) 1 (0.2770) 1 (0.8546) (0.8249) (0.5944) (0.8858) 
J 
j RESET 
L 
0.84914 0.079866 0.31933 1.3621 2.6284 1.4427 2536 1 
F test (0.3736) 
1 
(0.813) (0.5845) (0.2732) (0.1561) (0.2688) 444 . 03 (0.3444) 
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Table 9 
Diagnostic tests for the autoregressive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio 
and the long-term interest rate, LRINT 
Statistic\ UKW UKNW NLW NLNW BDW BDNW FRW - FRNW 
Model 
Model F-ratio 5.2051 18.756 4.1624 18.811 45.563 3757.8 0.58343 
(0-0086) 
. 
(0.0000) (0.0451) (0-0003) (0.0001) (0-0124) (0.4739) 
Antocorrelation 0.42133 1.6091 0.52872 0.073662 0.35472 0.036126 
F-test (0.6628) (0.2275) (0.4838) (0.7916) (0.5732) (0-8567) 
ARCH 0.29512 2.097 0.082489 0.31819 0.21515 1.5848 
F-test (0.5940) (0-1648) (0.7805) (0.5865) (0.6623) (0.2765) 
Normality 1.949 0.056482 0.6843 0.45223 0.26456 0.13859 1.0206 
Chi-squared 
Heteroscedasticity 0.35597 0.59605 0.48122 0.11835 0.51951 - 0.17652 F-test (0.8929) (0.7288) (0.7502) (0.9710) (0.7403) (0.8463) 
RESET 0.049649 0.84864 0.0012067 1.3385 2.1583 0.002485 
F-test (0.8262) (0.3685) 
. 
(0.9730) (0.2742) 
, (0.1922) (0.9622) 
Table 10 
Diagnostic tests for the autoregressive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio 
and ammeizate investment, INVEST 
statistic\ UKW UKNW NLW NLNW BDW BDNW FRW FRNW 
Model 
Model F-ratio, 6.0084 12.104 - - 39.416 - - - 
0.00 0.0002 
Autocorrelation 0.45537 0.52622 - - 0.0003852 - - - 
F-test (0.6410) (0.5992) (0.9850) 
ARCH 0.29894 0.014114 - - 3.1741 - - - 
F-test (0.5909) (0.9067) (0.1349) 
Nomudity 0.48712 9.2869 - - 0.76281 - - - 
Chi-squared 
Heteroscedasticity 3.632 2.102 - - 0.18336 - - - 
F-test (0.0274) (0.1281) (0.9280) 
RESET 0.0004039 0.68715 - - 4.1112 - - - 
F-test (0.9842) 
, 
(0.4169) (0.0890) 
. I 
Table 11 
Diagnostic tests for the autoregressive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio 
and aj! 2rej! ate output, GDP (GNP) 
Statistic\ UKW UKNW NLW NLNW BDW BDNW FRW FRNW 
Model 
Model F-ratio 4.8009 12.71 2.1757 19.075 - 5.384 - - 
(0.0192) (0.0002) (0.1710) (0.0006) (0.0384) 
Autocorrelation 0.31333 0.21725 0.89965 0.13985 - 3.47e-006 - - 
F-test (0.7347) (0.8067) (0.3676) (0.7184) (0.9986) 
ARCH 0.029075 0.015905 0.5199 0.013517 - 2.0221 - - 
F-test (0.8664) (0.9010) (0.4914) (0.9107) (0.2143) 
Nonnality 0.96502 3.1539 0.65204 0.4121 - 0.31589 - - 
Chi-squared 
Heteroscedasticity 4.8383 8.8259 0.5155 0.29791 - 0.30583 - - 
F-test (0.0095) (0.0006) (0.6182) (0.8661) (0.8560) 
RESET 3.935 0.25122 023672 4.7906 - 0.3095 
1 
F-test 
1 
(0.0612) (0.6217) 
. 
(0.6382) 
. 
(0.0600) (0.5981) 
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Table 12 
Diagnostic tests for the autoregressive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio 
and the interest cover ratio, INTCOVER 
statistic\ 11 UKW UKNW NLW NLNW BDW BDN`W FRW FRNW 
Model 1 Mod 
i 
e 
F 
t io Modeff-r 7.5096 6.2045 1.793 0.59968 
(0.0037) (0.2160) (0.5919) 
Autocorrelation 0.10419 0.062669 0.0018407 - 0.55896 
F-test (0.9015) (0.9395) (0.9667) (0.5089) 
ARCH 0.042889 0.0002699 0.25341 - 0.042214 
F-test (0.8380) (0.9871) (0.6283) (0.8562) 
Normality 9.4185 12.724 0.44941 - 0.58845 
Chi-squared 
Heteroscedasticity 0.13095 0.45456 1.089 - - 
F-test (0.9689) (0.8294) (0.4518) 
RESET 0.08652 0.56342 11.271 0.0565538 
F-test (0.7715) (0.4621) (0.0084) (0.8274) 
Table 13 
Diagnostic tests for the autoregressive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio 
and dividend cover, DIVCOVER 
Statistic\ UKW UKNW NLW NLNW BDW BDNW FRW FRNW 
Model 
Model F-ratio 6.4553 9.4233 - 13.146 121.48 - 0.0063437 3.000 
(0.0013) 0.001 
Autocorrelation 1.6651 0.41053 - 0.0039072 2.1163 - 1.4425 1.78 
F-test (0.2156) (0.6694) (0.9515) (0.1960) (0.2688) (0.2397) 
ARCH 0.053602 0.068427 - 0.75288 0.037767 - 0.048862 0.23668 
F-test (0.8194) (0.7966) (0.4108) (0.8536) (0.8324) (0.6521) 
Normality 0.67943 17.143 - 0.83261 3.6172 - 1.018 0.74782 
Chi-squared 
Heteroscedasticity 0.047339 0.57966 - 0.29922 0.21757 - 0.20432 - 
F-test (0.9539) (0.6820) (0.8671) (0.9081) (0.8217) 
RESET 0.3103 0.7564 - 5.5498 0.23948 - 4.0767 6.4916 
F-test (0.5837) 
. 
(0.3953) (0.0429) 
_ 
(0.6420) (0.0832) (0.0514) 
Table 14 
Diagnostic tests for the autoregressive distributed In models of the DDE ratio 
and the firm size measure, ASSETS 
Statistic\ UKW UKNW NLW NLNW BDW BDNW FRW FRNW 
Model 
Model F-ratio 4.0487 10.58 1.0302 8.7835 25.41 8.67 - - 
(0.0334) (0.0006) (0.3301) (0.0065) (0.0019) (0.0134) 
Autocorrelation 1.0897 0.24311 0.80244 1.7756 6.7738 0.23428 - - 
F-test (0.3575) (0.7865) (0.4751) (0.2244) (0.0599) (0.6488) 
ARCH 0.075357 0.083046 0.19915 0.26742 0.033372 0.39555 - - 
F-test (0.7868) (0.7762) (0.6649) (0.6236) (0.8667) (0.5635) 
Normality 3.1473 41.982 1.1354 0.59513 0.57171 0.20788 - - 
Chi-squared 
Heteroscedasticity 0.78797 0.10791 1.5782 - - - - - 
F-test LO. 55072 (0.9781) (0.2585) 
RESET _ 0.07401 0.21061 0.83167 3.0369 0.12013 0.091564 
F-test (0.7885) 
- 
(0.6510) 
_ 
(0.3813) 
_ 
(0.1249) (0.7464) 1 (0.7744) 
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Table 15 
Dia2nostic tests for the autoregressive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio 
and the liquidily ratio, WCRATIO 
Statistic\ t a S UKW UKNW NLW NLNW BDW BDN-W FRW FRNW 
M odel 
F 
-ratlo ModeI F 4.9726 12.441 25.239 34.813 1.1623 
(0.0002) (0.0001 (0.0002) (0.3850) 
Autocorrelation 0.10235 0.32245 - 1.7157 0.0089974 - 0.064672 
F-test (0.9032) (0.7281) (0.2227) (0.9275) (0.8118) 
ARCH 0.49717 0.057648 - 6.21e-005 0.20292 - 0.57382 
F-test (0.4889) (0.8127) (0.9939) (0.6712) (0.5038) 
Normality 6.2179 19.011 - 0.62886 0.85025 - 0.4807 
Chi-square 
Heteroscedasticity 0.48668 1.151 - 0.38695 0.28805 - - 
F-test (0.7454) (0.3666) (0.8107) (0.8664) 
RESET 0.63994 0.12264 - 0.60927 5.91 - 0.014897 
F-test (0.4327) 
. 
(0.7297) fO. 4551) 
. 
(0.0511) (0.9087) 
Table 16 
Diagnostic tests for the autoregressive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio 
and the proritabilily ratio, ROCE 
Statistic\ UKW UK-NW NLW NLNW BDW BDNW FRW FRNW 
Model 
Model F-ratio 10.453 9.3709 1.5891 14.413 55.182 9.7919 1.5373 0.87284 
(0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0001) 
Autocorrelation 0.53814 0.3044 0.21728 1.3272 0.065603 0.034106 0.0025052 2.1362 
F-test (0.5921) (0.7409) (0.6522) (0.2761) (0.8081) (0.8596) (0.9632) (0.1872) 
ARCH 0.12601 0.0065475 0.85036 1.1929 0.2362 0.025229 0.68154 0.12184 
F-test (0.7263) (0.9363) (0.3834) (0.3031) (0.6524) (0.8800) (0.4959) (0.7390) 
Normality 0.41744 26.153 0.76461 0.2888 0.20768 0.73133 0.50004 0.49219 
Chi-squared 
Heteroscedasticity 0.42968 0.43256 0.53221 0.26866 - 0.21861 - 3.6219 
F-test (0.7852) (0.7832) (0.7195) (0.8880) (0.9075) (0.1066) 
RESET 
I 
1.0008 0.33274 2.8332 0.6352 10.193 0.039102 0.087956 3.2587 
F-test 
. 
(0.3285) 
, 
(0.5702) 
. 
(0.1266) 
. 
(0.4440) 
. 
(0.0242) 
. 
(0.8498) 
. 
(0.7891) 
- 
(0.1140) 
_ 
Table 17 
Diagnostic tests for the autoregressive distributed lag models of the DDE ratio 
and the ()-proxy ratio, ORATIO 
S *tic\ UKW UKNW NLW NLNW BDW BDNW FRW FRNW 
Model 
Model F-ratio 9.1355 6.1752 0.56644 104.76 73.498 - 2.7678 - 
(0.0005) (0.0038) (0.4675) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1407) 
Autocorrelation 0.63892 0.073871 2.6227 1.1971 2.9118 - 1.7506 - 
F-test (0.5388) (0.9291) (0.1364) (0.3385) (0.1388) (0.2431) 
ARCH 0.010428 0.0031525 0.0005889 0.93434 1.3602 - 0.040537 - 
F-test (0.9197) (0.9558) (0.9812) (0.3545) (0.2961) (0.8503) 
Nonnality 0.48947 10.104 0.49343 1.9619 0.14198 - 0.6361 - 
Chi-squared 
Heteroscedasticity 1.9369 0.89773 0.13264 0.72588 0.8107' - - - 
F-test ý2.1445) (0.5249) (0,8777) (0.5077) (0.6174) 
RESET __ 3.5149 0.92266 1.2025 7.3672 0.0045842 3.3813 
F-test 
, 
(0.0755) 
. 
(0.3488) 
_ 
(0.2985) 
_ 
(0.0188) (0.9482) (0.1253) 
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APPENDIX N: 
ADDITIONAL COINTEGRATION AND DIAGNOSTIC TESTING TO 
SUPPORT THE EUROPEAN CORPORATE CAPITAL STRUCTURE ERROR 
CORRECTION MODELS 
Table 1 
The F-test for the presence of a deterministic trend within the European 
corporate error correction mechanisms with the DDE ratio as independent 
error correction 
mechanism 
dependent variable 
country 
sample 
degrees of 
freedom 
F-statistic accept/reject 
INFLATEchange UK weighted 2,20 5.4082 accept 
INFLATEchange UK non-weighted 2,20 7.4381 accept 
INFLATEchange NL weighted 2,10 4.0345 accept 
NIRINT UK non-weighted 2,15 5.6692 accept 
TAXRATIO UK weighted 2,22 3.7996 accept 
CTRATEchange UK non-weighted 2,21 5.6696 accept 
ROCE UK weighted 2,22 4.0177 _ accept 
ROCEchange BD weighted 2,7 10.921 reject 
DIVCOVER UK weighted 2,19 7.2039 accept 
ASSETSchange BD weighted 2,7 4.1803 accept 
WCRATIOchange T BD weighted 2,7 5.3047 accept 
Table 2 
Cointejzration tests for the UK weighted sample with the DDE ratio as 
indevendent variable, showing Dickey Fuller and Augmented Dickey Fuller 
statistics at different las! len2ths 
(without constant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
DF/ADF 
stat. 
Mack. 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
DIVCOVERIagO 1.45 1.239 1.429 1,22 A -3.92 -3.2430 R 
DIVCOVERIagl 1.90 1.125 1.538 2,21 A -4.545 -3.2530 R 
DIVCOVERIag2 1.52 0.998 1.676 3,20 1 -2.711 -3.2640 A 
DIVCOVERIag3 2.10/1-90 0.859 1.848 4,19 A -2.024 -3.2763 A 
DIVCOVERIag4 2.03/1.97 0.710 2.060 5,18 1 -2.273 -3.2900 A 
DIVCOVERIag5 1.95 0.554 2.318 6,17 1 -2.245 -3.3054 A 
INFLATEchangelagO 2.00 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -2.786 -3.2339 A 
INFLATEchangetagl 1.98 1.147 1.541 2,22 A -2.229 -3.2430 A 
INFLATEchangelajg2 2.03/1.97 1.026 1.669 3,21 A -1.651 -3.2530 A 
INFLATEchangelag3 2.10/1-90 0.894 1.828 4,20 A -1,022 -3.2640 A 
INFLATEchangelag4 1.84 0.752 2.023 5,19 1 -0.6001 -3.2763 A 
INFLATEchangelag5 1.80 0.603 2.257 6,18 1 -0.994 -3.2900 A 
ROCEIagO 1.64 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -2.531 -3.2182 A 
ROCElagl 1.73 1.188 1.546 2,24 A -2.353 -3.2256 A 
ROCE1ag2 1.60 1.078 1.660 3,23 -1.402 -3.2339 A 
ROCE1ag3 1.69 0.958 1.797 4,22 -1.707 -3.2430 A 
ROCE1ag4 1.80 0.829 1.964 5,21 -1.351 -3.2530 A 
ROCE1ag5 1.84 0.692 2.162 6,20 -1.324 -3.2640 A 
TAXRATIOlagO 2,12/1.88 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -1.743 -3.2182 
A 
TAXRATIOlagl 2.04/1.96 1.186 1.546 2,24 A -1.523 -3.2256 A 
TAXRATIOlag2 1.74 1.078 1.660 3,23 A -0.9072 -3.2339 
A 
TAXRAT121ýý 1.97 0.958 1.797 4,22 A -1.38 -3.2430 A 
. TAXRATI014Zý 1.98 0.829 1.964 5,21 1 -1.217 -3.2530 A 
_ TAXRATIOlag5 1.97 0.692 2.162 6,20 1 -1.017 -3.2640 
A 
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Table 3 
Cointegration tests for the UK non-weighted sample with the DDE ratio as 
independent variable, showing Dickey Fuller and Augmented Dickey Fuller 
statistics at different lag lengths 
(without constant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
DF/ADF 
stat. 
Mack. 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
CTRATEchange 1agO 1.22 1.273 1.446 1,24 R -3.442 -3.2256 R 
CTRATEchange tag 1 1.83 1.68 1.543 2,23 A -5.998 -3.2339 R 
CTRATEchange lag2 1.98 1.053 1.664 3,22 A -3.238 -3.2430 A 
CTRATEchange lag3 1.91 0.927 1.812 4,21 A -2.427 -3.2530 A 
CTRATEchange lag4 2.00 0.792 1.991 5,20 A -2.688 -3.2640 A 
CTRATEchange lag5 1.84 0.649 2.206 6,19 1 -2.431 -3.2763 A 
INFLATEchangelagO 1.98 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -3.91 -3.2339 R 
INFLATEchangetagl 1.98 1.147 1.541 2,22 A -3.193 -3.2430 A 
INFLATEchangelg2 1.93 1.026 1.669 3,21 A -2.62 -3.2530 A 
INFLATEchangelag3 2.05/1.95 0.894 1.828 4,20 A -1.676 -3.2640 A 
INFLATEchangelag4 1.86 0.752 2.023 5,19 A -1.216 -3.2763 A 
INFLATEchangelag5 1.43 0.603 2.257 6,18 1 -1.635 -3.2900 A 
MRINTIag 0 1.66 1.158 1.391 1,18 A -2.484 -3.2900 A 
MRINTIagl 1.60 1.015 1.536 2,17 A -2.797 -3.3054 A 
MRINTIag2 2.34/1.66 0.857 1.728 3,16 1 -1.49 -3.3229 A 
MRINTIag3 1.60 0.685 1.977 4,15 1 -0.9659 -3.3430 A 
MRINTIag4 1.39 1 0.505 2.296 5,14 1 1 -1.023 -3.3660 A 
MRINTIag5 1.91 1 0.328 2.692 6,13 1 1 -1.761 -3.3931 
Table 4 
Cointetyration tests for the Netherlands weiLyhted samnle with the DDE ratio as 
independent variable, showing Dickey Fuller and Augmented Dickel Fuller 
statistics at different In lenjiths 
(without constant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
DF/ADF 
stat. 
Mack 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
INFLATEchangelagO 1.48 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -2.616 -3.391 A 
INFLATEchangelagl 1.98 0.812 1.579 2,12 A -2.444 -3.4251 A 
INFLATEchangelg2 1.95 0.595 1.928 3,11 A -1.519 -3.4635 A 
MFLATEchangelag3 1.91 0.376 2.414 -1 425 -3.5104 A 
Table 5 
Cointegration tests for the German weighted sample with the DDE ratio as 
independent variable, showing Dickel Fuller and Augmented Dickey Full 
statistics at different In leni! ths 
(without constant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable 7 DW stat. lower DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
DF/ADF 
stat. 
Mack. 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
ASSETSchange lag 0 2.07/1.93 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -3.261 -3.5104 A 
ASSETSchange lag 1 2.53/1.47 0.629 1.699 2,9 1 -4.006 -3.5690 
R 
ROCEchange lag 0* 
1 
1.35 0.525 2.016 3,10 1 4.383 -4.2563 R 
WCRATIOchangelagO 1.58 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -3.443 -3.5104 A 
IL WCRATIOchangelagi 1 1.38 0.629 1.699 1 2,9 11 -4.351 1 -3.5690 - 
R 
I 
*- cointegration test includes a trend 
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Table 6 
Diagnostic tests for the UK weighted error correction models 
dependent variable ADDERATIO ADIVCOVER ADDERATIO ADDERATIO ADDERATIO 
(independent) (ADIVCOVER) (ADDERATIO) (AINFLATEchange) (AROCE) (ATAXRATIO) 
R-Squared 0.363941 Oý611365 0.309702 0.475559 0.317923 
Model F-ratio 5.4357 8.9143 4.4865 9.9747 5.1272 
12,19](0.0136) 13,17](0.0009) [2,20](0.0246) 12,22](0.0008) [2,22](0.0149) 
DW statistic 1.71 1.96 1.93 1.74 1.86 
Autocorrelation 0.39913 0.76986 0.14278 0.5508 0.46365 
F-test [2,17](0.6770) [2,15](0.4805) [2,18](0.8679) [2,201 (0.5850) [2,201 (0.6356) 
ARCH 0.0017037 0.32012 0.31862 0.22465 0.463 
F-test [1,17](0.9676) [1,15] (0.5799) [1,18](0.5794) [1,20](0.6407) [1,20](0.5040) 
Nonnality 0.59621 3.6219 2.5846 0.35906 2.1529 
Chi-squared 
Heteroscedasticity 1.4298 1.4441 2.1146 1.0661 1.4383 
F-test [4,14](0.2755) [6,10](0.2893) 14,15](0.1295) [4,17] (0.4035) [4,17](0.2643) 
RESET 1.1971 2.4837 0.032847 7.174 1.7931 
F-test [1,18](0.2883) [1,16] (0.1346) [1,19](0.8581) [1,21](0.0141) [1,21](0.1949) 
Table 7 
Diagnostic tests for the UK non-weighted error correction models 
dependent variable ADDERATIO ACTRATEchange ADDERATIO AINFLATEchange ADDERATIO 
(independent) (ACTRATEchange) (ADDERATIO) (AINFLATEchange) (ADDERATIO) (AMRINT 
R-Squared 0.540839 0.713947 0.304899 0.482618 0.28601 
Model F-ratio 12.368 11.231 4.3864 9.3281 3.0044 
[2,21](0.0003) [4,18](0.0001) 12,20](0.0263) [2,20](0.0014) [2,151(0.0799) 
DW statistic 1.56 1.84 1.90 1.36 1.60 
Autocorrelation L0984 0.066938 0.095197 3.3466 0.15791 
F-test [2,19] (0.3537) [2,16](0.9355) [2,18](0.9096) [2,18](0.0581) [2,13](0.8555) 
ARCH 0.61674 0.91565 0.090158 0.71896 0.048399 
F-test [1,19](0.4419) [1,16](0.3529) [1,18](0.7674) [1,18](0.4076) [1,13](0.8293) 
Normality 3.2441 0.0094251 10.502 0.48217 1.4762 
Chi-squared 
Heteroscedasticity 2.3086 0.40296 4.4863 0.70453 1.1052 
F-test [4,16] (0.1026) [8,9] (0.8925) [4,15](0.0139) [4,15](0.6010) [4,10] (0.4061) 
RESET 9.7403 0.050221 0.2624 0.019773 4.0717 
F-test [1,20](0.0054) [1,17](0.8254) [1,19](0.6144) [1,19](0.8897) [1,14] (0.0632) 
Table 8 
Diagnostic tests for the Netherlands weighted error correction models 
dependent variable ADDERATIO 
(independent) (AINFLATEchange) 
R-Squared 0.537516 
Model F-ratio, 5.8112 
12,10](0.0212) 
DW statistic 1.88 
Autocorrelation 0.096482 
F-test [1,91(0.7632) 
ARCH 0.14393 
F-test [1,81(0.7143) 
Normality 0.52457 
Chi-squared 
Heteroscedasticity 0.70798 
F-test [4,5] (0.6200) 
RESET 2.8546 
F-test f 1,91 (0.1254) 
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Table 9 
Diagnostic tests for the German weighted error correction models 
de e de dependent vaiiable t ADDERATIO AASSETSchange ADDERATIO AROCEchange 
(independent) In 
F 
(AASSETSchange) (ADDERATIO) (AROCEchange) (ADDERATIO) 
Rsur -Squared 0.78403 0.903711 0.841334 0-830617 
Model F-ratio 6.0504 15.642 8.8376 9.8076 
[3,51(0.0406) 13,51(0.0057) [3,51(0.0192) 13.61 (0.00") 
DW statistic 2.66 3.03 1.99 1.96 
Autocorrelation 1.4095 2.5745 0.02077 0.084898 
F-test [1,4] (0.30 [1,41(0.1839) [1,41(0.8924) [1,51(0.7825) 
ARCH 6.0375 0.14692 0.0010093 0.07919 
F-test [1,3] (0.0911) [1,31(0.7270) [1,31(0.9767) [1,41(0.7924) 
Normality 0.57887 0.31895 0.20454 0.465 
Chi-squared 
Heteroscedasticity - - - 
F-test 
RESET 0.018672 1.8032 0.87066 2.7285 
F-test [1,41(0.8979) [1,41(0.2505) [1,4] (0.4036) [1,51(0.1595) 
Table 9 
Diagnostic tests for the German weighted error correction models (cont. ) 
dependent variable ADDERATIO AWCRATIOchange 
(independent) (AWCRATIOchange) (ADDERATIO) 
R-Squared 0.90804 0.830808 
Model F-ratio 9.8743 8.1841 
14,41(0.0238) 13A (0.0225) 
DW statistic 3.04 0.802 
Autocorrelation 4.1028 1.6621 
F-test [1,31(0.1359) [1,41(0.2668) 
ARCH 0.0079741 0.099895 
F-test [1,21(0.9371) [1,31(0.7727) 
Normality 0.43856 0.17968 
Chi-squared 
Heteroscedasticity 
F-test 
RESET 0.29411 0.39716 
F-test (1,3] (0.6253) [1,41(0.5628) 
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APPENDIX 0: 
JOHANSEN PROCEDURE TESTS AND DIAGNOSTIC TESTS FOR MODEL 
SYSTEM 1 FOR THE UK WEIGHTED SAMPLE 
Table I 
Johansen Maximum Likelihood Procedure (Non-trended case) 
Cointegration LR Test Based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
List of ei S 0 genvalues in descendin g order: 
O7 
-13 
F 
. 
97 . 
59374 
. 
48772 
. 
35621 
. 
093160 
. 
0000 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% Critical Value 90% Critical Value 
r=0 r=1 70.6266 34.4000 31.6640 
r<= I r=2 18.0151 28.1380 25.5590 
r<= 2 r=3 13.3778 22.0020 19.7660 
r<= 3 r=4 8.8078 15.6720 13.7520 
r<= 4 r=5 1.9558 9.2430 7.5250 
Table 2 
Johansen Maximum Likelihood Procedure (Non-trended case) 
Cointeivation LR Test Based on Trace of the Stochastic Matrix 
List of ei genvalues in descendin g order: 
97073 
. 59374 . 48772 . 35621 . 093160 . 
0000 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% Critical Value 90% Critical Value 
r=0 r>= 1 112.7830 76.0690 71.8620 
r<= I r>= 2 42.1564 53.1160 49.6480 
r<= 2 r>= 3 24.1413 34.9100 32.0030 
r<= 3 r>= 4 10.7636 19.9640 17.8520 
r<= 4 r=5 1.9558 9.2430 7.5250 
, 
Table 3 
Estimated Cointe2rated Vectors in Johansen Estimation 
(Normalized in Brackets) 
Vanriable 7 Coefficient Standardised coefficient 
F I 
10 DD ERAT 1.0116 -1.0000) 
DIVCOVFR 
. 42205 -. 
41723) 
ROCE 
. 14188 -. 
14025) 
INFLATEchan ge -2.2212 2.1958) 
TAXRATIO 
[ 
-. 016198 . 016013) 
Intercept -2.4847 2,4563) 
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Table 4 
Long-run coefficient estimates of the Johansen procedure compared with a static 
lon-run model of an ADL(2) representation of the same model 
variable Johansen procedure 
estimated long-run 
coefficients 
coefficients of a static 
long-run representation 
of an ADL(2) model 
DDERATIO (dependent) (dependent) 
DIVCOVER -0.41723 -0.8398 
ROCE -0.14025 -0.3237 
INFLATEchange +2.1958 +4.308 
TAXRATIO +0.016013 +0.04091 
constant +2.4563 +4.949 
Table 5 
Estimated Adjustment Matrix in Johansen Estimation 
(Normalized in Brackets) 
Vanable Coefficient Standardised coefficient 
DDERATIO 
. 025064 (-. 025353) 
DIVCOVEID, -1.4716 1.4887) 
ROCE -. 13462 . 13617) 
INFLATEchange 
. 091377 (-. 092434) 
TAXRATIO 4.9246 ( -4.9816) j 
Table 6 
Estimated Long Run Matrix in Johansen Estimation 
DDERATIO DIVCOVER ROCE INFLATEchange TAXRATIO Intercept 
DDERATIO 
. 025353 . 010578 . 
0035559 -. 055672 -. 4060E-3 -. 062276 
DIVCOVER -1.4887 -. 62111 -. 20879 3.2689 . 023837 
3.6566 
ROCE -. 13617 -. 056815 -. 019099 . 29902 . 
0021805 . 33449 
INFLATEchange 
. 092434 . 
038566 . 012964 -. 
20297 -. 0014801 -. 22705 
TAXRATIO 4.9816 2.0785 . 69869 -10.9388 -. 
079769 -12.2364 
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Table 7 
The UK weighted multivariate error correction models for model system I 
Dependent ADDERATIO ADIVCOVFR AROCE AINFLATEchange ATAXRATIO 
variable 
Constant 0.0094466 -0.010550 -0.043798 0.00040991 -0.048166 (0.693) (-0.107) (-0.334) (0.153) (-0.058) 
ADDERATIO 11.456 -0.22833 -66.819 (7.978) (-6.775) (-5.264) 
ADDERATIO-1 - - - 
ADIVCOVER - -1.0437 0.019995 5.9175 
(-3.970) (3.375) (3.111) 
ADIVCOVER-1 0.066579 - -0.91197 0.019022 4.6088 
(2.302) (-3.683) (3.945) (2.370) 
AROCE 0.058840 -0.12789 - 0.019746 5.8039 
(5.726) (-3.121) (11.282) (7.158) 
AROCE-1 0.051800 -0.10476 -1.0376 0.021377 5.9395 
(4.056) (-2.713) (-11.832) (15.786) (5.586) 
AINFLATEchange -2.8330 - 47.648 - -275.38 
(-4.728) (11.282) (-5.783) 
AINFLATEchange-l -1.6485 - 30.918 -0.65322 -182.16 
(-2.681) (6.309) (-8.339) (-4.798) 
ATAXRATIO -0.0087502 - 0.14903 -0.0029303 - 
(-3.307) (7.158) (-5.783) 
ATAXRATIO-1 - - 0.072832 -0.0016135 -0.46555 
(2.470) (-2.899) (-2.579) 
ECM-2 0.36165 -1.0264 -7.1930 0.14746 41.418 
(3.783) (4.532) (-11.122) (12.671) (5.650) 
Table 8 
Diagnostic test for the UK weighted multivariate error correction models for 
model s3: stem 1 
dependent variable ADDERATIO ADIVCOVER AROCE AINFLATEchange ATAXRATIO 
R-Squared 0.789557 0.620753 0.985642 0.979923 0.906439 
Model F-ratio 5.3598 8.184 61.019 43-384 8.6118 
[7,10](0.0090) P, 151 (0.0018) 19,81(0.0000) [9,81(0.0000) [9,81(0.0029) 
DW statistic 2.72 1.96 2.42 2.29 2.36 
Autocorrelation 2.3478 1.9923 0.61882 0.35954 0.41035 
F-test [1,91(0.1598) [2,13](0.1759) [1,7] (0.4573) [1,71(0.5677) [1,71(0.5422) 
ARCH 0.72398 0.7578 0.99091 1.0068 0.81124 
F-test [1,81(0.4196) [1,13](0.3998) [1,61(0.3580) [1,61(0.3544) [1,61(0.4025) 
Normality 0.36448 0.49356 0.84095 0.080655 0.6397 
Chi-squared [21 [21 [21 [21 [21 
Heteroscedasticity - 0.34856 - - - 
F-test [6,81 (0.8920) 
RESET 9.4636 7.2878 1.1088 1.3232 1.3146 
F-test [1,91(0.0132) [1,141(0.0173) [1,71(0.3273) [1,71(0.2878) [1,71(0.2892) 
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APPENDIX P: 
JOHANSEN PROCEDURE TESTS AND DIAGNOSTIC TESTS FOR MODEL 
SYSTEM 2 FOR THE UK WEIGHTED SAMPLE 
Table 1 
Estimated Ad*ustment Matrix in Johansen Estimation(Normalized in Brackets) 
VF7anriable Coefficient Standardised coefficie nt 
l 
)DERAI DDERATIO -. 0021363 (. 0045840) 
)IVCOV D DIVCOVIER -2.4365 5.2284) 
E 
R OCE OCE -. 75514 1.6204) 
Table 2 
Estimated Long Run Matrix in Johansen Estimation 
DDERATIO DIVCOVER ROCE Intercept 
DDERATIO -. 0045840 -. 8169E-3 -. 6299E-4 . 0039862 
DIVCOVER -5.2284 -. 93178 -. 071844 4.5465 
ROCE -1.6204 -. 28878 -. 022266 1.4091 
Table 3 
Diagnostic test for the UK weighted multivariate error correction models for 
model system 2 
dependent variable ADDERATIO ADIVCOVER AROCE 
R-Squared 0.120593 0.657093 0.519588 
Model F-ratio 0.68565 9.5812 5.4077 
[3,15](0.5746) [3,15](0.0009) [3,15](0.0101) 
DW statistic 1.96 2.57 2.67 
Autocorrelation 0.20886 3.0658 4.8311 
F-test [2,13](0.8142) f2,131 (0.0811) 12,13](0.0270) 
ARCH 0.092768 0.0086199 0.023975 
F-test [1,13](0.7655) [1,13](0.9274) [1,13](0.8793) 
Nommlity 8.7035 1.1455 0.33744 
Chi-squared [2] [21 
Heteroscedasticity 0.31769 0.3196 2.0412 
F-test [6,81 (0.9102) [6,81 (0.9091) [6,81 (0.1725) 
RESET 1.5088 1.539 0.11293 
F-test [1,14] (0.2396) [1,14)(0.2352) [1,14] (0.7418) 
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APPENDIX 0: 
JOHANSEN PROCEDURE TESTS AND DIAGNOSTIC TESTS FOR MODEL 
SYSTEM 3 FOR THE UK NON-WEIGHTED SAMPLE 
Table 1 
Johansen Maximum Likelihood Procedure (Non-trended case) 
Cointegration LR Test Based on Maximal Eigenvalue of the Stochastic Matrix 
List of ei genvalues in descendin g order: 
. 87373 . 
83358 . 39411 . 
20849 -. 0000 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% Critical Value 90% Critical Value 
r=0 r1 33.1094 28.1380 25.5590 
r<= 1 r2 28.6914 22.0020 19.7660 
r<= 2 r3 8.0169 15.6720 13.7520 
r<= 3 r4 3.7409 9.2430 7.5250-1 
Table 2 
Johansen Maximum Likelihood Procedure (Non-trended case) 
Cointe2ration LR Test Based on Trace of the Stochastic Matrix 
List of ei genvalues in descendin g order: 
. 87373 . 83358 . 39411 . 20849 -. 0000 
Null Alternative Statistic 95% Critical Value 90% Critical Value 
r=0 r>= 1 73.5586 53.1160 49.6480 
r<= I r>= 2 40.4492 34.9100 32.0030 
r<= 2 r>= 3 11.7578 19.9640 17.8520 
r<= 3 r=4 3.7409 9.2430 7.52501 
Table 3 
Estimated Cointegrated Vectors in Johansen Estimation 
(Normalized in Brackets) 
Variable Vector 1 Vector 1 Vector 2 Vector 2 r 
coefficient coefficient coefficient coefficient 
(normalised) (normalised) 
DDERATIO 2.7235 -1.0000) -14.1677 -1.0'O,, OOj) 
CTRATEchange 1.6630 -. 61061) 12.8774 . 90893) 
INFLATEchange -9.5233- 3.4967) 
1.5868 . 11 
0) 00) 0 
j 
MRINT . 14241 
(-. 052288) -. 075899 572) (-. 0053 
Intercept -1.0643 . 39080) 
3.5715 i2og) i . 25209) 
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Table 4 
Estimated Adjustment Matrix in Johansen Estimation 
(Normalized in Brackets) 
Variable Vector I Vector I Vector 2 Vector 2 
coefficient coefficient coetTicient coefficient 
(normalised) (normalised) 
DDERATIO -. 0054457 ( . 
014831) 
. 067956 . 96277) CTRATEchange -. 013064 (. 035580) -. 018051 -. 25574) 
INFLATEchange . 015394 (-. 041924) -. 019487 -. 27608) 
j 
WUNT -5.8008 ( 15.7983) -. 22447 ( -3.1802) 
Table 5 
Estimated Long Run Matrix in Johansen Estimation 
DDERATIO CTRATEchange INFLATEchang e MRINT Intercept 
7 F 
ATIO DDER -. 97760 . 86603 . 15970 -. 0059333 . 24850 
CTRATEchange_ 
. 22016 -. 25417 . 095771 -. 4904E-3 -. 050563 
INFLATEchange 
. 31801 -. 22534 -. 17752 . 0036712 -. 085981 
MRINT -12.6181 -12.5372 54.8863 -. 80903 5.3724 
Table 6 
The UK non-weighted multivariate error correction models for model s1stem 3 
Dependent ADDERATIO 1 ACTRATEchange AINFLATEchauge AMRINT 
variable 
Constant -0.0083744 0.016203 -0.014012 0.35094 
(-1.194) (2.372) (-2.464) (0,746) 
ADDERATIO - - 20.137 
(1.402) 
ADDERATIO-1 -0.92481 0.51625 
(-2.168) (1.622) 
ACTRATEchange 0.26746 0.52921 -12-354 
(1.063) (2.498) (-0.684) 
ACTRATEchange-I 0.63612 - -18.844 
(2.624) (-1.566) 
AINFLATEchange - 0.82822 - 
29.361 
(3.355) (1.457) 
AINFLATEchange-l - -0.21744 
18.375 
(-1.246) (1.963) 
AMRINT - - 0.0093915 - (1.566) 
AMRINT-1 - 0.011199 -0.0052849 -0.27057 
(2.459) (-0.957) (-0.783) 
ECMV1-2 0.035241 -0.17230 0.20847 -11.033 
(0.650) (-3.084) (3.849) (-2.730) 
[E 
ECMV2-2 -1.1213 0.83164 -0.18250 
12.170 
(2.328) (3.215) ý-0.463) (0.601) 
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Table 7 
Diagnostic test for the UK non-weighted multivariate error correction models for 
model svstem 3 
dependent variable ADDERATIO ACTRATEchange AINFLATEchange AMRINT 
R-Sq 
F 
0.576956 0.722303 0.876837 0.853069 
Model F-ratio 2.4549 5.8524 6.1023 3.6287 
[5,91(0.1144) [4,91(0.0133) [7,61(0.0212) 8,5] (0.0860) 
statistic 1.39 2.35 1.12 1.21 
Autocorrelation 0.041193 0.68539 1.5275 0* 68672 
F-test [1,81(0.8442) [1,81(0.4317) [1,51(0.2714) [1,41(0.4539) 
ARCH 0.041878 1.7423 0.056458 0.089692 
F-test [1,71(0.8437) [1,71(0.2284) [1,41(0.8239) [1,31(0.7841) 
Normality 2.1648 0.28663 0.28477 0.2402 
Chi-squared [21 [21 [21 [21 
Heteroscedasticity - - - - 
F-test 
I 
RESET 0.78015 0.33451 2.4976 2.0944 
F-test 
1 
[1,81(0.4029) [1,81(0.5789) [1,51(0.1749) 1 [1,41(0.2214) 1 
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APPENDIX R: 
A COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF 
INTRA-RATIO TARGETING BEHAVIOUR WITHM EUROPEAN QUOTED 
FIRMS 
Table I 
The F-test for the presence of a deterministic trend in the capital structure 
constituent variables 
variable country degrees of freedom F-statistic accept / reject 
. 
LRLOANS LJK weighted 2,22 14.714 reject 
HMVEQUITY UK weighted 2,22 2.9014 accept 
. 
LNPLUSEQ UK weighted 2,22 3.7667 accept 
ASSETS UK weighted 2,22 2.0343 
_ 
LRLOANS UK non-weighted 2,22 3.0681 accept 
HMVEQUITY LJK non-weighted 2,22 5.3763 accept 
. 
LNPLUSEQ UK non-weighted 2,22 5.0189 accept 
ASSETS LJK non-weighted 2,22 2.0343 accept 
. 
LRLOANS NL weighted 2,11 2.3701 accept 
HMVEQUITY NL weighted 2,11 5.6959 accept 
LNPLUSEQ NL weighted 2,11 6.1577 accept 
ASSETS NL weighted 2,11 1.375 accept 
LRLOANS NL non-weighted 2,11 1.2928 accept 
HMVEQUITY NL non-weighted 2,11 9.5679 accept 
LNPLUSEQ NL non-weighted 2,11 9.8452 accept 
ASSETS NL non weighted 2,11 1.375 accept 
LRLOANS BD weighted 2,8 2.9134 accept 
HMVEQUITY BD weighted 2,8 4.3613 accept 
LNPLUSEQ BD weighted 2,8 2.039 accept 
ASSETS BD weiOAed 2,8 2.1826 accept 
LRLOANS BD non-weighted 2,8 3.9809 accept 
HMVEQLJITY BD non-weiglAed 2,8 3.3709 accept 
LNPLUSEQ BD non-weighted 2,8 3.0528 accept 
ASSETS BD non-weighted 2,8 2.1826 accept 
LRLOANS FR weighted 2,6 3.199 accept 
HMVEQUITY FR weighted 2,6 5.5961 accept 
LNPLUSEQ FR weighted 2,6 2.7975 accept 
ASSETS FR weighted 2,6 7.3275 accept 
_ 
LRLOANS FR non-weighted 2,6 2.0789 accept 
HMVEQUITY FR non-weighted 2,6 5.2082 accept 
LNPLUSEQ FR non-weighted 2,6 3.2929 accept 
ASSETS FR non-weighted 2,6 7.3275 accept 
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Table 2 
Unit root tests conducted upon UK capital structure constituent measures 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
Dickey 
Fuller 
stat. 
Mack. 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
LRLOANS(W) 1.92 1.123 1.654 3,25 A -5.33 -4.3738 R 
HMVEQIATY(W) 1.93 1.288 1.454 1,25 A 1.492 -2.6603 A 
AHMVEQUITY(W) 1.98 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -3.959 -2.6649 R 
LNPLUSEQ(W) 2.19/1.81 1.288 1.454 1,25 A 1.402 -2.6603 A 
ALNPLUSEQ(W) 1.98 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -4.562 -2.6649 R 
ASSETS(W) 1.19 1.288 1.454 1,25 R 0.8185 -2.6603 A 
AASSETS(W) 1.67 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -2.382 -2.6649 A 
AAASSETS(W) 1.65 1.257 1.437 1,23 A -6.045 -2.6700 R 
LRLOANS(NW) 1.75 1.288 1.454 1,25 A 0.5295 -2,6603 A 
ALRLOANS(NW) 1.59 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -4.087 -2.6649 R 
HMVEQUITY(NW) 2.90/1.10 1.288 1.454 1,25 R 3.975 -2.6603 A 
AHMVEQUITY(NW) 2.12/1.88 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -3.792 -2.6649 R 
LNPLUSEQ(NW) 2.76/1.24 1.288 1.454 1,25 R 3.876 -2.6603 A 
ALNPLUSEQ(NW) 2.26/1.74 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -3.793 -2.6649 R 
ASSETS(NW) 1.19 1.288 1.454 1,25 R 0.8185 -2.6603 A 
A. ASSETS(NW) 1.67 1.273 1.446 1,24 A -2.382 -2.6649 A 
AAASSETS(NW) 1 1.65 1 1.257 1 1.437 1 1,23 1A -6.045 -2.6700 R 
* DF test with trend included 
Table 3 
Unit root tests conducted upon the Netherlands capital structure constituent 
measures 
variable DW stat. lower upper degrees DW test Dickey Mack. Inference 
DW DW of A=accept Fuller critical A=accept 
critical critical freedom R=reject stat. R=reject 
I=inconc. 
LRLOANS(W) 1.34 1.045 1.350 1,14 1 -0.1091 -2.7570 A 
ALRLOANS(W) 2.09/1.91 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -2.674 -2.7760 A 
AALRLOANS(W) 2.06/1.94 0.971 1.331 1,12 A -5 -2.7988 R 
HMVEQUITY(W) 2.65/1.35 1.045 1.350 1,14 A -0.5566 -2.7570 A 
AHMVEQUITY(W) 2.03/1.97 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -5.197 -2.7760 R 
LNPLUSEQ(W) 2.66/1.34 1.045 1.350 1,14 A -0.3286 -2.7570 A 
ALNPLUSEQ(W) 2.00 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -5.104 -2.7760 R 
ASSETS(W) 1.83 1.045 1.350 1,14 A 1.63 -2.7570 A 
AASSETS(W) 1.74 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -2.638 -2.7760 
A 
AAASSETS(W) 2.07/1.93 0.971 1.331 1,12 A -4.188 -2.7988 
R 
_ LRLOANS(NW) 1.96 1.045 1.350 114 A 0.4365 -2.7570 A 
ALRLOANS(NW) 1.94 1.010 1.340 ] 1,13 A -3.348 -2.7760 
R 
HMVEQLJITY(NW) 2.83/1.17 1.045 1.350 1, ] 1,14 A 0.3319 -2.7570 
A 
AHMVEQUITY(NW) 2.04/1.96 1.010 1.340 I'] 1,13 A -5.15 -2.7760 
R 
LNPLUSEQ(NW) 2.95/1.05 1.045 1.350 1,14 A 0.6857 -2.7570 
A 
ALNPLUSEQ(NW) 1.89 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -5.207 -2.7760 
R 
ASSETS(NW) 1.83 1.045 1.350 14 A 1.63 -2.7570 
A 
AASSETS(NW) 1.74 1.010 1.340 1,13 A -2.638 1 -2.7760 1A 8 7988 2 R 
AAASSETS(NW) 2.07/1.93 1.331 1,12 - . 
A -4.18 
A94 
Table 4 
Unit root tests conducted upon the German capital structure constituent 
measures 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
Dickey 
Fuller 
stat. 
Mack 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
LRLOANS(W) 1.96 0.927 1.324 1,11 A 2.998 -2.8270 A 
ALRLOANS(W) 2.20/1.80 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -1.681 -2.8622 A 
AALRLOANS(W) 1.99 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -5.475 -2.9076 R 
HMVEQUITY(W) 2.50/1.50 0.927 1.324 1,11 A 1.001 -2.8270 A 
AHMVEQUITY(W) 1.85 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -3.19 -2.8622 R 
LNPLUSEQ(W) 1.58 0.927 1.324 1,11 A _ 3.926 -2-8270 A 
ALNPLUSEQ(W) 2.22/1.78 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -1.082 -2.8622 A 
AALNPLUSEQ(W) 2.11 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -5.465 -2.9076 R 
ASSETS(W) 2.02/1.98 0.927 1.324 1,11 A 1.799 -2.8270 A 
AASSETS(W) 1.77 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -2.133 -2.8622 A 
AAASSETS(W) 2.29/1.71 0.824 1.320 1,9 A -3.815 -2.9076 R 
LRLOANS(NW) 2.53/1.47 0.927 1.324 1,11 A 1.047 -2.8270 A 
ALRLOANS(NW) 1.65 0.879 1.320 1,10 R -3.598 -2.8622 R 
HMVEQUITY(NW) 2.79/1.21 0.927 1.324 1,11 A 0.5629 -2.8270 A 
AHMVEQUITYLINIW) 1.45 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -4.127 -2.8622 R 
LNPLUSEQ(NW) 2.51/1.49 0.927 1.324 1,11 A 1.329 -2.8270 A 
ALNPLUSEQ(NW) 1.72 0.879 1.320 1,10 R -3.13 -2.8622 R 
ASSETS(NW) 2.02/1.98 0.927 1.324 1,11 A 1.799 : 2.8270 A 
AASSETS(NW) 1.77 0.879 1.320 1,10 A -2.133 -2.8622 A 
AAASSETS(NW) 2.29/1.71 0.824 1.320 1,9 -3.815 -2.9076 R 
Table 5 
Unit root tests conducted upon the French capital structure constituent measures 
variable DW stat. lower upper degrees DW test Dickey Mack Inference 
DW DW of A=accept Fuller critical A=accept 
critical critical freedom R=reject stat. R=reject 
I=inconc. 
LRLOANS(W) 2.89/1.11 0.824 1.320 1,9 1 1.225 -2.9076 A 
ALRLOANS(W) 1.80 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -2.918 -2.9677 A 
_ AýLRLOANS(W) 2.50/1.50 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -5.886 -3.0507 R 
HMVEQUITY(W) 2.93/1.07 0.824 1.320 1,9 1 0.9982 -2.9076 A 
_AHMVEQUITY(W) 
1.94 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -3.151 -2.9677 R 
LNPLUSEQ(W) 2.50/1.50 0.824 1.320 1,9 A 1.999 -2.9076 A 
_ALNPLUSEQ(W) 
2.00 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -1.952 -2.9677 A 
AALNPLUSEQ(W) 2.50/1.50 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -4.105 -3.0507 R 
ASSETS(W) 1.22 0.824 1.320 1,9 A 4.997 -2.9076 A 
AASSETS(W) 1.83 0.763 1.332 1,8 A 0.5694 -2.9677 A 
_ AAASSETS(W) 1.49 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -1.813 -3.0507 A 
_ LRLOANS(NW) 1.92 0.824 1.320 1,9 A 1.892 -2.9076 A 
ALRLOANS(NW) 1.96 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -1.579 -2.9677 
A 
AALRLOANS(NW) 2.14/1.86 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -3.89 L-3: 0507 
R 
HMVEQLTITY(NW) 2.57/1.43 0.824 1.320 1,9 A 1.131 -2.9076 A 
A. HMVEQUITY(NW) 1.88 0.763 1.332 1,8 A A -2.752 -2.9677 
A 
_ AAHMVEQUITY(NW) 2.61/1.39 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -3.914 -3.0507 
R 
LNPLUSEQ(NW) 2.54/1.46 0.824 1.320 1,9 A 2.1 -2.9076 
A 
ALNPLUSEQ(NW) 1.76 0.763 1.332 1,8 A -1.95 -2.9677 
A 
AALNPLUSEQ(NW) 2.46/1.54 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -3.58 -3. - 
0507 R 
ASSETS(NW) 1.22 0.824 1.320 1.9 1 4.997 -2.9076 
A 
AASSETS(NW) 183 ' 0.763 1.332 1,8 A 
0.5694 -2.9677 A 
AAASSETS(NW) 
ý4 
9 0.700 1.356 1,7 A -1.813 -3.0507 
A95 
Table 6 
The F-test for the presence of a deterministic trend within the error. correction 
mechanism from the long-run static equation of LRLOANS upon various capital 
structure constituent variables 
F 
varlable 
; 
country degrees of freedom F-statistic accept / reject 
Ul HMVE IJITTY UK non-weighted 2,22 7.0867 accept 
LNPLUSEQ UK non-weighted 2,22 
. 
6.9024 accept 
ASSETS NL weighted 2,11 2.7533 accept 
HMVEQUITY NL non-weighted 2,11 1.3021 accept 
LNPLUSEQ NL non-weighted 2,11 1.3994 accept 
LNPLUSEQ BD weighted 2,8 6.5874 accept 
ASSETS BD weighted 2,8 2.7256 accept 
HMVýQUITY BD non-weighted 2,8 4.6396 accept 
LNPLUSEQ BD non-weighted 2,8 4.3595 
_ 
accept 
LNPLUSEQ FR weighted 2,6 8.7604 accept 
HMVEQUITY FR non-weighted 2,6 1.9623 accept 
I LNPLUSEQ FR non-weighted 1 2,6 2.0298 accept 
Table 7 
Cointegration tests for the UK non-weighted sample capital structure 
constituents, showing Dickey Fuller and Augmented Dickey Fuller statistics at 
different lap, lenpths (without constant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
P-inconc. 
DF/ADF 
stat. 
Mack. 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
HMVEQUITYlagO 1.66 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -3.86 1 -3.2182 R 
HMVEQUITYlagl 1.59 1.188 1.546 2,24 A -2.795 -3.2256 A 
HMVEQLTITYlag2 1.78 1.078 1.660 3,23 A -3.287 -3.2339 R 
HMVEQUITYlag3 1.83 0.958 1.797 4,22 A -2.989 -3.2430 A 
HMVE2U1TY1ag4 1.66 0.829 1.964 5,21 1 
-- 
-3.203 -3.2530 A 
LNPLUSEQIýV 1.64 1.288 1.454 1,25 A -3.859 -3.2182 R 
LNPLUSEQlagl 1.57 1.188 1.546 2,24 A -2.786 -3.2256 A 
LNPLUSEQ1ag2 1.77 1.078 1.660 3,23 A -3.296 -3.2339 R 
LNPLUSEQlag3 1.80 0.958 1.797 4,22 1 A -2.96 -3.2430 A 
LNPLUSEQla&4 1.63 0.829 1 L964 5,21 1 -3.145 1 -3.2530 
A 
Table 8 
Cointegyration tests for the Netherlands weighted sample capital structure 
constituents, showing Dickey Fuller and Augmented Dickel Fuller statistics at 
different lag lengths (without constant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable - DW stat. lower upper degrees DW test 
DF/ADF Mack. Inference 
DW DW of A=accept stat. critical A=accept 
critical critical freedom R=reject 
R=reject 
I=Inconc. 
ASSETS1agO 1.28 1.045 1.350 1,14 1 -1.651 -3.3660 
A 
ASSETSIagl 2.35/1-65 0.861 1.562 2,13 A -1.868 -3.3931 
A 
ASSETSIag2 2.10/1-90 0.658 1.864 3,12 A_ -2.191 -3.4251 
A 
ASSETSIag3 1.98 0.444 2.283 4,11 1 -2067 -34635 
A 
A96 
Table 9 
Cointegration tests for the Netherlands non-weighted sample capital structure 
constituents, showing Dickey Fuller and Augmented Dickey Fuller statistics at 
different lag lengths (without constant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
F ývariable DW stat. lower DW 
critical 
upper DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
DF/ADF 
stat. 
Mack 
critical 
Werence 
A=accept 
R=reject 
HMVEQUITYlagO 1.59 1.045 1.350 1,14 A -1.518 -3.3660 A 
. HMVEQUITYlagl 2.15/1.85 0.861 1.562 2,13 A -1.885 -3.3931 A 
HMVEQUITYIag2 2.31/1.69 0.658 1.864 3,12 1 -2.079 -3.4251 A 
HMVEQUITYIag3 1.20 0.444 2.283 4,11 1 -5.662 -3.4635 R 
LNPLUSEQlagO 1.65 1.045 1.350 1,14 A -1.754 -3.3660 A 
LNPLUSEQlagl 2.07/1.93 0.861 1.562 2,13 A -1.97 -3.3931 A 
LNPLUSEQIag2 2.06/1.94 0.658 1.864 3,12 A -1.738 -3.4251 A 
LNPLUSEQIag3 1.44 0.444 2.283 4,11 1 -4.817 -3.4635 R 
Table 10 
Cointegration tests for the German weighted sample capital structure 
constituents, showing Dic! Lej Fuller and Augmented Dickev Fuller statistics at 
different lag lengths (without constant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat. lower 
DW 
critical 
upper 
DW 
critical 
degrees 
of 
freedom 
DW test 
A=accept 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
DF/ADF 
stat. 
Mack 
critical 
Inference 
A=accept 
R=reject 
ASSETSIagO 1.44 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -2.008 -3.4635 A 
ASSETSIagi 1.73 0.697 1.641 2,10 A -2.105 -3.5104 A 
ASSETSIag2 1.41 0.455 2.128 3,9 1 -1.377 -3.5690 A 
LNPLUSEQlagO 2.16/1.84 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -3.988 -3.4635 R 
LNPLUSEQla 11 251/1.49 0.697 1.641 2,10 1 1 -3.743 1 -3.5104 R 
LNPLUSEQlag2 1.92 1 0.455 1 2.128 1 3,9 11 -3.612 -3.5690 R 
Table II 
Cointegration tests for the German non-weighted sample capital structure 
constituents, showing Dicka Fuller and Augmented Dicke3: Fuller statistics at 
different lap, lengths (without constant or trend) and Durbin Watson statistics 
variable DW stat. lower upper degrees DW test 
DF/ADF Mack Inference 
DW DW of A=accept stat. critical A=accept 
critical critical freedom R=reject 
R=reject 
I=inconc. 
HMVEQUITYlagO 1.51 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -3.045 -3.4635 
A 
I 
HMVEQUITYlagl 1.39 0.697 1.641 2,10 1 -1.847 -3.5104 
A 
HMVEQUITYlag2 1.22 0.455 2.128 3,9 1 -2.048 -3.5690 
A 
LNPLUSEQlagO 1.67 0.927 1.324 1,11 A -3.267 -3.4635 
A 
LNPLUSEQlagl 1.38 0.697 1.641 2 10 1 -2.199 -3_. 5104 
A 
LNPLUSEQlag2 1.38 1 0.455 2.128 1 3,9 
I 
I -1.471 1 -3.5690 A 
A97 
